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Series Foreword:
Comprehensive Assessment of Water 
Management in Agriculture
There  is  broad  consensus  on  the  need  to 
improve water management and to invest in 
water for food, as these are critical to meeting 
the  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs). 
The role of water in food and livelihood security 
is a major issue of concern in the context of 
persistent poverty and continued environmental 
degradation.  Although  there  is  considerable 
knowledge on the issue of water management, 
an  overarching  picture  on  the  water–food–
livelihoods–environment  nexus  is  missing, 
leaving uncertainties about management and 
investment decisions that will meet both food 
and environmental security objectives. 
The Comprehensive Assessment of Water 
Management in Agriculture (CA) is an inno  v  a-
tive, multi-institute process aimed at identify  ing 
existing knowledge and stimulating thought on 
ways to manage water resources to continue 
meeting the needs of both humans and eco-
systems. The CA critically evaluates the benefits, 
costs and impacts of the past 50 years of water 
development and challenges to water manage-
ment currently facing communities. It assesses 
innovative solutions and explores consequences 
of  potential  investment  and  management 
decisions.  The  CA  is  designed  as  a  learning 
process, engaging networks of stakeholders to 
produce  knowledge  synthesis  and  metho  d  -
ologies.  The  main  output  of  the  CA  is  an 
assessment report that aims to guide investment 
and management decisions in the near future, 
considering their impact over the next 50 years 
in order to enhance food and environmental 
security  to  support  the  achievement  of  the 
MDGs. This assessment report is backed by CA 
research and knowledge-sharing activities.
The primary assessment research findings 
are presented in a series of books that will form 
the  scientific  basis  for  the  Comprehensive 
Assessment  of  Water  Management  in 
Agriculture. The books will cover a range of 
vital topics in the areas of water, agriculture, 
food  security  and  ecosystems  –  the  entire 
spectrum of developing and managing water in 
agriculture, from fully irrigated to fully rainfed 
lands. They are about people and society, why 
they  decide  to  adopt  certain  practices  and 
not  others  and,  in  particular,  how  water 
management can help poor people. They are 
about  ecosystems  –  how  agriculture  affects 
ecosystems, the goods and services ecosystems 
provide for food security and how water can be 
managed to meet both food and environmental 
security objectives. This is the eighth book in 
the series.
Effectively  managing  water  to  meet  food 
and environmental objectives will require the 
concerted  action  of  individuals  from  across 
several professions and disciplines – farmers, 
fishers, water managers, economists, hydrol  o-
gists,  irrigation  specialists,  agronomists  and 
social  scientists.  The  material  presented  in   
this  book  represents  an  effort  to  bring  a   
diverse group of people together to present a 
unique assessment of river basin management   Series Foreword  xiii
throughout  the  world.  The  complete  set  of 
books  should  be  invaluable  for  resource 
managers, researchers and field implementers. 
These books will provide source material from 
which  policy  statements,  practical  manuals, 
and educational and training material can be 
prepared.
The CA is done by a coalition of partners 
that  includes  11  Future  Harvest  agricultural 
research centres, supported by the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR), the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) and partners from 
some 80 research and development institutes 
globally. Co-sponsors of the assessment, insti-
tutes that are interested in the results and help 
frame  the  assessment,  are  the  Ramsar 
Convention,  the  Convention  on  Biological 
Diversity, FAO and the CGIAR. 
For production of this book, financial support 
from the governments of the Netherlands and 
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Introduction
This  book  is  concerned  with  ‘river  basin   
trajectories’, loosely defined as the long-term 
interactions between societies and their envi-
ronments,  with  a  focus  on  the  development 
and management of water and associated land 
resources  (Molle,  2003).  A  basin  trajectory 
encompasses human efforts to assess, capture, 
convey, store, share and use available water 
resources, thereby changing waterscapes and 
turning parts of the hydrological cycle into a 
hydro-social  cycle  (Wester,  2008).  It  also 
includes human efforts to deal with the threats 
posed  by  particular  ‘shock  events’,  such  as 
droughts, floods and contamination incidents, 
and  to  achieve  a  degree  of  environmental 
sustainability. Last, a basin trajectory includes 
institutional change and the shifting relations 
of power that govern access to, and control 
over, water resources. While this book focuses 
on human-induced environmental and hydro-
logical transformations, its chapters also show 
how environmental change impacts on society 
and influences policy making. This includes the 
generation and particular social distribution of 
costs and risks, and shifts in the very concep-
tion of, and values attached to, nature.
The idea that the river basin is the ‘natural’ 
and most appropriate unit for water resources 
development  and  management  has  strongly 
influenced  water–society  relationships  in  the 
past 150 years (Molle, 2006; Warner et al., 
2008).  Late  in  the  19th  century  it  nurtured 
utopias and political struggles concerning the 
relationships between central and local power 
in  countries  such  as  Spain,  France  and  the 
USA (Molle, 2006). Based on colonial experi-
ences with water resources development in the 
Indus  (van  Halsema,  2002)  and  the  Nile 
(Willcocks,  1901)  basins  in  the  early  20th 
century and the establishment of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) in the USA during the 
1930s  (Lilienthal,  1944),  the  river  basin 
became the unit where ‘unified’ or ‘compre-
hensive’ water resources development was to 
take place. This approach focused on the full 
utilization of rivers, multi-purpose dams, and 
wider regional development planning (White, 
1957).
With time, and partly in reaction to signifi-
cant modifications of river systems by hydraulic 
infrastructure and human water use, the river 
basin became the pivotal geographical unit for 
integrated  water  resources  management 
(IWRM). The aim of this approach is to take 
into  account,  and  reconcile  conflicts  arising 
from, the interactions between surface water 
and  groundwater,  water  quantity  and  quality, 
human use and environmental functions, and 
scales and sectors of management (GWP, 2000; 
Grigg, 2008). More particularly, questions of 
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river basin governance, with the vexing issue of 
cross-scale interaction and integration, came to 
the fore, as water problems were increasingly 
recognized as managerial, societal and political 
(Molle  et  al.,  2007).  Watershed  movements 
and river basin organizations (RBOs) of various 
stripes  have  emerged  to  address  these  con  -
cerns.
The choice of the river basin as the manage-
ment  or  governance  unit  is  not  undisputed. 
While there is an obvious (physical) logic for 
working with hydrological units in which the 
generation  and  use  of  water  resources  are 
largely coterminous, it is also well recognized 
that river-basin-based approaches suffer from 
‘tunnel vision’ (Molle et al., 2007). Many driv-
ers and consequences of river basin dynamics 
can be observed outside the basin, where solu-
tions to local problems may also lie. In addi-
tion,  even  on  a  physical  plane,  river  basin 
boundaries may not be relevant, for example in 
the case of small islands, deltas, flood plains or 
coastal  areas.  The  occurrence  of  aquifer 
systems  that  are  non-coterminous  with  river 
basins,  or  of  interbasin  transfers,  is  also 
frequent  and  demands  consideration  of  link-
ages with adjacent basins. Yet all these particu-
lar situations can be treated as extensions of 
the river basin concept, and the influence of 
external  factors  can  be  considered  through 
specific examination of the interactions of a 
river  basin  with  its  physical,  economic  and 
political ‘environment’. 
Water challenges, in the form of scarcity, 
excess  or  pollution,  can  be  responded  to  in 
many different ways. Although droughts seem 
to call for dams, floods for dikes, and water 
pollution for treatment plants, response options 
are often much broader. Flood damage can be 
controlled  locally  by  infrastructure  (upstream 
dams,  dikes,  pumping  stations)  and  also  by 
more careful land-use planning (avoiding settle-
ment in flood-prone areas), efficient flood warn-
ing, changes in upstream land cover, restoration 
of buffer areas, etc. Situations of water scarcity 
can be responded to in three different ways: 
supply  augmentation  (more  water  mobilized 
through  dams,  canals  or  pumps);  demand 
management  (including  reducing  absolute 
demand or saving water to expand uses); and 
(re)allocation  (redefining  access  to  a  given 
amount of water) (Molle, 2003). Although the 
term ‘river basin trajectory’ may suggest there 
is a simple linearity in the development of river 
basins  from  supply  augmentation,  through 
demand  management  to  water  (re)allocation 
(Molden et al., 2005), the chapters in this book 
show that these three responses occur simulta-
neously and at different scales.
Technical  and  economic  rationality  have 
long inspired ways to select among available 
options by proposing various types of sophisti-
cated cost–benefit analyses and other impact 
assessments.  The  history  of  water  resources 
development (and that of public investment in 
general),  however,  abundantly  shows  that 
‘good  intentions  are  not  enough’  (Green, 
1996)  and  that  these  techniques  are  value 
laden, prone to distortion, and often justifica-
tions  of  projects  that  have  (already)  been 
decided  upon,  on  political  or  other  grounds 
(Berkoff, 2002). It also shows that options are 
never equivalent and that they entail flows of 
benefits and costs (financial, political or other-
wise), and risks that accrue to particular sectors 
or groups of society. The identification of risks 
and costs is made more complex by the fact 
that interventions in the hydrological cycle tend 
– and increasingly so when pressure on water 
resources rises – to generate externalities in 
terms  of  modifications  of  the  hydrological 
regime that affect users or residents elsewhere 
in the basin (Molle, 2007).
The question of political power and deci-
sion making – what are the options and who 
decides  –  is  at  the  core  of  the  ‘shape’  of  a 
particular basin trajectory. The distribution of 
decision-making power and the political clout 
of different groups of stakeholders in society – 
in other words a particular power configuration 
or governance regime – are key to defining 
allocation or dam management rules, the deci-
sion to build another dam, or the establishment 
of particular water-related institutions. A defin-
ing characteristic of river basin trajectories is 
the  political  struggles  surrounding  the  ways 
water is owned, allocated and managed, and 
‘over  the  right  to  define  what  a  water  right 
entails’ (Boelens and Zwarteveen, 2005).
One particular and generic aspect of a basin 
trajectory  is  the  closure  of  a  basin.  Basin 
closure  occurs  when  the  quantity  of  water 
abstracted is too high to ensure regular supply 
to downstream users or sufficient outflow to   River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes 3
dilute pollution, control salinity intrusion, flush 
sediments and sustain healthy ecosystems at 
the mouth of the river (Seckler, 1996; Molle, 
2003;  Molden  et  al.,  2005;  Molle  et  al., 
2007).  This  phenomenon  (illustrated  in  Fig. 
1.1) can be transient when it occurs only in a 
few dry months, and the basin is said to be 
closing, or almost permanent, when the basin 
is said to be closed. Basin closure occurs due to 
the  ‘overbuilding’  of  water  infrastructure  in 
river basins for the extraction of surface water 
and groundwater, to the point that more water 
is  consumed  by  agriculture,  industry  and 
humans than is renewably available (Molle et 
al., 2007). Rivers no longer reaching the sea 
or contracting lakes are the most visible signs 
of basin closure, as exemplified by the Colorado 
River and the Aral and the Dead Seas.
The process of river basin closure induces 
increased competition between water use(r)s, 
and water scarcity reaches such a level that the 
exploitation limits become evident. However, 
using the term ‘water scarcity’ to describe situ-
ations of water overexploitation is dangerous, 
as it obscures issues concerning unequal access 
to,  and  control  over,  water  (Bakker,  1999; 
Mehta, 2001). For most people, water scarcity 
is caused by competition between water uses 
and by political, technological and economic 
barriers that limit their access to water, rather 
than by physical water scarcity. Water scarcity 
is  caused  not  only  by  variability  in  supply 
(supply-induced scarcity) or increases in popu-
lation (demand-induced scarcity) but also by the 
overdevelopment of water resources, the selec-
tive entitlement of water rights and resource 
capture  by  better-off  people,  which  Homer-
Dixon  (1999)  terms  structural  scarcity.  The 
design and social control over water technolo-
gies  such  as  dams,  pipelines  and  irrigation 
canals  lead  to  what  Vincent  (2004)  terms 
designed water scarcity, which influences who 
gets access to water.
Basin  closure  and  water  overexploitation 
tend to spur water quality decline, intersectoral 
water  transfers,  inequitable  water  allocation 
and  reduced  access  to  water  (Molle  et  al., 
2007). The inequality in access to water and 
the  conflicts  between  the  different  users  of 
water call for new approaches to water manage-
ment (Mehta, 2001). The construction of large 
dams,  irrigation  schemes,  interbasin  transfer 
schemes and groundwater pumps create path 
dependency  and  lock-in  situations  (Sexton, 
1990). The socio-ecologies that become depen-
dent  on  these  technologies  and  the  water 
resource base are formidable and very difficult 
to reverse (Shah et al., 2003). While the over-
building of river basins results in a situation that 
constrains the scope for reducing water use, it 
also radically alters the role that hydrocracies 
need to play, from centralized water resource 
developers  to  regulators  and  facilitators  of 
decentralized water governance. 
Fig. 1.1. The process of basin closure.4  F. Molle and P. Wester
This  book  presents  a  rich  analysis  of  11 
river basin trajectories. Each chapter provides 
a historical perspective on river basin develop-
ment, highlighting the particular set of physical 
and  human  features  that  have  shaped  basin 
trajectories.  All  the  authors  have  faced  the 
double challenge of providing historical depth 
to  their  account  while,  at  the  same  time, 
combining analyses of both environmental and 
institutional  transformations.  Because  of  the 
scale chosen, that of medium river basins, it 
was not possible to include the details of more 
local processes, such as changes in the manage-
ment or governance of irrigation systems.
The 11 river basins investigated are mostly 
located in one country (the Zayandeh Rud in 
Iran, the Krishna and the Bhavani in India, the 
Merguellil  in  Tunisia,  the  Lerma–Chapala  in 
Mexico,  the  Yellow  in  China,  the  Ruaha  in 
Tanzania, and the Murray–Darling in Australia); 
other basins include the Olifants (South Africa) 
and  the  Colorado  (USA)  basins,  which  have 
their  lower  tips  located  in  Mozambique  and 
Mexico,  respectively,  and  the  Jordan  basin, 
whose study is limited to Jordan. Five basins 
are located in federal countries (USA, Mexico, 
Australia, India), where relationships between 
the federal and state governments appear to 
be a crucial dimension of basin management 
and governance. The 11 river basins all face 
conditions of water scarcity, with a few particu-
larly  acute  cases  (Jordan,  Zayandeh  Rud, 
Lerma–Chapala).
This chapter presents general findings and 
reflections drawn from the river basin trajecto-
ries analysed in this book, occasionally enriched 
by evidence drawn from other basins in the 
world. It attempts to both identify commonal-
ties  and  emphasize  the  specificity  of  each 
basin. It starts with a discussion on ideologies 
and  models  of  river  basin  management  and 
then describes four widely observed processes 
related to river basin trajectories. The responses 
of society to the issues raised by basin trajecto-
ries are then discussed. Last, conclusions are 
drawn.
Drivers of Change and Competing 
Paradigms
River basin development has long been predi-
cated on an ideology of domination of nature, 
where  ‘conquering’,  ‘harnessing’  or  ‘taming’ 
the  wilderness  were  touted  as  a  civilizing 
mission made possible by science and advances 
in technology. The development of irrigation 
was central in wider state settlement policies, 
whether it was to settle a nomadic population, 
as in Jordan (Chapter 2) or in Tunisia (Chapter 
7), provide jobs after the two World Wars to 
returning servicemen in Australia (Chapter 12) 
and South Africa (Chapter 3), break up hacien-
das  and  colonize  them  with  a  new  type  of 
industrious  farmer  devoted  to  ‘revolutionary 
irrigation’  in  Mexico  (Chapter  4;  Aboites, 
1998), or strategically occupy land (as in the 
USA, Chapter 6; or Israel, Lipchin, 2003). In 
the post-World War II period, irrigation held 
the promise of feeding the masses, raising rural 
income and – in the particular context of the 
Cold War – enlisting ‘development’ and food 
self-sufficiency in the struggle against commu-
nism. Projects were churned out based on the 
expectation of large increases in yields, opti-
mistic  cropping  intensities,  and  adoption  of 
cash crops.
The transition from local water control to 
large-scale  water  resources  development  by 
the state, based on river basins, was intimately 
linked to the ‘hydraulic mission’ of the hydrau-
lic bureaucracies (hydrocracies) created in the 
19th and 20th centuries. Wester (2008) defines 
the hydraulic mission as:
the strong conviction that every drop of water 
flowing to the ocean is a waste and that the 
state should develop hydraulic infrastructure to 
capture as much water as possible for human 
uses. The carrier of this mission is the 
hydrocracy who, based on a high-modernist 
world-view, sets out to control nature and 
‘conquer the desert’ by ‘developing’ water 
resources for the sake of progress and 
development. 
The hydraulic mission era, which ended in the 
1970s in most affluent countries, was marked 
by the growth of powerful state hydrocracies, 
such as in Mexico (Chapter 4), where the logo 
of the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources was Por 
la Grandeza de México (For the Greatness of 
Mexico).  Many  of  the  senior  hydrocrats 
manning  the  hydrocracies  were  educated  in 
the  West,  notably  in  the  USA,  where  the 
Bureau of Reclamation trained ‘a new genera-
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4) as well as engineers of many other coun-
tries, where the export of the TVA model was 
attempted (see Ekbladh, 2002; Molle, 2006).
The hydraulic mission era was characterized 
by a massive injection of public money in all 
countries  and  ‘blatant  subsidies  and  political 
favours’  in  the  USA  (Chapter  6;  Worster, 
1985; Reisner, 1993). These subsidies were a 
result of the recognition of the failure of private 
irrigation  initiatives  at  the  end  of  the  19th 
century,  such  as  in  Australia  (Chapter  12), 
India  (Chapter  10)  or  the  western  USA 
(Chapter 6), and also of the overriding political 
goals  attached  to  irrigation  development.  In 
the  USA  this  phase  was  associated  with  ‘a 
“private  commodity”  paradigm,  featuring  an 
emphasis on water development and the rights 
of individual rights-holders’ (Chapter 6).
This first phase of agricultural growth and 
modernization clearly marked the period from 
1960 to 1990 in the Ruaha basin in Tanzania 
(Chapter 8). It was later substituted by a narra-
tive of efficiency, environmentalism and water 
reallocation  during  the  period  1995–2005. 
While  in  the  former  period,  water  and  land 
were seen to be abundant, the latter drew from 
a growing perception of water as a finite supply 
and concerns over power cuts. A similar shift 
emerged in most basins, albeit at slightly differ-
ent times. In the USA, a ‘public value’ para-
digm, emphasizing resource protection, value 
pluralism, and democratic (i.e. collective and 
participatory)  decision  making,  took  root 
(Chapter  6).  In  the  Murray–Darling  basin 
(Chapter 12), the water reforms beginning in 
the late 1980s were also the product of chang-
ing ideas about how public institutions should 
be organized and operated. There was a wide-
spread feeling that decision making could no 
longer be left to small groups of engineers who 
had  spent  their  careers  dealing  mainly  with 
water resources infrastructure. Under the new 
arrangements, the basin’s river system was to 
be  managed  to  conserve  biodiversity  and 
improve  sustainability  as  well  as  for  produc-
tion. In the Olifants basin (Chapter 3), environ-
mental  and  social  considerations  were 
incorporated into the 1998 Water Law, which 
triggered attempts at broadening participation 
of stakeholders and quantifying environmental 
flows.  In  China  (Chapter  5),  the  Ministry  of 
Water Resources brought forward ideas for the 
conceptual  transformation  of  water  resource 
development and management from engineer-
ing-dominated  approaches  to  approaches 
based on demand management and the value 
of water resources (a shift from emphasis on 
gondchengshuili, engineering water benefits, 
to ziranshuli, broader water resources bene-
fits).
These changes were the result of a change 
in societal values linked to growing affluence 
and awareness of environmental degradation. 
In the Colorado basin (Chapter 6), the national 
goal  of  western  settlement  based  on  water 
resources development also created something 
heretofore missing from the region: an urban 
constituency drawn to the aesthetic and envi-
ronmental amenities of the region, supportive 
of public lands and other collective resources, 
and emphasizing quality of life over return on 
investment. As Kenney notes (Chapter 6), the 
inherent incompatibility of the two paradigms 
suggests  that  they  have  evolved  sequentially 
and incrementally rather than simultaneously. 
In China, however, the two attitudes are linked 
to competing philosophies and seem to have 
always  coexisted  (Chapter  5):  Confucianism 
and the Naturalist school of thought sought to 
explain nature on the basis of the complemen-
tary cosmic principles of yin and yang and saw 
man as a natural master of nature. Taoism, on 
the  other  hand,  saw  water  as  ‘the  supreme 
moral example of the stricture to find harmony 
with  “the  way”  (tao),  (…)  as  an  object  of 
contemplation  intending  to  reveal  moral 
truths … something to be admired rather than 
controlled,  …  with  gardens  as  a  place  of 
contemplation where it was possible to connect 
with  the  ultimate  realities  of  nature,  and  to 
escape worldly concerns.’
With the growing recognition of the associ-
ated social and environmental costs, and also 
with the decreasing availability of suitable dam 
sites, the hydraulic mission ran out of steam in 
most affluent countries in the 1970s (Barrow, 
1998).  Priority  shifted  towards  water  quality 
and  environmental  sustainability,  setting  the 
stage for a resurgence of the river basin concept 
in  the  1990s.  This  resurgence  was  strongly 
inspired by the ecosystem approach, in which a 
river basin is seen as an ecosystems continuum 
and  water  as  an  integral  part  of  ecosystems 
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ways, this is a reaction to the construction bias 
of the hydraulic mission era, but proponents of 
the  ecosystem  approach  are  adamant  that 
‘water  resources  should  be  managed  on  the 
basis of river or drainage basins in an integrated 
fashion, with a continued and deliberate effort 
to maintain and restore ecosystem functioning 
within  both  catchments  and  the  coastal  and 
marine  ecosystems  they  are  connected  with’ 
(IUCN, 2000). In the early 1990s, the central-
ity of river basins for environmental governance 
was reflected in the Dublin Principles (ACC/
ISGWR, 1992) and the formulation of IWRM 
approaches, and was later formalized by the 
European  Union  in  its  Water  Framework 
Directive (EU, 2000).
Major Processes at Work in River Basin 
Trajectories
River basins are very different from one another. 
However, the 11 story-lines that fol  low, as well 
as the wider bibliography on river basin devel-
opment and management, allow us to identify 
generic processes that are at work in most river 
basin trajectories. These are: (i) the overbuilding 
of river basins; (ii) the overallocation of entitle-
ments; (iii) the overdraft of reservoirs and aqui-
fers; and (iv) the double squeeze of agricultural 
water  use,  due  to  declining  water  availability 
and quality on the one hand and rising urban 
and environmental needs on the other.
Overbuilding of river basins
The overbuilding of river basins is a socially 
constructed  process  that  generates  basin 
closure through the overextension of the water 
abstraction capacity, in general for irrigation. 
Decision makers are faced with powerful incen-
tives for continued public investments in irriga-
tion infrastructure. Politicians, whether at the 
local or government level, have long identified 
iconic, large-scale projects as the best way to 
build  up  constituencies  and  state  legitimacy 
with public funds. Hydrocracies vie to maintain 
and expand their bureaucratic power (sustained 
budgets  and  fringe  benefits,  upholding  of 
professional legitimacy, etc.). Private consult-
ing  and  construction  firms,  often  linked  to 
particular politicians/parties, look for business 
opportunities.  Last,  development  banks  and 
cooperation agencies also have vested interests 
in  maximizing  the  disbursement  of  funds 
(Chambers, 1997).
The  overdevelopment  of  water-use  infra-
structure, principally irrigation schemes, gener-
ates water scarcity ‘mechanically’. When most 
available  resources  are  committed  and  little 
‘slack’ remains in the hydrological regime of a 
particular river basin, any substantial drop in 
available  resources  below  average  values  is 
likely  to  result  in  shortages  for  some  users. 
With a growing hydrological variability due to 
climate change and a tendency to mismanage 
carry-over stocks in reservoirs (managers being 
under  pressure  to  generate  electricity  or  to 
release water at the cost of mid-term reserves 
and  security  of  supply),  the  frequency  and 
intensity  of  such  shortages  are  increasing. 
Crises result in public outcry, media coverage 
of farmers with withering crops, newspapers 
stamped  with  pictures  of  cracked  soils,  and 
tales  of  looming  disasters.  Politicians  are 
prompt to seize such crises to promise more 
populist projects aimed at tapping more water. 
New  irrigated  areas  are  often  necessary  to 
make dam or diversion projects economically 
more attractive and also to achieve the ‘buy in’ 
of provinces or populations that will be affected 
by new reservoirs or projects. The vicious circle 
of overdevelopment thus becomes self-sustain-
ing (Molle, 2008). 
Augmenting supply maximizes benefits to 
what has been termed the ‘iron triangle’ in the 
western USA (Reisner, 1993; McCool, 1994) 
and often minimizes short-term political stress, 
compared with options where supply to exist-
ing  users  must  be  reduced  or  reorganized. 
Logrolling (Chapter 6) is a political behaviour 
that  fuels  overbuilding,  whereby  ‘legislators 
from various jurisdictions all agree to support 
each other’s proposed projects in their home 
districts. In this way, a project with only local 
appeal can gain the support of a broad base of 
legislators.’
The  process  of  basin  overbuilding  is  well 
illustrated  by  the  case  of  the  Zayandeh  Rud 
(Chapter 9), where each new import of water 
into the basin is justified by water shortages 
and accompanied by an expansion of irrigation 
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water use in the basin, providing more ‘slack’ 
and security to users, whatever additional water 
is made available is committed to expanding 
irrigation areas. This process is also illustrated 
by the Lerma–Chapala basin (Chapter 4) and 
other case studies from central and north-east 
Thailand, and from the Bhavani basin (Chapter 
11).
Other critical drivers of basin overbuilding 
appear  in  our  case  studies.  In  the  Colorado 
basin (Chapter 6), the upper states, and later 
Arizona,  partly  pursued  development  as  a 
means of securing their entitlements and claims 
by effectively diverting water. In the Krishna 
basin (Chapter 10), as the award (basin-sharing 
agreement) of 1976 was to be revised in 2000, 
the states sharing the Krishna water ‘engaged 
in  massive  development  of  their  hydraulic 
infrastructure (with serious economic and fiscal 
damage) to lay claim on water resources and 
ensure they would be holding a prevailing posi-
tion when the award would be renegotiated’ 
(Gulati  et  al.,  2005).  Politically  motivated 
concerns  for  regional  equity  also  fuel  basin 
overbuilding. Preventing regional tensions and 
threats of state implosion under the pressure of 
independence claims from all three regions of 
Andhra Pradesh state have been major drivers 
of  infrastructural  development  in  the  lower 
Krishna basin (Chapter 10; Venot et al., 2007). 
Although irrigation is first expanded in favour-
able areas, it leads to later claims from other 
(poorer) regions that they have not only been 
discriminated against but also need such invest-
ments for their development. This often leads 
to  the  expansion  of  costly  infrastructure  in 
marginal areas.
Politicians are used to resorting to overrid-
ing justifications that close or ‘securitize’ the 
debate (Warner, 2008): new projects are indis-
pensable  and  cannot  be  delayed  because 
‘poverty  demands  that  we  do  something’, 
development is needed and requires ‘sacrifice’, 
national or food security is at stake, or growing 
energy needs make the development of hydro-
power    ‘unavoidable’.  These  concerns  are 
legitimate and often truly pressing. But by clos-
ing the debate, decision makers also make it 
impossible to discuss alternatives, to examine 
in detail the social and environmental costs of 
projects, and to reveal the frequent absurdity of 
supply  augmentation  projects  when  seen 
through the lens of investment costs (soon to 
become cost overruns).
Overallocation of water entitlements
Basin overbuilding is also made possible by the 
fuzziness  or  absence  of  water  rights,  which 
means that many projects are, in fact, partly 
predicated upon water that is already commit-
ted  to  other  (generally  downstream)  areas. 
Such a problem may occur not only because of 
uncontrolled expansion of private irrigation, as 
in  the  Ruaha  (Chapter  8),  Lerma–Chapala 
(Chapter  4),  Zayandeh  Rud  (Chapter  9)  and 
Krishna basins (Chapter 10), but also because 
of state-initiated anti-erosion works, as in the 
Merguellil  (Chapter  7)  and  Yellow  River 
(Chapter  5)  basins,  or  even  public  irrigation 
schemes, as in the Zayandeh Rud and Chao 
Phraya (Thailand) basins.
River basins with stricter control of hydro-
logical conditions and definition of water rights 
and entitlements should theoretically avoid this 
trap. Experience shows that this is not the case. 
Overbuilding  through  private  investments  is 
paralleled by an overallocation of water entitle-
ments that creates similar patterns of scarcity. In 
the  Colorado  basin,  apportionment  of  water 
among riparian states has been based on opti-
mistic average hydrological data, without consid-
ering either evaporation losses in reservoirs to 
be built years later (now totalling 2 billion m3) or 
native  Indian  rights.  In  the  Murray–Darling 
basin, notably the state of New South Wales, 
licences have been granted despite recognition 
of the ticking time bomb represented by large 
contingents of ‘dozers and sleepers’ who only 
use their rights occasionally or pay their fees 
without using water. This has led to a water allo-
cation that amounts to 65% of all entitlements, 
on average, and to a reduction in security and 
predictability. In the Olifants basin (Chapter 3), 
all water was allocated, making it virtually impos-
sible to grant new rights to black communities. 
In the Lerma–Chapala basin, the 1991 treaty 
on surface water allocation was based on an 
optimistic assessment of annual water availabil-
ity  (with  two  dry  periods  excluded  from  the 
hydrological model underlying the treaty) and 
no attempt was made to reduce the volumes of 
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The overallocation of water entitlements is 
an  obvious  political  expedient  to  reduce 
tension,  avoid  denying  access  to  resources, 
and satisfy a maximum of existing (or would-
be)  users  in  particular  constituencies  (Allan, 
2006). This, of course, occurs at the cost of 
supply  security  to  all.  More  recently,  over-
allocation  was  made  more  critical  because 
of  prolonged  droughts  (Murray–Darling, 
Colorado,  Lerma–Chapala),  dwindling  runoff 
(Yellow  River),  and  painful  expectations  of 
climate  change  (Murray–Darling).  On  top  of 
these  concerns,  preoccupation  with  aquatic 
ecosystem  health  put  environment  flows  on 
top of the agenda. Attempts to reallocate water 
to the environment from existing users have 
been  largely  frustrated,  and  this  remains  an 
unresolved issue. In the Olifants basin, environ-
mental flows (eflows) have been much discussed 
but  have  so  far  remained  on  paper.  In  the 
Colorado basin, federal laws generally defer to 
the  tradition  in  state  water  law  of  allowing 
water users to consume rivers in their entirety. 
Western states now provide some mechanisms 
for granting water rights to instream flows, but 
these tend to be very limited in scope, often 
relying on water rights that are junior to tradi-
tional  consumptive  users.  In  the  Murray–
Darling basin, attempts to reduce entitlements 
to enhance environmental flows have also not 
been popular, and states have been forced to 
resort to a (still limited) buy-back of water rights. 
In the Zayandeh Rud and Jordan basins, the 
environmental objective of maintaining termi-
nal sinks (the Gavkhuni lake and the Dead Sea) 
has  been  simply  written  off.  The  Lerma–
Chapala (Chapter 4) offers an example of real-
location away from irrigation with the aim of 
sustaining the level of the Chapala lake, but 
this  objective  was  mainly  dictated  by  urban 
supply objectives downstream of the lake.
Overdraft of reservoirs and aquifers
As a consequence of basin overbuilding and/or 
the  overallocation  of  entitlements,  the  case 
studies confirm a widely observed tendency for 
managers and users to ‘overtap’ reservoirs and 
aquifers.  Reservoirs  generally  have  several 
purposes but are pivotal in providing interan-
nual regulation and carry-over storage. Storing 
water allows managers to ensure supply in dry 
years. Water security, measured as the capac-
ity  to  withstand  a  number  of  successive  dry 
years, is largely dependent upon storage capac-
ity. The Murray–Darling and Colorado basins 
are famous for storage capacities that are much 
higher than the average annual runoff: dams 
can  store  2.8  and  3.5  times  annual  runoff, 
respectively. Conversely, the lack of storage in 
basins such as the Ruaha and the Jordan means 
that users have to face greater irregularity and 
risk.
Under pressure from users and politicians, 
managers frequently release more water in a 
given year than would be expected if carry-over 
storage  were  managed  prudently.  This 
increases  risk  and  does  indeed  generate  or 
magnify crises. The case of the Zayandeh Rud 
basin (Chapter 9) shows how careless releases 
in 1999 and 2000 contributed to an excep-
tional crisis in 2001. Likewise, in 2000, the 
managers of the Nagarjuna Sagar dam in the 
lower Krishna basin took a gamble and released 
all the available water, paving the way for the 
ensuing crisis (Chapter 10). In the Ruaha basin 
(Chapter 8), pressure to generate hydroelec-
tricity at the national level also led to lowering 
of dam water levels beyond what risk manage-
ment dictated, and to subsequent major power 
cuts in the capital. In the Lerma–Chapala basin 
(Chapter 4), the 1991 surface water allocation 
treaty was based on the assumption that the 
carry-over storage in reservoirs would increase 
with time if the treaty was adhered to. Instead, 
carry-over  storage  was  largely  depleted  to 
comply with annual water allocations as river 
runoff was less than predicted by the hydro-
logical model underlying the treaty.
Overdraft of aquifers is a better-documented 
and more familiar problem. Almost all basins 
show a long-term drawdown of water tables. 
This is particularly worrying in basins where 
groundwater  provides  a  ‘buffer’  in  case  of 
insufficient supply of surface water, such as in 
the Zayandeh Rud, Lerma–Chapala and lower 
Yellow River basins. Indeed, as surface deliver-
ies  become  more  uncertain,  users  develop 
conjunctive  use  and  turn  to  groundwater  in 
compensation.  In  the  Lerma–Chapala  basin, 
groundwater-based irrigation also developed as 
a market response to opportunities for produc-
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ago, water tables were dropping at rates that 
would bring aquifers to exhaustion, but these 
have  been  partly  replenished  by  exceptional 
rainfall. The Merguellil, Jordan and Zayandeh 
Rud basins are typical cases where aquifers are 
declining and where authorities have found no 
way  of  reversing  this  process.  The  Jordan 
highlands suggest that price-based regulation is 
illusory and that where enforcement of quotas 
is not realistic the only solution is buying back 
wells  and  controlling  further  drilling.  The 
Merguellil  case  illustrates  the  contradiction 
between long-term sustainability concerns and 
the  short-term  needs  of  food  and  income 
generation,  which  explains  why  authorities 
often turn a blind eye to private drilling and 
aquifer overdraft (a decline of between 0.25 
and 1 m a year since the 1980s).
Reallocation from agriculture to cities (and 
the environment)
Another lesson drawn from many river basin 
trajectories is that agriculture – often after a 
phase of overexpansion due to basin overbuild-
ing – ends up constrained by a double squeeze 
(see Fig. 1.2). On the supply side, water avail-
ability  is  sometimes  reduced  by  long-term 
trends  due  to  climate  change  or  otherwise. 
Predictions  for  the  Colorado  basin  by  2100 
point to reductions anywhere between 11 and 
45%, while the Murray–Darling basin expects 
reductions in mean annual flow in the order of 
20–30%. Degradation of water quality is also a 
trend that contributes to reducing freshwater 
availability, with some river or drainage water 
unfit for use in domestic supply and even in 
agriculture.
On  the  demand  side,  the  large  historical 
share  of  agricultural  use  now  collides  with 
urbanization and environmentalism. All water-
short basins, although sometimes buying respite 
by  continued  supply  augmentation,  end  up 
facing the issue of water reallocation. It is always 
politically  very  sensitive  to  take  water  away 
from existing users to serve expanding urban 
constituencies; it is even more challenging – in 
a closed basin – to set water apart for ‘environ-
mental use’, i.e. to sustain or restore ecosystem 
health. Figure 1.2 shows how irrigation gets 
squeezed by these trends in supply and demand 
and  how  the  variability  of  freshwater  supply 
induces  increasingly  severe  shortages,  which 
tend to primarily affect environmental and agri-
cultural uses.
The  case  of  the  Lerma–Chapala  basin 
(Chapter  4)  illustrates  how  the  hydro-social 
networks  constituted  around,  and  by,  the 
hydraulic infrastructure in the basin make it 
difficult  to  reduce  consumptive  water  use, 
even if a range of water reforms are attempted 
and serious efforts are made to arrive at nego-
tiated agreements on surface water allocation 
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mechanisms. In the Colorado basin, the recipe 
of  ‘drawing  on  surplus  flows  in  wet  years, 
transferring water from agricultural to urban 
users in normal years, and tapping reservoir 
storage in dry years’ has reached its limits, as 
storage  reached  critical  lows  and  transfers 
faced a series of difficulties. Market mecha-
nisms allow a degree of reallocation to cities, 
and several direct agreements between urban 
and irrigation areas can also be noted: San 
Diego buying water from the Imperial Valley 
irrigation  district  (supplied  from  the  lower 
Colorado), Melbourne acquiring rights to 75 
Mm3 of the lower Murray–Darling in exchange 
for  investments,  and  Chinese  cities  in  the 
Yellow River basin transacting with irrigation 
districts. In other basins (diversions to Amman 
in  the  Jordan  basin,  to  Hyderabad  in  the 
Krishna basin, to Tirrupur and Coimbatore in 
the  Bhavani  basin,  to  coastal  cities  in  the 
Merguellil basin), transfers have been decided 
by administrative fiat. This was also the case 
in the Lerma–Chapala basin, where, in 1999, 
because of critically low levels in Lake Chapala 
and to secure Guadalajara’s water supply, the 
CNA  (National  Water  Commission)  trans-
ferred 200 Mm3 from the Solis dam, the main 
water source of the largest irrigation district in 
the basin, to Lake Chapala. A second transfer 
of 270 Mm3 followed in November 2001, as 
lake levels continued to decline.
Keeping water in lakes and rivers is even 
more  challenging.  In  the  Olifants  basin,  the 
establishment  of  environmental  flows  has 
remained  largely  theoretical,  with  different 
approaches tested to determine environmental 
requirements. The gridlock as to how to reduce 
agricultural use is likely to be eventually eased 
by constructing a new dam and therefore devel-
oping more resources. Such a way out is also 
visible in the Mexican case (with a new dam on 
the upper Santiago River to serve Leon city 
and a new dam on the Santiago River near 
Guadalajara to supply its urban water) and the 
Zayandeh Rud case (interbasin transfer). When-
ever  possible,  and  often  regardless  of  costs, 
supply augmentation is still a favoured option, 
which minimizes political stress but, of course, 
only buys time and eventually compounds basin 
closure.
Expectations of reduced supply are taken 
very seriously in the Murray–Darling basin. The 
main challenges for the future concern the best 
way to reduce overall allocation in the basin 
and, more importantly, to make sure that each 
state will take its share of the burden. It is no 
longer merely a question of complying with the 
1994 cap on abstraction but of adjusting to 
sig  nificantly reduced allocations for the irriga-
tion sector. The pressure to do this is mostly 
driven  by  current  environmental  allocation 
concerns, plus the expectation of reductions in 
mean annual flow in the order of 20–30% by 
2100  under  a  range  of  climate  change 
scenarios.
Major Societal Responses and Issues
Several major issues, associated with the four 
processes  highlighted  above,  can  be  singled 
out  and  illustrated  by  our  case  studies.  One 
issue concerns the ‘politics of blame,’ which is 
the way crises are explained, handled and used 
to justify specific policies and further particular 
agendas.  Other  issues  concern  the  actual 
responses to basin closure, the impact of water 
scarcity on water-use efficiency and equity, and 
basin governance.
The politics of blame
Water-related  problems  (floods,  shortages, 
contamination, etc.) are often accompanied by 
efforts by stakeholders, managers and politi-
cians to find explanations and apportion blame. 
The  way  blame  is  apportioned  to  different 
causes is important because it not only reflects 
the distribution of power (and the capacity of 
particular  stakeholders  to  get  their  message 
across in the media) but also paves the way for 
what will be done next, the money that will be 
spent, and the options that will be favoured. As 
such, it is an exercise of power.
Predictably, climatic vagaries or El Niño are 
convenient  scapegoats,  which,  indeed,  often 
bear part of the ‘responsibility’, but irrigation, 
its large share of water diversion, highlanders 
(responsible for deforestation) and pastoralists 
(associated with overgrazing) are also primary 
targets. During the second Lake Chapala crisis 
(Chapter 4), water authorities blamed the desic-
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levels of evaporation from the lake, although 
the extractions from the lake by Guadalajara 
city of at least 240 Mm3 a year contributed 
strongly to the decline of the lake. In the Ruaha 
basin,  water  shortages  experienced  in  the 
Mtera–Kidatu  hydropower  complex  (which 
resulted in power cuts in the capital and other 
cities) were blamed on upstream irrigators and 
pastoralists. A series of analyses demonstrates 
that,  despite  claims  by  power-generation 
authorities, the power cuts experienced from 
1992 onwards were largely due to improper 
dam operation rather than to upstream deple-
tion of water. In 2004, for example, the situa-
tion was so critical that the Mtera reservoir was 
operated by utilizing the dead storage, despite 
advice  to  the  contrary  from  the  Rufiji  Basin 
Water Office and the ministry responsible for 
water. This advice was not heeded, resulting in 
higher  risks  and  showing  the  economic  and 
political  importance  of  maintaining  power 
generation at any risk and cost.
In  the  Mekong  basin,  the  floods  in  the 
summer  of  2008  were  used  to  critique  the 
dams built by the Chinese in the upper basin 
and the lack of transparency concerning dam 
releases, although evidence of their responsi-
bility is dubious. Floods in central Thailand or 
the  Ganges  basin  have  also  been  associated 
with land management practices by highland-
ers, although scientific evidence of a correla-
tion is at best weak (Forsyth and Walker, 2008). 
In the Thai case, accusations have been blended 
with ethnic stereotypes and conveniently justi-
fied expansion of state enclosures (in the guise 
of national parks, reserves, etc.), afforestation 
by  private  companies  and,  in  some  cases, 
expulsion of hill tribes (Walker, 2003).
Whether justified or not, such accusations 
are active elements of negotiation processes (if 
any)  and/or  state  decision  making.  In  the 
Lerma–Chapala basin, the Grupo de Trabajo 
Especializado en Planeación Agrícola Integral 
(GTEPAI,  Specialized  Working  Group  on 
Integral  Agricultural  Planning)  attempted  to 
strengthen the negotiating position of irrigators 
in the river basin council. Its strategy was to 
show that the irrigated agriculture sector was 
serious about saving water and hence a credible 
negotiating  partner.  However,  the  stigma  of 
irrigation being a wasteful use of water was too 
strong, and the farmers continued to be blamed 
for the desiccation of Lake Chapala by urban 
dwellers and environmentalists.
Conversely,  proponents  of  particular  solu-
tions must paint them in a positive mode. The 
Red–Dead project in Jordan, which proposes to 
bring water from the Red Sea into the Dead 
Sea, generate hydropower and desalinate water, 
and pump part of it to Amman and other cities 
(Chapter 2), is alternatively painted with envi-
ronmental (save the Dead Sea), religious (the 
cradle of three religions) or political (the peace 
conduit) arguments. Other mega-projects, such 
as the diversion of the São Francisco in Brazil 
(Alves,  2008)  or  the  Water  Grid  in  Thailand 
(Molle and Floch, 2008), also emphasize ‘eradi-
cation of poverty’, enhanced rural incomes and 
abundant  water,  while  typically  disregarding 
costs and investment alternatives.
Responses to basin closure
Basin  closure  and  associated  water  scarcity, 
decline  of  water  quality  and  environmental 
degradation – as mentioned earlier – give way 
to three types of responses: supply augmenta-
tion, demand management and (re)allocation. 
It has been hypothesized that these three types 
of responses occur sequentially along the basin 
closure trajectory (Molden et al., 2005). While 
it is true that early phases of basin develop-
ment are almost exclusively typified by supply 
augmentation, case studies of closing or closed 
basins show that – under pressure and in the 
face of recurring crises – the three options are 
pursued concurrently.
The blend of options selected depends on 
the physical, financial and political features of 
each option. Physical constraints refer to the 
accessibility of water resources and clearly set a 
limit to what is possible. Yet such constraints 
are typically qualified by financial and political 
considerations,  as  shown  by  the  interbasin 
transfers through tunnels in the Zayandeh Rud 
basin and by the Red–Dead project in Jordan. 
If the costs of such works are shifted to the 
country as a whole and/or, partly, to the inter-
national community, then they may be eventu-
ally  realized.  Likewise,  the  acceptance  of 
federal policies in the Murray–Darling and the 
Colorado basins was strongly linked to billions 
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(e.g.  for  Land  Care  groups  in  Australia,  or 
water  diversions  and  dams  in  the  USA). 
Interbasin transfers may be opposed by ‘donor 
basins’, and imposition by the central govern-
ment may involve lots of political manoeuvring 
and arm-twisting, as seen in the current project 
to divert the water of the São Francisco River 
in Brazil (Alves, 2008). While in some cases 
project costs are an impediment, in other cases 
higher  costs  may  be  seen  as  desirable  by 
unchecked private interests.
While  most  infrastructural  projects  are 
costly,  other  measures  are  financially  more 
attractive. Technical improvements or conser-
vation  policies,  whether  physical  (e.g.  canal 
lining or retrofitting of home appliances) or not 
(e.g. awareness campaigns), may be cost-effec-
tive.  Fine  tuning  of  management  may  also 
result in savings. In the Colorado basin, the 
reservoir operations and shortage-sharing rules 
were the most debated elements in the recent 
audit process (Chapter 6). The water level in 
the dams governs not only the head (hydro-
power generation) and the flood-control capac-
ity but also the size of the water body and thus 
its evaporation losses. New rules may better 
account for hydrological changes and desired 
levels of security, and better balance priorities 
(e.g. environment versus human use).
Political  constraints  refer  to  the  political 
benefits  and  costs  associated  with  particular 
options. Options impacting key supportive or 
strong constituencies are likely to be discarded. 
This is clearly demonstrated in the case of the 
Jordan basin (Chapter 2), where regulation of 
groundwater use in the highlands and charging 
for water in the valley (notably in citrus and 
banana  farms)  are  poised  to  damage  the 
support of certain tribes and entrepreneurs to 
the King and the government. In the Olifants 
basin (Chapter 3), redistributive and participa-
tory  policies  are  adverse  to  white  economic 
interests and have made little progress. Other 
types  of  policies  meet  with  little  popular 
support  but  they  seem  to  go  ahead  out  of 
bureaucratic inertia or ideology, as the intrigu-
ing case of water-harvesting structures in the 
Merguellil basin suggests (Chapter 7).
As a result of such complex sets of constraints, 
responses  are  often  diverse  and  shifting  but 
more or less efficient. The Colorado basin has 
seen the emergence of an unusually rich suite of 
strategies  for  increasing  yields  and  avoiding 
(overcoming)  limits,  highlighted  by  efforts  to 
eliminate reservoir spills (and associated ‘over-
deliveries’  to  Mexico),  marketing  of  water 
salvaged  through  conservation  pro  grammes, 
the  eradication  of  water-loving  tamarisk  and 
Russian olive trees, weather modification (i.e. 
cloud  seeding),  desalination,  the  proposed 
importation of water from neighbouring basins, 
and compensated fallowing of agricultural land. 
In Jordan (Chapter 2), policies have also mixed 
all kinds of conservation incentives with supply 
augmentation  (dams,  import  of  groundwater 
from distant aquifers) and forced reallocation of 
water (from agriculture in the valley to cities in 
the highlands).
In the past, the key to positive-sum bargain-
ing in river basins was to expand the available 
benefits (i.e. water and power) at public cost, 
with little consideration of environmental and 
other public values. Today, opportunities for 
new  storage  or  diversions  are  limited,  civil   
society at large has gained political space and 
clout, and decisions are increasingly debated in 
wider  and  more  contested  arenas.  Yet  this 
clearly varies from one basin to another, and 
unilateral state decision making still prevails in 
many countries.
Hydrological pathologies 
The hydrology of closing basins is problematic. 
Because  most  flows,  including  return  flows 
from existing uses, are tapped, there is little 
‘slack’  in  the  basin  hydrological  system  to 
dampen or buffer natural hydrological variabil-
ity, and perturbations thus strongly reverberate 
on the whole system. The pathology of closed 
river  basins  has  been  the  subject  of  many 
works, which have emphasized the concept of 
river basin efficiency, as opposed to local user 
or system efficiency (Seckler, 1996; Molle and 
Turral, 2004; Perry, 2007). They have shown 
how local ‘inefficiencies’ associated with leaky 
canals,  reservoir  spills,  inefficient  irrigation 
practices and other system losses are often the 
primary source of water for other users or for 
ecosystems.
More generally, interventions in the hydro-
logical cycle generate externalities in terms of 
water quantity, water quality, sediment load or   River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes  13
timing that travel across the basin. These exter-
nalities are heightened by the process of closure 
but  are  also  sometimes  difficult  to  seize  or 
appreciate as they involve time lags and two-
way  interactions  between  surface  water  and 
groundwater  resources.  Deforestation  in  the 
Murray–Darling  basin  has  altered  runoff  and 
groundwater recharge, resulting in the phenom-
enon of dry-salinity. Afforestation in the upper 
Olifants basin has reduced natural runoff to the 
point  that  forest  areas  are  considered  as  a 
water user and forestry companies have to pay 
fees accordingly. Development of diffuse water-
harvesting structures and shallow wells in the 
Krishna  and  Merguellil  basins  has  critically 
curtailed  runoff  and  benefits  to  downstream 
water users. In the Zayandeh Rud basin, several 
hydrological  interactions  have  also  been 
evidenced, including reverted net flows between 
the  river-bed  and  adjacent  aquifers.  In  the 
Yellow  and  Lerma–Chapala  basins,  reduced 
river  base  flows  due  to  groundwater  over-
exploitation have also been observed.
Unless they save water that goes to sinks, 
such as saline aquifers or the sea (all ecosystem 
functions of river outflows being considered), 
conservation efforts tend to amount to disguised 
reallocation.  This  is  a  zero-sum  game,  with 
re  allocation  from  public  environmental  inter-
ests to water users, or from one user to another, 
merely  robbing  Peter  to  pay  Paul.  The  deal 
between  San  Diego  and  the  Imperial  Valley 
Irrigation  district,  supplied  from  the  lower 
Colorado, is a textbook example of a zero-sum 
game branded as a ‘win–win agreement’. The 
100  Mm3  of  water  ‘saved’  by  lining  the 
All-American  canal  and  reallocated  to  San 
Diego have merely been subtracted from the 
flows reaching the Salton Sea and replenishing 
the Mexicali aquifer, on which Mexican farm-
ers  on  the  other  side  of  the  border  depend 
(Cortez-Lara  and  García-Acevedo,  2000; 
Cortez-Lara, 2004).
Kendy et al. (2003) have also highlighted 
the hydrological nature of closed basins in the 
North China Plain, where virtually all annually 
renewable water is used (depleted) and ground-
water  tables  are  falling  with  agricultural  and 
urban expansion. While water might be used 
and reused more wisely or reallocated within 
the basin, little water reaching the sea means 
that all resources are depleted and that reduc-
ing demand can only come from reduced use 
(i.e. mostly reduced evapotranspiration). With 
almost no water reaching the sea, it could be 
argued that the same holds true for the Yellow 
River in general.
The lesson drawn from all these examples is 
that the management of river basins becomes 
increasingly difficult with closure. Arid basins 
are somewhat easier to manage, in that most 
of the resource mobilized is stored in a few 
reservoirs  or  aquifers,  which  are  potentially 
amenable to quantification. In basins such as 
the Yellow or Krishna, where rainfall is more 
frequent and better distributed throughout the 
year, supply and demand vary a lot and the 
spatial  and  temporal  distribution  of  flows  is 
harder to grasp and control. In all cases, supply 
augmentation,  conservation  and  reallocation 
appear to be clearly scale dependent. What is 
stored  or  con  served  at  one  point  is  often  a 
re  allocation  when  seen  at  a  larger  scale. 
Managing such externalities and interconnect-
edness  is  challenging  in  both  technical  and 
governance terms.
Adding further complexity to the hydrology 
of closed river basins is the variability of rain-
fall.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  an  ‘average’ 
hydrological year, although many treaties on 
surface water are based on calculations of long-
term averages. However, the periods for which 
rainfall data are available have proven to be too 
short  to  calculate  robust  averages;  assuming 
this is still meaningful in a context of climate 
change, where the future will not look like the 
past. In both the Colorado and Lerma–Chapala 
basins, treaties on surface water were based on 
calculations of average runoff that later proved 
to be too high. With climate change it appears 
that variability in rainfall will increase, further 
weakening the reliability of estimates of aver-
age runoff.
Family/subsistence farming versus 
entrepreneurial capitalism
As competition increases, water tends to be 
gradually reallocated towards uses with higher 
economic  value.  This  is  achieved  through 
administrative decisions, negotiations between 
users, or market mechanisms. An important 
and  ubiquitous  question  is  the  allocation  of 14  F. Molle and P. Wester
water within the agriculture sector and the fate 
of irrigated agriculture as water becomes more 
valuable.  Following  the  Dublin  principle  on 
water as an economic good, maximizing aggre-
gate  welfare  has  become  a  commonplace 
recommendation, but it is apparent that this 
principle  also  tends  to  conflict  with  that  of 
ensuring equity or livelihoods for the poorest.
Most basins present a contrast between two 
broad  types  of  agriculture:  the  first  type  is 
family  based,  sometimes  partly  devoted  to 
subsistence  agriculture,  with  limited  links  to 
markets and a lack of capital or knowledge, 
which  prevents  farmers  from  intensifying  or 
embarking on more market-oriented and risky 
ventures. The second type is entrepreneurial, 
market oriented or export oriented, and owners 
– frequently absentee owners – often manage 
their farms through hired managers and labour-
ers. This dichotomy is a simplification and does 
not do justice to hybrid types of farms: small-
holders fully integrated to the market (e.g. peri-
urban vegetable farming in the Merguellil plain) 
or absentee owners keeping low-value prestige 
olive tree plantations in Jordan. Yet it is useful 
in highlighting governments’ dilemmas in allo-
cating water and other resources.
Many state policies, indeed, are predicated 
on transforming the former type into the latter, 
often with little understanding of the constraints 
faced by farmers and with optimistic assump-
tions on how they will respond to ‘incentives’. 
In  particular,  it  is  often  inferred  that  higher 
water  prices  would  trigger  a  shift  towards 
higher-value  crops,  an  assumption  that  runs 
into  contradictions  since  these  higher-value 
crops  are  already  available  to  farmers;  they 
have  not  opted  for  them  for  good  reasons, 
which are often poorly understood.
The contrast between smallholder and agri-
business agriculture is particularly apparent in 
the  Olifants  basin,  where  discourses  on 
economic  efficiency  and  policies  to  redress 
inequalities of the past are at loggerheads. In 
the Colorado basin, agribusinesses that produce 
vegetables  exported  to  distant  states  are 
in  directly  pitted  against  extensive  rearing  of 
dairy  cows  in  Wyoming.  In  Brazil’s  São 
Francisco  basin,  public  irrigation  schemes 
designed  to  settle  poor  farmers  have  been 
abandoned in favour of wealthy and corporate 
investors coming from the south and abroad. 
In  the  Lerma–Chapala  basin,  the  boom  in 
export  agriculture  (primarily  vegetables)  has 
been  fed  by  expensive  groundwater,  while 
support  for  land  reform  communities  was 
discontinued in the early 1990s.
In the Krishna basin, two sets of policies 
have  translated  into  two  different  modes  of 
access to, and use of, water in different parts of 
the basin (Chapter 10). Broadly, the first group 
of policies aims at ‘efficiency in development’ 
and  concentrates  financial  and  institutional 
investments on those social groups and areas 
that  offer  the  highest  potential  for  develop-
ment. They are the technologies of the Green 
Revolution, adopted in medium and large irri-
gation projects, and more recently they have 
attempted integrating agriculture into agribusi-
ness chains. The second group aims at ‘equity 
in development’ and advocates rural develop-
ment programmes through strong state plan-
ning and public investments in remote areas. 
They  are  watershed  and  tank  rehabilitation 
programmes, and minor irrigation projects in 
upper  secondary  catchments  (Landy,  2008). 
This need to balance economic efficiency and 
equity in rural development has been a major 
driver of the spatial distribution of water use in 
the Krishna basin over the last 50 years.
Although  vegetable  and  fruit  production 
typically provides higher farm revenues, it tends 
to be capital intensive and a risky venture that is 
unfit for smallholders. In any case, this produc-
tion  only  makes  up  9%  of  the  world’s  total 
cropping  area  and  it  cannot  be  expected  to 
displace  other  grain,  oil  or  fibre  crops. 
Modernization of more extensive farms devoted 
to such crops is a problem experienced in many 
countries (including European countries such as 
Spain  and  Italy).  It  is  clear  that  productivity 
gains cannot be satisfactorily achieved through 
negative  incentives  such  as  pricing  but  must 
come through subsidies to help farmers invest 
and intensify. Adoption of micro-irrigation, for 
example, is almost invariably made possible by 
generous public subsidies.
Basin governance
All the hydrological and socio-political complex-
ities of river basin development and manage-
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relevant decision-making and governance struc-
tures. Although the establishment of RBOs has 
become a standard prescription, the diversity of 
physical and historical contexts militates for a 
less normative approach (Molle et al., 2007; 
Warner et al., 2008). However, the belief that 
a river basin agency should deal with all the 
water problems in a river basin is deeply rooted 
in the water sector. This reflects the modernist 
conviction  that  strong  government  agencies 
staffed by scientifically trained experts should 
be delegated responsibilities for policy design 
and  implementation  in  natural  resources 
management (Norgaard, 1994). For hydrocra-
cies, the river basin forms an ideal territorial 
unit over which they can rule, based on the 
argument that nature has determined this to be 
the scale at which water should be managed.
Thus, a central element of river basin trajec-
tories is the process of turning river basins into 
domains of water governance, a ‘scale-making 
project’  (Tsing,  2000)  frequently  pursued  by 
hydrocracies. However, this process is hidden 
from view, as recourse is made to the ‘natural-
izing  metaphor’  of  the  river  basin  (Bakker, 
1999). This leads to a neglect or denial of the 
political  dimensions  of  river  basin  manage-
ment,  through  the  reification  of  ‘natural’ 
boundaries, the emphasis on ‘neutral’ planning 
and the search for optimal management strate-
gies  (Molle,  2006).  Frequently,  the  situation 
before the creation of new river basin institu-
tions  is  treated  like  a  tabula  rasa,  while,  in 
effect, many organizations and institutions and 
the  technologies  for  controlling  water  are 
already in place (Warner et al., 2008). The 
chapters in this book show that the delineation 
of  river  basin  boundaries,  the  structuring  of 
stakeholder representation and the creation of 
institutional  arrangements  for  river  basin 
management are political processes revolving 
around matters of choice. An explicit recogni-
tion of the political dimension of river basin 
management is necessary so that institutions 
and  procedures  may  be  designed  in  a  more 
democratic and inclusive manner.
International  basins,  multi-state  basins  in 
federal  countries  and  national  basins  clearly 
appear as distinct cases. We focus here on the 
latter two. Federal countries exhibit a tension 
between the states overlapping within the basin 
and  the  central  federal  government.  States 
tend to have a large autonomy in managing 
their water resources, but it is clear that the 
sum of uncoordinated state-centred interests is 
unlikely  to  lead  to  sustainable  river  basin 
management.  The  case  of  India  shows  that 
states pursue antagonistic expansion strategies 
that are poorly checked by the existing sharing 
agreement. Interstate regulation in the Krishna, 
Colorado and Lerma–Chapala basins is largely 
achieved  through  water-sharing  agreements 
and  through  the  management  of  the  main 
infrastructures by federal agencies.
In  Australia,  salinity,  and,  more  recently, 
environmental and drought-related problems, 
have triggered federal interventions. The insti-
tutional challenge is whether a more active and 
dominant  role  by  central  government  will 
deliver arrangements that are better than exist-
ing  ones.  Although  the  Murray  River  Basin 
Commission has been credited with a success-
ful  mediation  role,  negotiated  and  voluntary 
water sharing and custodianship of the basin 
have been slow to react in front of pressing 
needs  and  environmental  degradation.  ‘The 
belief of Federal government is that it has the 
intellectual  horsepower,  political  muscle  and 
financial  resources  to  succeed  where  it  (and 
others)  believes  that  the  Murray  River  Basin 
Commission has failed. This is probably a belief 
that is common to many central government 
elites, and their immediate technocracies, and 
often leads to impatience with detail and the 
preservation of considerable secrecy and mini-
mal transparency’ (Chapter 12).
In the Olifants basin, attempts at establish-
ing a catchment management agency (CMA) 
have  been  stalled.  Officials  initially  had  high 
hopes for CMAs as ‘the key vehicles to imple-
ment the new water management paradigm’ 
(Schreiner  et  al.,  2002),  but  underestimated 
the requirements to make the initial consulta-
tion  process  genuinely  inclusive,  given  the 
highly unlevel playing field, with the large public 
and private water users well organized to defend 
their  interests  (Wester  et  al.,  2003).  Similar 
difficulties had been faced by the Olifants River 
Forum,  established  in  1993  to  promote 
co  operation  for  conservation  and  sustainable 
use  of  the  river.  The  forum  was  founded  by 
white  representatives  of  large  mining  firms, 
Kruger National Park and the Department of 
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the formation of the planned CMA, with local 
communities not well represented, and signalled 
a continuation of the ‘white water economy’ 
(van Koppen, 2007).
In the Lerma–Chapala basin, a river basin 
council was formed in the 1990s, initially only 
with government representatives, and later also 
with water-user representatives. However, this 
council had very few decision-making powers, 
and was not delegated the authority to approve 
the budgets of the federal water agency’s river 
basin office. Although proposals to move to a 
bimodal form of river basin management have 
been  debated  since  1992,  they  have  been 
successfully resisted by the federal water agency 
during  the  various  revisions  of  the  national 
water law. While more space has been created 
for the participation of water users and state 
governments in river basin management, the 
federal government remains in control.
In  many  cases,  participatory  policies  are 
initiated  by  government  agencies  with  the 
implicit intent to keep control of river basin 
management.  The  Lerma–Chapala  case, 
however, shows that such processes also create 
a political space that stakeholders can use to 
challenge  the  dominant  power  of  the  state. 
This  has  not  yet  happened  to  a  significant 
degree in the Olifants and Ruaha basins, but 
could change with time.
The Yellow River Conservancy Commission 
is another type of RBO where central power 
seems  to  be  overriding.  The  Esfahan  Water 
Agency is also an example of centralized water 
administration  that  concentrates  decisional 
power. Likewise, little direct representation of 
users  in  decision  making  is  observed  in  the 
Jordan, Krishna or Merguellil basins. The resil-
ience  of  civil-engineering-dominated  water 
bureaucracies is clearly one of the main obsta-
cles to change in these water sectors. Their 
water resources governance structure and poli-
cies  remain  characterized  by  centralization, 
hierarchy, specialization in infrastructural plan-
ning and secretive, top-down decision making.
As mentioned earlier, with regard to shifting 
paradigms, ideologies and societal values, water 
management is – or should be – in a constant 
flux  to  accommodate  these  changes.  The 
Murray–Darling basin provides a good example 
of  where  water  management  is  constantly 
evolving  and  adapting  to  changing  needs, 
biophysical influence and public expectation.
Conclusions
The chapters in this book illustrate the diversity 
of both the water challenges that societies face 
and  their  responses  to  these  challenges  in 
varied  physical  and  historical  contexts. 
Although  crucial  water  issues  include  flood 
management, urban water supply and sanita-
tion, and pollution control, the dominant proc-
ess is that of basin closure, whereby available 
water resources are invariably gradually tapped 
and  depleted  beyond  the  level  required  to 
ensure the sustainability of aquatic ecosystems 
and  minimize  the  conflicts  caused  by  supply 
variability. With river basin closure the interde-
pendencies  among  stakeholders,  the  water 
cycle,  aquatic  ecosystems  and  institutional 
arrangements increase. These interdependen-
cies manifest themselves in alterations of the 
water cycle that create positive and negative 
externalities to different categories of users and 
the environment. These externalities are not 
always easy to foresee or quantify and often 
result  in  amplified  turbulence  and  greater 
complexity  in  terms  of  water  governance 
mechanisms.
Despite the diversity of contexts presented 
by the case studies, four generic processes can 
be singled out. First, the process of overbuild-
ing, which directly fuels the closure of basins, 
reveals a number of societal and political mech-
anisms by which the development of water-use 
capacity  and  infrastructure  tends  to  outstrip 
resources  and  thus  to  generate  ‘scarcity’. 
Second,  this  overcommitment  of  resources 
also  affects  systems  of  allocation,  whether 
formal – through a system of rights – or other-
wise, which signals that it is politically always 
easier  to  downplay  hydrological  realities  by 
overallocating  one  ‘pie’  than  by  excluding 
some constituencies (or nature) from accessing 
it.  Third,  pressure  over  resources  translates 
into the ‘overtapping’ of both superficial (lakes 
and  dams)  and  underground  (aquifers)  reser-
voirs. Fourth, basin closure makes the issue of 
water allocation critical, and a ‘double squeeze’ 
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agriculture is under pressure from both grow-
ing  non-agricultural  needs  and  a  widening 
awareness of, and call for, a need to increase 
environmental flows, since nature, the residual 
user, bears the brunt of variability in supply.
Indeed, the lack of possibilities to develop 
new water supplies, and the perception that 
agriculture is a ‘low-value’ use of water, lead to 
increasing  intersectoral  water  transfers:  one-
way (frequently extra-legal) transfers from agri-
culture to industry and domestic use, as well as 
intrasectoral transfers in agriculture to econom-
ically higher-value crops and from small farm-
ers  to  large  commercial  farmers.  Most 
governments  face  the  need  to  reconcile  the 
antagonistic objectives of privileging economic 
efficiency and supporting the livelihoods of the 
poorest. Plans to transform subsistence farm-
ers into market-oriented producers make light 
of issues of risk, marketing, and access to capi-
tal, labour and information.
The overexploitation of water sources leads 
to  environmental  degradation  through  the 
destruction of aquatic ecosystems, the deple-
tion of aquifers and the generation of polluted 
wastewater flows (both industrial/urban efflu-
ents  and  agricultural  drainage  effluents).  In 
closed river basins, these trends can principally 
be  reversed  by  consuming  less  water  and 
making judicious use of wastewater; but creat-
ing new ‘hydraulic property’ (Coward, 1986), 
even where only marginal and costly solutions 
remain available (distant dams, interbasin trans-
fers, desalination), is often preferred and, in 
many cases, pursued in parallel with demand-
management options.
Response options are diverse and always in 
competition.  This  book  clearly  shows  how 
politically contested decision making is, both 
with regard to the selection of these options in 
general, and to water allocation in particular. 
The era of water resources development was 
characterized by a consensus on the desirability 
of the hydraulic mission, by the need to ‘make 
the desert bloom’, and the problems it dealt 
with could be classified as ‘tame’, i.e. amenable 
to solution by construction of hydraulic infra-
structure  and  injection  of  technology  and 
expertise (Lach et al., 2005). Many problems 
can now be characterized as ‘wicked’, with a 
multiplicity  of  viewpoints,  interests  and  uses 
that  demand  new  governance  mechanisms. 
Conventional  water  bureaucracies  or  RBOs, 
which were instrumental in (over)building river 
basins, need to change their operating para-
digms to be able to deal with basin closure. 
The  chapters  in  this  book  show  that  the 
cognitive, social and political complexities in 
closed  basins  are  such  that  no  easy-to- 
implement blueprints are available to resolve 
wicked  water  resources  management  prob-
lems.  They  take  us  through  very  rich  and 
instructive stories that make explicit the deeply 
political and contentious nature of river basin 
management, and the need to start from this 
recognition as a necessary first step for work-
ing towards a socially and environmentally just 
governance of water resources.
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Introduction
The lower Jordan River basin (LJRB) provides 
a fascinating tale of coupled social and environ-
mental transformations of a waterscape. In this 
semi-arid to desert area, water is an essential 
determinant of life, cultural values, social struc-
tures, economic activities, power and politics. 
The trajectory of this basin from a nomadic 
agro-pastoral Bedouin culture to an urbanized 
region where water circulation is highly artifi-
cial,  illustrates  how  a  particular  resource 
endowment is valued, mobilized, shared, used 
and fought for.
This  chapter  first  recounts  past  water 
resource development in the LJRB – defined as 
the Jordanian part of the Jordan River basin, 
downstream of Lake Tiberius – and dwells on 
the specific relationships between water, local 
culture  and  national/regional  politics.  The 
historical evolution of supply and demand is 
then expressed in terms of water balances that 
quantify the degree of closure of the basin.1 
Water  challenges  and  response  options  are 
then addressed through the lens of the distribu-
tion of the benefits and costs they entail, and of 
their linkages with the current distribution of 
decision  making  and  political  power.  Basin 
closure  induces  increased  interconnectedness 
between water users and ecosystems through 
an  increasingly  manipulated  water  cycle: 
response  options  are  interdependent  and 
reveal  the  political  and  contested  nature  of 
resource sharing and water management (Molle 
et al., 2007). This chapter describes how these 
processes, constrained by the drastic natural 
conditions of the basin, have unfolded since 
the late 1950s and explores possible futures.
Features of the Lower Jordan River Basin
The  Jordan  River  is  an  international  river 
which drains a total area of about 18,000 km². 
Its  three  headwater  tributaries  originate  in 
Lebanon and Syria and flow into Lake Tiberius, 
a freshwater reservoir now used almost exclu-
sively  by  Israel  (Fig.  2.1).  The  Jordan  River 
then flows southward before discharging into 
the Dead Sea.
Ten  kilometres  downstream  of  Lake 
Tiberius, the lower Jordan River receives water 
from  its  main  tributary,  the  Yarmouk  River, 
which originates in Syria. The Zarqa River and 
several  temporary  streams  of  lesser  impor-
tance, named side-wadis, come from the two 
mountainous banks and feed the lower Jordan 
River (Fig. 2.1). Prior to water development 
projects, the original flow of the Jordan River 
into the Dead Sea varied between 1100 and 
1400  Mm3/year  (El-Nasser,  1998;  Klein, 
1998; Al-Weshah, 2000).
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This chapter focuses on the LJRB and does 
not dwell on the geopolitical issues related to 
water sharing between the riparian states of 
the  Jordan  River  (Lebanon,  Syria,  Israel, 
Jordan).  The  Yarmouk  River  and  the  upper 
Jordan  are  thus  considered  as  contributing 
inflow  to  this  basin.  Moreover,  the  other 
streams  draining  to  the  Dead  Sea  from  the 
south and from Israel are also not analysed.
The  LJRB  represents  40%  of  the  entire 
Jordan  River  basin  but  only  7.8%  of  the 
Jordanian territory (cf. Fig. 2.1). The basin so 
defined  is  nevertheless  the  wettest  area  in 
Jordan,  is  home  to  83%  of  the  population, 
supplies 80% of the national water resources, 
and  encompasses  most  irrigated  areas.  The 
basin, like the country, is divided into two main 
areas (see Fig. 2.2):
•	 The	 Jordan	 valley	 is	 a	 110	 km	 stretch	
between  the  Yarmouk  River  in  the  north 
and the Dead Sea in the south. Its altitude 
varies from 200 m (in the north) to 400 m 
below sea level (in the south). The valley 
can be considered as a natural greenhouse, 
with moderate temperatures during winter 
and high records during summer, commonly 
exceeding 45 °C. Rainfall ranges from 350 
mm/year in the north to 50 mm/year near 
the Dead Sea (Fig. 2.3). The Jordan River 
flows in a 30–60 m deep gorge through a 
0.2–2 km wide fertile alluvial plain, locally 
called Al Zhor (Fig. 2.2). The rest of the 
valley, Al Ghor, is a 4–20 km wide area 
with deep and fertile colluviums.
•	 The	highlands	comprise	a	mountain	range	
running alongside the Jordan valley (named 
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Uplands  hereafter)  and  a  badia  (desert 
plateau) extending eastwards to Syria and 
Iraq (Fig. 2.2). About 30 km wide, with an 
altitude reaching 1000 m above sea level, 
these mountains receive around 400–600 
mm of rain per year, while snowfall can also 
be  observed  during  winter  (Fig.  2.3). 
Historically, they were covered with forests 
(essentially  composed  of  Mediterranean 
coni  fers), but are now mostly composed of 
rangelands with olive trees and stone-fruit 
trees.
The eastern plateau has an average altitude 
of 600 m, and rainfed cereals are grown near 
the mountains, in the area where rainfall is still 
sufficient  and  where  main  urban  agglomer-
ations  (Amman,  Irbid,  Al-Baq’ah,  Jerash, 
Ajloun) are concentrated. Eastward, precipita-
tion becomes scarcer (between 200 and 300 
mm/year), and only nomadic livestock farming 
and some groundwater-irrigated farms can be 
found.
Total precipitation in the LJRB is estimated 
at  2235  Mm3.  In  crude  terms,  88%  of  this 
precipitation is directly evaporated (40% of this 
evaporation being beneficial, i.e. consumed by 
irrigated  and  rainfed  crops  or  domestic  and 
industrial uses), 5% flows into the rivers, and 
the  remaining  7%  infiltrates  to  recharge  the 
aquifers (and is then pumped to meet human 
demands).
The flow at Lake Tiberius, which averaged 
605  Mm3/year  before  the  1950s  (Klein, 
Fig. 2.2. Topography of the lower Jordan River basin in Jordan.
Fig. 2.3. Average rainfall distribution in the lower Jordan River basin in Jordan.2  The Lower Jordan River Basin  23
1998), is now diverted by Israel to its National 
Water Carrier. The Yarmouk River is thus the 
main source of surface water: its flow averaged 
470  Mm3/year  in  the  1950s  (Salameh  and 
Bannayan, 1993), while the side-wadis and the 
Zarqa River originally contributed 120 and 90 
Mm3/year,  respectively  (Baker  and  Harza, 
1955).
The main aquifers closely dovetail with the 
five main sub-basins (Fig. 2.3): the Yarmouk 
basin  (YM),  which  drains  northward  to  the 
Yarmouk River; the Zarqa basin (AZB), which 
drains most of the badia towards the valley; 
the  northern  and  southern  side-wadi  basins 
(NSW  and  SSW,  respectively),  which  pool 
lateral  wadis  north  and  south  of  the  Zarqa 
River; and the Jordan valley (JV) itself. Annual 
recharge  of  the  aquifers  is  estimated  at 
155–160 Mm3/year (THKJ, 2004).
A Chronology of Water Resources 
Development
Ancient settlements and early land 
development
The lower Jordan River basin is at the heart of 
historical transformations in the Middle East, 
due to its central position ‘as a land bridge for 
animals  and  humans  between  Africa  and 
Eurasia; a Levantine corridor, a transit route 
for large and small migrant groups but also an 
area pinned between powerful states: Egypt to 
one side, Northern Syria/Mesopotamia to the 
other’ (van der Koij and Ibrahim, 1990: 14).
Large  settlements  like  Ain  Ghazal  (near 
today’s  Amman)  are  associated  with  the 
Neolithic  period  (c.8000–6000  b c).  In  this 
period, plants and animals (sheep, goats, cattle, 
pigs) were domesticated. Rainfed farming of 
wheat, barley and legumes expanded later, in 
the fourth millennium b c, to lentils, bitter vetch, 
sesame, olives, flax, dates and grapes. Rock 
basins and pools collecting natural water were 
utilized for storage for domestic and agricul-
tural uses (Lancaster, 1999).
Later, 900–300 b c was a flourishing period 
for the Arabic kingdoms and a peaceful time in 
the  LJRB.  The  first  urban  settlements  were 
established in this era. The Nabataeans moved 
from  the  Arabian  Peninsula  into  southern 
Jordan, where they established themselves in 
the eastern steppe and, with the help of ingen-
ious  hydraulic  infrastructures,  were  able  to 
farm the land at Petra while maintaining impor-
tant trading activities. After the conquest of the 
region by the Romans, the economy came to 
rely on a flourishing irrigated agriculture, trade 
and Christian pilgrimages (Lancaster, 1999).
Through  ups  and  downs,  the  region 
witnessed the Islamic conquest, the Ummayads, 
the  Abbasids,  the  Crusades,  the  Ayyubid–
Mamluk  era  (1187–1516)  and  the  Ottoman 
conquest in 1516. The Jordan valley reached 
the peak of its agricultural development during 
the  first  period  of  the  Mamluks  (14–15th 
century). Irrigation developed wherever possi-
ble, and sugar mills, powered by water, were 
built in many spots in the valley. The Ottoman 
administration period, in contrast, was charac-
terized by instability and depopulation in both 
the  valley  and  the  highlands.  In  1956,  the 
population of the east bank of the Jordan River 
(Transjordan)  was  estimated  at  52,000 
(Abujaber, 1988).
In  Western  travel  accounts  of  the  19th 
century, the Jordan valley appears as a wild 
and dangerous place (with the threat of malaria 
and the fear of attack and robbery by Bedouin 
tribes) but, at the same time, as a biblical region 
with impressive, exotic scenery. The valley was 
a large grazing ground and an important region 
intersecting the tribal land of several Bedouin 
tribes. Up to World War II, surface irrigation 
was practised along the wadi valleys and, most 
prominently, at the point where wadis formed 
alluvial  fans  in  the  Jordan  valley  (Lancaster, 
1999;  Suleiman,  2004).  Management  was 
com  munal, under the authority of the tribes’ 
sheikh,  but  coexisted  with  forms  of  private 
ownership of land and even of collective owner-
ship of spring water and well water (Shryock, 
1997).
The first planning interventions: 1921–1973 
Transjordan was placed under temporary British 
administration (Mandate) in 1921 and became 
fully independent in 1946, as the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan (THKJ). The British initi-
ated  cadastral  registration  of  land  titles  and 
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village boundaries, state domains and forests in 
agricultural lands. The mandate period allowed 
Zionist  projects,  also  based  on  irrigation 
schemes, to expand on the east bank of the 
Jordan  River  (the  East  Bank),  making  this 
region  a  security  area  (Goichon,  1967). 
Moneylenders and merchant families increased 
their investments in agriculture and their owner-
ship of land, forming the basis for later capital 
investments in agriculture, in parallel with the 
decreasing power of the Bedouin tribes.
As  one  of  the  regions  with  the  highest 
potential for agricultural expansion, the Jordan 
valley has been the object of numerous hydrau-
lic and agricultural feasibility studies since the 
end of the 19th century. For foreign experts 
the valley was a symbol of high productivity 
wasted for lack of attention, which thus required 
urgent external intervention, prompting Merril 
(1881:  139)  to  declare  that  ‘The  American 
farmer would look with envious eyes upon the 
fertile  portions  of  this  valley.’  Projects  were 
fuelled  by  technical  optimism  and  by  a  new 
ideology of irrigation as a transfer of resources 
and expertise from outside that would solve the 
problems  of  a  local  population  depicted  as 
‘conservative,  ignorant,  wretchedly  poor, 
unable to contend with the forces of nature’ 
(Gottman, 1937: 556).
In  1948,  following  the  creation  of  Israel, 
774,000  Palestinians  were  displaced  (UN, 
1949),  of  whom  70,000–110,000  escaped 
directly to the East Bank, which at the time had 
an  indigenous  population  of  about  440,000 
(Brand, 1995). Refugee displacement in 1948 
added to the urgency of developing irrigation: 
the  resettlement  programme  in  the  Jordan 
valley was highly influenced by USAID and the 
International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development  (later  the  World  Bank)  and 
inspired  by  the  ‘integrated  development’ 
scheme  of  the  Tennessee  Valley  Authority 
(TVA)  in  the  USA,  the  icon  of  large-scale 
hydraulic planning projects (Molle, 2006). This 
model of development clashed with previous 
British  foreign  policies  in  the  Middle  East 
focused  on  the  development  of  agricultural 
cooperation.  British  interventions  favoured 
small-scale  projects  built  on  local  indigenous 
expertise that could bypass the regional politi-
cal gridlock regarding the use of water resources 
in the Jordan basin (Kingston, 1996). By the 
mid-1950s the Jordanian Division of Irrigation 
had completed dams on several of the eastern 
wadis draining to the Jordan River (except the 
southernmost  wadi  Shu’ayb  and  the  larger 
Zarqa River), boosting irrigation in the Jordan 
valley (Kingston, 1996).
Already, in the 1930s, the first wells were 
dug in the highlands and water was pumped 
from Azraq (an oasis in the desert located about 
150 km east of Amman, outside the LJRB) 
(Lancaster,  1999).  Significant  exploitation  of 
groundwater started in the 1950s and 1960s, 
with the introduction of diesel motor pumps. 
Several international organizations (UNESCO, 
FAO, ILO) launched or promoted sedentariza-
tion  programmes  for  Bedouin  tribes,  which 
included plans for developing irrigated agricul-
ture  and  settlements,  viewed  as  an  essential 
step to economic integration, ‘modernization, 
stability in the region and control of rangeland 
(the badia)’ (Bocco, 2006). The area irrigated 
with groundwater gradually increased and was 
multiplied fourfold between 1965 and 1980. 
Government licences and soft loans for drilling 
private wells led to a frontier ‘moving ever east-
ward  into  an  increasingly  ecologically  and 
economically marginal environment’ (Millington 
et al., 1999).
The  introduction  of  tractors,  water  tanks 
and water pumps during the 1950s induced 
crucial  changes  in  water  management.  The 
Jordan valley was home to various systems of 
irrigation (wadis, diversions, canals, reservoirs, 
springs,  pumps)  and  multiple  actors  were 
involved (such as the United Nations Relief and 
Works  Agency  for  Palestinian  refugees 
(UNRWA), the Jordanian state, British consult-
ants, the World Bank, USAID). The construc-
tion  of  the  East  Ghor  canal,  which  was  to 
distribute water diverted from the Yarmouk all 
along the East Bank, started in 1957, but was 
halted several times due to warfare. The first 
69  km  were  completed  in  1966.  Between 
June  and  September  1967,  395,000 
Palestinians crossed the Jordan River, due to 
the  occupation  of  their  land  by  Israel.  Israel 
occupied the West Bank, and the Jordan valley 
became for some years a battleground between 
Palestinian  fighters  and  Israel  and,  in  1970, 
between Palestinian fighters and the Jordanian 
army. The extension of the canal to the south 
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oped on a large scale (13,500 ha) through the 
East Ghor concrete canal (later renamed King 
Abdullah canal, or KAC), in parallel with a land 
reform (1962), and several projects of urbani-
zation and settlements (Courcier et al., 2005).
The development phase: 1973–1995
In 1977, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
(MWI) published a global assessment of water 
resources  in  Jordan  (THKJ,  1977).  A  first 
harsh reality was the dramatic loss of the upper 
Jordan water to Israel: the inflow to the LJRB 
had  decreased  from  605  to  70  Mm3/year 
(Klein, 1998). Because of the combined water 
uses in Israel, Syria and Jordan, only 40% (505 
Mm3/year) of the historical flow of the Jordan 
River  still  reached  the  Dead  Sea  in  1975 
(Courcier et al., 2005).
The exploitation of water resources further 
increased  between  1975  and  1995.  In  the 
Jordan valley, irrigated agriculture was expanded 
through  the  construction  of  several  hydraulic 
facilities: extension of the KAC (with 3400 ha 
of land newly irrigated), installation of pressu-
rized water distribution networks, storage dams 
on the Zarqa River and other side-wadis. In the 
early  2000s,  past  investments  in  the  water 
sector in Jordan, mainly financed by interna-
tional aid, were estimated to total US$1500 
million  (Nachbaur,  2004;  Suleiman,  2004). 
With  new  techniques  of  production  (green-
houses, drip irrigation, plastic mulch, fertilizer, 
new varieties, etc.), the availability of Egyptian 
force and market opportunities (at least until 
the first Gulf War), irrigated agriculture in the 
Jordan  valley  enjoyed  a  boom  in  production 
and economic profitability, described by Elmusa 
(1994) as the ‘Super Green Revolution’. The 
particular climate of the Jordan valley allows 
many small entrepreneurial farmers to produce 
vegetables almost all year round (and especially 
during winter), as well as some fruits that can 
withstand heat in summer (citrus and bananas).
In  the  highlands,  private  wells  provided 
unlimited access to good-quality groundwater. 
Wealthy and dynamic entrepreneurs (of both 
Transjordanian and Palestinian origin), emulat-
ing or replacing past Bedouin or peasant (fella-
hin)  settlements,  made  massive  investments 
and developed an irrigated agriculture which 
supplied  Jordan  and  the  Gulf  countries  with 
fruits and vegetables during summer.
During the same 1975–2000 period, the 
urban population within the basin was multi-
plied by roughly 2.5 (DoS, 1978–2003), with 
urban groundwater use consequently growing 
fivefold to reach 150 Mm3/year (records of the 
MWI–Water  Resources  Department).  This 
demand was met by both increasing the number 
of wells in the surroundings of the cities and 
transferring  more  groundwater  from  distant 
areas and surface water from the KAC to urban 
areas in the highlands (Darmane, 2004). This 
latter transfer, initiated at the end of the 1980s, 
was  expanded  after  the  massive  inflow  of 
Jordanian-Palestinians  returning  to  Jordan 
after the first Gulf War (1991) and is now the 
main source of water for Amman (almost 100 
Mm3/year by 2008). This transfer was made 
possible because of the concomitant treatment 
of  wastewater  from  Amman:  effluents  are 
collected  in  the  King  Talal  reservoir  (built 
between 1971 and 1977 on the Zarqa River) 
and mixed with freshwater, and this blended 
water is then used to irrigate the middle and 
the south of the Jordan valley.
Further reduction in the water coming from 
the  Yarmouk  and  reaching  the  LJRB  was 
observed  after  the  late  1970s.  During  the 
1980s,  water  use  doubled  in  Syria,  with  35 
middle-size dams built in the upper Yarmouk 
basin and direct pumping from rivers and wells 
(El-Nasser,  1998).  In  the  early  2000s,  the 
Yarmouk  contributed  270  Mm3/year  to  the 
Jordan  River  (THKJ,  2004),  of  which  about 
110 Mm3/year flowed uncontrolled to the lower 
Jordan River until the recent completion of the 
Wehdah dam (2007). The peace treaty signed 
between Jordan and Israel in 1994 also speci-
fied that the 25 Mm3 pumped each winter by 
Israel from the Yarmouk would be returned to 
the KAC during the year, an agreement loosely 
implemented so far and which does not consider 
issues of water quality. With all these changes, 
the inflow to the Dead Sea was reduced to less 
than 20% of the historical flow of the Jordan 
River, resulting in a drop of its water level by 20 
m  since  the  late  1950s,  showing  a  dramatic 
degradation  of  the  environment  of  the  entire 
Jordan River system (Orthofer et al., 2007) and 
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1995 onward: the rise of the water challenge 
in Jordan
In  the  1990s,  water  rose  to  the  top  of  the 
nation’s  political  agenda.  Concerns  shifted 
from  refugees  in  the  1950s,  towards  land 
management in the 1970s, and finally water in 
the  1990s.  In  1997,  the  Jordanian  govern-
ment  adopted  a  new  Water  Strategy  Policy 
(THKJ, MWI, 1997), setting allocation priori-
ties to the urban sector, then to the industrial 
and tourist sector, and finally to the agriculture 
sector:  policy  reforms  aimed  at  meeting  the 
challenges faced by the country.
Physical scarcity of water resources is an 
obvious  challenge,  compounded  by  rapid 
population growth. The rapid increase in water 
needs is due to an improvement in living stand-
ards  and  to  a  high  demographic  growth  of 
2.9%, notably in urban areas (nearly 80% of 
the population is concentrated in cities) (DoS, 
2003).  Migration,  in  particular  the  sudden 
waves  of  Palestinian  refugees  in  1948  and 
1967, has had a major impact on water use in 
the  country.  So  did  the  wave  of  around 
300,000 people of Palestinian origin who had 
to return to Jordan from Kuwait after the Gulf 
War of 1990–1991, 95% of whom resettled in 
the LJRB area (de Bel-Air, 2002). The recent 
migration of Iraqis escaping from the embargo 
and the war – estimated at 1,300,000 – is now 
a major challenge for the country.
Groundwater overuse causes degradation of 
the groundwater resources, both in the short 
term (direct pollution due to infiltration of pesti-
cides and fertilizers: see JICA, 2004) and in 
the long term (salinization of groundwater due 
to a drop of water tables: ARD and USAID, 
2001; Chebaane et al., 2004). Overabstraction 
has also led to the drying of springs and, in 
particular, to the disappearance of the Azraq 
oasis, a Ramsar wetland. The measures taken 
to abate groundwater use for agriculture from 
private wells in the highlands have been unsuc-
cessful.  Abstraction  limits  have  never  been 
respected  and  too  many  licences  have  been 
issued. The Groundwater Control Bylaw No. 
85, passed in 2002 and further amended in 
2004, was designed to regulate groundwater 
abstraction  through  the  establishment  of  a 
quota of 150,000 m3 per year per well and a 
block  tariff  system  for  any  use  beyond  that 
quota.  However,  this  quota  is  much  higher 
than the limits mentioned in the original well 
licences. It was reported that farmer interest 
groups obtained the cancelling of the former 
lower limits against the acceptance of the prin-
ciple  of  taxing  volumes  abstracted  above  a 
higher limit (Pitman, 2004). Upper (optimistic) 
estimates  of  the  reduction  in  gross  water 
abstraction due to the bylaw point to a poten-
tial decrease of 4%, i.e. 5.5 Mm3/year, a drop 
in an ocean of overabstraction and quite short 
of the 40–50 Mm3 hoped for (Venot and Molle, 
2008). 
Water management challenges in the basin 
are linked not only to the expansion of Amman 
but also to the process of suburbanization of 
the countryside around the capital, near Irbid 
and  in  the  badia  (Lavergne,  1996).  Farms 
have become secondary residences, new villas 
have  increased  land  fragmentation,  and  the 
habitat in the highlands countryside gradually 
resembles that of Amman. A similar dynamic 
can be observed in the Jordan valley, where 
fenced fruit orchards often hide a villa – and 
sometimes a swimming pool – used at week-
ends and where the value of prestige and status 
is higher than the economic productivity of the 
farm itself.
Urban  development  and  the  lack  of 
untapped  resources  have  led  to  a  policy  of 
transferring increasing volumes of freshwater 
from irrigated agriculture to urban uses, thus 
affecting the stability of the agriculture sector. 
During  dry  years,  2000–2002  for  example, 
the Jordanian government froze the quantity 
of  water  reserved  for  cities,  while  drastically 
reducing the amount allocated to agriculture in 
the Jordan valley. This reallocation from the 
Jordan valley to the highlands has been partly 
compensated for by an ever-increasing supply 
of treated wastewater (TWW) to the south of 
the  valley  (McCornick  et  al.,  2002;  THKJ, 
MWI,  WAJ,  2004).  The  hazards  associated 
with a generalized use of TWW in agriculture 
remain poorly known and include workers’ and 
consumers’  contamination,  soil  degradation, 
clogging up of irrigation system emitters, disap-
pearance of certain sensitive crops (strawber-
ries,  beans,  citrus,  etc.),  consumers’  lack  of 
confidence in the quality of the products, drop 
in  prices  and  loss  of  some  export  markets 
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the  Jordan  valley,  there  is  also  growing 
evidence of water pollution by nitrates and soil 
degradation (Orthofer, 2001).
Water conservation and the quest for greater 
end-use  efficiency  have  also  spurred  several 
policies and measures in the urban and irriga-
tion  sectors.  These  include,  for  example, 
modernization  and  physical  improvement  of 
urban distribution networks, reduction of the 
volumes of water unaccounted for, and transfer 
of  Amman’s  water  supply  and  wastewater 
collection  to  a  private  company  (Darmane, 
2004).3 In the Jordan valley, measures include 
completing  the  conversion  from  the  earlier 
gravity network to pressurized systems, incen-
tives to adopt micro-irrigation at the plot level, 
reduction of per hectare quotas, and increases 
in the cost of water to farmers. At a collective 
level, a German cooperation programme (GTZ) 
supported efforts at building up the first water-
user associations in the Jordan valley.
Most of these policies have met with limited 
success. In the Jordan valley, quotas are low 
and farmers use their full allowance in all condi-
tions:  technical  interventions  improve  irriga-
tion efficiency not because water use is reduced 
but  because  better  uniformity  and  timing  of 
water application enhance crop evapotranspi-
ration  and  yields  (Molle  et  al.,  2008). 
Agricultural water prices in the Jordan valley 
have been raised several times but with negligi-
ble  impact  on  water  demand  (World  Bank, 
2003; Molle et al., 2008), especially for high-
value  fruits  and  vegetables.  If  prices  were 
further raised they would substantially dent the 
net revenue of citrus and banana farmers and 
encourage/force them to reconsider the bene-
fits, risks and constraints of adopting new crops 
and  technologies.  The  poorest  vegetable   
farmers would be bankrupt, at the risk of high 
social  and  political  consequences.  Quotas 
appear to be the only straightforward measure 
for  reducing  diversions.  The  1997–1999 
period was marked by a severe drought, which 
forced  reductions  in  allocation,  which  were 
extended  from  1999  to  2003,  although 
adjusted each year, and made permanent in 
2004. At a regional scale, this generated total 
freshwater savings of about 20.2 Mm3/year, 
reallocated to domestic use in Amman.
Another important and sensitive issue is the 
operation  and  maintenance  (O&M)  costs  of 
infrastructure. Until now, for both urban and 
irrigation supply, emphasis has been placed on 
obtaining international funding for implement-
ing  modern  systems  rather  than  on  O&M 
recurring costs. Degradation and fiscal auster-
ity call for better coverage of these costs. The 
increase in water tariffs in the Jordan valley has 
allowed two-thirds of O&M costs to be recov-
ered,  and  studies  show  that  full  O&M  cost 
recovery is achievable and commensurate with 
farmers’ income (Molle et al., 2008).
The future of irrigated agriculture raises a 
complex set of social, economic and political 
questions that largely lie outside of the water 
sector itself. The two major issues are the treat-
ment of prestige agriculture and the question 
of economic sustainability. Irrigated agriculture 
in the highlands has mainly developed during 
the  last  three  decades  through  large  private 
investments: the investors concerned belong to 
high  society  (MPs,  senators,  entrepreneurs, 
sheikhs,  etc.).  Their  social  importance  and 
their  influence  on  government  decisions 
suggest that all the measures aiming at reduc-
ing their water use will be conflict prone and 
will take a long time to implement. While part 
of this agriculture is highly capital intensive and 
profitable, around 30% of irrigation water is 
used  in  low-value  olive-tree  farms.  These 
orchards are a legacy of a time when the drill-
ing of wells was subsidized, and are held for 
reasons  of  prestige,  as  a  means  of  keeping 
ownership and control of land. Likewise, many 
citrus plantations in the Jordan valley are held 
by absentee owners (often urbanites) who are 
not interested in complex farm management, 
prefer  low-return,  extensive  agriculture,  and 
partly transform their farms into leisure places. 
Banana farms in the north of the valley are 
also  linked  to  politically  powerful  tribes  and 
partly thrive on higher water quotas and import 
barriers.
More generally, agriculture is facing declin-
ing profitability. Marketing constitutes the main 
problem that agricultural producers face (ASAL, 
1994; World Bank, 1999). Jordanian irrigated 
agriculture  mainly  developed  during  a  period 
(1975–1990)  of  strong  regional  demand  for 
fresh products. Products could be sold at a high 
price because of the payment capacity of the 
Gulf countries and limited competition in the 
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(greenhouses, irrigation systems, wells, equip-
ment, etc.) provided a handsome return within 
a few years and attracted many investors. After 
1985, the quick development of production in 
Jordan and in the region (Syria, Lebanon, Gulf 
countries) led to a drop in prices and in the 
profitability of investments (Nachbaur, 2004). 
Moreover, the first Gulf war of 1991 worsened 
this  situation,  since  the  Gulf  markets,  which 
constituted a major outlet for Jordanian prod-
ucts, were lost (Jabarin, 2001) as a result of the 
Jordanian  state’s  support  of  the  invasion  of 
Kuwait by Iraq. In addition, Jordan has favoured 
the  development  of  new  economic  sectors 
(tourism, services, industry) and signed several 
agreements4 which could undermine the prof-
itability  of  certain  agricultural  products  still 
protected in Jordan (e.g. bananas and apples). 
This  situation  could  also  reverberate  on  the 
country’s trade balance. Fruits and vegetables 
and their export represent, on average, 12% 
of the value of Jordanian exports (THKJ, MoA, 
2001),  and  any  reduction  in  the  production 
would raise macro-economic concerns.
Negative  impacts  would  be  passed  on  to   
the  more  vulnerable  rural  groups,  notably   
low-income  Jordanian  categories  (refugees, 
Jordanian tribes of low status, female labour-
ers)  and  male  migrants  (two-thirds  of  whom 
come from Egypt).
Water, People and Politics
These socio-economic and technical aspects of 
water use in the country are closely linked to 
cultural and regional politics and to the chang-
ing  relationships  between  Jordanian  society 
and water.
The social fabric and changing perceptions of 
water
In the past, land and water were controlled by 
the  ashira  (tribe)  represented  by  the  sheikh 
(tribal leader) and were linked to the notion of 
dirah, which played a central role in resource 
management. The term dirah derives from dar, 
which literally means ‘house’, which may be a 
cement construction as much as a tent, and 
refers  to  the  tribal  territory,  together  with  a 
system  of  exchange  organized  around  the 
khuwa (the payment to tribes to obtain their 
protection). Access to resources was allowed to 
other tribes depending on demographic pres-
sure, climatic conditions, resource scarcity and 
existing  alliances.  Thus,  the  border  and  the 
geographical extension of a dirah were often 
flexible but within perceptions of land that still 
persist nowadays (Bocco, 1987). This notion 
of territory is thus interlinked with indigenous 
ideas  of  resource  property.  As  Lancaster 
(1999)  showed,  ‘ownership  comes  through 
access, use, action and is validated by defence 
and  reputation.’  In  fact,  the  notion  of  ihya 
almawat (vivification of land) through amelio-
rations and work, and not the ownership of 
land by itself, granted the rights and the control 
of land. This also applied to water resources 
since the ownership of water was a ‘function of 
claims and access to resources, rather than a 
system of control and absolute right of disposal’ 
(Lancaster, 1999).
The  disruption  of  this  tribal  resource 
management  in  the  last  century  and  the 
displacement of Palestinians have transformed 
the  units  of  belonging.  Development  institu-
tions took charge of functions and responsibili-
ties that were previously exercised by the tribe, 
such as management of land and water. Local 
agricultural  and  irrigation  knowledge  was 
displaced from the extended family and tribe to 
the experts and the administration. New inter-
national borders have severed pastoral routes, 
and the cement blockhouse has replaced the 
goat-wool  tent.  Bedouins  have  shifted  from 
pastoralism  to  army  employment,  irrigated 
agriculture,  outmigration,  commercial  and 
trans  port  activities,  or  development  adminis-
tration.
Tribal political organization, forced displace-
ment of Palestinians, labour migration, warfare 
in  the  Jordan  valley,  and  intensive  planning 
have shaped today’s social structure and water 
projects. In this dynamic context, the develop-
mental concept of a ‘farmer community’ has 
worked  to  unify,  in  one  common  category, 
communities  who  perceive  themselves  as 
diverse and are characterized by social hetero-
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nal  representation  of  the  heterogeneous 
population in the Jordan valley as a homoge-
nous group of ‘Jordanian farmers’ within irri-
gation  projects  has  definitely  depoliticized  a 
tense  region  and  has  been  part  of  a  wider 
pro  cess  of  incorporation  into  the  nation. 
Through  water  development,  new  ‘farmer 
settlements’ have been set up. Muzar’e (farmer) 
is a category which can be understood only 
within the context of the new irrigated agri-
business developed in the LJRB: it refers to an 
occupational category within the new economic 
segmentation and differs from the traditional 
fellahin  (peasant),  who  is  understood  as  a 
wider moral and political belonging.
Modernization  did  not  by  itself  mean  the 
disappearance  of  tribal  solidarity  –  on  the 
contrary, it has readapted to new political and 
ecological environments. Bedouin values and 
tribal  belonging  have  been  mobilized  and 
reproduced as part of a process of nation build-
ing within a demographic context marked by a 
large  population  of  Palestinian  origin  (which 
fuelled a separate sense of belonging – inherent 
in the Palestinian national struggle), a contested 
border in the Jordan valley, and the Hashemite 
Kingdom’s need for legitimacy in a tense envi-
ronment. Tribal solidarity has often overlapped 
with  the  national  administrative  structure, 
shaping the new bureaucratic apparatus and 
national identity, and playing a central role as a 
form of patronage and a basis for affiliation 
(Brand, 1995). Therefore, ‘tribal identity has 
become  politicized  as  it  continues  to  be  the 
basic channel for allocation of resources by the 
central government’ (Shami, 1982).
Other actors have been less visible. Since 
1970, Egyptian migrants, together with minor 
groups of Syrian men and Pakistani families, 
have provided cheap labour to labour-intensive 
agricultural  systems.  Jordanian  male  wage 
labour in agriculture has nearly disappeared in 
recent decades, since men seek employment 
with  better  wages  and  less  drudgery  outside 
agriculture. This is counterbalanced by a femi-
nization of agricultural labour, although not  with-
standing the large number of women working 
as labourers today, the responsibility for irriga-
tion has remained in the hands of men since it 
symbolizes the control over the wider produc-
tion process (Shami and Taminiam, 1990).
The building of the state and regional 
geopolitics 
In the past, periods of development and stag-
nation have often been related to the presence 
or  absence  of  a  strong  authority  that  could 
offer  security  and  protection  to  the  Jordan 
valley (Khouri, 1981) and could allow a grow-
ing  population  to  thrive.  Periods  of  intense 
settlement have often been followed by periods 
with  a  sparse  population,  abandonment  of 
agricultural settlements and insecurity.
In  the  Ottoman  period  (1516–1921)  the 
state tried to establish firm control by introduc-
ing new concepts of land and water, support-
ing the immigration of agricultural settlers from 
the Caucasus, the setting up of a bureaucratic 
apparatus, the emergence of merchant elites 
in the agriculture sector (many from Syria or 
from  Circassian,  Chechen  and  Turcoman 
communities) and an increase in the export of 
agricultural  products.  Yet  the  communal 
patterns  of  resource  management  remained 
effective.
In 1933, the Land Settlement Law promul-
gated by the British administration opened the 
way to cadastral registration of land titles and 
to  fiscal  surveys.  Agricultural  development 
through  irrigation  projects  for  Bedouins  was 
viewed by the British as the first step of a wider 
detribalization process that would help stabilize 
the  country  and  settle  ‘new  farmers  to  a 
neglected  land’  (Lowdermilk,  1944),  as  this 
area was erroneously portrayed, an essential 
step to economic integration, social emancipa-
tion and stability within nation construction.
At  first  instrumental  in  settling  pastoral 
groups, water development would soon (after 
1948)  be  aimed  at  resettling  refugees.  The 
development of water on the east bank of the 
Jordan valley in the 1950s led to the establish-
ment of a new power structure and engendered 
a  water  bureaucracy,  the  Jordan  Valley 
Authority (JVA). The tribal hierarchical system 
of distribution gave way to centralized planning 
of water, and high subsidies for irrigated water 
became a political tool, allowing state penetra-
tion in a crucial and unsettled rural area. Project 
implementation was characterized by a lack of 
participation  and  involvement  of  the  local 
population,  and  the  JVA  introduced  a  new 30  M. Van Aken et al.
system of loyalty, through a centralized admin-
istration.
As de Bel-Air (2002) has shown, the state–
citizen relationship has been intimately linked 
to the rentier nature of the Jordanian econ-
omy, based on an indirect rent (external aid 
from the Gulf States or the USA, remittances 
from migrants, etc.) and reproducing a clien-
telistic pattern of redistribution of resources, in 
which  water  is  embedded.  The  structure  of 
power has thus been linked to this redistribu-
tion of rents and to patronage: in this context, 
the economic value of agriculture, often criti-
cized nowadays due to its large use of precious 
water  and  limited  profitability,  cannot  be 
detached from the political and social mean-
ings that agricultural development has acquired 
in Jordan, in terms of political stability, tribal 
and refugee settlement, and national incorpo-
ration of rural and arid areas.
Waterscape transformations and the new 
social environment
Today, irrigation in the LJRB has become an 
arena  of  struggle  among  different  interest 
groups. In the Jordan valley, for example, the 
struggle between the extensive bureaucracy and 
its computerized distribution system, on the one 
hand, and the illegal methods reinvented daily 
by farmers to get access to water, on the other, 
express different and contrasting ‘projects’ with 
regard to water management. Centralized water 
management and the shift from surface irriga-
tion to micro-irrigation and pressurized pipelines 
date back to the 1980s and have, in a very short 
time,  radically  changed  the  ways  of  thinking 
about and using water. This context of change is 
at the core of today’s struggles and conflicts that 
arise around water at the local level. We face a 
situation of legal pluralism, with an overlapping 
of  formal  and  informal  water  property  rights 
systems and claims, in a context characterized 
by a lack of local participation and increasing 
water scarcity.
A first major change has been the transition 
from a water allocation based on the house-
hold head and tribal representatives to an allo-
cation based on land use, controlled by a water 
administration  vested  with  a  new  authority. 
This technical and bureaucratic presence has 
led  to  a  wider  process  of  secularization  and 
materialization  of,  and  disenchantment  with, 
water (Hamlin, 2000): detached from the tribal 
community,  water  has  become  a  technical 
affair,  often  artificially  separated  from  its 
attendant social and cultural dimensions.
A second main consequence is the changed 
idea of water in relation to time. The water 
share was traditionally connected to an idea of 
a personalized and socialized time related to 
specific local ecological contexts and connected 
to the lineage system, where every part of the 
larger  community  received  its  time-share, 
which could be exchanged and adapted along 
social and neighbourhood relationships. With 
the establishment of a central bureaucracy, a 
new characterization of water in terms of quan-
tity (cubic metres) and pressure of supply has 
been introduced.
Third, with state irrigation, a new idea of 
territory in relation to local communities has 
taken place. With drip irrigation and the intro-
duction  of  pressurized  collective  networks 
during the 1990s, water has also gone under-
ground and is not directly available or physi-
cally visible. Besides, water users in the LJRB 
are  more  and  more  hydraulically  intercon-
nected  within  pressurized  systems  covering 
larger  areas  than  was  the  case  when  water 
flowed through traditional earthen canals. 
Last, expert knowledge has become more 
important today than before in managing water 
since  it  has  introduced  a  specific  culture  of 
organization  and  is  linked  to  a  resource 
management regime whereby, as Waller (1994) 
put it, ‘water managers use their expertise to 
portray  them  [i.e.  the  changes]  as  technical 
rather than political decisions.’ This is a major 
issue in the Jordan valley, where water manage-
ment is described as an issue for experts, too 
complex for farmers to handle. This technical 
emphasis has both depoliticized the actual deci-
sions made in relation to water and neutralized 
wider public debate on water issues in Jordan.
The Lower Jordan River Basin at the 
Crossroads
Embedded  in  a  society  in  the  making,  with 
Bedouins, peasants, Palestinian refugees and 
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setting, water is a guiding element of historical 
transformations. Its importance in the future 
may even increase, as Jordan’s scarce water 
resources  cannot  keep  up  with  needs  and 
immigration. This section first dwells on histor-
ical changes in land use and in the components 
of the water balance, giving a detailed account 
of the water flows in 2000, before expanding 
on the different solutions at hand.
Basin closure and the water squeeze
Changes in land use
The first notable evolution since the late 1950s 
is  that  of  land  use.  Rainfed  cropping  areas 
significantly  increased  in  the  1950–1975 
period, with cereals providing work and food to 
a growing population (Fig. 2.4). This extensive 
type of agriculture later declined, with a shift in 
the economy towards non-agricultural activities. 
Irrigated  olive-tree  orchards  in  the  highlands 
dramatically increased, from 420 ha in 1950 to 
11,000 ha in 2000, i.e. making up close to half 
of the irrigated areas in the highlands (the other 
half  consisting  of  vegetables  and  stone-fruit 
trees) (Courcier et al., 2005). Figure 2.4 high-
lights  the  structural  differences  between  the 
Jordan valley and the highlands: cultivated areas 
are much larger in the highlands (a total area of 
143,900 ha in 1950) than in the valley (32,300 
ha),  which  reflects  the  large  areas  of  rainfed 
cereals and olive trees planted in the former. 
Irrigated areas increased from around 10,200 
ha in 1950 to 45,800 ha in 2000.
Water accounting in 2000
The description of the transformation of the 
LJRB given in the preceding sections can be 
paralleled by a more quantitative accounting of 
the resulting (im)balance between water supply 
and  demand.  The  net  inflow  to  the  LJRB 
includes rainfall, interbasin transfers, and possi-
ble net overdraft of the aquifers and reservoirs. 
This total inflow is partly transformed through 
evapotranspiration of crops (irrigated, rainfed 
and also natural vegetation) and evaporation 
from water bodies, and through municipal and 
industrial (M&I) processes. The balance flows 
to the Dead Sea, considered as a sink since 
maintaining  its  level  is  not  considered  as  a 
management objective.
Fig. 2.4.  Crop- and region-wise evolution of cropped areas in the lower Jordan River basin in Jordan since 
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Water  is  depleted,  or  consumed,  by  four 
generic processes: evaporation, flows to sinks 
(e.g. a saline aquifer), pollution and incorpora-
tion into a product (e.g. plant tissues) (Molden, 
1997). In 2000, the LJRB consumed 86% of 
its  net  inflow  through  the  above  processes. 
About a third of the remaining outflow to the 
Dead  Sea  was  coming  from  uncontrolled 
Yarmouk water (Courcier et al., 2005), which 
is  now  partly  stored  in  the  Wehdah  dam. 
Beneficial depletion (evapotranspiration from 
irrigation,  rainfed  agriculture,  and  M&I  uses) 
accounted  for  33.5%  of  the  net  inflow,  low 
beneficial depletion (evapotranspiration from 
natural vegetation and forest) for 14.5% and 
non-beneficial  depletion  (evaporation  from 
bare  land,  deserts  and  water  bodies)  for  the 
remaining  38%  (2%  of  the  net  inflow  was 
exported to other basins and 12% as runoff). In 
the LJRB, irrigation accounts for 18% of the 
total depleted fraction. Data also indicate that 
despite all the allocation conflicts between the 
cities and agriculture, the share of M&I deple-
tion is negligible, representing only 3% of the 
total depleted fraction in the LJRB. This share, 
however, rises to 16% when compared with the 
amount of water depleted by irrigation, and to 
10% when expressed in terms of withdrawals.
These  basin-level  figures  prompt  some 
remarks on the question of efficiency in water 
use. Groundwater-based irrigation efficiency in 
the  highlands  has  increased  in  the  last  two 
decades, with an almost complete shift from 
surface  water  irrigation  to  micro-irrigation 
(Elmusa, 1994; THKJ, 2004). In many cases, 
farmers continued pumping the same amount 
of  water  and  have  expanded  their  irrigated 
area (Venot and Molle, 2008). This not only 
increased farmers’ incomes but also resulted in 
higher  evapotranspiration  and  lower  return 
flow to the aquifer, thus compounding the net 
overdraft. There is evidence that percolation 
losses from irrigation in the highlands return to 
the aquifer (JICA, 2001) and therefore do not 
affect  the  net  water  balance  significantly 
(although pumping costs and the low quality of 
return  flows  are  issues).  Areas  irrigated  by 
diversion of wadis along the main valleys also 
have high efficiencies because return flows are 
quickly reintegrated to the main stream. In the 
valley, the shift to micro-irrigation owes more 
to  the  intensification  of  agriculture  than  to 
water scarcity per se, since it started 15 years 
before  talks  of  a  water  crisis  emerged. 
Cultivation of vegetables under plastic mulch 
that  controls  weeds  makes  micro-irrigation 
necessary and also allows better application of 
water and nutrients (fertigation). Other more 
extensive crops (notably citrus) as well as part 
of the banana crop are still irrigated by gravity, 
but the defined JVA quotas keep application 
losses to a minimum since quotas are less than 
full  crop  requirements  in  months  when  the 
overall demand exceeds supply.
Water balances can also be expressed vis-à-
vis  the  controlled  renewable  blue  water 
(CRBW), i.e. the sum of surface water, aquifer 
recharge and imports from both distant aqui-
fers and surface water, from which have been 
deducted the (few) resources which cannot be 
controlled and are of ‘no use’: a few flash floods 
exceeding the capacity of the dams5 as well as 
brackish flows from Israel. The overall water 
use in the basin, considered as a system, has 
continuously  increased,  with  depleted  with-
drawals accounting for 11% of the CRBW in 
1950, for 37% in 1975, and for 87% in 2000 
(Courcier et al., 2005).6 The LJRB is a closed 
river basin, where little water is left to be mobi-
lized and used. This sets a drastic limit to what 
can be achieved through conservation means 
(see next section).
Evolution of the terms of the water balance in 
the lower Jordan River basin
From the situation in the 1950s, when few of 
the surface water and groundwater resources 
were used, to the current situation of overex-
ploitation, the terms of the water balance have 
obviously varied from one extreme to the other. 
The net inflow into the basin moved from over 
3300  Mm3/year  in  1950  to  around  2600 
Mm3/year in the following periods, because of 
upstream  diversions  by  Israel  and  Syria. 
Deducting  rainfall  water  directly  evaporated 
from crops and bare soil, renewable blue water 
shows a similar drop by 50%, with a slump at 
671 Mm3 in 2000 (Fig. 2.5). The CRBW is 
significantly lower, since uncontrolled and/or 
brackish flows from the Yarmouk (now control-
led by the Wehdah dam) or Israel are discounted. 
Strikingly,  withdrawals  (gross  diversions  of 
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minus interbasin transfers) now amount to 660 
Mm3/year,  or  121%  of  CRBW,  because  of 
groundwater overdraft and multiple diversions 
(return  flows  from  wadi  irrigation  or  from 
Amman are reused downstream). Annual with-
drawals  have  continuously  and  dramatically 
increased in the last 50 years, from 101 Mm3 
in 1950 (20% of the CRBW) to 316 Mm3 in 
1975 (58% of the CRBW), and 660 Mm3 in 
2000. In 2000, only 130 Mm3/year of control-
lable  blue  water  made  it  to  the  Dead  Sea 
(Courcier et al., 2005). Figure 2.5 also shows 
the evolution of the intended beneficial deple-
tion (irrigation and M&I), which almost equated 
to CRBW in 2000. Overdraft of aquifers now 
reaches 32 Mm3/year (Courcier et al., 2005). 
Figure 2.6 shows the terms of water balances.
This water accounting pools together four 
different kinds of water sources – groundwater, 
surface  water  (controlled  by  dams),  stream 
water (uncontrolled flows that are diverted) and 
efficient rainfall (used by irrigated and rainfed 
crops)  –  in  a  single  category:  water  use  (or 
withdrawals).  These  four  categories  of  water 
sources are, however, not equivalent because 
the  degree  of  control  managers/users  have 
over them varies highly (in decreasing order in 
the  above  list)  (Molle,  2003).  It  is  therefore 
instructive to disaggregate water use into these 
four  categories  and  to  plot  these  fractions 
against time. By so doing, and including projec-
tions for 2025,7 we obtain a view of both their 
relative importance and time dynamics: Figure 
2.7 first shows that (effective) rainfall on rainfed 
crops constitutes the major category of benefi-
cial water, even in such arid conditions. It is 
also  striking  that  groundwater  abstraction  in 
the LJRB now appears as a source of greater 
magnitude than (controlled) gross diversions of 
surface  water  (275  Mm3/year  against  120 
Mm3/year  in  2000),  although  this  will  be 
reversed  when  the  Red–Dead  project  is  in 
operation (see later). Surface water follows the 
construction of the dams, while stream water 
includes  side-wadis  and  Yarmouk  diversions: 
stream water increases with the construction of 
the KAC (supplied by water diverted from the 
Yarmouk) but decreases as dam construction 
shifts water from the stream water category to 
the surface water category.
Sectoral water use 
Sectoral water use has changed widely over the 
last 50 years (together with the projection for 
2025).  While  total  agricultural  withdrawals 
have  levelled  off  since  the  mid-1970s,  M&I 
withdrawals reached 31% of total withdrawals 
in 2000 (M&I depletion amounts to 10% of 
total withdrawals) and are expected to hit 52% 
Fig. 2.5.  Evolution of net inflow and available water in the Jordanian part of the lower Jordan River basin in 
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in 2025 (Courcier et al., 2005). This evolution 
will reproduce that observed in Israel, where 
agricultural water use remains, by and large, 
stable, but increasingly relies on treated waste-
water, while M&I uses benefit from increases in 
supply  and  eventually  supersede  agriculture. 
The share of groundwater in M&I is dominant 
but this situation will also be inverted with the 
supply of the Red–Dead project.
Water options and the distribution of benefits 
and costs
Faced with conditions of water scarcity, socie-
ties have three broad types of options at their 
disposal (Molle, 2003). First, they may increase 
the  amount  of  water  that  is  controllable  for 
human  use;  this  is  the  conventional  supply 
augmentation option. Second, they may try to 
conserve water, either by reducing demand or 
by serving more users with the same amount of 
water  abstracted.  Third,  they  may  keep  the 
current level of withdrawals but reallocate water 
among  uses  and  users.  These  three  options, 
water resources development, conservation and 
allocation, can be resorted to at different scales, 
typically  those  of  country  (national  policies), 
basin or local levels. When considering nested 
scales it becomes clear that these categories are 
not ‘waterproof’ (for example, mobilizing water 
locally  by,  say,  small  dams  may  be  seen  as 
re  allocation at the basin level) and that the three 
options are resorted to concomitantly.
Which  of  the  three  options  is  selected 
depends on the respective costs and benefits 
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attached  to  these  options  and  on  the  social 
distribution of these costs and benefits among 
concerned parties (politicians, private compa-
nies, marginal groups, irrigators, cities, devel-
opment banks, etc.) (see Molle et al., 2007 
and  Chapter  1,  this  volume).  Costs  are  not 
only financial but also political, environmental, 
or expressed in terms of risk, health impact 
and benefits foregone. Likewise, benefits are 
not  only  monetary  but  often  political,  or 
expressed in terms of amenity and prestige, for 
example.  It  is  the  relationship  between  the 
distribution of decision-making power and the 
potential social distribution of the costs/bene-
fits attached to each option that largely deter-
mines  which  actions  are  taken.  This  section 
examines  the  main  options  offered  to  the 
Jordanian society through this lens.
Supply augmentation
Most water sources have now been tapped and 
the  costs  of  mobilizing  additional  water 
resources  are  ever  increasing.  These  costs, 
which have until now been supported by the 
government  and  international  aid  (expensive 
dams, long-distance transfers, elevation costs, 
desalination, etc.; see GTZ, 1998; Nachbaur, 
2004), may have to be increasingly borne by 
the population in the next decades.
The last reservoirs, which are likely to be 
built  on  side-wadis,  are  generally  far  from 
consumption centres, smaller and expensive. 
One of these, located on the wadi Mujib, which 
flows  directly  to  the  Dead  Sea,  has  recently 
added  a  capacity  of  35  Mm3/year.  The  last 
main reservoir to have been built (after being 
delayed for several decades) was the Wehdah 
(unity) dam on the Yarmouk. It has a storage 
capacity of 110 Mm3, for an annual inflow of 
85  Mm3/year  (THKJ,  2004).8  The  conse-
quence is a nearly complete disappearance of 
the lower Jordan River flow as well as that of 
lateral  flows  (Mujib  dam)  reaching  the  Dead 
Sea.  The  resources  made  available  will  be 
diverted mostly to cities.
Fig. 2.7. Water withdrawal trends in the lower Jordan River basin in Jordan from 1950 to 2025 according to 
four water ‘categories’.36  M. Van Aken et al.
In the situation of extreme scarcity character-
istic of the country, large transfers have long 
been  envisaged  (transfer  of  fresh  water  from 
Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and even Turkey; transfer 
of sea water from the Mediterranean Sea to the 
Dead  Sea  (GTZ,  1998));  but  these  transfers 
have never been implemented because of the 
regional political instability and their very high 
costs in terms of investment and O&M. A large 
transfer from the fossil aquifer of Disi, located 
about 325 km south of Amman, has now been 
funded (at a purported cost of US$990 million), 
and finally entrusted to a Turkish company. The 
project is to provide 100 Mm3/year, extracted 
by 65 wells at a depth of 500 m. According to 
the Water Minister, Raed Abu Soud, ‘The capi-
tal [Amman] will get water from the aquifer for 
the  coming  100  years’  (Terra  Daily,  2008b), 
while experts speak of 50 years (Terra Daily, 
2008a). Uncertainty about the yield of the aqui-
fer is paralleled by doubt about the fate of the 
existing  irrigation  based  on  the  same  aquifer 
(which  consumes  80  Mm3/year),  as  experts 
explain that the two uses are incompatible (IRIN, 
2007).  The  issue  is  considered  as  ‘sensitive’ 
because  ‘there  are  tens  of  farms  owned  by 
former high-ranking officials with thousands of 
employees,  the  majority  of  them  expatriates’ 
and the government is still ‘considering revok-
ing licences for many farms in the area’ (IRIN, 
2007).
The  Disi  project  is  dwarfed  by  a  US$5 
billion plan to transfer seawater from the Red 
Sea to the Dead Sea over a distance of 180 
km. A large transfer (1500 Mm3/year in total) 
is planned in order to supply the main cities of 
Jordan, Palestine and Israel, but a first phase of 
800–1000 Mm3/year should bring to the Dead 
Sea a volume close to that historically contrib-
uted by the Jordan River. Seawater would be 
desalinated  on  the  shores  of  the  Dead  Sea 
using the electricity generated by the natural 
difference in altitude (400 m) (Harza, 1998). 
The project has been alternately justified as the 
mother of all solutions, a means to restore the 
Dead Sea and its value to the three main mono-
theist religions, a means to counter environ-
mental  degradation  and  salvage  the  tourism 
industry, a solution to urban water shortages, 
and a way of fostering regional collaboration 
and contributing to the peace process in the 
region (the project is also known as the ‘peace 
conduit’). The World Bank and several country 
donors are supporting a feasibility study of this 
multi-billion  dollar  project,  launched  in 
December  2006.  This  project  bears  all  the 
characteristics  of  mega-projects:  a  relatively 
secretive planning and design, and an array of 
justifications  that  borrow  from  discourses  on 
state  building,  national  security  and  peace 
building, and is likely to face massive cost over-
runs (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Other local desal-
ination projects of smaller scale are also being 
planned or implemented.
Another supply augmentation option is to 
reclaim wastewater to make it reusable in agri-
culture. It is forecast that, from 2025, Amman 
will  produce  100  Mm3  of  wastewater  each 
year. We have seen earlier that more TWW 
would be sent to the Jordan valley and that this 
raises a host of economic, cultural and health-
related issues.
Last,  a  marginal  increase  in  freshwater 
supply might come from the implementation 
of the 1994 Peace Treaty between Jordan and 
Israel: Israel is bound by the treaty to desalinate 
the 20 Mm3 of saline water it now dumps each 
year  into  the  Jordan  valley,  below  Lake 
Tiberius, and will transfer half of this volume to 
Jordan.
Conservation
Water crises serve to increase scrutiny of the 
‘losses’ occurring in man-made conveyance and 
distribution networks. Urban supply networks, 
notably those of Amman, have been targeted by 
several recent projects. Unaccounted-for water, 
which  includes  losses  by  leakage  (and  non-
payment), was around 50% and is supposed to 
have been reduced to around 30% in Amman, 
after network rehabilitation and better manage-
ment. A new US$250 million plan to rehabili-
tate old water networks is also underway (Terra 
Daily,  2008b).  Additional  measures  have 
included public campaigns to raise awareness 
and encourage rationing in times of drought, 
and  relative  increases  in  prices.  Recent 
announcements  (April  2008)  of  further  hikes 
have,  however,  caused  havoc,  showing  the 
social sensitivity of price increases in a context 
of rising commodity prices.
Agriculture  is  also  often  designated  as  a 
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irrigation networks have also been targeted. In 
the highlands, as mentioned earlier, the various 
policies implemented have had limited impact, 
and improving irrigation technology, at best, 
reduces return flows to the aquifer (and there-
fore creates no net savings) or, at worst, leads 
farmers  to  capitalize  on  lower  per  hectare 
water requirements to expand cultivation (since 
land is not a constraint), thus increasing total 
water  depletion  and  worsening  the  status  of 
the  aquifer.  Raising  prices  to  disqualify  low-
value olive trees will only lead to wells being 
sold to farmers engaged in a capital-intensive 
agriculture that is associated with higher deple-
tion rates. Consequently, the only way to effec-
tively curb abstraction is to buy wells back from 
farmers, and offer compensation for discon-
tinuing  licences,  a  measure  considered  posi-
tively by many farmers in the Amman–Zarqa 
basin  (Chebaane  et  al.,  2004).  Reaching  a 
sustainable  level  of  groundwater  exploitation 
would  require  discontinuing  all  agricultural 
groundwater  abstractions.  It  seems  unlikely, 
however, that from a role of producer–exporter 
of  fresh  products  Jordan  will  become  a  net 
importer of these products. Moreover, as seen 
earlier, policies to reduce irrigated agriculture 
in the highlands are likely to face fierce opposi-
tion and to be delayed and only partially imple-
mented, if at all.
The scope for conservation in the valley is 
somewhat larger, although equally limited. Part 
of  the  inefficiency  comes  from  dysfunctional 
distribution at the level of the collective pump 
stations,  and  pilot  projects  have  shown  that 
redefinition of water turns could improve reli-
ability, while other efforts have been devoted 
to building up water user associations (GTZ, 
2001,  2002;  Van  Aken,  2004;  MREA  and 
JVA,  2006;  San  Filippo,  2006).  Quotas  for 
vegetables are already so low that it is hard to 
imagine  any  substantial  gains  in  efficiency; 
some  improvements  can  still  be  achieved  in 
citrus  and  banana  plantations,  which  enjoy 
larger quotas, and retrofitting of on-farm distri-
bution networks has been found to be profita-
ble  because  of  the  improved  application  of 
water and resulting gains in yield and quality of 
products. All these gains, however, are achieved 
with a full consumption of quotas. Decreasing 
demand through a hike in prices is not feasible: 
with two-thirds of O&M costs recovered in the 
valley it is hard to imagine price increases much 
beyond the O&M level, at which elasticity of 
demand is negligible. Here too, as shown by 
the rationing implemented in the past decade, 
effective cuts in water diversions were obtained 
by  reducing  quotas,  not  by  price  incentives 
(Molle et al., 2008).
(Re)allocation
Reallocation is the most delicate option and 
arguably the most politically stressful. Irrigated 
agriculture consumes two-thirds of the national 
water resources (THKJ, 2004) and competes 
with domestic and industrial uses, which have 
been officially declared a priority (THKJ, MWI, 
1997). The competition with agriculture in the 
highlands is indirect, because water from most 
distant wells can hardly be transferred to cities, 
and in the long term, because the actual over-
draft of the aquifers decreases the resources 
potentially  available  for  future  urban  use,  as 
well  as  their  quality,  and  implies  that  more 
costly  alternative  resources  will  have  to  be 
tapped.
Water has been, and will be, reallocated out 
of agriculture in the valley, although the impact 
has been smoothed by the supply of TWW. An 
important aspect of this sectoral competition is 
the  growing  vulnerability  of  agriculture  to 
climatic vagaries. As the overall residual water 
user, agriculture in the valley bears the brunt of 
the  variability  in  supply  (see  Chapter  1). 
Compensation measures for fallowing land or 
in case of reduced supply (as in 2001) need to 
be considered in order to avoid financial and 
livelihood breakdowns. As seen earlier, further 
reallocation can be effected through reduction 
of quotas. In 2004, however, in contradiction 
to its policy to reduce demand, the JVA legal-
ized citrus orchards planted illegally between 
1991  and  2001,  granting  them  the  higher 
citrus allocation instead of the vegetable quota 
they received earlier. This illustrates the politi-
cal clout of the Ghzawi tribe, well established in 
the northern part of the valley, and the way 
tribal solidarity and national policies may over-
lap or conflict with each other.9
Reallocation of water among farmers in the 
Jordan valley can be envisioned if, following 
the  completion  of  the  Wehdah  dam,  annual 
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the  possibility  of  trading  water  would  then 
enhance  both  irrigation  and  economic  effi-
ciency, but this would require a quite elaborate 
system of monitoring and computing of indi-
vidual  water  diversions,  with  effective  valley-
wide  mechanisms  to  move  allocations  from 
one user to another. Fine tuning of irrigation 
supply  would  do  away  with  overirrigation  in 
(the  rare)  times  of  excess  supply  but  would 
substantially reduce leaching of salt. There are 
serious reservations and worries about whether 
this might also have an impact on soil saliniza-
tion (McCornick et al., 2001).
Reallocation  from  low-value  to  high-value 
agriculture can also be obtained by incentives to 
farmers to either change their cropping patterns 
or  lease/sell  their  farms  to  entrepreneurs. 
Higher water prices, or removal of tariff barri-
ers, would, for example, decrease the profitabil-
ity of marginal, subsidized and/or thirsty crops, 
including ‘luxurious’ olive trees in the highlands, 
and  citrus  or  banana  in  the  Jordan  valley.10 
Two types of farmers are concerned, with two 
corresponding obstacles to policy implementa-
tion. Some of these crops are grown by (some-
times  wealthy)  absentee  owners  who  are 
interested in prestige or leisure and not in agri-
cultural returns, and who are therefore insensi-
tive to price incentives. In addition, as mentioned 
earlier, these landowners are linked to influen-
tial tribes or to political elites and are likely to 
oppose  such  policies.  A  second  group  is 
composed of vulnerable farmers with little capi-
tal,  labour  or  willingness  to  face  the  risk  of 
intensifying their practices. High-value, profita-
ble crops are already an option for them and 
there are good reasons/constraints why they 
have not opted for them earlier. Positive incen-
tives that reduce capital and risk constraints, 
offering subsidies for improving irrigation tech-
nology,  attractive  cropping  alternatives,  and 
exit  options  with  compensation  should  be 
implemented if prices are to be raised (Venot et 
al., 2007).
A political ecology of responses to water 
scarcity
While all these options are on hand and have 
been floated for a number of years, most have 
not been implemented or have met with limited 
success. The overall decision-making process is 
highly  political  and  is  based  on  a  constant 
re  assessment of the costs and benefits incurred 
by the different categories of actors and by the 
environment, in both the short and the long 
term. Financial and economic costs that form 
the heart of conventional cost–benefit analyses 
only capture part of the story. Political arbitra-
tion remains central to decision making.
This  is  not  the  place  to  make  a  detailed 
analysis of Jordanian society, but a few groups 
have already appeared in the preceding discus-
sions:  the  royal  entourage,  the  different 
Bedouin tribes, Bedouin and Palestinian entre-
preneurs  in  the  valley  and  the  highlands, 
impoverished  farmers,  urban-based  land-
owners, migrant labourers, the aid industry and 
national/transnational  expert  systems.  These 
categories  are  interlinked  by  relationships  of 
economic power, patronage and social stratifi-
cation. The constant confrontations of inter-
ests, ideologies and power at the interface of 
these groups define which actions are taken or 
not. Complexity is added by the fact that these 
confrontations are not restricted to water deci-
sions,  but  include  other  hot  issues  (land, 
economic liberalization, shrinkage of the state 
sector, agreement with WTO, the Palestinian 
question, etc.), which signal the embeddedness 
of  water  policy  within  the  wider  political 
arena.
Table  2.1  illustrates  how  the  different 
options reviewed earlier translate into specific 
costs and benefits to particular actors.11 Supply 
augmentation options tend to be the favoured 
solution of most quarters. They are attractive 
to development banks, politicians (works are 
visible  political  landmarks),  water  bureaucra-
cies  (professional  legitimacy  and  sustained 
budgets) and the private sector (business oppor-
tunities) (Molle, 2008). Because they are capi-
tal intensive they also frequently open the way 
to corruption and private benefits. Costs tend 
to be shifted to weak or silent constituencies 
(typically the environment and the next genera-
tions) and shifted to the country as a whole 
(public investments), although the involvement 
of private investments means that consumers 
will  share  an  unknown  part  of  the  burden. 
Treated wastewater is a compensation to farm-
ers deprived of fresh water in the valley but 
entails hidden costs in terms of health hazards 
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Wehda dam on the Yarmouk; smaller dams on 
side-wadis





Farm ponds (farmers in the valley)
Conservation/reduction
Reduce leakage in Amman and other cities






Improve on-farm irrigation (valley and highlands)
(Re)allocation
Reallocate water from the valley to highlands’ 
cities
Define yearly quotas in the valley
Pricing policies (reallocate irrigation water or 
farms to entrepreneurs)
Reduce quotas of citrus and bananas in the valley
Table 2.1. Water sector reforms and interventions in Jordan: a multi-actor perspective on the distribution of costs and benefits.40  M. Van Aken et al.
The cost of conservation through techno-
logical  improvement  (in  Amman’s  networks, 
collective or on-farm irrigation) largely depends 
on who shoulders the capital costs. For high-
value crops, entrepreneurs pay for technology 
because its effect on produce quality, yield and 
labour makes it profitable. For less risky and 
capital-intensive crops, adoption of technology 
is not attractive and depends on government 
financial support and promotion by extension 
services.  Negative  incentives  alone,  through 
price increases or reduced quotas, are likely to 
spark opposition or social unrest and to give 
way  to  negotiations  and  weakening  of  the 
measures (as for the by-law on groundwater 
use).
In  order  to  understand  the  contemporary 
political  framework  in  relation  to  water  it  is 
useful to be reminded here of some events. In 
1988, King Hussein declared Jordanian disen-
gagement from the West Bank, an important 
political act towards the Jordanian population 
of  Palestinian  origin.  In  April  1989,  riots 
exploded in the town of Ma’an, in southern 
Jordan,  when  subsidy  reductions  on  certain 
basic  items  were  announced  in  accordance 
with a debt-rescheduling agreement with the 
IMF. Riots and opposition also shook southern 
Jordan in the 1996 ‘bread riots’, and later in 
2003. It is feared that recent increases in the 
price  of  commodities  will  lead  to  further 
demonstrations (Al-Jazeera, 2008; LA Times, 
2008).  It  is  important  to  note  that  these 
demonstrations developed in areas dominated 
by tribes once highly loyal to the Hashemite 
regime but who felt marginalized in the redistri-
bution of resources. 
As Richards (1993) put it:
In Jordan, all government decisions must be 
viewed through the lens of His Majesty, who 
must balance contentious internal and external 
forces. It is the calculus of the ‘balancing act’, 
not economic logic that determines all economic 
(and other) policies. The costs of offending 
important political actors, whether domestic or 
foreign, must be offset by tangible benefits. 
Agriculture is viewed mainly as a source of 
patronage  for  key  constituencies,  whose 
support is essential to achieve domestic stabil-
ity/foreign policy goals. Some landowners in 
the highlands and many farmers in the valley 
belong to influential Bedouin tribes that provide 
important support for the King, such as the 
Adwani tribe in the valley, whose members are 
well represented in the army and government 
bureaucracy.  Maintaining  their  support,  in 
particular against young urban Islamist radicals, 
is very important for the King, and sectoral or 
economic policies must therefore offer ‘pack-
ages’ in which compensations are extended to 
adversely  affected  constituencies  (Richards, 
1993). This provides hints on why many agri-
cultural or pricing policies are watered down, 
circumvented  or  delayed.  Relationships 
between  the  King  and  Palestinians  are  also 
important ‘given the Palestinian private sector/
Transjordanian public sector divide, and given 
the fact that economic liberalization targets a 
shrinkage in the state sector and an encourage-
ment in the private sector, it is not surprising 
that  Transjordanians  felt  threatened  by  the 
economic  restructuring’  (Brand,  1995).  Past 
conflicts with Palestine – and the lack of a solu-
tion  to  the  problem  of  refugees  –  still  loom 
large.
Regional  politics  (not  addressed  in  this 
chapter)  also  appear  in  several  issues:  the 
peace agreement between Israel and Jordan 
and the transfers of water attached to it, and 
also  the  lurking  competition  with  Israel  on 
whether the Red–Dead project will prevail, as 
opposed to alternatives to transfer water from 
the Mediterranean Sea, over which Israel would 
have full control. Because of the regional polit-
ical situation and financial needs, the Red–Dead 
project will have to be facilitated by interna-
tional aid or funding agencies, and bringing up 
environmental (save the Dead Sea), religious 
(the cradle of three religions) or political (the 
peace  conduit)  arguments  may  allow  Jordan 
and  Israel  to  shift  parts  of  the  costs  to  the 
‘international community.
Conclusion
This chapter illustrates the gradual anthropo-
genization and complexification of the lower 
Jordan  River  basin  over  a  time-span  of  60 
years.  It  describes  a  striking  transformation 
from  the  situation  around  1950,  when  only 
10,000  ha  were  irrigated,  groundwater  was 
untapped and abundant water flowed to the 
Dead Sea, to the current situation, when nearly 
all surface resources are diverted and commit-  The Lower Jordan River Basin  41
ted  and  groundwater  is  being  severely  over-
exploited. This trajectory has revealed a drastic 
concomitant  change  of  societies  and  water-
scapes in an arid region subject to dramatic 
political tensions and socio-technical change.
Mobility  of  social  groups  has  had,  and 
continues to have, a major impact in framing 
the  trajectory  of  the  basin:  the  tradition  of 
trans  humance and nomadism of tribal pastoral 
groups, interconnected with agricultural settle-
ments and fluxes of rural labour, the past slave 
trade, the two main shocks due to the forced 
migration of Palestinian refugees, the migra-
tion of workers from Pakistan and Egypt and 
the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Iraqis  who 
recently  found  shelter  in  Jordan  have  been 
major drivers of the changes of the waterscape 
of  the  LJRB.  In  addition  to  migrations  and 
displacement, mobility also refers to contacts 
with the ‘outside’, including fluxes of exogenous 
ideologies  and  institutional  actors  in  the 
management of resources and flux of capital to 
a rentier economy (from remittances and the 
aid  industry  and  also,  more  recently,  from 
economies at war and from Gulf countries).
Water projects have constituted a main tool 
in the search for stability, both with regard to 
regional competition for this scarce resource 
and in terms of internal stability: an instrument 
to settle and ‘root’ nomadic populations and to 
depoliticize a tense context; a vehicle for build-
ing up bureaucracies, which would be pivotal in 
the distribution of resources and the develop-
ment of patronage; a form of consensus build-
ing and modernization of the nation; a way to 
‘solidify’ the border in a disputed frontier area; 
and  a  means  to  cement  regional  peace  and 
obviate wars. All these have been determining 
elements in shaping patterns of water resources 
development and management and in defining 
new relationships between the state and citi-
zens, between tribes and the state, and between 
farmers and engineers.
The waterscape of the LJRB, first occupied 
by  Bedouins  and  small  rural  settlements, 
witnessed  the  emergence,  or  the  occasional 
presence, of actors as diverse as Palestinian or 
Iraqi refugees, Pakistani or Egyptian workers, 
sheikhs from the Gulf region, peace negotia-
tors,  greenhouse  entrepreneurs,  irrigation 
bureaucrats,  foreign  development  experts, 
researchers,  international  bankers,  tourists, 
Islamic fundamentalists, urban absentee owners 
with swimming pools in their orchards, Bedouin 
farmers using desalination plants, and prestige 
olive-tree gardens watered in the middle of the 
desert. These actors have contributed to the 
peculiar trajectory of the LJRB.
Bedouin  tribes  who  controlled  natural 
resources, interlinked with peasant settlements, 
were the first to be targeted by irrigated settle-
ment schemes (in both the highlands and the 
Jordan valley), construed as a basis for nation 
building:  their  incorporation  into  the  state 
apparatus has been the counterbalance to the 
disruption of their pastoral economy and also 
the basis of the adaptation of tribal solidarity 
within the new political system. 
Rural livelihoods have shifted from livestock, 
rainfed cereals and olive trees, with spots of 
seasonal irrigated farming, to an artificial, ‘plas-
tic’ and intensified agriculture, partly linked to 
export  markets  and  also  to  rentier  strategies 
(irrigated olive trees in the highlands and some 
citrus orchards in the valley). Palestinian techni-
cal knowledge, foreign aid and immigration of 
foreign  labourers  (the  often  ‘invisible’  water 
users in agriculture, under the dependence of 
their patrons and managers) have been pivotal 
in  agricultural  development.  Technological 
change, in particular micro-irrigation and pres-
surized networks, has made water users inter-
dependent in a social context characterized by 
social/ethnic  heterogeneity  and  by  the  frag-
mentation  of  previous  social  networks  and 
forms of cooperation. Waterscapes have been 
reshaped  from  small  springs  and  streams 
diverted  to  family  gardens  and  communal 
patterns of distribution of land and water in the 
integrated  agro-pastoral  management  to  a 
centralized  bureaucratic  system  with  water 
pumps and pipes lifting water 1000 m up from 
the valley bottom and from distant aquifers to 
cities.  Water  is  thus  largely  de-territorialized, 
since it has lost its ancient linkages with land 
and local communities. Both the valley and the 
highlands, on the one hand, and agricultural 
areas and cities, on the other, are thus intercon-
nected and interdependent. This interdepend-
ence manifests itself in terms of competition 
(water  quantity)  and  also  more  and  more  in 
terms of water quality.
Around 2000, 64% of surface runoff and 
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through irrigation and M&I depletion, and this 
percentage springs up to 83% if we disregard 
the uncontrolled flow of the Yarmouk to the 
Jordan valley. At present, the basin is closed, 
as most of the water is mobilized and depleted. 
Because of the reuse of water and of current 
groundwater overdraft, withdrawals amount to 
121%  of  controllable  blue  water.  Resulting 
environmental change has included depletion 
of aquifer systems, springs drying up in oases 
and salinization of groundwater, as well as the 
lowering of the level of Dead Sea by over 20 
m. It is also important to note that the high 
percentages of controlled and depleted volumes 
are obtained even though we have considered 
the  Dead  Sea  as  a  sink  with  no  ‘needs’. 
Environmental  considerations  have  de  facto 
been written off as a result of the diversion of 
the upper Jordan by Israel but are back on the 
agenda, as illustrated by the debate around the 
Red–Dead project. 
A new cycle of pressure over water resources, 
continued  concentration  of  power  and  water 
use in urban centres, and capital investments is 
being  triggered  by  the  recent  inflow  of  Iraqi 
refugees. Among competing solutions, conser-
vation offers a limited prospect: the Wehdah 
dam has brought controlled blue water resources 
to the level of 93% of the total renewable blue 
water, irrigation efficiency has been drastically 
improved through micro-irrigation, and perco-
lation  losses  in  highland  agriculture  largely 
return to the aquifer. Consequently, the scope 
for water savings at the local and basin levels is 
much reduced. Control of leakage in Amman 
and  further  efficiency  gains  in  the  valley  are 
desirable, but they will not radically alter the 
facts that a ceiling has been reached and that 
demand-management options may only allevi-
ate the actual situation without providing long-
term  solutions.  Typical  capital-  and 
technology-intensive  supply  augmentation 
projects, namely large-scale interbasin transfers 
(Disi, Red–Dead) and desalination, may there-
fore be the sign not only of a lasting dominance 
of  the  engineering  approach  but  also  of  the 
exhaustion of resources in the face of a new 
boom in population.
Yet the permanence of the use of scarce 
resources in low-value agriculture (olive trees 
and citrus), in subsidized thirsty crops (bananas) 
or by rich private entrepreneurs (Disi’s fossil 
water) constitutes an economic ‘anomaly’ that 
makes  water  import  or  desalination  projects 
look suspicious, since the cost of water will be 
much higher than its opportunity cost in these 
agricultural  activities.  Political  objectives  and 
constraints,  as  is  often  the  case,  override 
economic considerations, and agriculture keeps 
a  role  in  buying  loyalty  from  some  Bedouin 
tribes and rewarding high-level officials. Threats 
to vested interests inherent in demand-manage-
ment measures raise the political costs of these 
policy options. The gradual intensification of 
agriculture towards a capital- and knowledge-
intensive  activity  also  has  implications  for 
weaker segments of the population in terms of 
social stratification, access to land and distribu-
tion of benefits, and stresses the importance of 
compensations and of the availability of alter-
native activities for those who are pushed to 
give up agriculture.
As a closing basin, the LJRB is character-
ized  by  an  increasing  interconnectedness  of 
uses  and  users  through  a  hydrological  cycle 
reshaped by human technology. But technol-
ogy allows a reversal of gravity and water to be 
pumped from the valley to the highlands, in a 
manifestation of the sectoral competition over 
water, and of the economic and political power 
of urban users. In agriculture, entrepreneurs, 
family  farms  and  rentiers  also  compete  for 
water,  in  both  the  valley  and  the  highlands, 
with  their  respective  strategies  and  assets  – 
financial,  political  or  otherwise.  The  weaker 
and  the  most  downstream  ‘user’,  the  Dead 
Sea, is the ultimate loser. These intricate influ-
ences of social, economic and political factors 
in the shaping of the LJRB’s future trajectory 
illustrate the inherent and strong coupling of 
the  evolution  of  both  societies  and  water-
scapes.
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Notes
  1   The  water-accounting  exercise  presented  here 
draws  on  the  categories  of  water  balance 
proposed by Molden (1997). For more details on 
data sources refer to Courcier et al., 2005 and 
Van Aken et al., 2007.
  2   Average  rainfall  distribution  is  adapted  from 
EXACT (1998).
  3    Recently, the process of privatization has been 
slowed down. For example, after 2006 a public 
company (Mihayuna) replaced the private one in 
charge  of  the  management  of  Amman’s  water 
utilities.  At  the  same  time,  several  projected 
privatizations  have  been  delayed  (notably  one 
concerning the privatization of the Jordan Valley 
Authority, the public agency in charge of water 
management in the Jordan valley).
  4   The WTO, the Jordan–EU Agreement, the Great 
Arab  Free Trade  agreement  establishing  a  free 
trade area between the Arab states, and several 
bilateral agreements, notably with the USA and 
Israel.
  5     At  the  time  of  our  accounting,  flash  floods 
included  110  Mm3  from  the  Yarmouk  River, 
which  could  not  be  stored  and  flowed  to  the 
Dead Sea. Those are now (2008) captured by the 
recent Wehdah dam, constructed upstream of the 
intake of the KAC.
  6   The CRBW amounted to 493, 543 and 545 Mm3/
year in 1950, 1975 and 2000, respectively. With 
the completion of the Wehdah dam CRBW is 655 
Mm3/year.
  7   These include: the recent Wehdah dam on the 
Yarmouk  River,  increasing  water  imports  from 
outer basins, the construction of several desali-
nation  plants,  the  extension  of  irrigation  (with 
treated  wastewater)  in  the  south  of  the  Jordan 
valley, the reduction of agricultural groundwater 
abstraction in the highlands, and the first trans-
fers  of  desalinated  water  through  the  Red 
Sea–Dead Sea project (100 Mm3/year; against a 
provision of 570 Mm3/year for Jordan at comple-
tion of the project (Harza, 1998)).
  8    In 2007 and 2008, inflows in the Wehdah dam 
were, however, much lower than expected (this 
could be due to increased water use in the upper 
Yarmouk basin).
  9   As  illustrated  by  recurring  conflicts  between 
members  of  the  Adwani  tribe  in  the  southern 
Ghor and high-ranking officials of the JVA.
10   Alternatives include different types of vegetables 
and fruits, such as date palm in the valley, which 
are low water consuming, relatively salt resistant 
and highly profitable but are capital and manage-
ment intensive, risky and require good control of 
marketing.
11   These categories of actors are, of course, simplifi-
cations. In reality none of them is homogeneous 
but consideration of inner diversity is beyond the 
scope of this work.
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Overview of the Argument
Beginning in the early 19th century, land and 
water resources in South Africa’s Olifants basin 
were  systematically  mobilized  to  benefit 
commercial  agriculture,  mines  and  industries 
owned by a tiny minority of the population. 
During the 20th century, the majority African 
population was increasingly confined to small 
areas  of  the  basin  having  little  agricultural 
potential or access to water. This resulted in 
dramatic contrasts between the wealthy minor-
ity and the extremely poor majority. Since the 
early 1990s, under the new democratic regime, 
South Africa’s constitution, with its basic rights 
guarantees, including access to water, and its 
world-famous  Water  Act,  intended  both  to 
reverse the wrongs of the past and to conserve 
scarce water resources for future generations, 
have raised high expectations. The Water Act 
is being implemented by politicians and profes-
sionals whose good intentions cannot be ques-
tioned.  However,  to  date,  access  to  water 
remains highly inequitable in the Olifants basin, 
and  socio-economic  well-being  is  improving 
very slowly.
Setting the Physical Scene
The Olifants water management area
The Olifants River is the largest tributary to the 
Limpopo, one of several transboundary rivers 
in  Southern  Africa.  Shared  by  Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique, the 
Limpopo basin has an area exceeding 400,000 
km2 (45% in South Africa). Of a basin popula-
tion of 14 million, 10.7 million are in South 
Africa (a quarter of the total population). Turton 
(2003) emphasizes the critical strategic impor-
tance of the Limpopo basin for all four riparian 
countries and the considerable ethnic diversity 
overlapping national boundaries.
The total area of the Olifants basin (includ-
ing  Mozambique  and  South  Africa  and  two 
large  northern  tributaries,  the  Letaba  and 
Luvuvhu) is 73,534 km2, nearly 17% of the 
Limpopo  basin  (ARC  and  IWMI,  2003). 
‘Olifants’ is the Afrikaans name for elephant. 
In Northern Sotho, the main language of the 
basin, it is ‘Lepelle’, ‘the river that meanders 
along’ (Bulpin, 1956). About 770 km long, the 
Olifants originates east of Johannesburg and 
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flows north before curving gently to the east. 
Its upper reaches are in the ‘highveld’, over 
1200 masl. Further east, the lower reaches are 
below a steep escarpment in the ‘lowveld’, at 
altitudes  of  less  than  800  m.  The  Olifants 
crosses three provinces (Gauteng, Mpumalanga 
and Limpopo) into Kruger National Park, then 
flows  into  Mozambique,  where  it  meets  the 
Limpopo (Fig. 3.1).
In  Mozambique,  the  Massingir  dam,  with 
2840 Mm3 of storage, is important for hydro-
power,  irrigation  (30,000  ha),  flood  control, 
and urban and rural water supply, as well as 
maintenance of low flows to prevent salt water 
intrusion at the mouth of the Limpopo (Carmo 
Vaz, 2000). There have been several devastat-
ing floods in recent years.
From  the  perspective  of  Mozambique, 
upstream South African water use is a vitally 
important issue, fraught with the potential for 
conflict. Low flows result in salt water intrusion 
and  water  shortages  (FAO,  2004:87–88).  In 
2005,  the  Olifants  stopped  flowing  into 
Mozambique for 78 days, causing considerable 
hardship. The implications for Mozambique of 
South African use of the Olifants have not been 
addressed by researchers and there is no specific 
international agreement on water flows. The 
South African Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF) is aware of this issue, although 
its assumptions about the amount that should 
flow to Mozambique may not be consistent with 
those of Mozambique officials.
The  official  Olifants  water  management 
area1 in South Africa drains an area of 54,308 
km2. In 2005, the population of 3.2 million 
represented 7% of the national population. Of 
this population, 67% is rural, higher than the 
national  average.  Blacks  are  the  majority 
(94%),  with  an  illiteracy  rate  of  50%. 
Distribution of wealth and access to services 
are  highly  skewed  between  urban  and  rural 
areas, and between whites and blacks (Maga-
gula et al., 2006). Population growth is slow, 
although shifting from rural to urban over time. 
There are seven major tributaries to the Olifants 
(Fig. 3.1). Based on DWAF’s demarcation, the 
Olifants water management area is a ‘primary 
drainage area’ (McCartney et al., 2004), and 
includes seven secondary, 13 tertiary and 114 
quaternary sub-basins. But the basin is normally 
divided  into  five  distinct  water  management 
regions (McCartney et al., 2004; de Lange et 
al., 2005).
Fig. 3.1.  Map of Olifants River, major dams (triangles), tributaries, towns (hexagons) and demarcation of 
former homeland areas (shaded areas). From McCartney and Arranz (2007).  The Oilfants River Basin, South Africa  49
Physical features
The geology of the basin is complex, and domi-
nated by igneous and metamorphosed rocks. 
There is a relatively low-relief, gently undulat-
ing plateau and a steep escarpment roughly 
separating the lower Olifants region from the 
middle and upper regions. Land use consists 
primarily of cultivation (dry and irrigated), graz-
ing, mining, industry, forestry, and rural and 
urban  settlements.  There  are  many  tourist 
attractions in the basin, including the Kruger 
National  Park,  private  game  reserves,  Blyde 
River Canyon Nature Reserve and several wild-
life management areas. There are important 
fish  hatcheries  and  trout  farms,  while  some 
reservoirs are also used for recreation.
Climate, rainfall and hydrology
The basin is characterized by warm summers 
and mild winters, with temperatures influenced 
by altitude. In summer, maximum temperatures 
are 30–34°C and with a minimum of 18–22°C; 
in  winter  they  are  22–26°C  and  5–10°C, 
respectively. Frost occurs only in the southern 
and  western  portions  of  the  basin  (FAO, 
2004).
The mean annual precipitation is 630 mm, 
with a range of 500–800 mm and coefficients 
of variation greater than 0.25 in all sub-basins. 
In the mountains to the east and on the escarp-
ment,  annual  rainfall  can  exceed  1000  mm 
(McCartney  and  Arranz,  2007).  The  rainy 
season is from October to April, with heavy 
rainfall  in  December  and  January  producing 
occasional floods. There are no months when 
rainfall  exceeds  potential  evapotranspiration, 
and  typically  it  exceeds  50%  of  potential 
evapotranspiration only in November–February 
(McCartney  et  al.,  2004).  Midsummer  dry 
spells are common, making rainfed agriculture 
risky.
McCartney et al. (2004) studied the hydr-
ology, complementing DWAF’s work (Basson 
and Rossouw, 2003; van Vuuren et al., 2003; 
DWAF, 2004a). The naturalized mean annual 
flow (MAF) of the whole basin is 2040 Mm3, 
only about 6% of the average annual rainfall 
(McCartney et al., 2004). However, this value 
masks  considerable  annual  variability.  Actual 
measured runoff, as influenced by human activ-
ities and exotic (i.e. alien) vegetation, reaches 
1235 Mm3 (de Lange et al., 2005). All studies 
agree that with total South African consump-
tion at around 44% of the naturalized MAF and 
increasing, the basin is already stressed.
DWAF estimates that the total groundwater 
recharge is 3–6% of mean annual precipita-
tion, which is about 1800 Mm3. Others suggest 
that  the  average  recharge  is  only  half  this 
amount, so values are not precise (McCartney 
et al., 2004). DWAF variously estimates total 
groundwater abstractions at 75–99 Mm3, prin-
cipally from mining, urbanization, stock-water 
and irrigation.
Estimates of average annual transfers into 
the basin as of 1990 (the official values have 
not changed in 18 years) vary slightly at around 
196 Mm3 (McCartney et al., 2004). Most of 
this  (188.8  Mm3)  is  used  for  cooling  power 
stations operated by Eskom (Electricity Supply 
Commission). It leaves the basin as evapora-
tion and has little impact on basin hydrology. 
Nearly  all  these  interbasin  transfers  support 
large-scale commercial water users (van Vuuren 
et al., 2003:4, 2ff.). Transfers out of the basin 
are very small.
Agriculture, livestock and forestry in the 
basin
Commercial  agriculture  officially  contributes 
only 7% of Gross Geographical Product (GGP) 
to the basin economy, but this is nearly twice 
the national level. Subsistence and small-scale 
agriculture, whose value is not measured, play 
a critical role in human survival, child nutrition 
and potential poverty alleviation.
South Africa generally classifies three farm-
ing  types:  (i)  subsistence/semi-commercial 
farming  (typically  dryland);  (ii)  commercial 
dryland farming (large scale and highly mecha-
nized);  and  (iii)  commercial  irrigated  farming 
(export  oriented,  intensive)  (Magagula  and 
Sally, 2005). All three occur in the basin, with 
commercial dryland on more than 70% of the 
cultivated area of 1.17 million ha, and commer-
cial irrigated covering around 11% (128,000 
ha).  Today,  the  average  size  of  commercial 
farms  in  Limpopo  Province  is  972  ha  (van 
Koppen, 2007). An estimated 70% of water 50  D. Merrey et al.
withdrawals goes to irrigation (30% of which is 
groundwater)  (Magagula  and  Sally,  2005). 
Estimated  water  requirements  using  the 
SAPWAT  model  range  from  436.8  Mm3 
(DWAF  data)  to  569.5  Mm3  (van  Heerden, 
2004). Of the estimated R 5.3 billion (approxi-
mately US$828 million) gross value of agricul-
tural production in 2004, 60% was generated 
by commercial dryland and 37% by commer-
cial  irrigation  (Magagula  and  Sally,  2005). 
High-value crops for export, such as citrus, are 
more common here than elsewhere in South 
Africa. Maize remains the dominant crop by 
area  and  is  grown  in  summer  under  rainfed 
conditions.
In addition, there is a small-scale irrigation 
sector, mostly in the former homeland areas. 
The basin has around 72 small-scale irrigation 
schemes with a total command area of 9534 
ha, 5564 farmers and an average plot size of 
1.6  ha.  However,  many  of  these  are  either 
defunct or underutilized. More than half of the 
farmers are women and often elderly (Mpahlele 
et al., 2000; Kamara et al., 2002; van Koppen 
et al., 2006).
Large parts of the Olifants basin are used 
for livestock and game farming. Van Vuuren et 
al.  (2003)  estimate  337,006  livestock  units, 
but there are no data from the former home-
lands. Cattle are the most common, but there 
are  also  sheep.  Game  (impala,  kudu,  water-
buck, gemsbok and rhino) is farmed for hunt-
ing  and  meat  production,  and  is  becoming 
popular.  Nationally,  the  ‘hunting  industry’ 
creates  many  jobs  and  a  substantial  income 
(www.phasa.co.za/index.php?pid=3).
Commercial forestry (mainly pine and euca-
lyptus) is an important water consumer; it is 
estimated to cover 400 km2 (Le Roy, 2005:10). 
Non-indigenous trees were originally grown for 
mining needs, but today commercial forestry is 
mainly linked to paper production (Lévite et 
al., 2003), and is dominated by large national 
and international corporations. These planta-
tions account for 28% of national commercial 
forestry. Non-indigenous species are seen as 
depleting far more water through evapotran-
spiration  than  indigenous  forests.  Therefore, 
DWAF charges companies for the additional 
‘stream flow reduction’ at a rate of R 10 per ha 
(DWAF, 2004b). There are also about 1399 
km2 of indigenous forests in the Blyde River 
and lower Olifants regions. An assessment of 
actual evapotranspiration (ETa) in part of the 
middle  Olifants  during  one  day  in  January 
2002,  using  a  remote-sensing  technique 
(SEBAL), found that agriculture accounted for 
only 24% of actual basin ETa, compared with 
over 58% through commercial forests (Ahmad 
et al., 2005).
Expansion of mining in the basin
Mining, a significant user and polluter of water, 
is  the  largest  economic  sector  in  the  basin 
(22.1% of GGP versus 7% GDP nationally). 
Employment in mining is growing slowly in the 
Olifants:  declines  in  gold  mining  balance 
growth in platinum mining. Manufacturing is 
largely a function of the relatively cheap supply 
of  coal  and  electricity,  much  of  it  based  on 
processing  minerals.  There  are  eight  major 
coal-fired electricity power stations, generating 
more  than  50%  of  South  Africa’s  electric 
supply (van Vuuren et al., 2003). The down-
stream impact of coal mining from both decom-
missioned  and  functioning  mines  is  a  major 
problem,  with  the  release  of  acidic  leachate 
into  both  surface  water  and  groundwater 
(Klarenberg, 2004).
Monopolizing Water and Creating Water 
Scarcity
From the early 19th century, the history of the 
Olifants River basin has been a story of resource 
capture  by  the  powerful.  By  the  late  20th 
century, a small race-based minority controlled 
nearly all the land, water and mineral resources 
and  the  wealth  they  produced,  while  the 
African  majority  was  becoming  increasingly 
poor and marginalized (van Koppen, 2007).
Warfare and competition on the eve of the 
Afrikaner Boers’ arrival
In the early 19th century, the Olifants basin was 
inhabited by African ethnic groups, largely agro-
pastoralists also engaged in trade with the Indian 
Ocean. Demand for ivory had led to a quantum 
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Maputo,  Mozambique)  (Reader,  1998:469–
470). Rainfall patterns were critical for grazing 
and  sorghum  cultivation.  The  highveld  and 
middleveld areas were more suitable for cultiva-
tion  and  summer  grazing;  the  malaria-  and 
tsetse-infested lowveld was only suitable for dry-
season winter grazing and as a major source of 
ivory.  Settlement  was  largely  along  streams. 
People  spoke  languages  that  are  part  of  the 
Bantu  language  family,  divided  mainly  into 
Sotho  and  Nguni  languages  (Earle  et  al., 
2006:9–16). They were agro-pastoralists, highly 
mobile  groups  with  loose  political  affiliations 
that  easily  assimilated  other  groups  (Delius, 
1983).
Even  before  the  Afrikaner  Boers  arrived, 
there  was  rising  competition  for  water  and 
land, cattle raiding and more serious warfare. 
Fearing  slave-traders  (for  Europe’s  colonies 
and the Cape Colony), waves of the population 
fled  into  the  Limpopo  and  Olifants  basins, 
seeking  protection  from  the  1780s  to  the 
1840s (Reader, 1998:464–478). The closing 
of the land frontier in the narrow coastal areas 
inhabited by Nguni-speaking people (i.e. Zulus), 
combined with serious periodic droughts, led 
to new and bloodier warfare. Conquering tribes 
came  into  the  Olifants  basin,  raiding  cattle, 
destroying assets and either subjugating inhab-
itants  or  driving  them  out.  As  this  process 
(called  mfecane)  was  occurring,  the  Boers 
began moving in from the south, and with their 
superior  technology  (guns,  horses)  defeated 
many  dominant  African  groups.  They  too 
needed slaves for labour (euphemistically called 
‘apprentices’)  to  farm  (Reader,  1998:472–
473).  They  grew  the  same  crops  using  the 
same technologies as the Africans and were 
often dependent on the Africans’ willingness to 
help them (Delius, 1983; Reader, 1998:480).
As African chiefs became more powerful, 
social differentiation grew. The Pedi chiefdom, 
with its centre in the Tubatse (Steelpoort) valley, 
ultimately  controlled  tens  of  thousands  of 
Africans. By the 1840s, it controlled the main 
trade routes, buying cloth and guns from the 
coast in return for iron, copper beads, meat, 
ivory,  horns  and  slaves.  In  1876,  near  the 
present-day Flag Boshielo dam, Sekhukhune I 
defeated the Boers. However, 3 years later, his 
army was crushed when the British joined the 
Boers and Swazis against him (Delius, 1983).
Opening salvos: white expropriation of land, 
water and mineral resources, 1832–1913
Migration, alliances and conquests in the 
early 19th century
During  the  eight  decades  from  1832  to  the 
early 1900s, three groups of whites, initially 
mutually hostile, encroached into the basin: the 
Boers, a small group of missionaries and the 
British. Both the Africans and the whites were 
seriously subdivided, but the whites exploited 
the cleavages among the Africans more effec-
tively  (Thompson,  2001).  The  early  Boers 
competed directly with the Africans for water, 
land  and  trade  routes.  Although  the  black 
population exploded (becoming 20 times more 
numerous than the whites) over the century, 
this did not translate into political or economic 
power.  Conflict  over  land  grew,  leading  to 
clashes. The Pedi defeat of the Boers in 1876 
and  the  annexation  of  the  Zuid–Afrikaanse 
Republiek (ZAR) by the British in 1877 led to 
the reorganization of the Republic’s adminis-
tration, enabling it to defeat the Pedi in 1879. 
The Pedi heartland was put under classic British 
colonial ‘indirect rule’, as a ‘location’ in which 
black chiefs ruled, supervised by white magis-
trates (Delius, 1983).
In  1886,  gold  was  discovered  in 
Witwatersrand near the Olifants basin, as well 
as smaller deposits of gold and minerals within 
the basin. By 1895, the first coal mine in the 
upper Olifants region opened. Then the British 
and  foreign-owned  corporations  wished  to 
control all of Southern Africa. The ZAR, now 
led  by  Paul  Kruger,  vehemently  resisted  and 
sought to tax the mines, leading to the Second 
Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).
Boers and British: white conquest and 
expropriation
Understanding  the  developments  in  the 
Witwatersrand (now the largest industrial and 
urban complex in sub-Saharan Africa) is critical 
to  understanding  the  Olifants  basin  develop-
ment trajectory (Turton and Meissner, 2002). 
The discovery of gold led to Johannesburg’s 
rapid growth and placed enormous strains on a 
water supply previously perceived as plentiful.
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control over water, land and mineral resources 
were nearly destroyed. The Boers controlled 
the  most  fertile  lands  and  the  best  water 
supplies.  British  legislation  backed  by  the 
British  Army  declared  registered  water  and 
land  to  be  white  private  property.  A  tiny 
proportion of the land was set aside for African 
occupation. Boer society was changing rapidly, 
becoming more inequitable and elitist. A group 
of new Afrikaner ‘notables’ became large land-
owners.  Speculators,  absentee  landlords  and 
companies from outside the basin owned 20% 
of the land by 1900. Well-watered land, often 
occupied  by  Africans,  was  the  first  to  be 
controlled.  Africans  were  forced  to  provide 
labour to these farms.
With rising market demand for maize and 
other food crops for miners, large-scale crop-
ping,  sometimes  irrigated,  was  initiated.  For 
decades,  absentee  white  owners  extracted 
rents from African tenants and sharecroppers; 
but as the market grew and railway facilities 
were constructed, there was a shift to capitalist 
wage labour arrangements for farm manage-
ment (Bundy, 1988; Terreblanche, 2002). The 
Afrikaner notables and British mining interests 
now had a shared interest in a docile, low-wage 
labour force, leading to the ‘alliance of maize 
and gold’. Many Boers who could not compete 
with large farms were also pushed into land-
lessness, forcing them to compete with cheap 
African labour.
Nevertheless, African farmers, often share-
croppers  on  white-owned  land,  responded 
effectively to the new food markets, adopting 
new strains of maize and irrigation. Some of 
these farmers used communal land and kinship 
relations as a base; some purchased land using 
legal  loopholes;  but  most  were  tenants  on 
white-owned land. Unfortunately, most of these 
‘peasant capitalists’ were soon deprived of their 
access to land and markets (Bundy, 1988).
The process of creating an ideological and 
de  facto  basis  for  territorial  and  institutional 
segregation  was  consolidated  by  the  South 
African Native Affairs Commission in 1905. Its 
purpose  was  to  forge  a  black  male  migrant 
labour force with a black female subsistence 
base in the ‘native reserves’; this labour was 
allocated proportionally to the mines and to 
Afrikaner farms. This segregation policy was 
further consolidated with the Native Land Act 
of  1913  (Thompson,  2001;  Terreblanche, 
2002).
The  1913  Act  separated  the  Union  into 
white areas (91% of the land), where Africans, 
coloureds  and  Indians  were  disenfranchised, 
and  black  reserves  ruled  by  ‘chiefs’  as  black 
administrators.  The  Development  Trust  and 
Land Act of 1936 consolidated this exclusion-
ary process. These Land Acts also implicitly 
deprived Africans of any formal water rights, 
because riparian rights were tied to land owner-
ship (van Koppen, 2007).
In  1910,  with  the  establishment  of  the 
Union  of  South  Africa,  a  Native  Affairs 
Department was created, and later the Native 
Administration Act of 1927 formalized ‘chiefs’ 
as  arms  of  the  government.  In  1936,  the 
reserves were placed under the South African 
Native Trust (later the South African Develop-
ment  Trust),  and  legitimized  the  racially  and 
gender-segregated labour market with extremely 
low  wages  for  men.  The  apartheid  govern-
ment’s homeland policies after 1948 entrenched 
these  patterns  more  rigidly.  Through  the 
Homeland Constitution Act of 1971, existing 
reserves were reorganized and new ones estab-
lished,  based  on  nine  officially  recognized 
African ethnic groups. In the Olifants basin, the 
supposed ‘Northern Sotho’, including the Pedi, 
were  included  in  Lebowa,  created  in  1973. 
Similarly, on the eastern highveld, KwaNdebele 
was created for the Ndbele, and Gazankulu for 
the Shangaan to the north-west border of the 
Olifants basin (see Fig. 3.2).
By the early 1900s, all of the ingredients 
for  state-supported,  race-based  wealth  accu-
mulation  were  in  place,  and  these  greatly 
determined  the  Olifants  basin  development 
trajectory. These ingredients included:
•	 A	Land	Act	excluding	Africans	from	claims	
to most of the land, water and minerals.
•	 Native	 reserves	 as	 a	 reservoir	 of	 cheap	
labour.
•	 Repressive	labour	laws,	enhancing	employ-
ers’ control over the black labour force.
•	 Discriminatory	 arrangements	 favouring	
white workers.
Henceforth, until late in the apartheid era, 
water development was used to further deepen 
the divide between privileged whites and the 
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‘race-based  differentiation  in  basin  develop-
ment’. The state played a critical role in this 
hydraulic mission in the Olifants basin, initially 
mainly catalysing irrigation development, but 
from the 1970s onwards promoting centrally 
controlled, large-scale bulk water supplies, in 
particular to the Witwatersrand and the adja-
cent Olifants highveld. The era of engineers 
able to overcome all obstacles to increase the 
water  supply  to  meet  growing  demand  had 
arrived  (Turton  and  Meissner,  2002:41;  van 
Koppen, 2007).
State-supported water development in the 
20th century
Irrigation development and the role of the 
state
There were three waves of investment in irriga-
tion in South Africa: around the 1920s (with a 
peak in 1922), in the 1930s (with a peak of 
5% of total state expenditure) and in the 1970s. 
Until the 1950s, the government exclusively 
supported irrigation development; support for 
other users started in the 1950s, and around 
1970 priority shifted from agriculture to other 
uses (Department of Water Affairs, 1986).
The ZAR adopted its first irrigation law in 
1884, revised it in 1908 and established an 
Irrigation Department in 1903 (van Koppen, 
2006). By the late 19th century, the Transvaal 
had adopted the Roman–Dutch permit system 
(van  Koppen,  2007).  In  1912,  the  union 
government  created  a  national  Irrigation 
Department  and  promulgated  the  Union 
Irrigation  and  Conservation  of  Waters  Act. 
This  Act  adopted  the  British  riparian  rights 
system, which tied water rights to land owner-
ship. This continued until major revisions were 
made through the Water Act of 1956, when 
the  Irrigation  Department  became  the 
Department of Water Affairs (DWA). This Act 
further strengthened government control over 
water and broadened its scope to ensure indus-
trial and mining interests, the new priority.
From the 1920s, another motivation was to 
employ poor unemployed whites and to settle 
potential farmers such as white war veterans. 
Smallholders were seen as more intensive and 
committed cultivators, and labour intensiveness 
was seen as a way of absorbing landless and 
unemployed whites. The policy also helped to 
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secure  white  domination  of  productive  land. 
Two such schemes were in the Olifants: the 
Loskop dam and the Rust de Winter scheme 
(Turton et al., 2004; van Koppen, 2007; see 
Fig.  3.1).  The  government  encouraged  both 
irrigation  boards,  i.e.  schemes  managed  by 
white  farmers  but  heavily  subsidized,  and 
government water schemes for white farmers.
The Loskop dam was built by and for poor 
white men during the depression era. Today, 
the area below the dam is intensively irrigated, 
growing, in particular, high-value crops (citrus 
and table grapes) for export. Most farms are 
large, modern and capital intensive, employing 
thousands of workers.
Seventeen irrigation boards were established 
in the basin (van Koppen, 2007). Public irriga-
tion has been especially important in the middle 
Olifants, under the Loskop dam. As settlement 
of  white  farmers  proceeded,  Africans  were 
forced  to  move.  But  there  were  a  few  cases 
where  the  South  African  Development  Trust 
purchased white farms to ‘rationalize’ bounda-
ries between white areas and homelands, includ-
ing farms below the Flag Boshielo dam (Stimie 
et al., 2001:57–58; van Koppen, 2006).
The trajectory of dam construction 
McCartney et al. (2004) estimate the basin has 
37 major and another 300 ‘minor’ dams, plus 
3000–4000 small dams, with a total cumula-
tive storage of about 1480 Mm3 (85% in the 
major dams). The total storage capacity is 72% 
of  the  average  annual  naturalized  flow. 
McCartney et al. (2004) also note that more 
than half are multi-purpose dams (often includ-
ing irrigation), while 28% (38% of the storage) 
are solely for irrigation. Figure 3.3 is a timeline 
of storage development in the 20th century, 
distinguishing former homelands from former 
white areas (Republic of South Africa). There is 
a clear discrepancy, with nearly all dams aimed 
at  benefitting  white  users  until  the  1980s, 
when two dams were built that also provided 
some benefits to former homeland areas (see 
also McCartney et al., 2004:27–31).
Water for mining, industry, energy, and rural 
and urban sectors
Until  the  1940s,  water  development  in  the 
Olifants for urban uses, mining and industry 
was  largely  a  private  affair  of  municipalities 
and firms. These schemes were scattered phys-
ically, and generally their costs were low. The 
Water Act of 1956 changed the prioritization 
of water use and, for the first time, made some 
subsidies  available  to  non-agricultural  local 
bodies. Coal mining in the upper Olifants basin 
played  a  major  role  in  this  shift.  Eskom  (a 
parastatal created in 1919) constructed coal-
fired electricity-generating plants in the upper 
Olifants  highveld,  and  coal-based  industries 
developed  around  iron  and  steel,  using  ore 
available  locally.  For  these  industries,  which 
require  large  and  highly  secure  quantities  of 
water,  dams  were  constructed  in  the  upper 
Olifants  from  1950,  but  demand  quickly 
exceeded supply (van Koppen, 2007).
Mineral deposits had stimulated land specu-
lation, prospecting and railway development. 
Phalaborwa and Steelpoort became two major 
mining  areas.  In  Phalaborwa  (in  the  lower 
Olifants: see Fig. 3.1), first copper and, later, 
phosphate were the most important minerals, 
but  this  has  now  diversified.  Initially,  small 
dams were built to supply water to the mines, 
white urban areas and black townships. The 
Phalaborwa  Water  Board  was  established  in 
1963, and after 1994 it was expanded and 
renamed  the  Lepelle  Water  Board.  By  the 
1970s, the assurance of water supply during 
the dry months to most of these downstream 
areas had become risky.
The Steelpoort area is even richer in miner-
als (platinum, magnetite, chrome). Mining was 
also done within the Pedi native reserve, but 
under  the  firm  legal  control  of  the  union 
government.  Mines  created  jobs  for  men, 
although  recruitment  was  from  outside  the 
region.  By  the  1970s,  the  appetite  of  the 
mining houses was whetted to further exploit 
the underground wealth in the Olifants basin, 
and the need to quench their thirst for water 
increased, a trend that has recently intensified.
Water policies on the eve of democracy: 
creating the ‘white water economy’ 2 
After  1970,  water  for  the  mining,  industrial 
and  white  urban  sectors  became  priorities  –   
although support for irrigation continued. This 
entailed  not  only  large-scale  water  works, 
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upper  Olifants  for  electricity  generation,  but 
also providing further assurance of supply to 
the  Witwatersrand  (started  in  the  1980s) 
through the Lesotho Highlands Project. Based 
on this, industrial development was promoted 
outside the white towns but near the home-
lands (Fig. 3.2) for their cheap labour. As a 
result, most of the total basin GGP is produced 
in the urban areas of the upper Olifants.
The  same  policy  led  to  prioritizing  water 
supplies to mining in Phalaborwa, justifying the 
construction  of  the  multi-purpose  Blydepoort 
(or Blyderivierspoort) dam in 1975. The third 
focus  was  supplying  mines  in  the  Steelpoort 
sub-basin. Stimie et al. (2001:38) estimate that 
the  number  of  mines  (around  100)  was  the 
primary driver for constructing the Flag Boshielo 
dam in 1987, although the dam also supports 
small-scale  irrigation  and  water  supply  to 
Polokwane (then called Pietersburg). Agriculture 
was not neglected: in 1977, the Loskop dam 
was raised to increase its storage capacity, in 
tandem with new upstream dams in Witbank 
and Middleburg (see Figs 3.1 and 3.3).
Water for subsistence: irrigation in the 
former homelands
The  creation  of  the  ‘homelands’,  combined 
with  forced  removals  and  rapid  population 
growth, led to rising tensions and frustration. 
Lebowa’s population grew from 291,000 in 
1970  to  629,000  in  1985.  The  tensions 
engendered by congestion and poverty further 
undermined  the  remaining  community-based 
water management institutions.
From the 1930s, the government tried to 
minimize  poverty  by  imposing  urban-based 
models, for example by regulating grazing. The 
1956  Tomlinson  Commission  recommended 
‘Betterment Schemes’ as measures to ‘develop’ 
the homelands by concentrating access to land 
only on large-scale male farmers and moving 
the landless closer to settlements (‘homeland 
towns’). Some domestic water schemes were 
developed, but in a top-down manner, ignoring 
the needs of black rural households (e.g. for 
livestock, gardening).
Black  farmers  had  themselves  initiated 
many  small-scale  irrigation  schemes  (around 
36), especially along the middle Olifants River. 
Most of these were developed on lands formerly 
irrigated  by  whites,  and,  in  most  cases,  the 
South African Native Trust had bought them to 
consolidate  white–black  segregation.  Most 
homeland  irrigable  land  was  owned  by  the 
Trust  and  sometimes  ‘improved’  with  new 
water management infrastructure before plots 
were allocated. The plot size was usually 1.28 
ha,  considered  by  white  definitions  sufficient 
for a nuclear African family to farm full-time 
and earn a ‘reasonable livelihood’. Plot holders 
were supposed to be males farming full-time, 
but by 1994 most irrigators on what was called 
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the  ‘Olifants  River  Scheme’  under  the  Flag 
Boshielo dam were, and remain, women. This 
was partly due to male migration for work and 
also  reflected  women’s  traditional  role  (van 
Koppen et al., 2006).
After 1969, plot holders needed ‘Permission 
to Occupy’ (PTO) certificates. In 1993, owner-
ship of all but four ‘farms’ in the scheme was 
transferred  from  the  South  African 
Development  Trust  to  the  government  of 
Lebowa and the infrastructure was improved 
by the Lebowa Agricultural Corporation; the 
Flag Boshielo (then called ‘Arabie’) dam was 
built  by  1987.  The  irrigable  area  was  over 
2000  ha,  controlled  by  ‘white  management 
and leadership’, assumed to be the key condi-
tion for success. Management dictated crops 
(alternating wheat and maize), dates of plough-
ing, fertilizer and chemicals to be used, irriga-
tion  and  harvesting  schedules;  provided 
ploughing services and inputs; and purchased 
the outputs. Service costs were deducted from 
the  sale  price  before  paying  the  cultivators. 
Shah et al. (2002:6) observe that farmers were 
hardly more than labourers on their own plots. 
These  centrally  managed  schemes  collapsed 
on the withdrawal of government support after 
1994.
The Olifants on the eve of democracy: 
population, poverty and concentrated wealth
The stark differentiation between the poor and 
well off, blacks and whites, and rural and urban 
people  is  worse  in  the  Olifants  than  at  the 
national level. Sixty per cent of the population 
reside in the former homeland areas, constitut-
ing 26% of the basin area (Fig. 3.2). Two-thirds 
are in rural areas, mostly in scattered informal 
villages  with  limited  commerce  and  services. 
There are few major urban centres within the 
basin,  but  important  interactions  exist  with 
Pretoria  and  Johannesburg.  Ninety-four  per 
cent are black Africans. Most future population 
growth will be urban; the rural population is 
expected  to  stabilize  because  of  HIV/AIDS 
(van Vuuren et al., 2003).
According to the 2001 census, 47% of the 
Olifants labour force is unemployed, with most 
available  jobs  outside  the  former  homelands 
(Magagula et al., 2006). Nearly 50% of formal 
jobs are in government, 21% in mining and 
19%  in  agriculture.  Distribution  of  wealth  is 
highly skewed between urban and rural areas 
(van Vuuren et al., 2003). Some 70% of the 
population live in poverty; 75% of them report 
they have no monthly income (Magagula et al., 
2006).
Much  of  the  area  below  Loskop  dam  (a 
region where International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI) researchers have worked inten-
sively)  is  now  in  the  Greater  Sekhukhune 
District  Municipality,  which  today  combines 
prosperous  as  well  as  poor,  formerly  white 
areas  with  poor,  predominantly  black  areas. 
This  region  contains  some  of  the  highest 
concentrations  of  heavy  metals  in  the  world 
(chromium,  platinum,  titanium,  vanadium) 
(Ziervogel et al., 2006). Growth in mining in 
this area and in the Steelpoort region is enor-
mous but has not yet reduced the municipality’s 
69%  unemployment  rate.  The  2005  census 
recorded a population of 1.12 million living in 
the  district,  mostly  in  the  former  homeland 
areas.  Commercial  agriculture  is  the  main 
employer there (Ziervogel et al., 2006:9–10). 
Only 30% of households have access to agri-
cultural land.
Post  Uiterweer  et  al.  (2006)  provide  a 
poignant description of the problems charac-
terizing  Sekhukhune.  In  the  19th  century, 
Sekhukhuneland  had  been  a  powerful  king-
dom; today, it is one of the poorest areas in the 
country and no longer well known. Over 40% 
of the villages did not have even a basic water 
supply in 2004.
The Post-1994 Dispensation: Trying to 
Achieve Equity without Reducing  
Large-scale Users’ Access
The new dispensation in South Africa: 
constitutional guarantees and idealism
Remarkably, there was a peaceful, negotiated 
transition from the apartheid regime to a repre-
sentative, constitutional government based on 
one person, one vote. The first fully democratic 
election was held in 1994, and elections have 
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tution, created through a wide-ranging public 
consultation  process,  has  explicit  provisions 
regarding citizens’ rights to a healthy, sustain-
able  environment  and  access  to  health  care 
and ‘sufficient food and water’, and requires 
the government to take reasonable measures 
to progressively achieve these and other rights 
(de Lange, 2004).
A  widespread,  although  white-dominated, 
consultative process during the mid-1990s led 
to the National Water Services Act (1997) and 
the National Water Act (NWA) of 1998 being 
adopted. This process is described in detail by 
de Lange (2004) and others (De Coning and 
Sherwill,  2004;  Backeberg,  2005;  Garduño 
and Hinsch, 2005; De Coning, 2006). Despite 
strong differences of opinion, the final bill was 
broadly supported by all major parties. This is 
remarkable  considering  the  radical  nature  of 
some reforms: for example, the riparian rights 
system  and  private  groundwater  ownership 
were  abolished,  as  well  as  the  connection 
between land and water rights. Water is now a 
national resource, with the Minister of Water 
Affairs as its custodian on behalf of the govern-
ment, and a system of licensing for specified 
periods has replaced water rights in perpetu-
ity.
The  NWA  has  been  perceived  by  senior 
DWAF officials as an instrument to achieve the 
broader goals of the new South Africa, captured 
in the slogan ‘a better life for all’ (Muller, 2001; 
Schreiner et al., 2002). It is intended to provide 
a framework for achieving broad, constitution-
ally mandated goals, such as equity, productiv-
ity and environmental sustainability, as well as 
specific  objectives,  such  as  cost  recovery, 
decentralized  management,  effective  service 
delivery and flexibility to adapt to changes.
DWAF  has  been  simultaneously  carrying 
out numerous complex activities to implement 
the NWA while transforming itself structurally 
and in terms of gender and ethnic balance, and 
recruiting  new  expertise.  It  has  carried  out 
studies, prepared policy statements and imple-
mentation guidelines, and held many consulta-
tions  with  stakeholders,  which  have  become 
increasingly race and gender balanced. It has 
also been pilot testing reforms.
DWAF has also given the highest priority to 
providing basic water and sanitation services as 
rapidly as possible to the estimated population 
of  12  million  lacking  these  in  1994,  and  is 
making good progress: as of July 2008, 2.48 
million still do not have water supply infrastruc-
ture  and  13.38  million  lack  basic  sanitation 
infrastructure  (http://www.dwaf.gov.za/dir_
ws/wsnis/,  accessed  4  July  2008),  but  this 
situation is far better than it was a decade ago. 
Since 2006, this function has been a municipal 
responsibility. To implement the right to suffi-
cient water, DWAF adopted a ‘free basic water’ 
policy, giving every household a right to 6000 
litres per month without charge. Where good 
infrastructure is in place, this works well, but 
for most poor rural municipalities, implemen-
tation is difficult (Post Uiterweer et al., 2006; 
Muller, 2007). With the handover to the newly 
created  local  municipalities,  domestic  water 
service  has  become  increasingly  problematic 
without  the  temporary  ‘cushion’  previously 
provided  by  DWAF’s  technical  staff  (van 
Koppen, 2007).
Implementation of the water act in the 
Olifants basin: institutional transformation?
The Olifants catchment management agency: 
a stalled process
The NWA provides for establishing catchment 
management agencies (CMAs) in each water 
management  area,  to  decentralize  and  inte-
grate river basin management and to provide 
stakeholder forums. A CMA is not expected to 
be fully democratic; its board should be broadly 
representative of basin interests but is appointed 
by the minister (Ligthelm, 2001). DWAF offi-
cials initially had high hopes for CMAs as ‘the 
key  vehicles  to  implement  the  new  water 
management  paradigm’  (Schreiner  et  al., 
2002:127): ‘Catchment Management Agencies 
for poverty eradication in South Africa’ is the 
title  of  a  paper  by  a  senior  DWAF  official 
(Schreiner and van Koppen, 2001).
The process of establishing an Olifants CMA 
was initiated in 1998 by a major consulting firm.   
IWMI  was  appointed  as  ‘peer  reviewer’.  The 
process itself, pitfalls and proposed solutions are 
described from DWAF’s perspective by Ligthelm 
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Wester et al. (2003) assessed the process and 
compared  it  with  a  much  different  approach   
in Mexico. The draft CMA proposal (van Veelen 
et  al.,  2002)  was  submitted  to  DWAF,  but   
not  taken  to  the  minister,  although  CMAs   
are being established in a few other (smaller) 
basins.
With hindsight, DWAF policy makers were 
probably  overoptimistic  about  the  efforts 
required  to  render  the  consultation  process 
genuinely  inclusive,  given  the  highly  unlevel 
playing field. The large public and private water 
users are well organized to defend their inter-
ests. However, the rural poor are not organ-
ized,  and  most  were  not  even  aware  of  the 
process  (Stimie  et  al.,  2001;  Wester  et  al., 
2003).  There  were  serious  cultural  barriers: 
most of the consultants were white engineers 
who did not speak the local languages. Only 
summary  translations  were  provided.  Poor 
communities tended to raise issues such as lack 
of drinking water, only to be told these prob-
lems would be addressed by others. In short, as 
Wester et al. (2003:808) note, ‘the effective-
ness of the process in the poor rural areas is 
doubtful’.
Clearly, DWAF and its consultants did not 
address  the  core  issues.  The  consultants 
focused on the organizational structure of the 
CMA,  not  on  the  critical  issue  of  equitable 
voice and power capture by minority interests 
in setting the agenda of the CMA. The consul-
tations were not designed to ‘balance’ political 
inequalities, for example by investing special 
efforts  in  dialogues  with  poor  communities. 
Therefore, the CMA could never have achieved 
the government’s equity objectives. There were 
similar experiences in other basins (Wester et 
al., 2003; Waalewijn et al., 2005; Simpungwe, 
2006).  In  recent  years  DWAF  has  reached   
out  to  the  new,  upcoming  local  and  pro-   
vincial governments through Provincial Water 
Summits in 2005 and 2006; in the long run, 
municipalities are expected to fill the local void, 
while large-scale users will also cooperate with 
local and provincial governments. These devel-
opments,  under  the  conceptual  umbrella  of 
‘Water  for  Growth  and  Development’,  have 
also served to begin closing the administrative 
gap  between  domestic  and  productive  water 
services (van Koppen, 2007).
Catchment management forums (CMFs)
DWAF senior officials realized the dangers of 
replicating  existing  inequities  and  monitored 
the consultation processes carefully. A major 
challenge is involving poor communities, and 
especially women, in these processes (Schreiner 
et al., 2004). One solution was to pursue more 
bottom-up  participation  (Schreiner  and  van 
Koppen,  2001;  Schreiner  et  al.,  2002; 
Simpungwe,  2006).  In  three  other  water 
management  areas,  DWAF  tried  to  enhance 
the skills of the poor, especially of women, by 
getting  them  involved  in  this  participation 
(Schreiner et al., 2004). Some resources were 
also allocated in the Olifants to enable a grass-
roots organizer to demonstrate how this would 
work (Schreiner and van Koppen, 2001). She 
organized  workshops  in  the  local  language, 
which  addressed  domestic  and  productive 
water issues. A suggestion emerged to organ-
ize multi-tiered, small-scale water users’ forums 
as a way to ensure effective local representa-
tion  in  the  future  CMA  governing  board. 
Smallholder water user forums (SWUFs) were 
thus  suggested  in  the  draft  Olifants  CMA 
proposal, but this was never followed up.
These  proposed  SWUFs  are  not  to  be 
confused with the Olifants River Forum (ORF), 
established in 1993 to promote cooperation 
for  conservation  and  sustainable  use  of  the 
river  (www.orf.co.za;  see  Schreiner  and  van 
Koppen,  2001;  Klarenberg,  2004:89–91). 
The  founders  were  mostly  white  representa-
tives of large mining firms, the Kruger National 
Park and DWAF. Membership today is more 
varied,  but  local  communities  are  not  well 
represented.  It  is  clear  that  this  forum  was 
intended, in part, to lobby DWAF and influence 
the formation of the planned CMA and water 
allocation processes, and in this sense it is a 
continuation of the ‘white water economy’ (van 
Koppen, 2007). Simpungwe (2006:15) claims 
that more than 200 CMFs have emerged in 
other South African catchments, and DWAF 
has formally endorsed their importance, even 
in the absence of supporting legislation (DWAF, 
2004b:97–98). Like the Olifants River Forum, 
many of these recent CMFs are de facto domi-
nated  by  government  departments,  other 
formal  organizations  and  white  economic 
interests, minimizing the potential to empower 
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Schreiner and van Koppen (2001) reflect 
on DWAF’s high hopes that an inclusive CMA 
process could lead to institutions able to service 
the  poor  better.  Unfortunately,  there  is  little 
evidence that CMAs, or CMFs for that matter, 
have  achieved  this.  In  the  Eastern  Cape, 
Simpungwe (2006) found that CMFs have not 
been  effective  in  achieving  equity;  while  he 
remains optimistic, his cases suggest that they 
have not created a level playing field – differen-
tial political and economic power distort the 
outcomes. In the Olifants, DWAF halted the 
CMA process in favour of attempting to estab-
lish CMAs in other, usually smaller, basins, and 
is using its own authority to manage the basin. 
Institutional transformation through CMAs is 
stalled, although there is now greater attention 
to  the  role  of  local  and  provincial  govern-
ments.
Water users’ associations and transformation 
of irrigation boards
The  NWA  provides  for  establishing  local 
co  operative  associations  to  undertake  water-
related  activities  for  their  members’  mutual 
benefit called water users’ associations (WUAs). 
There  are  several  approaches:  transforming 
existing irrigation boards into more inclusive 
WUAs; establishing new WUAs on small-scale 
government  schemes;  or  other  water  users, 
farmers or not, forming a WUA. In practice, 
most are organized around irrigation schemes.
Unlike  irrigation  boards,  WUAs  should 
include all water users, for example farm work-
ers  and  informal  water  users.  Therefore,  in 
transforming  the  irrigation  boards,  whose 
members are nearly all white men, the board 
members  must  reach  out  to  farm  workers, 
neighbouring  communities  and  local  govern-
ment, and give them a voice. The commercial 
farmers  have  invested  substantially  in  what 
they consider as ‘their’ irrigation scheme; for 
them, the new rule is problematic as people 
who have made no investment can participate 
in  decisions  that  affect  the  scheme’s  future 
(Faysse, 2004; Schreiner et al., 2004).
Comparing seven irrigation boards (two in 
the Olifants), Faysse (2004:14ff.) identifies two 
factors  explaining  the  level  and  outcome  of 
involving ‘Historically Disadvantaged Individuals’ 
(HDIs). First, commercial farmers’ initiatives to 
open  the  management  to  HDIs  occur  only 
where upstream HDIs can affect downstream 
commercial farmers’ water availability or where 
they are paying fees. Although DWAF policy 
states  that  all  water  users  can  participate  in 
WUA management whether they pay or not, 
commercial farmers oppose this and discount 
non-paying members.
Second, there is a lack of clarity about WUA 
responsibilities and there are competing defini-
tions of ‘equity’. Irrigation boards were invari-
ably set up with access to water, fees and votes 
based  on  the  proportionality  rule;  therefore, 
commercial  farmers  feel  emerging  farmers’ 
roles should be on an ‘equal footing’ under this 
rule.  Emerging  farmers,  often  supported  by 
government  departments,  feel  special  treat-
ment is ‘equitable’, given their inherent histori-
cal disadvantages.
Faysse (2004:18ff.) suggests preconditions 
for the effective inclusion of HDIs: representa-
tion based on organizing the HDI community, 
access to information, and stronger capacity to 
voice  problems  and  influence  decisions.  To 
achieve  this,  Faysse  (2004:23)  emphasizes 
that DWAF must monitor progress and use its 
enforcement capacity where needed. Only a 
few irrigation boards have been transformed 
into WUAs to date. The underlying conceptual 
framework for WUAs is the same as for CMFs 
–  using  ‘multi-stakeholder  platforms’  to  level 
the playing field among stakeholders. Clearly, 
the assumptions behind this approach need to 
be questioned.
Transferring management of small-scale 
irrigation schemes to WUAs 
Nearly all small-scale irrigation schemes are in 
former homeland areas. They were designed 
with entirely different objectives than commer-
cial  irrigation,  and  the  problems  they  face 
reflect this history. Although some have older 
roots, many were built by the government in 
the 1950s, and farmers were basically contract 
labourers.  Most  schemes  were  highly  subsi-
dized and stopped operating when the manage-
ment parastatals collapsed in the mid-1990s 
(Mpahlele  et  al.,  2000;  Shah  et  al.,  2002; 
Machethe et al., 2004; Veldwisch, 2006).
In  the  late  1990s,  the  Limpopo  (then 
‘Northern’) Province tried to ‘revitalize’ some 60  D. Merrey et al.
schemes. IWMI, the University of Pretoria and 
the  University  of  Limpopo  (then  called  the 
University  of  the  North)  became  associated 
with  this  programme,  concentrating  on  the 
small schemes below the Flag Boshielo dam. 
The  problems  of  these  schemes  include  low 
yields, small plot sizes, high operational costs 
and  centralized  management.  With  low  and 
variable  farm  incomes,  most  plot-holders 
depend  largely  on  other  sources  of  income. 
Irrigated plots are a source of some security, 
but people do not invest in them. It is only on 
some vegetable schemes where (mostly) women 
have very small holdings that productivity and 
net income per ha are high, but the holdings 
are too small to provide sufficient household 
income  (see  also  Mpahlele  et  al.,  2000).  In 
2003,  a  much  larger  revitalization  of  small-
holder irrigation schemes (RESIS) programme 
was launched throughout the Limpopo prov-
ince (see the conclusions, below).
Water as an instrument of social reform: water 
allocation reform (WAR)
The context of glaring inequities between the 
poor, largely black, majority and the wealthy, 
largely  white,  minority  is  well  recognized  by 
government. A basic premise of reform has 
been that reversing inequities needs democratic 
institutions that give a real voice to the poor. 
However,  the  democracy-as-solution  premise 
itself needs critical re-examination: can water 
reform really be the driver to reduce poverty 
and achieve equity, while preserving the econ-
omy,  i.e.  avoiding  rapid  radical  changes  in 
current ownership patterns?
For senior DWAF officials, ‘water is seen as 
a tool in the transformation of society towards 
social and environmental justice’ (Schreiner et 
al., 2002:129). They acknowledge the chal-
lenges and obstacles, but generally offer solu-
tions  within  this  ‘new  water  management 
paradigm for poverty eradication and gender 
equity’ (the subtitle of the paper by Schreiner 
et al., 2002). The new legislation did introduce 
the paradigm, and DWAF officials are seriously 
committed to meeting equity goals. But para-
digms, whether new or old, carry their own 
implicit, often hidden, assumptions, which may 
not always be realistic.
 While emphasizing the importance of radi-
cal water reform, DWAF also perceives a need 
to ‘balance’ equity with productivity and profit-
ability.  It  is  cautious  about  reallocating  too 
quickly  lest  ‘the  country  suffer  economic  or 
environmental  damage  as  emerging  users 
struggle to establish productive and beneficial 
use  of  water’  (DWAF,  2005:3–4;  see  also 
Garduño  and  Hinsch,  2005:xi;  Seetal  and 
Quibell, 2005). Indeed, this caution is expressed 
in the minister’s National Water Act speech to 
the  National  Assembly  in  1998:  ‘Our  water 
policy says that our aim in managing water is 
not  just  to  ensure  equitable  access  to  the 
resource, not a crude dividing up of so many 
buckets per person. Our aim is to extract and 
exact the maximum benefit to society from its 
use.’3
However, Minister Kader Asmal goes on to 
say that ‘The mischief we have to right in the 
economic use of water is to ensure that the 
benefits from the use of our common water are 
equitably shared.’ Shortly thereafter he states, 
‘… all South Africans have equal (emphasis 
added) rights of access to water resources.’ A 
subsequent minister, Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, simi-
larly emphasizes ‘the need to introduce equity 
in water distribution’, and water as ‘one obvi-
ous tool for the eradication of poverty’ (DWAF, 
2004b:1–2). Elsewhere, the minister discusses 
the need for equity, efficiency and sustainability 
but does not address the underlying potential 
trade-offs  and  contradictions  of  these  three 
policy ‘principles’.
Over time, DWAF appears to have lost faith 
in using CMAs as a means to achieve equity; in 
the Olifants, DWAF chose not to forward the 
CMA proposal to the minister and to carry out 
the  CMA  functions  itself  for  the  indefinite 
future.  To  operationalize  these  intentions  in 
other  domains  of  its  competence,  DWAF 
started implementing a ‘water allocation reform’ 
(WAR).  The  NWA  replaces  the  water  rights 
system that previously combined rights tied to 
land and, in government water control areas, 
rights  based  on  prior  appropriation,  with  a 
fixed-period,  tradable  licensing  system. 
Moreover, water allocation aims at redressing 
inequities of the past and allows for transferring 
water from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have-nots’. In a 
technical and legal sense, WAR involves imple-
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However, superimposing a licensing system is 
not necessarily appropriate with huge numbers 
of  poor  informal  users,  and  alternative  tools 
such  as  general  authorizations  are  proposed 
instead (DWAF 2006; van Koppen, 2007).
DWAF  (2005:8)  notes  that  the  WAR 
programme is being implemented because of 
the ‘slow progress with, and little evidence of, 
redress as we enter the second decade of South 
Africa’s democracy’. But the process proposed 
is careful, measured, ‘balanced’, and focused 
on water and not on land or support services. 
A major objective of WAR is to ‘meet the water 
needs of HDIs and the poor’. The actions to 
achieve  this  include  financial  support  to 
resource-poor farmers and compulsory licens-
ing to support ‘equitable (re)allocation of water’ 
(www.dwaf.gov.za/war/).
The  WAR  position  paper  (DWAF,  2005) 
was discussed in all provinces. In the absence 
of effective forums, poor rural people will have 
little voice, placing the entire responsibility on 
DWAF. Investing in creating effective forums 
facilitated by DWAF to prevent elite capture 
might have been a way to achieve broad agree-
ment around the programme. Current state-of-
the-art views on promoting institutional reforms 
suggest the state must be the main driver of 
reform, but the process itself must be struc-
tured  and  designed  to  facilitate  negotiations 
and create coalitions of stakeholders (Merrey 
et al., 2007).
Attempts by DWAF to achieve equity with-
out radical reallocation are seeking to ‘balance’ 
factors that may really be incompatible or at 
least not amenable to water allocation reform 
alone.  This  is  compounded  by  the  govern-
ment’s lack of an integrated approach to agrar-
ian and rural reform. Land reform and support 
to new emerging farmers are done with little 
coordination  by  the  national  Department  of 
Land Affairs, the provincial agricultural depart-
ments  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  local  govern-
ments. Indeed, past water-sector reforms have 
often  been  attempted  internationally  without 
recognizing that they must be part of a larger 
inter-sector reform programme (Merrey et al., 
2007).  In  sum,  the  evidence  suggests  that 
water reform alone is not enough. Land reform 
accompanied by water reform might have a 
greater impact on equity.
Household rainwater harvesting: reducing 
malnutrition while avoiding reform
DWAF  is  initiating  a  subsidized,  household-
level  rainwater-harvesting  programme  based 
on  the  experience  of  the  Water  for  Food 
Movement  and  systematic  pilot  testing. 
Growing  fruit  and  vegetables  has  substantial 
benefits  (Schreiner  et  al.,  2004;  de  Lange, 
2006:46–48).  Grants  are  provided  to  build 
tanks and train women in nutrition and vegeta-
ble production and use of water for household 
purposes, livestock, etc. (DWAF, 2007).
This programme is clearly useful in assisting 
poor  households  to  improve  nutrition,  child 
performance at school and possibly incomes. 
However, despite substantial short-term bene-
fits for the poor, it does not address the funda-
mental equity problems or the need for more 
radical agrarian transformation, and may even 
divert attention from this.
Trade-offs’ paralysis: environment, 
Mozambique, big business or the poor?
The NWA requires environmental protection. 
The reserve is the only water ‘right’ specified in 
the Act; it has priority over all other uses and 
must be strictly met before allocating water to 
other uses. The reserve comprises: (i) the basic 
human needs reserve, i.e. water for drinking 
and other domestic uses, consisting of less than 
1% of mean annual rainfall (MAR); and (ii) the 
ecological reserve (i.e. water to protect aquatic 
ecosystems,  requiring  an  estimated  23%  of 
Olifants MAR) (McCartney et al., 2004; van 
Koppen, 2007).
The  ecological  reserve  determination  for 
the Olifants was based on the building block 
method  (Tharme  and  King,  1998;  DWAF, 
1999; King et al., 2000; Louw and Palmer, 
2001),  and  does  not  include  basic  human 
needs (Schreiner et al., 2002). Standards are 
set for different reaches of the river – heavily 
used sections have a lower standard than more 
pristine sections, which are seen as worthy of 
preservation.
Currently,  average  environmental  flow 
requirements are met in most months, except 
in some locations during the dry season. Water 
resources  do  not  match  demand;  therefore, 62  D. Merrey et al.
DWAF is not fully implementing the reserve to 
avoid  damage  to  existing  economic  users. 
Instead, it plans to phase in full implementa-
tion  over  time.  Meeting  the  reserve  require-
ments while providing more water to mining 
and commercial agriculture is among the main 
motivations  for  infrastructural  development 
(i.e. construction of the controversial de Hoop 
dam on the Steelpoort River and raising the 
Flag  Boshielo  dam;  DWAF,  2004a). 
Implementation  of  the  reserve  could  signifi-
cantly improve dry-season flows through the 
Kruger  National  Park  into  Mozambique.  We 
are not aware of any detailed assessment of the 
costs and benefits – and of losers and benefici-
aries – of meeting the ecological reserve.4
Projections of water demand and supply: 
discourse of water scarcity trumps all
McCartney and Arranz (2007:1) assess three 
scenarios of ‘future’ water demand, based on 
plausible and internally consistent projections 
of water use in 2025. They use the water eval-
uation and planning (WEAP) model, based on 
water balance accounting, to build scenarios to 
answer ‘what if’ questions on changes in allo-
cation, demand and efficiencies (see www.sei.
se;  SEI,  2001).  After  developing  a  ‘historic’ 
water demand (1920–1989) and a ‘baseline’ 
demand (1995) for each scenario, McCartney 
and Arranz (2007) assess the implications of 
constructing  new  infrastructure  and  imple-
menting  water  conservation  and  demand 
management practices, and calculate levels of 
supply assurance; by combining water produc-
tivity data with estimated unmet demand, the 
authors estimate the economic cost of failing 
to supply water to each scenario.
The  annual  net  demand  in  1995  ranges 
from 577 Mm3 to 995 Mm3, depending on 
rainfall (‘average’ 744 Mm3) (McCartney and 
Arranz,  2007:21).  The  basin  experiences 
shortfalls  annually,  mostly  for  irrigation 
(approximately  26  Mm3),  and  also  smaller 
shortfalls for mining (in this scenario rural and 
urban supplies are assured at the 99.5% level, 
i.e. failure would occur less than once in 200 
years). The annual cost of this unmet demand, 
based on figures from Prasad et al. (2006:24) 
varies from approximately US$6 to 50 million 
(0.2–1.5% of current GGP), mostly in agricul-
ture. In this scenario, environmental flows are 
simulated as they are. Full implementation of 
the  reserve  would  lead  to  shortfalls  in  both 
urban and rural sectors, and would reduce the 
assurance of supply to mining and irrigation, 
bringing the total costs to US$13 to 78 million 
(McCartney and Arranz, 2007:25). The analy-
sis does not assess the benefits of meeting the 
reserve (there is no market basis for doing so) 
or the presumed benefits for the livelihoods of 
poor people.
The  three  future  scenarios  project  low, 
medium and high water demand levels, depend-
ing  on  population  growth,  changes  in  per 
capita demand, mine openings and closings, 
commercial forestry practices and assumptions 
on implementation of the reserve. They assume 
no change in commercial irrigation, land use 
and livestock. Within each scenario, demand 
fluctuates annually, based on rainfall and hence 
irrigation  requirements,  from  625  to  1325 
Mm3 (McCartney and Arranz, 2007: 25).
For all scenarios in 2025, seasonal supply 
shortfalls occur every year, and since irrigation 
is given the lowest priority, it suffers the most. 
In the high-demand scenario, shortfalls occur 
annually in every sector. The estimated costs 
range from US$23–404 million (low demand), 
to US$92–1334 million (high demand), i.e. a 
range of 12 to 41% of GGP (McCartney and 
Arranz, 2007:30). The authors also assess the 
likely  impacts  of  infrastructural  development 
and  measures  of  water  conservation  and 
demand management. New infrastructure and 
water demand management combined result in 
better levels of supply, although shortfalls are 
not  eliminated;  annual  costs  are  reduced  to 
between US$0.6 million (good rainfall in low-
demand  scenario)  to  US$191  million  (poor 
rainfall in high-demand scenario) (McCartney 
and Arranz, 2007:35–36, Table 30).
These  scenarios  are  indicative,  offering  a 
useful  platform  for  discussion,  and  suggest 
further  research,  including  an  assessment  of 
social  consequences,  the  impact  of  ground-
water development and full cost–benefit analy-
ses  (McCartney  and  Arranz,  2007:  33–34). 
Another gap is linking water productivity and 
equity  with  environmental  sustainability  and 
international  flows  to  understand  the  exact 
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tation policies (such as water allocation reform) 
at  least  implicitly  assume  a  zero-sum  game: 
achieving  greater  equity  will  reduce  overall 
productivity  (DWAF,  2005).  But  there  is  no 
evidence to support this perspective for agri-
culture: smallholders can certainly achieve high 
levels of water productivity, and more equitable 
allocation of basic water supplies will undoubt-
edly have large impacts on local productivity 
and well-being. In other sectors, there may well 
be water productivity economies of scale; in 
this case, benefit sharing becomes crucial, as 
discussed below.
A  more  systematic  socio-economic  and 
political analysis is needed as a basis for inte-
grated reform policies (e.g. land and water), 
and researchers could use tools such as WEAP 
to identify alternatives. Surprisingly, no investi-
gations  have  assessed  more  radical  alterna-
tives. In future, demand will increase. Plausible 
scenarios indicate that even with low to medium 
growth  (i.e.  net  water  demand  increasing  to 
between  818  and  1073  Mm3  by  2025), 
currently planned infrastructure will be insuffi-
cient to meet demands, including those of the 
reserve; shortfalls will occur every year, with 
irrigation  suffering  most  (McCartney  and 
Arranz, 2007:26–27, Table 20). Water conser-
vation and demand management interventions 
must be implemented.
Outcomes to Date: Old and New 
Winners and Losers
We have discussed the extreme inequity in the 
Olifants basin, its history and drivers. In the 
mid-1990s, the former homeland areas, with 
64% of the population, accounted for less than 
3%  of  the  total  agricultural  GGP,  2.35%  of 
total mining GGP and 3.4% of manufacturing 
GGP (Lévite, 2003). This inequity continues 
and may not be improving. Researchers have 
applied  three  methodologies  for  measuring 
equity  of  both  access  to  and  benefits  from 
water: the water poverty index, equity coeffi-
cient and Gini coefficient. All of these meas-
ures have limitations, but taken together they 
reinforce  the  observation  of  continuing  high 
levels of inequity. Molle and Mollinga (2003) 
and Shah and van Koppen (2006) warn that 
such  indicators  must  be  used  cautiously  and 
complemented with local in-depth studies, but 
the findings do provide important insights.
Magagula et al. (2006) assess the impact of 
water scarcity and lack of water access using 
the ‘water poverty index’ (WPI), which is based 
on five component indices: resources, access, 
capacity, use and environment, each with vari-
ous sub-indices and using a scale from 0 to 
100.5 A low score indicates high poverty. The 
WPI of the Olifants basin was 27.1 for 2001, 
half  the  national  estimated  WPI  (52.2).  The 
WPI is worst in and near the former home-
lands, as displayed in Fig. 3.4. Although WPI 
improved in many quaternaries between 1994 
and 2005, Magagula et al. (2006) point out 
that  many  quaternaries  changed  very  little, 
despite interventions by DWAF.
Prasad et al. (2006) use data from DWAF’s 
Water-use  Authorization  and  Management 
System and other sources to assess equity – 
’who  uses  how  much  water,  where,  and  for 
what purpose’ (Prasad et al., 2006:67). They 
examine 13 tertiary sub-basins and four sectors 
– agriculture, industry, mining and water supply 
services – and calculate a measure of ‘skew-
ness’, the degree of diversion from total equity 
(which they refer to as ‘equity coefficient’), in 
terms of ‘water use per capita’ and ‘water use 
per  unit  area’.  The  equity  coefficient  ranges 
from 0 to 1, zero being the least equitable.
They note the huge variation among sub-
basins within all sectors. The equity coefficients 
for per capita water use are highly skewed and 
low. In agriculture, a few farmers receive most 
of  the  water.  More  striking  is  that  the  least 
equitable sector was basic water services, even 
in  2003.  The  water  services  and  agriculture 
sectors are intended to serve individuals and 
numerous farms and therefore should be the 
most meaningful; industry and mining are in 
the  hands  of  a  few  large  firms,  making  the 
measure less useful. Figure 3.5 combines two 
measures for each sector, i.e. water use per 
capita and water use per unit area, to provide 
a composite score. By this measure, the basin-
level average equity coefficient is a low 0.161. 
Agriculture is again the least inequitable and 
water supply the most inequitable.
Cullis and van Koppen (2007) use the Gini 
coefficient  to  assess  inequality  of  access  to 
water in the basin, to our knowledge the first 
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equal situation, the Lorenz curve would be a 
straight line, termed the line of equality, and 
the  Gini  coefficient  0.0.  In  most  cases,  it 
diverges below the line of equality, showing the 
inequality  of  distribution  of  income,  land  or 
water, with the Gini coefficient moving to 1.0 
for total inequality. 
The  Gini  coefficient  for  South  Africa’s 
national income is the second highest among 
middle-income countries after Brazil, and has 
been increasing during the past decade, from 
0.60 in 1995 to 0.64 in 2001 (Cullis and van 
Koppen,  2007).  This  distribution  obviously 
reflects  the  historical  legacy.  Inequality  of 
access to land is even worse than inequality of 
income, and is intimately related to the inequal-
ity of access to water and its benefits. Cullis 
and van Koppen (2007) measure the distribu-
tion of direct access to water by rural house-
holds and the distribution of indirect benefits of 
water use in the form of direct employment.
Using DWAF estimates, the Gini coefficient 
of direct rural water use is a shocking 0.96. 
The 1782 registered users claim to use 1550 
Mm3 per year, while the 290,000 rural house-
holds use an estimated (not ‘claimed’) 74 Mm3 
per year. Therefore, 99.5% of rural households 
use just 5% of the total water used, demon-
strating  an  extremely  inequitable  distribution 
(Fig. 3.6). These findings may exaggerate the 
Fig. 3.4.  Changes in the water poverty index (WPI), in the Olifants basin (Olifants Water Management Area 
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inequity.  ‘Claimed’  water  use  is  likely  to  be 
significantly higher than actual water use, as 
large-scale  users  attempt  to  maximize  the 
amount they can obtain through registration.
Further,  as  alluded  to  in  the  minister’s 
speech  quoted  above,  extracting  maximum 
benefits and sharing these equitably are more 
important than ‘dividing up so many buckets 
per person’. Using official employment figures 
and  assuming  that  all  industries  have  equal 
levels of efficiency and all employed persons 
benefit equally (ensuring a ‘best possible’ but 
highly unrealistic case), Cullis and van Koppen 
(2007) plot the distribution in terms of employ-
ment. The Gini coefficient for the benefits of 
water use in rural areas is 0.64, better than the 
0.96 for direct use but equal to the national 
Gini coefficient and still highly unequal.
Cullis and van Koppen (2007) also test two 
policy scenarios: (i) the impact on equality of 
revitalizing  small-scale  irrigation;  and  (ii) 
increasing  the  allocations  to  all  rural  house-
holds. Because it affects relatively few people, 
revitalizing small-scale irrigation has a marginal 
impact. This finding is confirmed in an adja-
cent basin by Hope et al. (2008). Increasing 
the direct allocation of water to unemployed 
households  from  the  current  approximately 
Fig. 3.5.  Combined equity coefficients in the Olifants basin, 2003. From Prasad et al. (2006).
Fig. 3.6.  Distribution of estimated direct and indirect rural water use in the Olifants basin. From Cullis and 
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255 m3 per household per year to 610 m3 per 
household per year would improve the amount 
of water available for domestic use and permit 
irrigation  of  a  garden  of  1000  m2.  Existing 
registered users would have to reduce their irri-
gation demand by just 6%. The water-use Gini 
coefficient  would  improve  slightly  for  both 
direct water use (0.94 to 0.90) and distribution 
of benefits (0.65 to 0.58).
The Gini coefficient is potentially a useful 
tool  to  assess  policy  scenarios  and  measure 
outcomes, but as shown above mere ‘tinkering’ 
to improve equity in a ‘balanced’ manner will 
contribute  only  marginally  to  achieving  the 
country’s equity goals.
The  current  WAR  process  is  intended  to 
‘promote  equity,  address  poverty,  generate 
economic  growth,  and  create  jobs’  (DWAF, 
2005:1).  A  recent  paper  whose  first  two 
authors  were  senior  DWAF  officials  has  the 
intriguing title, ‘Washing away poverty: water, 
democracy and gendered poverty eradication 
in  South  Africa’  (Schreiner  et  al.,  2004). 
However, the evidence to date does not support 
using water reforms as an entry point for wider 
socio-economic  reforms.  Reforms  in  other 
sectors, especially land, combined with strength-
ening the political voice of relatively disenfran-
chised  people  in  an  integrated  manner  is 
critical.6  Otherwise,  the  politically  powerful 
water users will continue to prosper while depri-
vation continues among the poor. We return to 
this theme below.
Conclusion: Will the Poor Basin Resident 
Get Her Fair Share?
Continuities from apartheid to democracy: 
old paradigms in new bottles
The  National  Water  Act  introduced  a  new 
water management paradigm to support the 
restructuring  of  South  African  society  as 
mandated by the constitution. Although many 
new ideas were introduced, we have also been 
struck by the high degree of continuity – mostly 
unconscious  and  denied  if  pointed  out  –  in 
assumptions and concepts that may be impedi-
ments to achieving the equity goals, as they are 
hold-overs from an era with antithetical objec-
tives. Van Koppen (2007) has also raised this 
point with regard to requirements that water 
investments must be ‘economically viable’ and 
even  self-financing.  Tapela  (2005:5)  argues 
that  the  emphasis  on  ‘efficiency’,  user-pays 
principle  and  ‘economic  value’  of  water 
narrows the prospects of resource-poor, small-
scale farmers.
This  ‘commoditization  of  water’,  rather 
similar to the current reliance on the market 
for acquiring land to implement land reform, is 
not  conducive  to  encouraging  smallholder 
farmers; rather, it further strengthens the hand 
of the large-scale users and weakens the case 
for  reallocation  to  the  poor.  Further,  in  the 
current discourse, ‘water scarcity’ is redefined 
as an entirely physical phenomenon, not one 
that is largely socially and politically constructed 
(and  can  therefore  be  reconstructed,  though 
not easily). By choosing to accommodate the 
large-scale  water  users  and  environmental 
requirements  as  a  de  facto  high  priority,  it 
forces water reforms to deal at the margin.
The  truth  is  that  South  Africa  and  the 
Olifants basin are not seriously constrained by 
an absolute physical scarcity of water; rather, 
the  perceived  ‘scarcity’  has  been  created  by 
large allocations to commercial agriculture and 
mines, and now also to the ecological reserve, 
thus closing the door to other alternatives. But 
the discourse on this created situation of ‘scar-
city’  is  always  –  misleadingly  –  in  terms  of 
physical scarcity, thus avoiding assessment of 
other  choices.  Hence,  the  few  attempts  at 
scenario building, if they refer to reallocation at 
all, propose relatively small transfers from the 
rich to the poor, certainly potentially benefit-
ting the poor while not threatening the rich but 
definitely not having much impact on equity. 
They assume the current status quo, i.e. contin-
uing priority to large-scale sectors.
Another  continuing,  unexamined  assump-
tion is that, in agriculture, ‘large is best’. The 
historical development of white agriculture in 
South Africa has led to large-scale, highly capi-
talized farms, now seen as inevitable: there is 
no vision for small- or medium-scale farmers, 
except as transitional to larger farms. Indeed, 
Lahiff (2007:11, 13) points out that explicit 
legal and policy restrictions against subdividing 
farms remain in place, based on a 1970 apart-
heid-era  law  ‘inspired  by  the  danger  of  … 
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the failure to subdivide is the single greatest 
contributor to the underperformance of land 
reform. It is based on the ‘viable size’ argument 
for  maintaining  white  farmers’  minimum 
incomes. Over time, the agrarian economy has 
been  structured  around  the  model  of  large-
scale agriculture.
There is a hidden assumption of a trade-off 
between  equity  and  productivity.  However, 
small farms tend to be undercapitalized, with 
poor  access  to  information  and  markets  – 
lower  water  productivity  is  certainly  not  an 
inherent characteristic of small or medium-size 
farms, although total income from a small farm 
is lower. Therefore, official discussion revolves 
around  how  more  of  the  large  farms  can 
become black owned, not whether there are 
more equitable alternatives.
As far back as 1977, South African water 
managers believed their approach was aligned 
with international standards, as documented at 
the  Mar  del  Plata  conference  (van  Koppen, 
2007:36). Although the rhetoric emphasizes 
economic  viability  and  user-pays  principle, 
DWAF  has  continued  to  subsidize  modern, 
large-scale  white  farms  –  the  Lower  Blyde 
Irrigation  Board’s  new  pipeline  replacing  a 
leaky canal was financed with a loan guarantee 
from DWAF (i.e. a subsidy) on a promise that 
800 ha of additional land for previously disad-
vantaged farmers would also be included.7
The  programmes  to  ‘revitalize’  small-scale 
irrigation in former homelands are also based 
on  some  old  assumptions:  that  farmers  are 
mostly men, and that small farms based on the 
old land allocations (1.28–5 ha) can be ‘econom-
ically viable’ for black families if only they have 
better technologies and better links to markets.8 
The  Limpopo  province  is  currently  imple-
menting a billion rand (US$130–200 million) 
revitalization  programme.  Initially  designed  to 
emphasize  farmer  empowerment,  capacity 
building and community involvement, pressures 
to spend funds quickly led to a shift to promot-
ing  sophisticated  technologies  installed  by 
commercial  contractors  with  little  beneficiary 
participation (de Lange, 2006:21–22; Denison 
and Manona, 2007:32–33, 35). It is unlikely 
that such a programme will make a substantial 
difference, as Tapela (2008) also concludes.
While DWAF is being substantially restruc-
tured, the main functional difference from the 
old department is the addition of forestry to its 
mandate: there has been no restructuring of 
water, land and agriculture into some kind of 
agrarian  reform  ministry,  for  example.  Most 
literature has emphasized the break with past 
policies and paradigms, which in many respects 
is real, and South Africa deservedly receives 
much  credit  as  an  IWRM  pioneer;  however, 
even before 1994, South African water plan-
ners perceived themselves as pioneers in IWRM 
principles (van Koppen, 2007). It is important 
also to note the reality of continuity underpin-
ning the new paradigm: it may be a new bottle 
but the contents are a mixture of old and new.
Institutional stagnation
While  institutional  reforms  are  stalled  in  the 
Olifants,  there  are  many  innovative  experi-
ments underway elsewhere, such as the esti-
mated  200  catchment  management  forums. 
Therefore, it is a mistake to generalize to the 
entire country from this discussion – although 
it is equally wrong to claim that the Olifants 
findings are not relevant elsewhere. However, 
the evidence shows that transformation of irri-
gation boards to participatory and representa-
tive WUAs has stalled nationally. Promotion of 
new WUAs in small-scale schemes is proceed-
ing slowly. In a few basins, catchment manage-
ment agencies have been initiated, but in the 
Olifants the process was stopped when DWAF 
realized it was not leading to the kind of stake-
holder-driven  institution  envisioned  by  the 
Water  Act.  Unfortunately,  DWAF  did  not 
promote smallholder water user forums in the 
basin,  to  enable  broader  participation.  The 
water  allocation  reform  (WAR)  programme 
itself is progressing slowly, partly because the 
disadvantages  of  the  conversion  of  former 
rights  to  licences  are  becoming  clearer.  For 
example, it is simply impossible to issue credi-
ble licences to the thousands of small users.
One problem may be that DWAF is trying 
to do too many different and complex things 
simultaneously. Trying to achieve very difficult 
institutional reforms while also meeting strin-
gent  environmental  standards,  strengthening 
local government capacity and implementing 
major infrastructural projects, all while under-
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impossible task for any organization. This is 
compounded by a more serious problem – the 
lack of an integrated approach across sectors 
and departments to institutional reform: land 
reform, agricultural services and mining are all 
under  different  departments.  How  can  one 
achieve significant water equity unless the asso-
ciated inequity in land is addressed simultane-
ously? How can local communities benefit from 
mines in their midst if they do not have a voice 
to demand a reasonable share of the benefits? 
This  fragmentation  may  be  the  reason  for 
DWAF’s search for a ‘balanced’ approach – it 
has no choice.
Finally, the discourse on ‘water scarcity’ as 
a largely physical phenomenon has not helped. 
This socially created perception is rarely ques-
tioned and leads to claims that there are seri-
ous trade-offs between equity and productivity, 
that the options are limited and that satisfying 
downstream  international  and  environmental 
demands while achieving real equity in benefits 
is impossible. This discourse has resulted in an 
inability to envisage alternative visions for the 
Olifants.
Potential for change under the democratic 
dispensation
The  development  trajectory  of  the  Olifants 
basin  simultaneously  reflects  the  broader 
patterns  of  historical  development  in  South 
Africa and the ‘typical’ pattern of basin devel-
opment, where demand for water exceeds the 
available supply. The current incomplete and 
uncertain status of reforms represents a pattern 
characterizing  most  middle-income  countries 
(for example, see Wester (2008) on Mexican 
reforms). All river basins are ‘unique’ in many 
respects, but there are also commonalities that 
provide  grist  for  the  science  of  river  basin 
management.
The following are the most salient conclu-
sions  emerging  from  this  study;  they  are 
discussed further below:
1. The  Olifants  is  an  extreme  example  of 
capture and development of natural resources, 
including water, for the benefit of a very small 
minority  at  the  expense  of  the  majority  of 
inhabitants: it is a trajectory of water resources 
development  initially  for  commercial  agricul-
ture, mining and energy, and more recently for 
industry  and  cities,  now  accompanied  by 
concerns for environmental flows and availabil-
ity of water for basic human needs.
2. Promulgation  of  a  revolutionary  water 
reform process after 1994, driven by constitu-
tional and political imperatives, and expressed 
through the National Water Act of 1998, has 
not met expectations to date.
3. There  are  glaring  contrasts  among  high 
expectations of using water as an instrument 
for poverty eradication and social reform, the 
cautious technocratic approach to implemen-
tation of reforms and disappointing outcomes 
to date.
4. A rhetorical and formal break with the past 
priority on development for the few has been 
accompanied  by  continuities  that  undermine 
reform objectives.
5. Opportunities for reducing poverty through 
achieving a higher degree of water equity and 
productivity do exist.
Within the international water management 
community, the NWA is rightly famous and is 
held up as a model. It is based on international 
‘best  practices’  such  as  Integrated  Water 
Resources  Management  (IWRM)  principles, 
democracy, meeting basic human water needs 
and  prioritizing  ecological  requirements. 
Implementation  of  the  NWA  in  the  Olifants 
basin had begun even before it became law. 
There can be no doubting how seriously imple-
mentation is being pursued, or the profession-
alism  of  government  departments,  including 
DWAF. Nevertheless, progress has been slow.
The optimism about using water as a lever 
to achieve social and economic reforms was 
unrealistic  for  at  least  two  reasons:  (i)  the 
cautious technocratic approach to implemen-
tation of water reforms; and, probably more 
salient,  (ii)  the  lack  of  an  integrated  multi-
departmental implementation.
DWAF  wishes  to  achieve  radical  reforms 
without  damaging  the  perceived  stream  of 
benefits  from  large-scale  uses.  Its  officials 
usually  work  to  ‘perfect’  policies  and  proce-
dures  in  writing  through  consultation  before 
any  field  testing  is  initiated.  It  has  therefore 
been slow in establishing WUAs, transforming 
irrigation  boards  and  implementing  water   The Oilfants River Basin, South Africa  69
re  allocation.  It  has  delayed  the  process  of 
implementing the CMA out of well-placed fears 
that it would be captured by existing elites, but 
it has failed to promote proposed democratic 
grassroots forums. During this process, DWAF 
has  seemed  reluctant  to  try  new  ideas  on  a 
small scale to learn lessons before scaling up. 
Recently, it appears that DWAF has really been 
internalizing  lessons  learned,  for  example 
through its new initiatives on Water for Growth 
Development.
Another  problem  is  the  technocratic,  as 
opposed to political, approach taken by DWAF. 
This  reflects  the  technical  expertise  and 
mandate  of  the  department.  After  the  first 
Minister  of  Water  Affairs  (Professor  Kader 
Asmal), the succeeding three ministers focused 
their  attention  primarily  on  delivering  water 
supply and sanitation to the previously unserved 
population. This priority is understandable but 
may  have  been  at  the  expense  of  actively 
supporting reforms.9 Both the aborted CMA 
proposal  process  and  the  WAR  programme 
have been left to technocrats, as if one can 
‘engineer’ a satisfactory solution that provides 
water  to  new  users  while  avoiding  serious 
inconvenience to large-scale interests. 
In fairness, it must be stated that the disap-
pointing outcome of this cautious approach is 
largely a product of the lack of an integrated 
multi-departmental  approach  to  reform  –  a 
higher-level political failure. Although DWAF 
has  undertaken  various  efforts  to  establish 
coordinating committees with the Department 
of Agriculture, with mixed results, the problem 
is, to reiterate, a higher-level political failure. 
This is compounded by the efforts required to 
establish an entirely new local and provincial 
government structure to replace the pre-1994 
territorial and institutional segregation. In hind-
sight, such an integrated approach might have 
directed attention to the root problem recog-
nized in 1998 by the Minister of Water Affairs: 
the point is not ‘dividing up so many buckets of 
water per person’ but to produce and share 
equitably the maximum possible benefits.
The new South Africa is dramatically differ-
ent from the old. There is now a remarkably 
open, democratic, inclusive and still idealistic 
political system. Nevertheless, as also noted by 
van  Koppen  (2007),  one  can  also  perceive 
striking continuities between the old and new 
regimes,  suggesting  a  high  degree  of  hidden 
‘path  dependency’.  Ideologically,  ideas  about 
the importance of the economy (cost recovery) 
have  continued,  even  when  accompanied  by 
the reality of state subsidies. For example, the 
de  Hoop  dam  will  benefit  large-scale  mining 
firms most, with some ‘trickle-down’ to poor 
communities. While acknowledging substantial 
public investments for domestic water supply 
schemes for people in no position to cover the 
costs,  these  schemes  are  constructed  to  an 
entirely  different  standard  (25  litres/person/
day) than those in the wealthy cities. This seems 
similar to the old idea that the required land-
holding for a black farmer to be self-sufficient is 
smaller than for a white farmer. In the past, 
infrastructure was built to promote the interests 
of race-based (i.e. white) capitalists; today, with 
‘Black Economic Empowerment’, a new black 
and white elite continues to receive extraordi-
nary benefits. Water, like land, continues to be 
monopolized  by  a  small  group  of  privileged 
people,  while  the  government  continues  its 
‘hydraulic mission’, with priority for promoting 
large-scale interests (usually sweetened by refer-
ence to community benefits).
One lesson learned is that a single-factor or 
single-sector approach is inadequate. Providing 
a better water supply in the absence of other 
inputs is not enough for profitable agriculture. 
Similarly, hamstrung by legal impediments to 
subdividing  farms,  government  has  tried  to 
allocate land to groups with little experience in 
agriculture  and  with  insufficient  institutional 
support. There has been insufficient examina-
tion  of  alternative  futures  for  South  African 
agriculture and water use.
It would be presumptuous for us to propose 
such  alternative  futures.  However,  we  are 
prepared to offer the following ideas to stimu-
late  thinking  on  this  issue.  In  the  short  to 
medium  term,  government  could  adjust  its 
investments  to  improve  equity,  productivity 
and  well-being.  Examples  include  large-scale 
implementation  of  household  rainwater 
harvesting  and  other  water  infrastructure;  a 
more bold approach to reallocating water from 
large-scale users to others; more effective tech-
nical,  financial  and  institutional  support  for 
smallholder  producers  to  enable  them  to 
increase  their  incomes  in  a  sustainable  way; 
and paying greater attention to ensuring that 70  D. Merrey et al.
the benefits from large commercial water users 
such  as  mines  are  shared  equitably  with 
communities. Even the modest reallocation of 
water  from  large-scale  commercial  users  to 
rural households is likely to have a useful impact 
on the well-being of poor rural people.
But for the longer term we believe a new 
agrarian vision is urgently required. A possible 
approach  would  be  to  commission  a  small 
group of eminent visionary people to articulate 
a set of alternative agrarian futures, including 
specific  ideas  on  integrated  implementation 
arrangements. The goal would be to achieve 
equitable land and water reforms that satisfy 
the needs and demands of rural and peri-urban 
people, recognition of women’s roles in agri-
culture  and  small  enterprises,  provision  of 
effective private and public support services to 
new farmers, and new models for wider shar-
ing of benefits while minimizing local costs of 
mining  mineral  wealth.  The  commission’s 
report can be used for widespread consulta-
tions on the alternatives, with strong political 
participation.  These  consultations  would 
provide a platform for political leaders to move 
forward.
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Notes
1   There  are  19  officially  designated  ‘Water 
Management  Areas’  in  South  Africa,  which  are 
intended to be river basin management units under 




selection of policy statements provided to us by 
Mr  Mike  Muller,  former  Director  General  of 
DWAF.
4    For lack of space we have not dealt with issues of 
water quality; however, there is increasing concern 
about its impacts on humans and wildlife; see, for 
example, the following report on crocodile deaths 
in the Olifants within the Kruger Park: www.int.iol.
co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=31&art_id= 
vn20080605055357280C518855, accessed 4 July 
2008.
5    See Sullivan (2002) and Sullivan et al. (2002) for 
explanations of the WPI index calculation.
6   A point fully recognized by some officials, includ-
ing B. Schreiner, but the institutional barriers to 
such integration are overwhelming.
7   Two years after the approval of this loan guaran-
tee, it appeared the ‘solution’ was one or two large 
farms to be owned by black Africans under the 
government’s  Black  Economic  Empowerment 
(BEE) programme; BEE is increasingly controversial 
– critics perceive it as insufficiently broad based 
and therefore leading to changing the colour of 
the elite and not greater equity. Land claims have 
stalled this process. The new pipeline is currently 
operated profitably by the Rand Merchant Bank. 
We have no recent information on which to base 
further remarks.
8    Locally, small plots are often seen as acceptable 
because they enable more equitable land alloca-
tions, given the limited irrigated area available.
9    However,  the  ‘Masibambane  III’  programme, 
co-financed  by  the  European  Union  and  other 
partners  and  recently  launched  by  the  DWAF 
Minister  Hon.  Lindiwe  Hendricks,  explicitly 
includes completion of departmental restructuring 
and promoting institutional reforms, as envisioned 
by the NWA (Water Wheel, 2008).  The Oilfants River Basin, South Africa  71
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Introduction
This chapter portrays the river basin trajectory 
of the Lerma–Chapala basin in central Mexico. 
It  analyses  the  relationship  between  basin 
closure and the hydraulic mission, defined as 
the  strong  conviction  that  the  state  should 
develop hydraulic infrastructure to capture as 
much water as possible for human uses (Wester, 
2008). In particular, it focuses on the role of 
the hydrocracy (hydraulic bureaucracy) in the 
creation  of  water  overexploitation  in  the 
basin.
The Lerma–Chapala basin is in serious trou-
ble, with water use at unsustainable levels and 
severe water pollution. Since the late 1970s, 
groundwater  overexploitation  has  led  to 
sustained declines in aquifer levels of 2 m/year 
on average, while surface water depletion has 
been close to, or has exceeded, annual river 
runoff  in  all  but  the  wettest  years.  This  was 
made possible by the drawing down of water 
stored in lakes and reservoirs. Twice in the 20th 
century (in 1955 and 2002), Lake Chapala, the 
downstream lake into which the Lerma River 
flows, nearly fell dry, losing more than 80% of 
its volume on both occasions. Between 2003 
and 2008 above-average rainfall lessened the 
surface water crisis, with Lake Chapala recov-
ering to above 80% of its storage capacity in 
September 2008, the highest level since 1979. 
While years of abundant rainfall can temporar-
ily stop the overexploitation of surface water, 
the long-term consequences of water pollution 
and  groundwater  overexploitation  are  more 
dramatic and difficult to reverse. Tackling these 
three  water  crises  requires  addressing  their 
interlinkages  and  the  social  mechanisms  and 
institutional  arrangements  that  govern  water 
use.
The Lerma–Chapala basin provides a strik-
ing  example  of  the  complexities  of  water 
reforms in closed river basins, where consump-
tive water use is close to, or even exceeds, the 
level of renewable water availability (Keller et 
al., 1996; Seckler, 1996). It is a basin in which 
many of the policy prescriptions emphasized in 
international water debates, such as irrigation 
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management  transfer  (IMT)  (Gorriz  et  al., 
1995;  Rap,  2006),  integrated  river  basin 
management (IRBM) (Mestre, 1997; Wester et 
al., 2003) and increasing stakeholder partici-
pation  in  water  management  have  been 
applied. Owing to the important economic and 
social interests linked to water in the densely 
populated and economically important Lerma–
Chapala basin, it has served as a water policy 
testing ground for successive Mexican govern-
ments. Starting in the early 1990s, the federal 
government  has  enacted  far-reaching  water 
reforms (decentralization, participatory organi-
zations, a new water law in 1992), accompa-
nied by substantial funding for water treatment 
plants, support to water organizations, water-
saving  programmes  and  public-awareness 
campaigns.  However,  these  efforts  have  not 
reversed  environmental  degradation  in  the 
basin nor led to a reduction in water use, and 
the three water crises remain dramatic today. 
This chapter explores why this is so, primarily 
focusing on surface water. 
The next section introduces the basin and 
describes  the  process  of  basin  closure.  The 
following three sections provide a broad over-
view of the trajectory of the Lerma–Chapala 
basin, focusing on three periods (1500–1910, 
1911–1980  and  1981  to  the  present).  For 
each period, an analysis of the history of water 
development and the concomitant transforma-
tions in terms of water control and manage-
ment are given. Conclusions are then drawn.
The Main Water Challenges in the 
Lerma–Chapala Basin
Physical setting of the Lerma–Chapala basin
The Lerma–Chapala basin is named after the 
Lerma River and the lake into which this river 
drains, Lake Chapala (see Fig. 4.1). When full, 
Lake  Chapala  discharges  into  the  Santiago 
River,  which  flows  in  a  north-westerly  direc-
tion, to meet the Pacific after some 520 km. 
Since  the  early  1980s,  very  little  water  has 
flowed  naturally  from  Lake  Chapala  to  the 
Santiago  River,  due  to  dropping  lake  levels, 
and the Lerma–Chapala basin has, in effect, 
become  a  hydrologically  closed  basin.  Lying 
between  Mexico  City  and  Guadalajara,  the 
basin crosses five states (Querétaro, covering 
5% of the basin, Guanajuato (44%), Michoacán 
(28%), México (10%) and Jalisco (13%)) and 
covers  around  55,000  km2,  nearly  3%  of 
Mexico’s  land  area.  Although  the  average 
annual  runoff  in  the  basin  of  5513  Mm3   
(DOF,  2003)  is  only  1%  of  Mexico’s  total 
runoff, the basin is the source of water for 15% 
of Mexico’s population (11 million in the basin 
and 2 million each in neighbouring Guadalajara 
and Mexico City). Located in central Mexico, 
the basin is an important agricultural and indus-
trial area, containing around 13% of the area 
equipped  for  irrigation  in  the  country  and 
generating  9%  of  Mexico’s  gross  national 
product (Wester et al., 2005).
Irrigated  agriculture,  covering  some 
795,000  ha,  is  the  main  water  user  in  the 
basin. Eight irrigation districts (formerly state 
managed)  cover  around  285,000  ha,  while 
some 16,000 farmer-managed or private irri-
gation  systems  (termed  ‘irrigation  units’  in 
Mexico)  cover  510,000  ha.  Twenty-seven 
reservoirs provide 235,000 ha in the irrigation 
districts with surface water, while around 1500 
smaller reservoirs serve 180,000 ha in the irri-
gation units. An estimated 17,500 tube-wells 
provide around 380,000 ha in the basin with 
groundwater, of which 47,000 ha are located 
in  irrigation  districts  (CNA/MW,  1999).  The 
area actually irrigated between 1980 and 2001 
is a matter of debate, with estimates ranging 
from 628,000 ha (CNA/MW, 1999) to more 
than a million ha (INE, 2003) per year.
Lake Chapala, with a length of 77 km and 
a maximum width of 23 km, is Mexico’s larg-
est natural lake. At maximum capacity the lake 
stores 8125 Mm3 and covers an area of 1154 
km2 (Guzmán, 2003:110). When full, the aver-
age depth of the lake is 7.2 m, making it one 
of the world’s largest shallow lakes. The shal-
low depth of the lake results in the loss of a 
large percentage of its storage to evaporation 
each year, with net evaporation of around 600 
Mm3 per year. Lake Chapala is highly valued 
by the inhabitants of Jalisco state, where the 
lake  is  situated,  as  well  as  by  some  30,000 
foreigners (mostly American retirees) living on 
its shores, and is a prime tourist destination. In 
addition,  it  provides  Guadalajara,  Mexico’s 
second  largest  city,  with  65%  of  its  water 
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Water overexploitation and Basin Closure
Since  the  early  1980s,  surface  water  and 
groundwater in the basin have been overex-
ploited. Although average rainfall from 1990 
to  2001  (679  mm)  was  only  6%  below  the 
historical average (722 mm) (IMTA, 2002a), 
the  amount  of  water  depleted  in  the  basin 
exceeded annual renewable water during this 
period, with no allocations for environmental 
flows. This was made possible by lowering the 
interannual stock of water stored in the basin’s 
lakes,  reservoirs  and  aquifers.  Groundwater 
was overexploited, with declines in static aqui-
fer levels of 1–5 m per year due to an esti-
mated  annual  groundwater  deficit  of  1336 
Mm3 (IMTA, 2002a), while the consumptive 
use of surface water exceeded supply in all but 
the wettest years, nearly leading to the demise 
of Lake Chapala. Figure 4.2 presents the fluc-
tuations in Lake Chapala’s volume from 1934 
to 2002, while Table 4.1 relates these fluctua-
tions to developments in the basin. The section 
on  Water  Reforms  and  Water  Transfers 
discusses how the lake fared after 2002.
Starting in 1945, water storage in the lake 
declined  sharply,  from  an  average  of  6429 
Mm3 between 1935 and 1945 to 954 Mm3 in 
July  1955,  due  to  a  prolonged  drought 
combined  with  significant  abstractions  (750 
Mm3 per year on average) from the lake for 
hydroelectricity generation and irrigation (de P. 
Sandoval, 1994). During this period, around 
214,000 ha were irrigated in the basin, mainly 
with surface water, and the constructed storage 
capacity in the basin was 1628 Mm3. However, 
because of good rains towards the end of the 
1950s, the lake recuperated, and storage aver-
aged 7094 Mm3 from 1959 to 1979.
In 1980, a second period of decline set in. 
By  this  time,  constructed  storage  capacity  in   
the basin had increased to 4499 Mm3 and the 
average  irrigated  area  had  grown  to  around 
680,000  ha,  with  a  significant  increase  in 
groundwater  irrigation.  Although  abstractions 
from the lake for hydropower generation had 
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ceased, Guadalajara city started drawing large 
amounts of its urban water supply (between 200 
and  400  Mm3)  directly  from  the  lake.  The 
combination of these factors and below-average 
rainfall  (705  mm)  resulted  in  declines  in  the 
lake’s storage to around 2000 Mm3 in 1990. 
After a good recuperation in the early 1990s, 
with  lake  storage  reaching  5586  Mm3  in 
October 1993 (68% of maximum storage), lake 
storage  started  declining  again,  dropping  to 












Rainfall (mm/year)a       683       626       764       705       679
Inflow to Lake Chapala 
  (Mm3/year)b     2,485     1,085     2,127       429       677
Inhabitants (thousands of 
  people)c
    2,500
 (1940)
    3,000
   (1950)
    4,500
   (1970)
    8,700
   (1990)
  11,000
   (2000)
Irrigated area (ha)d 155,000 214,000 508,000 675,000 689,000
Sources: ade P. Sandoval (1994) for all periods, except IMTA (2002a) for rainfall from 1989 to 2001; bde P. 
Sandoval (1994) up to 1988, BANDAS CD-ROMS for 1989 to 2001 (IMTA, 2002b); cde P. Sandoval (1994) 
for 1940, 1950, 1970. Census figures for 1990, 2000 from CNA/MW (1999); dEstimates of actual total 
irrigated area, averaged for the period, from CNA/MW (1999).
Fig. 4.2.  Monthly Lake Chapala storage volumes and average inflows from 1934 to 2002.  The Lerma–Chapala Basin, Mexico  79
1145 Mm3 in June 2002 (14% of maximum 
storage), the lowest measured since 1955 (see 
Fig. 4.2).
Table  4.1  provides  further  details  of  the 
water situation in the basin, showing the sharp 
drop in inflows to Lake Chapala since 1979. 
While average rainfall from 1979 to 1988 was 
higher  (705  mm)  than  from  1934  to  1944 
(683  mm),  the  inflow  to  Lake  Chapala  was 
markedly lower (429 Mm3 versus 2485 Mm3). 
River inflow from 1989 to 2001 was slightly 
higher (677 Mm3), due to good rains in the 
early 1990s, but this was not enough to reverse 
the decline of Lake Chapala. Thus, the second 
period of lake decline was mainly due to the 
overextraction  of  water  for  urban  use  in 
Guadalajara and agricultural use both upstream 
and directly from the lake, and partly due to 
less rainfall. Between 1930 and 2000, the irri-
gated  area  in  the  basin  increased  fivefold, 
according to official statistics, and possibly by a 
factor  of  7.5,  while  the  population  also 
increased fivefold during this period. The result-
ing levels of blue water depletion have made 
the basin very sensitive to variations in rainfall, 
with lower than average rainfall directly trans-
lating into reduced inflows to the lake. Between 
1980 and 2001, the lake experienced a nega-
tive  annual  storage  change  of  191  Mm3  on 
average  (IMTA,  2002a),  but  in  years  with 
above-average  rainfall,  such  as  1991,  the 
volume of the lake increased markedly.
To analyse Lerma–Chapala’s trajectory, the 
hydraulic mission concept is used. Based on 
work  by  Reisner  (1993)  and  Swyngedouw 
(1999), Wester defines the hydraulic mission 
as:
the strong conviction that every drop of water 
flowing to the ocean is a waste and that the state 
should develop hydraulic infrastructure to capture 
as much water as possible for human uses. The 
carrier of this mission is the hydrocracy, which 
sets out to control nature and ‘conquer the 
desert’ by ‘developing’ water resources for the 
sake of progress and development.
(Wester, 2008:10) 
In Mexico, the hydraulic mission, the centrali-
zation of water development and the growth of 
the federal hydrocracy mutually reinforced one 
another and formed an important component 
of state formation in post-revolutionary Mexico. 
Three  phases  in  the  centralization  of  water 
resources development in Mexico can be iden-
tified: the birth of the hydraulic mission in the 
late  19th  century,  the  rise  of  the  hydraulic 
mission from the 1920s to the 1940s, and the 
heyday  of  the  hydraulic  mission  from  the 
1950s to the 1970s. The following sections 
analyse these periods in the case of the Lerma–
Chapala basin.
The Granary of Mexico: Water 
Development before the 1910 Revolution
Irrigation development in the Lerma–Chapala 
basin significantly expanded with the arrival of 
the Spaniards and the resulting colonization of 
the  basin.  The  discovery  of  silver  mines  in 
Guanajuato in the 1550s led to the rapid settle-
ment of the Bajío (a fertile valley in the basin 
covering  most  of  Guanajuato,  and  parts  of 
Querétaro  and  Michoacán)  and  the  develop-
ment of irrigated agriculture for wheat cultiva-
tion, mostly through private initiative and by 
monasteries (Murphy, 1986). The increasing 
demand for cereals by Mexico City led to the 
expansion  of  irrigation  based  on  run-of-the-
river irrigation schemes in the 17th and 18th 
centuries and the ingenious use of flood water 
through  the  construction  of  cajas  de  agua 
(embanked field ponds), primarily from tribu-
taries of the Lerma River. This system consisted 
of interlinked and embanked fields of 5–200 
ha each, filled in succession with flood water 
and with direct runoff from hills. These cajas 
(literally  boxes)  were  drained  in  a  staggered 
pattern  after  several  months  and  then  sown 
with wheat, while the larger cajas also stored 
water for supplementary irrigation. This form 
of controlled flooding was developed to a high 
degree  of  complexity  in  the  Bajío  (Sánchez, 
2005). By the end of the colonial period, the 
basin’s  water  resources  were  already  inten-
sively used, and by 1900 the run-of-the-river 
irrigation  potential  of  the  tributaries  of  the 
Lerma  River  had  been  largely  developed, 
covering around 60,000 ha (SRH, 1953).
Towards the federalization of water allocation 
and development
The hydraulic mission started to gather force in 
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when the federal government began asserting 
its control over water both to promote commer-
cial agriculture and to arbitrate in water alloca-
tion  conflicts  between  hacendados  (large 
landowners). Before then, irrigation and drink-
ing  water  had  largely  been  local  affairs, 
although land and water rights were originally 
based  on  royal  grants  during  the  colonial 
period. The first 75 years of the 19th century 
were a period of turmoil and political unrest, 
with few new irrigation works in the basin. This 
changed in the last quarter of the 19th century, 
with attempts by hacendados to turn marshes 
and  lakes  into  private  property  for  land 
re  clamation purposes. 
The  Porfirio  Díaz  regime  (1876–1911), 
known  as  the  Porfiriato,  strongly  supported 
private  capital  and  foreign  investment,  and 
developed laws that led to extreme forms of 
land concentration. During the Porfiriato, the 
federal  government  established  control  over 
the country and focused on mining and rail-
road construction. An oligarchy of some 250 
families, controlling 80% of the nation’s land, 
handsomely  profited  from  the  increased 
production  and  trade,  while  an  estimated 
90–95% of rural households, forming 75% of 
Mexico’s population, were landless according 
to  the  1910  census  (Hamilton,  1982).  The 
extreme concentration of land ownership, with 
eight  individuals  holding  22.5  million  ha  in 
1910, was a potent ingredient of the revolu-
tion that was to follow (Hamilton, 1982).
During the Porfiriato, the scale and number 
of  hydraulic  projects  increased  considerably, 
and the federal government started to play an 
active  role  in  water  development  and  the 
concessioning of water rights. In an excellent 
historical study, Aboites (1998) traces what he 
terms the federalization process in water affairs 
from 1888 to 1946. He indicates that, in the 
Mexican context, the term federalization refers 
to the process that led to the concentration of 
political and legal powers and faculties in the 
federal  government,  in  short,  centralization 
(Aboites,  1998).  Before  1888,  communities 
and  municipalities  administered  water  rights 
and water was controlled locally. This changed 
in  1888,  when  congress  passed  the  Ley 
General de Vías de Comunicación (General 
Law on Communication Routes), which author-
ized the federal government to regulate the use 
of navigable and interstate rivers and specified 
that water concessions could only be issued by 
the  federal  government  (Aboites,  1998).  A 
decisive  step  in  the  federalization  of  water 
management  was  the  amendment  of  Article 
72 of the constitution in 1908, which placed 
rivers  in  the  public  domain.  Based  on  this 
amendment, surface water as private property 
no longer existed and access to surface water 
was only possible through concessions issued 
by the federal government. Thus, in the space 
of 20 years, in legal terms, water in Mexico 
passed from being a local affair to falling in the 
public  domain,  administered  by  the  federal 
government (Aboites, 1998).
Land reclamation projects in the Lerma–
Chapala basin during the Porfiriato
Water  development  in  the  Lerma–Chapala 
basin during the Porfiriato mainly consisted of 
land reclamation, hydroelectricity projects and 
some  irrigation  development.  These  projects 
were undertaken by large landowners, some-
times in conjunction with foreign capital, and 
with an increasingly active involvement of the 
federal government in the funding and approval 
of these initiatives. The drainage of the Chapala 
and  Zacapu  marshes,  and  the  proposals  to 
drain the Lagunas de Lerma and the Cuitzeo 
and Yuriria lakes (see Fig. 4.1 for locations) 
stand out as examples of the land reclamation 
efforts (Wester, 2008). The expansion of run-
of-the-river  irrigation  works  on  tributaries  of 
the Lerma River also received attention, but 
the main incursion of the federal government 
in this area consisted of the formulation of river 
regulations. 
The drainage of the Zacapu marsh (Ciénega 
de  Zacapu),  located  in  Michoacán  near  the 
headwaters of the Angulo River, is exemplary 
of how land reclamation projects were under-
taken during the Porfiriato. As in other land 
reclamation projects, there was an important 
link  between  foreign  capital,  the  federal 
bureaucracy  and  large  hacendados.  The 
Zacapu  marsh,  covering  an  area  of  around 
150 km2, was up to 8 m deep and surrounded 
by several haciendas and farming communities 
(Guzmán-Ávila,  2002).  Eduardo  Noriega,  a 
hacendado  and  friend  of  Porfirio  Díaz,   The Lerma–Chapala Basin, Mexico  81
obtained a concession from the federal govern-
ment in 1900 to drain the marsh and construct 
a  hydroelectricity  plant  near  the  exit  of  the 
marsh. As the Angulo was not navigable and 
did not form a boundary between two states 
and thus did not legally fall under federal juris-
diction,  other  hacendados  challenged  this 
concession, but to no avail. On the reclaimed 
land of 12,000 ha, Noriega developed an irri-
gation  system,  which  started  functioning  in 
1907,  with  a  large  loan  from  the  federal 
government (Guzmán-Ávila, 2002).
The land reclamation fever rapidly spread 
throughout the basin during the Porfiriato, and 
various proposals were submitted to the federal 
government  by  hacendados  to  drain  the 
Lagunas de Lerma and the Yuriria and Cuitzeo 
lakes.  However,  due  to  local  opposition  or 
struggles  between  hacendados,  these  works 
were not executed. A land reclamation project 
that  was  to  have  a  lasting  impact  on  Lake 
Chapala was the draining of the Ciénega de 
Chapala (Lake Chapala marsh). Until the late 
19th  century,  Lake  Chapala  remained  in  its 
natural  state,  but  this  changed  dramatically 
during the Porfiriato, as described below.
In 1894, a hydroelectricity plant, the first in 
Latin America and the second in the world, 
was constructed on the Santiago River at El 
Salto,  some  60  km  downstream  of  Lake 
Chapala, to provide Guadalajara with electric-
ity.  This  plant  received  its  water  from  Lake 
Chapala, which flowed into the Santiago River 
if the lake level was above cota1 95.00. The sill 
at the mouth of the Santiago River stopped the 
flow of water if the lake dropped below this 
level,  while  the  form  of  the  outlet  to  the 
Santiago  River  and  the  sediments  deposited 
there by the Zula River, which joins the Santiago 
River just below Lake Chapala, restricted the 
amount of water leaving the lake above this 
level. This effectively blocked the outflow from 
the  lake  during  the  rainy  season  and  could 
head up the water in the lake by 2–3 m. In one 
of the first studies on Lake Chapala, Miguel 
Quevedo y Zubieta shows that, on average, the 
lake reached cota 97.13 in the rainy season 
and would then fall to an average of cota 95.82 
in  the  dry  season,  based  on  measured  lake 
levels from 1896 to 1904 (Quevedo y Zubieta, 
1906:18).  As  the  average  elevation  of  the 
Ciénega  was  cota  96.20,  a  large  part  of  it 
would  flood  each  year,  depending  on  river 
inflows. When the Ciénega was flooded, Lake 
Chapala would reach a length of 100 km, a 
surface  area  of  1600  km2  and  would  store 
around 9400 Mm3 (de P. Sandoval, 1994:26).
During  the  dry  season,  when  the  lake 
dropped below cota 96.00, the little water that 
flowed into the Santiago was held up at the 
Poncitlán rapids. This led to the construction 
of a barrage at Poncitlán, completed in 1903, 
by which the level of Lake Chapala could be 
kept at cota 97.80. This made it possible to 
prolong high levels of storage in the lake, to be 
gradually released throughout the dry season 
for the El Salto hydroelectricity plant. However, 
it also entailed that the Ciénega de Chapala 
remained flooded longer. This led to complaints 
from hacendados with land in the Ciénega and 
motivated  one  of  them,  Manuel  Cuesta-
Gallardo,  to  develop  plans  to  embank  and 
drain the Ciénega de Chapala. He hired Luis P. 
Ballesteros to develop a plan for the reclama-
tion and subsequent irrigation of the Ciénega, 
and in 1903 obtained a concession from the 
federal government to do so (Boehm, 1994). 
In 1905, work started on constructing embank-
ments with a length of 95 km to separate the 
Ciénega  from  Lake  Chapala,  which  was 
completed in 1910. A total area of 500 km2 
(50,000 ha) was cut off from the lake, reducing 
its storage capacity by some 1500 Mm3 and 
leading to its current normal operating storage 
capacity of 7900 Mm3 at cota 97.80 (Boehm, 
1994).
Besides the land reclamation projects, the 
federal government became actively involved 
in drawing up river regulations. Based on the 
1894  law,  existing  water  rights  had  to  be 
reconfirmed  on  rivers  falling  under  federal 
jurisdiction, and the federal government had to 
approve  new  water  concessions.  Kroeber 
(1983) and Aboites (1998) provide a detailed 
account  of  how  the  Fifth  Section  of  the 
Secretaría de Fomento drew up an increasing 
number of river regulations and how this led to 
increased  federal  control  over  water.  In  the 
Lerma–Chapala basin, the Laja River, a tribu-
tary of the Lerma in Guanajuato, provides an 
example of this process (Sánchez, 1999). In 
1895, hacendados with colonial water rights 
on the Laja River requested that the federal 
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The federal government quickly established a 
commission to study the dispute, and in May 
1897  decided  that  a  complete  study  of  the 
river was necessary to regulate all the water 
rights on the river. In 1901, the federal govern-
ment  enlarged  the  mandate  of  the  study 
commission, to confirm and formalize all exist-
ing water rights and to conduct a full study of 
the  river  to  verify  if  new  water  concessions 
could be awarded. Interestingly, the Laja was 
not a river falling under federal jurisdiction, but 
this  did  not  prevent  the  Fifth  Section  from 
proposing a detailed river regulation in 1906 
and establishing a permanent federal commis-
sion  to  inspect  water  withdrawals  from  the 
river. Although this was resisted by the hacien-
das drawing water from the Laja, the river was 
gradually  brought  under  federal  control 
(Sánchez, 1999).
This section has reviewed how the federal 
government increased its control over surface 
water during the Porfiriato. Through changes 
in the legal framework, the federal jurisdiction 
over rivers and lakes was expanded and the 
federal  government  became  involved  in 
confirming existing water rights and the formu-
lation of river regulations. More importantly, 
large hacendados were granted concessions to 
drain  lakes  and  to  construct  irrigation  and 
hydroelectricity  works,  which  frequently 
entailed  the  dispossession  of  previous  water 
rights holders, primarily campesinos and indi-
genas, and also other hacendados. This oligar-
chic  form  of  water  resources  development 
meant that the federal government itself did 
not construct water works, but rather supported 
a clique of hacendados with loans and water 
concession to do so. This changed after the 
Revolution of 1910–1920, as detailed below.
The Hydraulic Mission and the First Lake 
Chapala Crisis 
The hydraulic mission of the hydrocracy and 
the bureaucratic–authoritarian state that devel-
oped in Mexico after the revolution of 1910–
1920 strongly influenced water development 
in the Lerma–Chapala basin. The centraliza-
tion of water development in Mexico acceler-
ated in 1926 with the creation of the Comisión 
Nacional de Irrigación (CNI: National Irrigation 
Commission) and continued until the 1970s. 
These 50 years witnessed a large increase in 
the irrigated area in the Lerma–Chapala basin, 
intertwined with the formation and expansion 
of a strong hydrocracy with a keen sense of its 
hydraulic mission. The logo of the CNI and its 
successor,  the  Secretaría  de  Recursos 
Hidráulicos  (SRH:  Ministry  of  Hydraulic 
Resources), formed in 1946, contains the bold 
mission  statement  of  Mexico’s  hydrocracy, 
namely Por la Grandeza de México (for the 
Greatness of Mexico). A more apt summary of 
the hydraulic mission is hard to come by.
The rise of the hydraulic mission: from 
oligarchic to revolutionary irrigation
The  trend  towards  stronger  federal  control 
over  water  initiated  under  Porfirio  Diaz’s 
regime was consolidated in Article 27 of the 
1917 Constitution. This article defined natural 
resources, including oil, land and surface water, 
as the inalienable property of the nation and 
established the ejido (common property) form 
of land tenure for the redistribution of land. 
Article 27 also established that the only way to 
gain  access  to  surface  water  was  through  a 
concession granted by the federal government. 
Based on Article 27, the centralization of water 
management began in earnest in the 1920s, 
when President Calles launched a programme 
for  the  construction  of  large-scale  irrigation 
districts and created the CNI as a semi-autono-
mous agency within the federal Secretaría de 
Agricultura  y  Fomento  (SAyF:  Ministry  of 
Agriculture and Development). The CNI rapidly 
established  itself  as  a  competent  hydrocracy 
and  by  1935  was  constructing  11  irrigation 
districts (IDs) throughout Mexico. 
The CNI set out to develop ‘revolutionary’ 
irrigation systems, as opposed to the promo-
tion of ‘oligarchic’ irrigation under the Porfiriato 
(Aboites,  1998).  The  revolutionary  aspect 
initially consisted of using the construction of 
irrigation systems by the federal government to 
break  up  haciendas  and  colonize  them  with 
yeoman farmers, working and owning medium-
sized irrigated farms (20–100 ha). The aim of 
the federal government was that this new rural 
middle class would gradually replace the large 
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stability to the countryside. Aboites (1998) has 
termed  this  ‘revolutionary  irrigation’,  as  the 
post-revolutionary  regime  initially  focused  on 
using  irrigation  instead  of  land  reforms  to 
achieve the revolutionary promise of ‘land and 
liberty’, mainly in northern Mexico. With the 
more radical land reforms of the 1930s, atten-
tion  shifted  to  supporting  the  ejidos  (land 
reform communities) with irrigation works. In 
1930, ejidos controlled only 15% of the land in 
irrigation  districts,  but  by  1940  this  had 
increased  to  60%  (Wionczek,  1982:370). 
Although the beneficiaries of the revolutionary 
irrigation policy were different, what remained 
the same was that the federal government led 
this social transformation process, by funding, 
designing  and  constructing  the  irrigation 
systems (Aboites, 1998). The management of 
the irrigation districts also became increasingly 
centralized from the 1930s onwards, although 
the water laws promulgated between 1926 and 
1947 contained provisions for the creation of 
water boards to manage irrigation districts (Rap 
et  al.,  2004).  However,  the  CNI  frequently 
took control of the irrigation districts, as detailed 
below for the Lerma–Chapala basin.
Irrigation development in the Lerma–Chapala 
basin under the CNI
The following provides an overview of irriga-
tion development in the Lerma–Chapala basin 
during the CNI era. Attention is mainly paid to 
the creation of the Alto Río Lerma Irrigation 
District (ARLID) in the Middle Lerma region, 
which  was  to  become  the  largest  irrigation 
district in the basin, and brief mention is made 
of developments in the Lower Lerma region. 
This  brings  out  how  the  CNI  increased  its 
control over water in the basin and set in motion 
the process leading to water overexploitation.
Before  the  CNI  started  developing  water 
resources in the basin, around 60,000 ha were 
already irrigated in the basin, with numerous 
run-of-the-river irrigation systems and cajas de 
aguas (SRH, 1953). Shortly after the CNI was 
formed, heavy rainfall in 1926 led to extensive 
flooding in the Lerma–Chapala basin. The CNI 
immediately focused its attention on the basin 
and  formed  two  internal  commissions  to 
develop plans for the development of irrigation 
districts and hydroelectricity plants in the basin. 
In their combined proposal, published in 1927, 
they  recommended  the  construction  of  the 
Corrales  dam  on  the  Lerma  River  on  the 
border of the Middle and Lower Lerma (see 
Fig. 4.3), to complement the Tepuxtepec dam, 
then under construction on the border of the 
Upper  and  Middle  Lerma  (Cuevas-Bulnes, 
1941). The Corrales dam, with a planned stor-
age capacity of between 750 and 1500 Mm3, 
would serve to irrigate the lands of the Lower 
Lerma  region,  including  the  Ciénega  de 
Chapala, and to generate hydroelectricity using 
the 150 m drop of the Zoró falls on the Lerma. 
They also recommended the construction of a 
new dam downstream of Tepuxtepec, to store 
more water for irrigation. It was estimated that 
261,000 ha could be irrigated in the basin with 
surface water if these two new dams were built. 
Figure 4.3 presents the area currently irrigated 
in the basin and the main irrigation schemes 
and dams discussed in this chapter.
When the CNI presented its master plan, 
the construction of the Tepuxtepec dam had 
just started. In October 1926, a contract was 
signed between SAyF and the Compañía de 
Luz y Fuerza del Suroeste de México (Light 
and Power Company of Southwest Mexico), 
granting it an annual water concession of 750 
Mm3  for  hydroelectricity  generation  and 
permission to construct the dam. The dam was 
completed in 1936, with a storage capacity of 
370  Mm3  (Santos-Salcedo,  1937).  Between 
1970 and 1973, the SRH elevated the dam’s 
crest and increased its storage capacity to 585 
Mm3 (Garcia-Huerta, 2000).
After  the  construction  of  the  Tepuxtepec 
dam, the amount of water flowing in the Lerma 
River increased during the winter season. This 
led to an increase in the irrigated area from 
some 36,000 ha in 1927 to some 46,575 ha 
in 1937 in the area that was to become the 
Alto  Río  Lerma  irrigation  district  (Santos-
Salcedo,  1937:160).  This  increase  occurred 
mainly because the CNI had started rehabilitat-
ing the old run-of-the-river canals and construct-
ing new ones on the Lerma River below the 
dam. In 1933, the CNI formed the Alto Río 
Lerma irrigation district, to fully develop the 
lands that could be irrigated with water from 
the  Tepuxtepec  dam.  However,  this  created 
conflicts, and water users on already existing 
canals resisted the intrusion of the CNI. During 84  P. Wester et al.
the 1920s, the Dirección de Aguas of SAyF 
had drawn up water distribution regulations for 
the  run-of-the-river  canals  along  the  Lerma, 
including the canals of Acámbaro, Salvatierra, 
Valle de Santiago and Jaral de Progreso.
For these canals Juntas de Aguas (water 
boards) were established, based on the 1926 
irrigation  law,  and  the  Dirección  de  Aguas 
attempted to regulate their water withdrawals 
by  confirming  existing  water  rights.  In 
November  1933,  an  agreement  was  signed 
between the CNI and the Dirección de Aguas, 
in  which  control  over  all  the  irrigated  areas 
from  the  Tepuxtepec  dam  to  the  city  of 
Salamanca was passed to the CNI, to fall under 
the  newly  created  Alto  Río  Lerma  irrigation 
district.  Through  this  agreement  the  CNI 
gained control over an irrigated area that until 
then had been managed locally for nearly 400 
years. The increasing intrusion of the CNI led 
to protests from the existing Juntas de Aguas. 
Their  protest  was  to  cost  them  dearly.  In 
February 1938, the CNI reacted by suspending 
all the Juntas de Aguas and taking over their 
responsibilities. It was not until the irrigation 
management transfer programme in the 1990s 
that  these  Juntas  de  Aguas  were  re-estab-
lished,  this  time  as  water  user  associations 
(WUAs). Until then, the hydrocracy controlled 
the irrigation district.
While establishing its control over the run-
of-the-river canals, the CNI also started work 
on the construction of the Solís dam, some 10 
km upstream of Acámbaro in Guanajuato. The 
purpose  of  this  dam  was  to  improve  flood 
control and store the water released (for hydro-
electricity  generation)  from  the  Tepuxtepec 
dam for irrigation. Construction of the Solís 
dam, with a capacity of 800 Mm3, started in 
1939 and was completed in 1949. The CNI 
also built several large new canals to more than 
double the area under irrigation in ID011 to 
around 76,000 ha in 1946, up from 36,000 
ha in 1927 (Wester, 2008). By 1940, the CNI 
had also developed plans for the further expan-
sion of irrigation in the state of Guanajuato, 
including the Coria canal, to bring 25,000 ha 
under irrigation, and the Begoña dam on the 
Laja River, to irrigate some 18,000 ha. Owing 
to  the  first  Lake  Chapala  crisis  (see  below) 
these works were delayed but were completed 
by the end of the 1970s.
A  similar  process  occurred  in  the  Lower 
Lerma region, where the CNI took control of 
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the Ciénega de Chapala through the construc-
tion of irrigation and drainage works under the 
leadership  of  Ballesteros.  Vargas-González 
(1993) provides a detailed account of how these 
developments  interrelated  with  the  redistribu-
tion  of  land  in  the  area  and  how  this  led  to 
increased  federal  control  over  the  area. 
Ballesteros  joined  the  CNI  in  1926  as  chief 
engineer of the Lower Lerma region and vigor-
ously promoted the construction of the Corrales 
dam to increase the irrigated area in the Lower 
Lerma. In the end, the Corrales dam was not 
built,  initially  due  to  financial  constraints  and 
later because the proposed dam turned out to 
be sited on a geological fault. None the less, the 
water resources development plan presented by 
Ballesteros in 1927 was to guide developments 
in the basin until the late 1970s, and most of 
the works he and his CNI colleagues proposed 
in the 1930s were eventually constructed. This 
has  led  Pérez-Peña  (2004)  to  speak  of  the 
‘Ballesteros school’ in the development of the 
Lerma–Chapala basin, whose objective was the 
full utilization of the basin’s water.
The  above  section  has  outlined  how  the 
CNI increased its role in water development in 
the Lerma–Chapala basin, by taking over the 
control  of  irrigation  systems  that  had  previ-
ously been managed locally, through both legal 
means and the construction of hydraulic infra-
structure. In particular, the dissolution of the 
Juntas de Aguas in ID011 was a harbinger of 
the  centralized  water  control  that  was  to 
develop  after  the  1940s.  The  land  reform 
partly helped the CNI to establish its control, 
but a stronger drive was its hydraulic mission to 
make good the promises of the revolution by 
developing  ’revolutionary  irrigation’.  This 
mission was to reach its zenith between 1946 
and 1976, with the creation of the SRH and 
the continued expansion of the irrigation fron-
tier in the Lerma–Chapala basin.
The heyday of the hydraulic mission: river 
basin development and the SRH
During the 1940s, the concept of river basins 
as a unit of development started to gain force 
in  Mexico,  based  on  the  Tennessee  Valley 
Authority  (TVA)  model.  During  the  election 
campaign of Miguel Alemán in 1946, the CNI 
lobbied  the  presidential  candidate  to  initiate 
projects  for  regional  development  in  various 
Mexican river basins and to form an overarch-
ing ministry of water resources. Directly after 
Alemán became president this happened, with 
the  creation  of  the  Secretaría  de  Recursos 
Hidráulicos  (SRH:  Ministry  of  Hydraulic 
Resources) in December 1946 to replace the 
CNI. The objective of the SRH was the compre-
hensive development of water resources and 
the concentration of the government’s efforts 
in this field in a single organization.
Along  with  the  concentration  of  water 
resources development in the SRH, river basin 
commissions  were  created  by  presidential 
decrees between 1947 and 1950 for several of 
Mexico’s key basins, such as the Papaloapan, 
Tepalcatepec, Fuerte and Grijalva (Barkin and 
King,  1970).  These  commissions  were  to 
pursue  comprehensive  river  basin  develop-
ment, based on the TVA model, but with the 
SRH minister as their president. The emphasis 
on  comprehensive  river  basin  development 
was to characterize the heyday of the hydraulic 
mission. From 1946 to 1976, the SRH vastly 
expanded its activities and mandate, with the 
river basin commissions serving to bypass state 
governments and other federal agencies. The 
SRH  came  to  believe  it  was  responsible  for 
achieving ‘the greatness of Mexico’, not only 
through water resources development but also 
through regional development based on river 
basins. The hydraulic mission reached its zenith 
in the early 1970s with the passage of a new 
water law and the formulation of a national 
hydraulic plan. 
In the Lerma–Chapala basin, the creation of 
the SRH coincided with the first Lake Chapala 
crisis, which lasted from 1945 to 1958. The 
following  sections  show  how  the  hydraulic 
mission led to the ‘overbuilding’ of the basin, by 
reviewing the Lerma–Chapala–Santiago basin 
study commission created by the SRH in 1950, 
the  controversies  surrounding  the  first  Lake 
Chapala crisis, and the continued expansion of 
the irrigation frontier in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Lerma–Chapala–Santiago study 
commission
In 1950, the SRH formed the Lerma–Chapala–
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strongly related to the first Lake Chapala crisis. 
In April 1947, the lake dropped below cota 
95.15, at which point water no longer flowed 
to the Santiago River, for the first time since 
1916. Hence, the three hydroelectricity plants 
on  the  Santiago,  which  depended  on  Lake 
Chapala, frequently had to stop operating. As 
these plants, owned by the Nueva Compañía 
Eléctrica Chapala (New Electricity Company 
of Chapala), were the only sources of electric-
ity for Guadalajara, this led to strong demands 
from  industrialists  and  the  inhabitants  of 
Guadalajara that the lake should be kept full by 
restricting  irrigation  in  the  basin.  This  led 
Orive-Alba,  the  SRH  minister,  to  form  a 
commission consisting of respected SRH engi-
neers to study the problems of the basin. This 
commission set itself the task:
… to achieve a complete regularization of the 
existing water use systems [in the basin] and a 
better planning of those that can be realized in 
the future; arrive at a full understanding of the 
available water resources and their potential; and 
effectuate a more equitable water distribution in 
the basin through an adequate and combined 
operation [of existing infrastructure]. 
(Vallejo-Ivens, 1963:5)
In a report published in December 1953, 
the commission set forth its recommendations 
for solving the lack of hydroelectricity and for 
fully utilizing the basin’s water (SRH, 1953). 
The commission proposed the construction of 
a large hydroelectricity dam on the Santiago 
River, downstream of the confluence of several 
of  its  tributaries,  to  replace  the  plants  that 
depended  on  Lake  Chapala.  It  also  recom-
mended the construction of the Corrales dam 
on the Lerma River, with a storage capacity of 
500  Mm3,  and  the  construction  of  the  La 
Begoña dam on the Laja River, with a capacity 
of 180 Mm3. Its other proposals consisted of 
plans to drain lakes throughout the basin to 
‘suppress unnecessary evaporation’. Thus, the 
commission recommended constructing a 20 
km long and 6 m high embankment in Lake 
Chapala to reclaim 25,000 ha for agriculture. 
It also recommended draining Lake Cuitzeo by 
constructing a canal connecting it to the Lerma 
River, thus reclaiming 45,000 ha for agricul-
ture, and draining Lake Yuriria to reclaim 7000 
ha (SRH, 1953).
Although the execution of these plans would 
have  a  devastating  effect  on  Lake  Chapala, 
there  was  consensus  in  the  commission  on 
their  desirability;  the  hydraulic  mission  was 
clearly in high gear. However, a contentious 
issue that the commission had to deal with was 
the sinking of deep tube-wells near the head-
waters of the Lerma River to supply drinking 
water  to  Mexico  City.  In  the  1940s,  work 
started  on  canalizing  the  mountain  streams 
feeding the Lerma and transferring this water 
to Mexico City through a tunnel. In addition to 
this transfer, it was proposed to sink deep tube-
wells near the Lagunas de Lerma to augment 
the supply to Mexico City. The representative 
of the state of Mexico in the study commission 
strongly opposed this project (Santos, 2006). 
Guanajuato’s representative also opposed the 
interbasin transfer, arguing it would have nega-
tive consequences for agriculture in Guanajuato. 
However, the government of the federal district 
persevered  and  succeeded  in  increasing  the 
number of groundwater wells surrounding the 
Lerma wetlands. In the early 1950s, some 4 
m3/s  (126  Mm3/year)  were  transferred  to 
Mexico City, increasing to 10 m3/s (315 Mm3/
year) by the 1970s (Alba, 1988:163). These 
transfers affected the hydrologic cycle of the 
basin  by  sucking  dry  the  Lerma  River  at  its 
headwaters.  After  the  interbasin  transfer 
started, the Lagunas de Lerma and the wetlands 
of the upper Lerma quickly fell dry, to only 
partly  fill  during  the  rainy  season.  Another, 
even more contentious issue the study commis-
sion had to deal with was the sharp drop in the 
water  levels  in  Lake  Chapala.  It  had  largely 
been created in 1950 to deal with this crisis, 
but, as the next section shows, in many ways 
its actions made the crisis worse.
The first Lake Chapala crisis (1945–1958)
From  1945  onward  a  period  of  lower  than 
average rainfall (see Table 4.1), combined with 
extractions from Lake Chapala for hydroelec-
tricity generation (520 Mm3/year), resulted in 
the first Lake Chapala crisis. The response of 
the  federal  government  to  this  crisis  was 
strongly  influenced  by  the  hydraulic  mission 
mind-set of the time and primarily consisted of 
efforts to secure the water supply of the hydro-
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the  second  Lake  Chapala  crisis  (see  Water 
Reforms and Water Transfers), the hydrocracy 
blamed  the  desiccation  of  the  lake  on  the 
drought and the lake’s high evaporation losses 
(de P. Sandoval, 1981). However, the extrac-
tions from the lake by the Eléctrica Chapala 
Company of some 520 Mm3 a year, combined 
with  215  Mm3  for  irrigation,  contributed 
strongly  to  the  decline  of  the  lake.  Without 
these  abstractions,  the  lake  would  not  have 
fallen  below  cota  96.00  throughout  the 
1945–1958  period  (de  P.  Sandoval,  1994). 
The  efforts  of  the  SRH  and  the  Lerma–
Chapala–Santiago  study  commission  focused 
on ensuring these abstractions by a succession 
of  hydraulic  interventions  in  the  lake.  The 
majority  of  these  works  were  planned  and 
executed by the Eléctrica Chapala Company 
with authorizations from the SRH, while some 
were directly executed by the SRH. It is clear 
that  the  Lerma–Chapala–Santiago  study 
commission, staffed by SRH hydrocrats, viewed 
Lake  Chapala  as  an  unaffordable  luxury  for 
Mexico and believed that its water should be 
used to the fullest extent possible.
A  civil  protest  movement  developed  in 
Guadalajara  during  the  first  Lake  Chapala 
crisis, just as it did decades later (see Water 
Reforms  and  Water  Transfers),  which  went 
against  the  hydraulic  mission  of  the  SRH. 
Pérez-Peña (2004) provides a detailed account 
of the origin and activities of the Comité de 
Defensa  del  Lago  Chapala  (Committee  for 
the Defence of Lake Chapala). This committee 
initially  consisted  of  four  people,  with  the 
author Ramón Rubín as its driving force, and 
was formed to protest against the 18 December 
1953 presidential decree that authorized the 
Lerma–Chapala–Santiago  commission  to 
reduce the size of the lake’s area by 25,000 
ha. In January 1954, the committee sent an 
open  letter  to  the  president  requesting  the 
withdrawal of his decree. Throughout 1954, a 
range of academics, intellectuals and influential 
politicians joined the committee and pressured 
the Jalisco governor to stop the desiccation of 
the lake. Owing to pressure from the commit-
tee,  the  implementation  of  the  presidential 
decree  was  stopped  (and  finally  revoked  in 
1983). With the recovery of the lake in 1955, 
the activity of the committee lessened, and by 
1958 it had faded away (Pérez-Peña, 2004).
Although  the  Lerma–Chapala–Santiago 
commission failed to construct a new embank-
ment in Lake Chapala, it did sow the seeds for 
the second Lake Chapala crisis, by making the 
decision to use Lake Chapala for Guadalajara’s 
water supply. In 1953, at the height of the first 
Lake  Chapala  crisis,  the  commission  started 
work on developing the Atequiza–Las Pintas 
aqueduct to withdraw water from Lake Chapala 
for Guadalajara. The aqueduct’s starting-point 
was  the  Ocotlán  pumping  station,  which 
pumped  water  from  Lake  Chapala  into  the 
Santiago River, from where it flowed 40 km to 
the Atequiza canal. At the end of the Atequiza 
canal, water was pumped up 22 m to the newly 
dug  Las  Pintas  canal  (25  km  long),  which 
brought  the  water  to  the  city’s  main  water 
supply system. The initial capacity of this work 
was 1 m3/s, but it was later increased to 9 
m3/s. The aqueduct entered into operation in 
1956, although at that time the lake was nearly 
empty (de P. Sandoval, 1981).
In July 1955, the lake dropped to its lowest 
recorded level, namely cota 90.8 (954 Mm3), 
resulting in a very erratic electricity supply to 
Guadalajara. However, very good rains in the 
autumn brought relief, and the lake recovered 
sufficiently to restart electricity production. By 
1958, the lake had again dropped dangerously 
low, but another autumn of very good rainfall 
caused it to recover by nearly 5 m and the lake 
remained relatively full until 1979. The heavy 
rains of 1958 caused extensive flooding in the 
basin and serious damage to the Solis dam. As 
a result, between 1958 and 1982, the Solís 
dam was not filled to its full storage level but 
kept around 500 Mm3. The water in excess of 
this storage was passed on to Lake Chapala 
until  1982,  when  the  reconstruction  of  the 
Solís dam was completed.
Although the first Lake Chapala crisis had 
demonstrated  that  the  basin  had  already 
reached its limits concerning water availability, 
the construction of new dams and the expan-
sion of the irrigation frontier throughout the 
basin  continued  unabated  during  the  1960s 
and 1970s. Many of the works planned by the 
commission in 1953 were constructed by the 
SRH,  and  groundwater  irrigation  became 
increasingly  important.  The  dam  storage 
capacity in the basin more than doubled, from 
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the largest increase in the history of the basin 
(de P. Sandoval, 1994), while the irrigated area 
grew from 390,000 ha in 1960 to 640,000 
ha in 1980, primarily in irrigation units (CNA/
MW, 1999). The details of these developments 
will  not  be  recounted  here,  but  they  clearly 
bear out that the hydrocracy took little heed of 
the warning of the first Lake Chapala crisis, but 
rather took it as an affirmation of its hydraulic 
mission to fully develop the water resources of 
the basin.
Water Reforms and Water Transfers: from 
Central Control to Negotiated 
Uncertainties
The drive by the federal government to mobi-
lize ever more water through the construction 
of hydraulic infrastructure started to falter in 
the late 1970s, leading to the demise of the 
hydraulic mission in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
1976,  the  river  basin  commissions  were 
disbanded,  and  President  López-Portillo 
merged the SRH with the Ministry of Agriculture 
to  create  the  Secretaría  de  Agricultura  y 
Recursos  Hidráulicos  (SARH:  Ministry  of 
Agriculture  and  Hydraulic  Resources).  This 
resulted in bureaucratic struggles and a politi-
cally expressed demand for renewed autonomy 
on  the  part  of  the  hydrocrats,  which  they 
regained in January 1989, when the Comisión 
Nacional  del  Agua  (CNA:  National  Water 
Commission) was created (Rap et al., 2004). 
Also, the focus on river basins was kept alive in 
the  National  Hydraulic  Plan  commission, 
where  a  group  of  water  resource  planners 
developed policy ideas on decentralized river 
basin management (Wester, 2008).
Although the 1960s and 1970s were the 
heyday of dam construction in the basin, with 
storage  capacity  more  than  doubling,  the 
1980s also saw some continued dam construc-
tion. The strengthening and raising of the Solís 
dam  was  important  and  was  completed  in 
1982, which increased its storage capacity to 
1200 Mm3. Together with some minor dams, 
this increased storage capacity in the basin to 
4499 Mm3 by the end of the 1980s, which 
was  nearly  equivalent  to  the  annual  average 
surface water runoff in the basin. The elevation 
of the Solís dam coincided with the start of the 
second Lake Chapala crisis and was one of the 
contributing factors to the crisis, together with 
lower  than  average  rainfall  and  the  over-
concessioning of surface water rights.
Another  important  development  that 
affected  Lake  Chapala  was  that  Guadalajara 
increased its withdrawals from the lake for its 
urban water supply. In the 1980s, a 42 km 
long pipe aqueduct was built to directly connect 
Lake  Chapala  with  Guadalajara,  fed  by  a 
pumping station with a capacity of 7.5 m3/s on 
the  shores  of  Lake  Chapala.  This  aqueduct 
started functioning in 1992 and was intended 
to replace the Atequiza–Las Pintas aqueduct, 
constructed in the 1950s. However, Guadalajara 
continued to use both aqueducts and withdrew 
more than its annual concessioned volume of 
240 Mm3 from Lake Chapala. Guzmán (2003) 
estimates that Guadalajara withdraws around 
450 Mm3 from the lake each year, while an 
additional 130 Mm3 are withdrawn from the 
lake  for  irrigation.  These  withdrawals  are 
significant,  as  the  average  annual  storage 
change in Lake Chapala from 1980 to 2001 
was −191 Mm3 (IMTA, 2002a). However, the 
Jalisco  state  government  has  consistently 
blamed  the  desiccation  of  Lake  Chapala  on 
excessive  irrigation  withdrawals  upstream  in 
Guanajuato and claims that it has reduced its 
withdrawals from Lake Chapala.
Concern about water quantity and quality in 
the  Lerma–Chapala  basin  increased  in  the 
1980s  with  the  start  of  the  second  Lake 
Chapala crisis (1980–2002). The pace of insti-
tutional reforms increased after 1988, when 
the newly elected president of Mexico, Carlos 
Salinas, gave high priority to water issues (Rap 
et al., 2004). This materialized in the creation 
of the CNA in 1989, the transfer of govern-
ment  irrigation  districts  to  users  starting  in 
1989, and a new Water Law in 1992. These 
water reforms and larger political changes in 
Mexico in the 1990s, such as the transition to 
multi-party  democracy  and  decentralization 
policies,  led  to  a  growing  influence  of  new 
water actors in the basin, such as state water 
commissions,  WUAs  and  environmental 
organizations. With the demise of the hydraulic 
mission and the rise of environmental issues, 
the demands and pressures on the hydrocracy 
changed  fundamentally,  from  water  supply 
development to water demand management.   The Lerma–Chapala Basin, Mexico  89
This  section  analyses  the  attempts  by  the 
hydrocracy to deal with basin closure in the 
Lerma–Chapala basin in the 1990s and 2000s 
in this changed context, focusing on surface 
water allocation at basin level and groundwater 
regulation.
Attempts to bend down the water 
overexploitation curve 
The main water management challenge in fully 
closed basins is bending down the water deple-
tion curve. In the Lerma–Chapala basin, the 
hydrocracy made an attempt to bend the curve 
down in the 1990s by defining surface water 
allocation mechanisms at river basin level and 
by increasing the participation of state govern-
ments and, later on, of water users, in river 
basin management. In April 1989, the Mexican 
president and the governors of the five states in 
the basin signed a coordination agreement to 
improve river basin management and to ‘rescue’ 
Lake  Chapala.  The  agreement  con  tained 
com  mitments to modify water allocation mech-
anisms, to improve water quality, to increase 
water-use efficiency and to conserve the basin’s 
ecosystems. In September 1989, a consulta-
tive council (CC) was formed to translate the 
agreement  into  action.  Achievements  of  the 
CC  include  the  formulation  of  a  river  basin 
master plan in 1993; a wastewater treatment 
programme, initiated in 1991; and a surface 
water  allocation  agreement,  signed  by  the 
governors  of  the  five  basin  states  and  the 
federal government in August 1991 (Mestre, 
1997). However, these changes were carried 
out in a top-down manner, in which the politi-
cal  context  considerably  influenced  how  the 
policies  were  realized.  This  resulted  in  the 
exclusion of Lake Chapala as a ‘water user’ 
from the water allocation rules in the surface 
water  allocation  agreement  (Wester  et  al., 
2004).
The  achievements  of  the  CC  led  to  the 
inclusion of an article in the 1992 Water Law 
on river basin councils (RBCs), defined as coor-
dinating and consensus-building bodies between 
the CNA, federal, state and municipal govern-
ments,  and  water  users.  While  responsibility 
for  water  management  was  retained  by  the 
CNA, the RBCs were conceived as important 
mechanisms  for  conflict  resolution.  The 
Lerma–Chapala  CC  became  the  Lerma–
Chapala River Basin Council in January 1993. 
Currently,  it  consists  of  a  governing  board 
made up of the CNA Director, the five state 
governors and six representatives for water-use 
sectors  (agriculture,  fisheries,  services,  indus-
try, livestock, urban). The RBC also includes a 
monitoring  and  evaluation  group  (MEG)  and 
several specialized working groups. The MEG 
meets on a regular basis and is charged with 
preparing council meetings and applying the 
1991  surface  water  allocation  agreement 
(Wester et al., 2003).
In the Lerma–Chapala basin, surface water 
is allocated annually, based on concession titles 
and the surface water allocation agreement of 
August 1991. The concession titles set out the 
maximum volume that concession holders are 
entitled to, but the CNA may adjust the quan-
tity  that  each  user  receives,  based  on  water 
availability.  The  objective  of  the  agreement 
was to save Lake Chapala, primarily to secure 
Guadalajara’s  domestic  water  supply.  It  sets 
out three allocation policies, namely critical, 
average and abundant, based on whether the 
volume of water in the lake is less than 3300 
Mm3,  between  3300  and  6000  Mm3,  and 
more than 6000 Mm3, respectively. For each 
allocation policy, formulas are used to calculate 
water allocations to the irrigation schemes in 
the basin, based on the surface runoff of the 
previous year. While no provisions for environ-
mental flows were included in the agreement, 
the algorithms of the three allocation policies 
were designed to ensure sufficient carry-over 
storage in the basin’s reservoirs. If adhered to, 
the  modelling  runs  showed  that  this  would 
generate  sufficient  spillage  from  reservoirs 
during the rainy season, and thus provide river 
inflows to Lake Chapala (Wester et al., 2005). 
However, a flaw of the agreement was that it 
was only based on rainfall data from 1950 to 
1979,  thus  excluding  the  dry  years  in  the 
1940s and the 1980s. As a result, estimations 
of annual water availability, and hence water 
allocations, were too high, as become clear in 
the 1990s.
Since 1991, the MEG has met each year to 
apply the water allocation rules of the 1991 
treaty,  closely  adhering  to  its  provisions. 
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tion districts never used more water than allo-
cated to them under the treaty (Wester et al., 
2005). None the less, Lake Chapala’s volume 
more than halved between 1994 and 2002. 
This led to intense debates in the RBC, with 
environmentalists and the Jalisco state govern-
ment blaming the upstream irrigation districts 
in  Guanajuato  for  using  too  much  water. 
However,  other  contributing  factors  to  the 
reduced inflows from the Lerma River to the 
lake  are  the  following:  CNA’s  weak  control 
over surface water use in the small irrigation 
units, direct pumping from the river and Lake 
Chapala for irrigation, 10 years of lower than 
average rainfall, and reduced river base flows 
due to groundwater overexploitation (Wester, 
2008).  In  addition,  the  1991  treaty  itself  is 
partly  at  fault  since  it  overestimated  annual 
water availability and did not explicitly define 
environmental flows, which would have ensured 
a  base  flow  in  the  Lerma  River  and  hence 
inflows to Lake Chapala.
Water transfers and farmer initiatives to save 
water
Since 1999, political conflicts and negotiation 
processes surrounding the allocation of surface 
water  have  dominated  the  Lerma–Chapala 
RBC.  Although  stakeholder  participation  in 
water management has been broadly accepted 
in Mexico, the relationships between social and 
government actors are strongly influenced by a 
long tradition of concentration of political and 
decision-making  power  at  the  federal  level 
(Vargas  and  Mollard,  2005).  Negotiations  in 
the past were common, albeit with the federal 
authority  as  the  central  actor,  commanding 
patronage  and  corporatist  relationships.  The 
traditional coalition between farmers (to obtain 
subsidies from the government), the adminis-
tration (dependent on politicians, also at the 
local level) and elected representatives (to avoid 
unrest in their states) continues to be strong, 
alongside stakeholder participation, decentrali-
zation  and  multi-party  elections  in  Mexico. 
Currently,  the  decentralization  of  water 
manage  ment to river basins entails the crea-
tion of different spaces for social participation, 
which changes conflict-solving and negotiation 
practices.
In  November  1999,  because  of  critically 
low lake levels, and under pressure from Jalisco 
to secure Guadalajara’s water supply, the CNA 
transferred 200 Mm3 from the Solis dam, the 
main  water  source  of  the  largest  irrigation 
district in the basin, to Lake Chapala. This was 
the first time that surface water was physically 
transferred from the agriculture sector to the 
urban  and  environmental  sectors  under  the 
1991 treaty. A second transfer of 270 Mm3 
followed  in  November  2001,  as  lake  levels 
continued  to  decline.  These  water  transfers 
were met with staunch resistance from farm-
ers, mostly from the middle of the basin, and 
undermined  the  legitimacy  of  the  RBC. 
Farmers felt that their water was being stolen, 
as they received no compensation and because 
the 1991 treaty did not outline procedures for 
water transfers. In contrast, environmentalists 
and the Jalisco state government argued that 
much more water had to be transferred to save 
the lake, as around 10 Mm3 were needed to 
raise the lake level by 1 cm. This led many in 
Jalisco to refer to the water transfers as ‘aspi-
rins’ for the lake’s headaches, with the media 
calling for much stronger medicine to cure the 
lake. 
Before 1999, none of the WUA leaders in 
the  Alto  Río  Lerma  irrigation  district  were 
actively  involved  in  the  RBC.  However,  the 
water transfers galvanized these leaders to act. 
In May 2000, the presidents of WUAs from 
Jalisco, Guanajuato and Michoacán met one 
another for the first time to discuss ways to 
strengthen  their  position  in  the  RBC.  Until 
then, WUAs had only dealt with the CNA, and 
there  were  no  horizontal  linkages  between 
WUAs  from  different  irrigation  districts.  In 
2001, the WUAs established a new working 
group in the RBC, under the leadership of the 
representative for agricultural water use on the 
RBC. Until the end of 2002, this Grupo de 
Trabajo Especializado en Planeación Agrícola 
Integral (GTEPAI: Specialized Working Group 
on Integral Agricultural Planning) attempted to 
strengthen the negotiation position of irriga-
tors in the RBC. A central element of GTEPAI’s 
strategy was to show that the irrigation sector 
was serious about saving water and hence a 
credible negotiation partner. The cooperation 
of  government  agencies,  agro-industries  and 
producers under the GTEPAI initiative resulted   The Lerma–Chapala Basin, Mexico  91
in a change in cropping patterns during the 
winter  season  of  2001/02.  Throughout  the 
basin, GTEPAI facilitated the conversion from 
wheat (four irrigation turns) to barley (three irri-
gation turns) on 47,000 ha. This resulted in a 
record production of barley, reduced imports 
for breweries, and claimed water savings of 60 
Mm3 (Paters, 2004). While GTEPAI improved 
farmer representation and participation in the 
RBC, its efforts to save water went unrecog-
nized by the other members of the RBC. 
While the farmer representatives took the 
lead, the threat of civil disobedience by farmers 
decreased.  However,  in  November  2002, 
when the CNA decided that a third water trans-
fer of 280 Mm3 was to take place during the 
summer of 2003, tensions increased and farm-
ers warned that they would occupy the Solis 
dam to prevent the transfer. Simultaneously, 
the representative of agricultural water use on 
the RBC was pressured to resign from the RBC 
during the MEG meeting in November 2002. 
The disappointment of farmer representatives 
and  others  involved  with  GTEPAI  was  such 
that they decided to dissolve the GTEPAI and 
to revert to interest group politics.
During the summer of 2003, unexpected 
heavy  rains  coincided  with  the  third  water 
transfer, causing floods in many parts of the 
basin. Instead of being accused of stealing irri-
gation  water  from  farmers,  the  CNA  was 
blamed  for  aggravating  flooding  through  the 
water transfer. Although the very good rains of 
2003  led  to  a  spectacular  recovery  of  Lake 
Chapala,  with  stored  volumes  jumping  from 
1330  Mm3  in  June  2003  to  4250  Mm3  in 
January 2004 (see Fig. 4.4), this did not cool 
down tempers, as Jalisco wanted a full lake and 
had  secured  CNA’s  support  for  this.  In 
November 2003, the Jalisco representative on 
the RBC again demanded the transfer of water 
from upstream dams to Lake Chapala, fuelling 
the anger of farmer representatives and further 
straining  the  relationship  with  Guanajuato. 
None the less, the CNA announced that 205 
Mm3 would be transferred, representing 50% 
of the unallocated water stored in the basin’s 
reservoirs, and on 27 November 2003 opened 
the Solís dam. However, the CNA denied that 
this was a transfer, arguing that it was neces-
sary for the hydraulic security of the Solís dam. 
The WUAs in the Middle Lerma did not buy 
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into this excuse and, for the first time, took the 
issue  to  court  on  12  December  2003.  The 
judge of the Celaya district court ruled in favour 
of the farmers and ordered that the transfer be 
stopped.  However,  by  the  time  the  judge 
forbade  the  transfer,  the  water  had  already 
flowed, with 174 Mm3 reaching the lake.
Under pressure from Jalisco, 955 Mm3 was 
transferred from reservoirs in the basin to Lake 
Chapala between 1999 and 2004, of which 
817  Mm3  arrived  (Dau-Flores  and  Aparicio-
Mijares, 2006). Although these water transfers 
were insufficient to ‘save’ the lake and could be 
seen as an instance of symbol politics, they did 
have consequences. First, around 100,000 ha 
could  have  been  irrigated  with  this  ‘excess’ 
water. The reduced allocations to the irrigation 
districts negatively affected farmers’ livelihoods, 
the  larger  agricultural  economy  and  the 
performance of the WUAs that depended for 
their income solely on irrigation service fees. In 
addition,  the  leadership  of  the  WUAs  was 
severely questioned by water users because of 
the lack of water for irrigation, although there 
was water available. Second, Jalisco could claim 
that it was saving the lake, as without the trans-
fers Lake Chapala would have dropped to 746 
Mm3  in  July  2002,  208  Mm3  less  than  the 
lowest level in 1955 (Dau-Flores and Aparicio-
Mijares, 2006:68). Third, the CNA reaffirmed 
its position as the central decision maker in the 
basin, although the transfers damaged its legiti-
macy and reputation. Last, farmer representa-
tives became actively involved in negotiations at 
the river basin level and developed an initiative 
to switch to less water-demanding crops.
Renegotiating the surface water allocation 
agreement
Throughout this period, a parallel process was 
underway to revise the 1991 water allocation 
agreement. In this process, the controversies 
and conflicts in the basin came together, such 
as  the  conflict  between  agricultural  interests 
and those defending the lake (environmental-
ists and Guadalajara/Jalisco state), the decen-
tralization struggles between the CNA and the 
states in the basin, and the clash between a 
technocratic approach to allocating water and 
a  negotiated  agreement  approach.  In  1999, 
the members of the RBC  decided to revise the 
agreement, as it was clear that it was not rescu-
ing Lake Chapala. This was attributed to weak-
nesses in the 1991 agreement, including an 
overestimation of water availability in the basin, 
an underestimation of the area under irrigation 
and the lack of mechanisms to control the clan-
destine use of water (Güitrón, 2005). In 1999 
and 2000, detailed hydrological studies were 
carried out by a consultant hired by the CNA to 
develop a new model for calculating surface 
runoff, without this leading to major changes in 
the water allocation agreement. 
In March 2002, the Jalisco representative 
on  the  RBC  requested  a  full  revision  of  the 
1991  allocation  agreement,  leading  to  the 
creation of a new working group, called the 
Grupo  de  Ordenamiento  y  Distribución 
(GOD: Ordering and Distribution Group). This 
group consisted of the CNA, government offi-
cials of the five states in the basin and consult-
ants  hired  by  Jalisco  and  Guanajuato.  To 
develop  consensus  in  this  group,  it  was  felt 
necessary  to  contract  a  ‘neutral’  outsider  to 
execute the hydrological studies and develop a 
new  water  allocation  model.  Thus,  it  was 
decided to contract IMTA (Instituto, Mexicana 
de  Tecnología  del  Agua),  Mexico’s  water 
research institute. This proved to be important, 
as IMTA became a mediator and provided the 
negotiation parties with updated and revised 
hydrological data and water allocation scenar-
ios (IMTA, 2002a). Until the end of 2003, little 
progress  was  made  in  the  negotiations, 
although the detailed studies and their discus-
sion in the RBC did lead to a new consensus 
on  hydrological  data  and  the  design  of  the 
water allocation model. 
Behind the scenes, the revision of the surface 
water agreement became linked to negotiations 
surrounding the construction of two new dams 
in the Santiago basin, both located in Jalisco. 
The Arcediano dam on the Santiago River is to 
provide Guadalajara with water, so that the city 
can stop withdrawing water from Lake Chapala. 
The second dam will be located on a tributary of 
the Santiago River, and will provide León, the 
largest city in Guanajuato, with water. However, 
to receive this water Guanajuato must guaran-
tee that it will allow the return flows from León 
to flow to Lake Chapala. The discussions on the 
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linked to the water allocation negotiations, to 
such an extent that political brokerage at high 
levels was needed to reach a simultaneous deal 
on both issues. In early 2004, President Fox 
made  the  allocation  of  federal  funds  to  the 
construction of these two dams conditional to 
the signing of a new water allocation agreement 
(Campillo, 2004).
Thus, the last phase of the negotiations was 
entered into under a charged political atmos-
phere. At an RBC meeting held in May 2004, 
the  CNA  regional  office  presented  an  ’opti-
mized’ water allocation scenario that did not 
include the need for water transfers. Instead, it 
was proposed that the volume stored in the 
reservoirs of the basin would not exceed their 
normal storage capacity, by keeping the emer-
gency flood storage empty. Hence, any excess 
storage  water  would  be  discharged  to  Lake 
Chapala. The ‘optimized’ allocation scenario 
also showed that, irrespective of Lake Chapala’s 
volume, farmers would always receive at least 
50% of their concessioned volume. The good 
rains  of  2004,  with  Lake  Chapala  reaching 
75% of its capacity in November, helped pave 
the way for the signing of a new surface water 
allocation covenant in December 2004. The 
revised agreement entails further reductions in 
allocations to irrigation if water levels in Lake 
Chapala  are  low,  but  it  does  not  explicitly 
contain  provisions  for  environmental  flows. 
The resistance of farmer representatives to the 
new covenant decreased after the presentation 
of  the  ‘optimized’  water  allocation  scenario, 
and after the inclusion of an article in the cove-
nant that it could be revised each year. The 
pressure exerted by the Mexican president and 
the issue linkage with the construction of new 
dams were also important elements that led to 
the  signing  of  the  new  covenant.  However, 
without the good rains of 2003 and 2004 the 
story would have been quite different, and it 
remains to be seen how well the new water 
allocation covenant will function when the next 
dry period occurs.
The invisible water crisis: groundwater 
overexploitation
A  more  pressing  issue  than  surface  water   
allocation in the Lerma–Chapala basin is the 
serious overdraft of the basin’s aquifers, esti-
mated at 1336 Mm3 per year (IMTA, 2002a). 
The situation in the Middle Lerma region is 
particularly acute, with extractions exceeding 
recharge  by  40%  (CEAG,  2006).  As  some 
380,000  ha  in  the  basin  are  irrigated  with 
groundwater, and industrial and domestic uses 
depend  almost  entirely  on  groundwater,  the 
long-term consequences of continued ground-
water  overexploitation  overshadow  those  of 
Lake Chapala drying up. However, efforts to 
reduce  groundwater  extractions  have  yielded 
few results to date. 
In 1993, the Lerma–Chapala RBC signed a 
coordination  agreement  to  regulate  ground-
water extraction in the basin, but progress on 
the ground has been limited (CNA, 1993). The 
weak  control  of  the  CNA  over  groundwater 
extractions  and  the  high  social  and  political 
costs of reducing groundwater exploitation are 
primary  obstacles.  Although  the  constitution 
mandates the federal government to intervene 
in overexploited aquifers by placing them under 
veda (prohibition), thereby prohibiting the sink-
ing of new wells without permission from the 
federal government, the experience with vedas 
has been disappointing (Arreguín, 1998). For 
example, the number of wells in Guanajuato 
alone increased from approximately 2000 in 
1958 to 16,500 in 1997, although the drilling 
of new wells in the whole state was already 
forbidden in 1983 (Guerrero, 2000).
Based on the recognition that vedas had 
not  worked  and  to  counter  the  continued 
depletion  of  groundwater  in  the  basin,  the 
CNA  started  promoting  the  formation  of 
Comités  Técnicos  de  Aguas  Subterráneas 
(COTAS:  Technical  Committees  for 
Groundwater)  in  selected  aquifers  in  the 
Lerma–Chapala basin in 1995 (Wester, 2008). 
Through  the  establishment  of  COTAS,  the 
CNA sought to organize aquifer users, with the 
aim  of  establishing  mutual  agreements  for 
reversing  groundwater  depletion.  Based  on 
developments  in  the  state  of  Guanajuato, 
where  the  Comisión  Estatal  de  Agua  de 
Guanajuato (CEAG: Guanajuato State Water 
Commission)  enthusiastically  promoted  the 
creation of COTAS (Guerrero, 2000; Wester, 
2008), the structure of the COTAS has been 
defined at the national level in the rules and 
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rules, the COTAS are defined as water user 
organizations, whose membership consists of 
all the water users of an aquifer. They are to 
serve as mechanisms for reaching agreement 
on aquifer management, taking into considera-
tion the needs of the sectors using ground  water 
(CNA, 2000). 
As with the RBC, government has played an 
active  role  in  forming  and  promoting  the 
COTAS but with a much larger involvement of 
state governments. In the state of Guanajuato, 
14  COTAS  (of  which  11  fall  in  the  Lerma–
Chapala  basin)  have  been  formed  with  the 
financial,  logistical  and  technical  support  of 
CEAG (Hoogesteger, 2004; Sandoval, 2004). 
While CEAG has encouraged the COTAS to set 
their own agenda, it has retained an important 
influence on the COTAS. Because agriculture is 
the major groundwater consumer, most of the 
discussions in the COTAS in Guanajuato revolve 
around  increasing  irrigation  efficiencies  and 
reducing water use by the agriculture sector.
On paper, COTAS are platforms where all 
the users of an aquifer meet to reach agree-
ments on aquifer management. However, user 
participation has been quite low, notwithstand-
ing attempts by the state water commissions to 
involve as many stakeholders as possible. In 
part, this is due to a lack of reliable information 
on the owners of pumps in an aquifer and the 
lack of infrastructure and human resources on 
the part of the COTAS, making it difficult to 
summon all the users. Hence, during the form-
ative  stage  of  the  COTAS  only  well-known 
people  were  invited  to  participate  (Wester, 
2008). In the majority of cases, the representa-
tives of the agriculture sector in the COTAS 
are commercial farmers or agro-industrialists. 
This procedure, which has not brought together 
all the pumpers in an aquifer but rather builds 
on a small group of leaders who are not neces-
sarily representative, has hamstrung the effec-
tiveness  of  the  COTAS.  Although  nearly  all 
stakeholders agree that the situation is grave, 
this has not yet translated into a multi-stake-
holder  process  to  reach  a  negotiated  agree-
ment on reductions in groundwater extractions. 
Hence, the overall impact of the COTAS has 
been minimal. None has yet devised mecha-
nisms  to  significantly  reduce  groundwater 
extractions,  and  the  tough  issue  of  how  to 
reach agreement on an across-the-board reduc-
tion in pumping has not yet been broached.
Furthermore, many participants and staff of 
the COTAS and CEAG have become frustrated 
because the COTAS have little power to make 
a real difference in groundwater extractions. 
This is because they have no faculties to control 
groundwater extractions and have to rely on 
the  goodwill  of  users  and  other  institutions, 
particularly the CNA. As the CNA is the only 
government  agency  that  can  issue  pumping 
permits,  and  is  responsible  for  the  enforce-
ment of aquifer regulations, groundwater users 
are keen to maintain good relations with the 
CNA. In addition, the CNA has taken a back 
seat in the COTAS, and has emphatically not 
given  them  a  mandate,  thus  sending  the 
message to groundwater users that the COTAS 
are  irrelevant.  The  CEAG  has  continued  to 
promote the COTAS, in the hope that it can 
wrestle some control over groundwater away 
from the CNA. However, as long as the CNA 
continues to give preference to the lucrative 
business of legalizing ‘irregular’ pumps instead 
of throwing its weight behind the COTAS, the 
chances of a negotiated agreement on reduc-
tions in groundwater extractions are bleak.
Conclusions
This chapter shows how the hydraulic mission, 
embedded in the various manifestations of the 
hydrocracy in Mexico, led to the ‘overbuilding’ 
of the Lerma–Chapala basin and the concomi-
tant overexploitation of water. The trajectory of 
the Lerma–Chapala basin is comparable to that 
of many other closing river basins, starting with 
small-scale, local water management, and then 
progressing  to  large  dams  and  irrigation 
schemes  funded,  built  and  operated  by  the 
state.  Technology  development  has  been  an 
important driving force of the hydraulic mission, 
as without reinforced concrete and hydrocar-
bon-fuelled machinery most of the large hydrau-
lic  works  could  not  have  been  constructed. 
Other important drivers were the availability of 
labour  and  capital,  which  were  frequently 
constraining factors in the history of the Lerma–
Chapala  basin.  The  specifics  of  how  the 
Lerma–Chapala basin was overbuilt have been 
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lenges the basin is facing, such as environmen-
tal  degradation,  overexploitation  of  water, 
increasing social conflicts and the need for all 
involved actors to develop new ways to negoti-
ate their way out of basin closure.
The closure of the Lerma–Chapala basin is 
a combination of increasing human pressures 
on  water,  the  overconcessioning  of  water 
rights, and rainfall fluctuations. However, the 
creation of water overexploitation in the basin 
was not inevitable or an automatic process, but 
the outcome of the hydraulic mission of the 
federal government’s hydrocracy. In its efforts 
to  ‘develop’  the  basin,  the  hydrocracy  was 
strongly supported by state governments and 
water users to achieve the fullest utilization of 
water for the greatness of Mexico. The convic-
tion that every drop of water evaporating from 
Lake Chapala is a ‘waste’ is still strong today 
among  farmers  and  hydrocrats;  it  partly 
explains the lack of concerted efforts to reduce 
consumptive water use in irrigated agriculture. 
If Lake Chapala had not been the main source 
of  water  for  Guadalajara  and  an  important 
tourist destination, it is doubtful whether the 
state of Jalisco would have made an effort to 
’rescue’ the lake.
Another important finding presented in this 
chapter is the role of water abstractions from 
Lake Chapala. It is probable that the first and 
second Lake Chapala crises would not have 
occurred if no abstractions from the lake had 
taken  place.  This  is  an  important  point  as, 
throughout the years, hydrocrats have argued 
that the cyclical declines in Lake Chapala were 
due to years of drought. While years of less 
rainfall obviously lead to lower inflows to the 
lake, the yearly abstraction of 520 Mm3 from 
the  lake  during  the  1940s  and  1950s  for 
hydroelectricity generation were an important 
cause of the first Lake Chapala crisis. The rela-
tively wet period in the 1960s and 1970s made 
it possible for the hydrocracy to execute the 
water infrastructure development plans it had 
formulated since the 1930s. In particular, the 
elevation of the crest of the Solís dam in 1982 
was important, as this increased the storage 
capacity in the Middle Lerma region. However, 
irrigation is not fully to blame for the second 
Lake Chapala crisis. From 1980 to 2001, the 
overall negative annual storage change of the 
lake was 191 Mm3, while withdrawals from the 
lake  for  Guadalajara’s  water  supply  were  at 
least 240 Mm3 and possibly as high as 450 
Mm3 per year. Without these withdrawals the 
lake would not have declined.
The presence of Lake Chapala at the down-
stream end of the Lerma–Chapala basin poses 
special challenges for water management in the 
basin. This revolves around the extent of fluc-
tuations in the lake’s volume that are regarded 
as  acceptable.  Before  the  hydraulic  interven-
tions  of  the  20th  century,  high  lake  levels 
resulted in outflows discharging to the Santiago 
River.  The  hydraulic  modifications  of  Lake 
Chapala and the construction of dams upstream 
largely cancelled these outflows and, depending 
on rainfall levels, resulted in the retraction or 
expansion  of  the  lake’s  volume.  The  above-
average rainfall between 2003 and 2008 led to 
a good recovery of the lake, showing how sensi-
tive it is to variations in rainfall. In effect, it has 
temporarily reopened the basin from a surface 
water perspective. With a lake that is so sensi-
tive to rainfall variations, the determination of 
the range of acceptable variations in its volume 
is subjective and its quantification raises political 
difficulties. In years with lower rainfall, farmers 
need more water while there is less water avail-
able, leading to reduced inflows to the lake. To 
stop the lake from falling below critical levels, 
water  needs  to  be  transferred  from  dams 
precisely when farmers need it most. This calls 
for the design of compensation mechanisms for 
farmers to forgo irrigation in dry years, but this 
option  has  not  yet  been  considered  in  the 
Lerma–Chapala basin. 
The key finding of this chapter is how diffi-
cult it is to reduce consumptive water use in 
closed basins, even if a range of water reforms 
are attempted and serious efforts are made to 
arrive  at  negotiated  agreements  on  surface 
water  allocation  mechanisms.  The  three 
responses to river basin closure identified by 
Molle (2003), namely allocation, conservation 
and  supply  augmentation,  are  clearly  in 
evidence in the Lerma–Chapala basin. Part of 
the answer as to why it is so difficult to reduce 
consumptive water use is because of the ‘over-
building’  of  the  basin  and  the  hydro-social-
networks  (Wester,  2008)  constituted  around, 
and by, the hydraulic infrastructure in the basin. 
The  construction  of  hydraulic  infrastructure 
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the  hydrological  cycle  into  the  hydro-social 
cycle, thereby creating constituencies depend-
ent on water for their livelihoods. For example, 
the widespread hydraulic modifications to Lake 
Chapala changed it from a natural lake into a 
managed storage reservoir, on which Guadalajara 
depends for its urban water supply. The political 
and economic repercussions are such that it is 
very  difficult  to  reduce  withdrawals  from  the 
lake,  while  the  existence  of  the  Chapala–
Guadalajara  aqueduct  provides  ‘easy’  water, 
which  precludes  attempts  to  increase  water 
delivery  efficiencies  in  the  city.  Similarly,  the 
dams, irrigation canals and tube wells constructed 
in  the  basin  have  led  to  the  development  of 
numerous hydro-social-networks that are bent 
on continuing the abstraction of water for irriga-
tion.  Left  to  their  own  devices,  these  hydro-
social-networks will continue withdrawing more 
water than is sustainable.
Note
1   The  depth  of  Lake  Chapala  is  measured  with  a 
locally defined benchmark, originally called the 
acotación  (elevation  mark)  and  later  the  cota 






level.  At  present,  the  lake’s  normal  maximum 
operating level is at cota 97.80, while at around 
cota 90.00 it is nearly empty.
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Introduction
In 1997, the Yellow River dried up, 750 km 
from  its  mouth  in  the  Bohai  Sea,  triggering 
significant comment and concern both within 
and  beyond  China.  In  China,  this  drying-up 
elicited a broad response in print and broadcast 
media about the environmental consequences 
of rapid economic development. At the same 
time, the state directed a range of scientific and 
technical organizations to focus research on the 
causes of water depletion in the Yellow River 
basin. Internationally, the general issue of water 
scarcity in north China prompted speculation 
about China’s future ability to feed itself and the 
consequent  impact  on  global  grain  markets 
(Brown and Halweil, 1998).
As suggested by the dramatic photographs 
of the desiccated river bed, the protagonist in 
this  contemporary  drama  was  indeed  the 
Yellow River. One explanation for the vigorous 
domestic  and  international  response  to  the 
drying-up lies in the tangible economic impor-
tance of the Yellow River to the North China 
Plain – the ‘breadbasket’ of China. The prob-
lems  with  the  Yellow  River  suggested  the 
profound impact that resource scarcity could 
have on China’s continuing transformation to 
a global economic power. An additional expla-
nation for the outcry generated by the drying 
up  of  the  Yellow  River  was  cultural.  In  the 
historical memory of past and contemporary 
Chinese, the Yellow River is the ‘mother river’ 
– the river that sustained the growth of Chinese 
civilization. To witness this river fail to reach 
the sea was to conjure up a host of negative 
images about the Chinese and China.
The goal of this chapter is to elucidate the 
contemporary  relevance  and  importance  of 
the Yellow River by exploring the trajectory of 
its historical development. This historical trajec-
tory includes the trends over time in the physi-
cal development of the river’s water resources, 
including  traditional  river-control  practices. 
Just as importantly, it also includes the evolu-
tion of traditional values and symbols related to 
water and the river. As a result, this chapter, 
perhaps to a greater degree than any other in 
this volume, devotes substantial space to under-
standing the relevance of historic cultural ante-
cedents  to  current  issues.  The  physical  and 
cultural aspects together help explain contem-
porary approaches to hydraulic management 
of the Yellow River basin and the options that 
Chinese society and basin managers have for 
the future.
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Physical Geography of the  
Yellow River Basin
Most descriptions of the Yellow River’s geogra-
phy commence with a recitation of facts. For 
example,  the  Yellow  River  begins  in  the 
Qinghai–Tibetan Plateau of Qinghai province, 
from where it flows across eight other prov-
inces and autonomous regions, before empty-
ing into the Yellow Sea north of the Shandong 
peninsula  (Fig.  5.1).  With  a  length  of  over 
5400 km, the Yellow River is the second long-
est in China and the tenth longest in the world, 
and  drains  an  area  larger  than  France.  The 
basin  contains  approximately  9%  of  China’s 
population  and  17%  of  its  agricultural  area. 
While  such  static  figures  may  be  of  passing 
interest, it is a deeper understanding of varia-
tion in the Yellow River basin’s physical geog-
raphy  that  is  necessary  if  one  wishes  to 
understand the issues which both the Chinese 
government and basin residents face in their 
daily efforts to use, manage and protect the 
river. For accomplishing this formidable task, 
and for analysis, the river is often divided into 
its three main reaches.
Upper reach
The upper reach of the Yellow River drains just 
over half of the total basin area and extends 
from the river’s origin in the Bayenkela moun-
tains to the Hekouzhen gauging station down-
stream  from  the  city  of  Baotou.  On  the 
Qinghai–Tibetan  Plateau,  where  the  Yellow 
River begins, steep rock slopes, low evapora-
tion  and  high  moisture  retention  produce 
runoff coefficients estimated to range from 30 
to  50%  (Greer,  1979;  World  Bank,  1993). 
This, combined with relatively high precipita-
tion levels, results in this westernmost region 
of the upper reach contributing 56% of the 
entire river’s total runoff by the point of the 
Lanzhou gauging station (YRCC, 2002b). As 
the river moves northward from there into the 
Ningxia/Inner Mongolian plains and the Gobi 
desert,  potential  evaporation  rises  to  levels 
several times that of precipitation. The spatial 
variation in flow contribution within the upper 
reach is further exacerbated by human usage 
patterns. In the most western regions of the 
upper reach, relatively low population densi-
ties, agricultural development and industrializa-
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tion  limit  in  situ  usage.  As  the  river  moves 
northward  from  Lanzhou,  the  agricultural 
population, with its long history of irrigation, 
and  a  growing  industrial  base  substantially 
increase water withdrawals.
Middle reach
The middle reach, covering 46% of the basin 
area and providing virtually all of the remaining 
runoff,  begins  at  the  Hekouzhen  gauging 
station (YRCC, 2002a). The middle reach of 
the Yellow River plays a significant role in basin 
water balances and availability for human use 
for two reasons. First, the reach includes some 
of the Yellow River’s major tributaries, such as 
the Fen and the Wei, which contribute substan-
tially  to  the  total  flow.  Second,  as  the  river 
begins  its  ‘great  bend’  to  the  south,  it  cuts 
through the Loess Plateau and its potentially 
fertile but highly erodible loess soils. These soils 
enter the main stem and its tributaries as massive 
quantities of silt, resulting in average sediment 
concentrations  unprecedented  among  major 
waterways and giving both the river and the sea 
into  which  it  flows,  their  common  ‘Yellow’ 
names (Milliman and Meade, 1983).
Sediment  levels  in  the  Yellow  River  are 
caused, in part, by such natural factors as the 
erodibility of the loess soils already mentioned, 
low  average  precipitation  (which  retards  the 
growth  of  soil-stabilizing  vegetation);  and  an 
increase  in  the  gradient  and  power  of  the 
Yellow  River  as  it  passes  through  the  most 
erodible zone. However, these levels are clearly 
exacerbated  by  anthropogenic  factors,  many 
of which have been in place for centuries or 
millennia (Ronan, 1995). While there is debate 
on the degree to which the Loess Plateau was 
’naturally’ forested, it seems clear that as early 
as the Qin and Han dynasties, large areas of 
land  had  been  deforested  for  fuelwood  and 
agricultural  expansion,  a  factor  believed  to 
have  contributed  to  increased  erosion  and, 
perhaps, regional desiccation (Menzies, 1995). 
Whatever the cause, the long-standing nature 
of the sedimentation phenomenon can be seen 
in the Chinese use of the phrase ‘when the 
[Yellow] river runs clear’ to mean ’never’. As 
will be described later, control of the potentially 
devastating  Yellow  River  floods,  which  are 
greatly exacerbated by the high sediment loads 
generated in the middle reach, has formed a 
central theme in Chinese water management 
and politics for at least 3000 years. In addition, 
control of sedimentation to reduce the severity 
and  frequency  of  flooding,  accomplished 
through flushing, is now estimated to require 
about 25% of the total Yellow River flow and 
so  is  a  major  factor  in  current  utilization  of 
basin water.
Lower reach
The lower reach of the Yellow River commences 
at the apex of the natural basin in Taohuayu 
near the city of Zhengzhou and forms one of 
the most unique river segments in the world. 
Here,  the  sediment  transported  from  the 
middle reach begins to settle as the river spills 
onto the flat North China Plain, producing a 
consistent aggradation of the bed and a natu-
rally  meandering  and  unstable  channel  (Ren 
and Walker, 1998). This instability has, in fact, 
been so severe that the Yellow River has had 
six major channel changes over the past 3500 
years, in which the outlet to the sea has shifted 
400 km from one side of the Shandong penin-
sula to the other (Greer, 1979). These massive 
shifts  in  the  river  channel,  as  well  as  more 
frequent  smaller  movements,  have  clearly 
caused  problems  for  the  millions  of  people 
who have attempted to farm the fertile alluvial 
soils of the lower reach. In response, succes-
sive river managers down the millennia have 
constructed  levees  along  the  banks  of  the 
Yellow River in an attempt to stabilize the main 
channel. While such structures may hold the 
channel in the short term, their success depends 
on consistently raising levee walls as sediment 
elevates the level of the channel constrained 
within.
Over time, the process of raising levees has 
contributed to a ‘suspended’ river, in which the 
channel bottom is above ground level, some-
times by more than 10 m (Leung, 1996). This 
raising of the channel above the level of the 
neighbouring  countryside  has  clear  implica-
tions  for  the  severity  of  flooding  when  the 
levees inevitability fail in their function. In addi-
tion, the elevated bed alters the meaning of the 
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above ground level, the surrounding landscape 
cannot drain into the river nor can tributaries 
enter it. This essentially means that the river 
‘basin’  becomes  a  narrow  corridor  no  wider 
than  the  few  kilometres’  breadth  of  the 
embanked channel. With almost no inflow, the 
contribution  of  the  lower  reach  is  limited  to 
only 3% of the total runoff. While much of the 
sediment  is  deposited  in  the  lower  reach, 
approximately half has historically reached the 
river’s outlet to the sea. These large deposits 
have, until recently at least, caused the river’s 
delta to expand outward, creating substantial 
new farmlands (Ren and Walker, 1998).
Extra-basin issues including the south–north 
transfer
While  the  above  discussion  focused  on  the 
current geographical boundaries of the Yellow 
River basin, it is important to note that these 
boundaries,  particularly  in  the  lower  reach, 
have  changed,  and  may  again  change,  over 
time. As mentioned, the high sediment load of 
the  Yellow  River  makes  the  channel  very 
un  stable in the lower reach, where the topog-
raphy is extremely flat. When the Yellow River’s 
channel shifts, typically after a flood event or 
through human intervention, it connects hydro-
logically with either the Hai River system to the 
north or the Huai River system to the south, 
resulting in an expansion of basin boundaries 
across  various  portions  of  the  North  China 
Plain. The last time such a change occurred 
was in 1938, when the Yellow River’s south 
dyke was purposefully breached at Huayuankou 
to  block  an  advance  of  the  Japanese  army. 
The river was returned to its present course by 
engineering means in 1947 (Todd, 1949). The 
imposition  of  the  Grand  Canal,  which  runs 
perpendicular  to  the  generally  east-to-west-
flowing  rivers  of  eastern  China,  and  which 
essentially links all basins from Hangzhou north 
to Tianjin, further complicates the strict defini-
tion of basin boundaries in the lower reach.
Another problem confusing the understand-
ing of the Yellow River basin boundaries is the 
lack of congruence between the geographical 
extent of the basin as commonly delineated and 
the relevant hydrological units. For example, in 
the lower reach of the basin, seepage from the 
suspended  main  stem  of  the  river  recharges 
groundwater aquifers in both the Hai and Huai 
basins, where it is extracted for crop produc-
tion. Additional water is also transferred out of 
the basin for industrial and domestic use, espe-
cially to the cities of Jinan, Qingdao and Tianjin. 
Of potentially greater significance for the future 
is the planned construction of the ‘south waters 
north’ engineering schemes, which may even-
tually transfer large amounts of water from the 
Yangtze  River  basin  into  the  Yellow  River, 
further marring the relevance of the geographi-
cal definition of the Yellow River basin (Biswas 
et al., 1983).
Water and Governance in Chinese 
History
This and the following section explore how the 
state, during the late Imperial, early Republican, 
Nationalist  and  People’s  Republic  periods 
sought to manage the Yellow River in central 
China.  They  identify  multiple  meanings  of 
water in general and the Yellow River in partic-
ular during the longue durée (an approach to 
the study of history, giving priority to long-term 
structures over events) of Chinese history and 
examine  how  these  meanings  shaped 
20th-century efforts to control the Yellow River. 
Despite  fundamental  differences  in  political 
form among the various Chinese state-building 
projects of the 20th century, each state was 
fundamentally  driven  by  similar  modernizing 
assumptions,  and  each  sought  to  selectively 
draw upon multiple historical meanings of the 
Yellow River and water in similar ways.
As reflected in the official histories written 
during  the  Imperial  period,  the  origin  of 
Chinese  civilization  is  directly  connected  to 
water. One of the first renderings of this crea-
tion myth comes from the Annals of History 
(Shiji), written by Sima Qian (circa 145–90 b c) 
during the Han dynasty. Yü the Great, reputed 
to be the founder of China’s first dynasty, is 
credited with draining the great north-central 
plain by digging discrete channels to lead the 
water of the Huai, Yellow, Yangtze and Wei 
rivers to the sea. The ordering of these water-
ways,  collectively  known  as  the  ‘four  great 
rivers’ (sidu), was attributed to Yü by most of 
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(Wang, 1987). The work of Yü the Great led to 
the development of sedentary agriculture and 
gave rise to a state that promoted agricultural 
pursuits and was sustained by appropriating a 
portion of the agricultural surplus. In sum, Yü 
the Great was responsible for the development 
of the cradle of Chinese civilization. The crea-
tion  tale  not  only  helped  to  legitimize  the 
venera  tion  of  agriculture  by  later  Confucian 
states, but also continued to inspire Chinese 
water-control  endeavours  throughout  the 
Imperial  period  and  beyond  (Levenson  and 
Schurman, 1969).
Complementing the connection of the birth 
of Chinese civilization with water were other 
systems of early Chinese thought that arose 
during the period of the ‘Hundred Schools’ in 
the  late  Zhou,  early  Warring  States  period 
(circa  500  b c).  Adherents  of  the  Naturalist 
school of thought, which developed during this 
period, sought to explain nature on the basis of 
the  complementary  cosmic  principles  of  yin 
and yang (Fairbank et al., 1989). Yang repre-
sents the male, light, hot and active qualities, 
while yin represents the forces of femaleness, 
darkness, coldness and passivity. These oppos-
ing elements, however, represent complemen-
tary forces that comprise nature. 
The  Naturalists  also  stressed  the  basic 
concept of the ‘five elements’ to explain the 
composition  of  nature.  The  five  elements  – 
fire, earth, metal, water and wood – came to 
represent  a  pre-science,  which  was  used  in 
combination  with  other  cosmic  correlations, 
including numerology and astrology, to formu-
late calendars and to form the foundation of 
geomancy (fengshui). The point here is that 
the view of water as articulated by the Naturalists 
(female, dark, passive) complemented the crea-
tion  myth  surrounding  Yü  the  Great.  The 
connection centred on the qualities of female-
ness as giver of life, or that which was respon-
sible for the birth of a civilization. At the same 
time,  we  can  see  an  affinity  between  the 
passive, dark qualities of water as described by 
the Naturalists and the historical sanction that 
manipulating water gave to Yü the Great.
Taoism was another major Chinese philo-
sophical movement with direct connection to 
water. The meaning of water in philosophical 
Taoism represents an alternative to the crea-
tion myth surrounding Yü the Great and the 
concepts of the Naturalists. Water is perhaps 
the supreme moral example of the stricture to 
find harmony with ‘the way’ (tao) through the 
principle of wu-wei, or do-nothingness. Left to 
its own accord, water finds its harmony with 
the way by effortlessly following the contours 
of the land. Water as an object of contempla-
tion intending to reveal moral truths informed 
much of China’s cultural production during the 
Imperial period. Viewed by Taoists as some-
thing  to  be  admired  rather  than  controlled, 
mountains  and  other  features  of  the  natural 
landscape were rendered in poetry, painting 
and gardens as places of contemplation, where 
it  was  possible  to  connect  with  the  ultimate 
realities  of  nature  and  to  escape  worldly 
concerns. The quietude of unaltered landscapes 
was a recurring poetic and philosophical theme 
during  the  Imperial  period  (Murphey,  1967; 
Greer, 1979).
Certainly,  this  sort  of  cultural  expression 
was produced by, and for the benefit of, the 
literati,  and  it  is  precisely  these  people  who 
were the face of the predominant socio-politi-
cal system in imperial China – Confucianism. 
Indeed,  Confucianism  and  Taoism  share  a 
fundamental similarity in their respective view 
of the unity of heaven, earth and man. There is 
a long tradition of Confucian-trained members 
of the bureaucratic class absenting themselves 
on  occasion  from  their  administrative  duties 
and  seeking  a  more  contemplative  life  in 
nature.
Despite the strength of the Taoist traditions 
regarding nature, and the expression that this 
was  often  given  in  cultural  production,  it  is 
equally true that nature in Imperial China was 
altered  in  a  massive  way.  Deforestation  of 
upstream  regions  supported,  expanded  and 
intensified  agricultural  pursuits  necessary  to 
support expanding populations. Farmers viewed 
water as a means of supporting these pursuits, 
and as something which needed solutions for 
managing  both  dry  (irrigation)  and  wet  (flood 
control) periods. Imperial states, in turn, through 
the medium of the administrative bureaucracy, 
viewed water as a means of pro  moting agricul-
ture,  thereby  increasing  expropriation  of  the 
agricultural surplus to expand and sustain the 
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Development and Management of the 
Yellow River Basin
For most of the Imperial period, the Imperial 
Chinese state expended considerable resources 
in controlling the water of the Yellow River. 
One focus was the early development of irriga-
tion. An additional focus was the construction 
of an extensive canal system connecting the 
Huai with the Yellow and Yangtze river valleys 
to  facilitate  the  transport  of  the  agricultural 
surplus to capital regions. The building of these 
canals created a complex matrix of waterways 
involving the lower Yellow plains. Complicating 
water controls were the periodic shifts of the 
Yellow River. Throughout the Imperial period, 
state priorities remained centred on maintain-
ing  the  system  of  canals  that  provided  the 
artery  of  grain  tribute  transport  to  northern 
capitals.
Canal transport and irrigation became inti-
mately tied to the growth of Imperial power. 
Canal transport, developed within the context 
of  warfare,  served  the  formation  of  political 
power.  Irrigation  sustained  agricultural  devel-
opment, which, in turn, expanded revenue for 
the political centre. Thus, the importance of 
water spawned a need to create an administra-
tive organization to develop and maintain large 
canal  and  irrigation  systems.  Although  the 
degree to which the central government was 
involved in local irrigation projects was in fact 
limited,  20th-century  sinologists  such  as 
Wittfogel (1957) correctly identified the impor-
tance of effective water management to main-
taining  the  state  and  the  empire  during  the 
Imperial  period.  The  pattern  for  subsequent 
water  administration  was  established  during 
the  Han  dynasty  (206b c–220a d).  In  the 
Imperial  capital,  dushui  (the  office  of  the 
Director  of  Water  Conservancy),  under  the 
Ministry  of  Public  Works,  was  created  as  a 
planning and coordinating organization for the 
management of all river basins in China. At the 
same time, responsibility for labour recruitment 
and construction was delegated to local admin-
istrative units (Greer, 1979). The central chal-
lenge to successful water management during 
the Han dynasty, and later, was the ability to 
coordinate  the  efforts  of  the  centre  and  the 
locality.
The imperial period
Governments  in  the  early  Imperial  period 
persistently faced a cycle of water management 
issues: heavy dependence on water develop-
ment for irrigation and grain transport led to a 
breakdown  of  hydraulic  conditions  when 
central  authority  waned,  which  in  turn 
mandated large expenditures to restore stabil-
ity. Managing this cycle required central capac-
ity  to  undertake  large-scale  engineering 
projects. Indeed, throughout the Imperial era, 
rulers repeatedly viewed the regulation of water 
as providing legitimacy to rule. The historical 
precedent was Yü the Great, who claimed the 
right to rule based on his success in regulating 
water during the prehistorical period. Indeed, 
official dynastic histories esteemed the rule of 
individual  rulers  or  their  dynastic  houses  by 
claiming the legitimate historical mantle of Yü 
the Great. Such was the legitimizing rhetoric of 
Ming (1368–1644), who administered Yellow-
conservancy projects in the mid-15th century.
Throughout  the  Ming  and  Qing  (1368–
1911)  dynasties,  Yellow  River  policy  was 
guided by two differing principles: (i) diverting 
the flow of the Yellow River to the sea through 
different channels; and (ii) increasing the scour-
ing capacity of the Yellow River by shu shui 
gong  sha  (confining  the  river  between  high 
dykes).  Although  these  schemes  were  alter-
nately adopted, they were guided by the singu-
lar goal of protecting grain transport (Huang, 
1986). The debate between those advocating 
each of the two main engineering approaches 
was couched in moral terms. This debate was 
between a ‘Confucian approach’, which sought 
to regulate the behaviour of waterways through 
human action (i.e. digging channels to divert 
flows), and a ‘Taoist approach’, which sought 
benefit through the natural quality of water (i.e. 
allowing the natural forces of water to wash 
away silt) (Wu and Fan, 1993).
The struggle waged by the Ming court to 
regulate the Yellow River reveals several points. 
With overall management premised on safe-
guarding canal transport, the options available 
to management officials were limited. The two 
alternatives  within  this  context,  ‘dividing  the 
flow of the Yellow River’ and ‘utilizing a single 
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approaches to the management of the Yellow 
River  well  into  the  20th  century.  In  1578, 
important  additions  to  these  fundamental 
approaches  were  proposed,  including  the 
construction  of  retention  basins  in  upstream 
segments of the Yellow River to regulate flows 
in  periods  of  heavy  runoff.  However,  these 
plans were abandoned. One potential explana-
tion is the fractured nature of administrative 
authority  over  waterways  in  central  China. 
Competing bureaucratic units during the Ming 
dynasty, such as the Grand Canal Commission, 
Board of Public Works and provincial organiza-
tions,  exerted  pressures  not  always  comple-
mentary  to  one  another.  The  Qing  dynasty, 
however,  established  the  view  that  complete 
centralized control over the Yellow River was 
critical.  The  creation  of  the  Yellow  River 
Administration (YRA) in the early Qing dynasty 
(circa 1700) was the institutional expression of 
this sentiment.
The  YRA  was  created  in  the  early  Qing 
period  and  headed  by  a  director  general 
appointed  by  the  central  government.  With 
offices in Jining (Shandong province), the YRA 
served as a planning and coordinating organi-
zation  for  the  lower  Yellow  River  basin,  the 
Grand Canal, and the lower Huai River valley. 
The functional goal of the YRA was to main-
tain grain transport from the south. As such, 
the YRA was essentially an adjunct of the Grain 
Transport Administration, as its primary func-
tion was to prevent flooding in the lower Yellow 
and  Huai  rivers,  which  would  endanger  the 
smooth functioning of the Grand Canal (Pietz, 
2002). The historical importance of the YRA 
was that it was the first administrative organi-
zation in China to consider basin-wide issues, 
even though its actual operation was restricted 
to the lower Yellow River basin. Thus, when 
basin-wide river management gained currency 
in  the  early  and  mid-20th  century  in  North 
America and Europe, China already had insti-
tutional  experience  with  basin  governance 
concepts.
In 1855, the Yellow River yet again changed 
course. The river breached its banks in Henan 
and  adopted  a  northerly  course,  running 
through Shandong province to the sea. By this 
time, much of the grain tribute to the capital 
Beijing was transported by ocean. But the shift 
of the Yellow River rendered any transport via 
the  Grand  Canal  hopelessly  inefficient  and 
expensive.  Thus  the  immediate  rationale  for 
central  control  of  the  Yellow  River,  namely 
maintenance of the canal system, was lost. As 
a  consequence,  the  YRA  was  abolished  in 
1856. The removal of central management of 
Yellow River control ultimately left local and 
provincial  institutions  responsible  for  water 
management in their immediate locales. The 
general collapse of Qing provincial and local 
government institutions, mirroring the deterio-
ration of central capacity, meant that Yellow 
River management languished. By the end of 
the dynasty in 1911, water-control structures 
along the Yellow River, particularly in the lower 
reaches, were collapsing.
Basin development and management during 
the early 20th century 
The period between 1855 and 1927 repre-
sented an important transformation in Yellow 
River  management.  The  shift  of  the  Yellow 
River in 1855 triggered the withdrawal of state 
patronage over water management, although 
there were attempts during the last years of the 
Qing  and  the  early  years  of  the  Republican 
period to reconstitute centralized control. By 
the so-called Warlord period (1915–1926) the 
fundamental collapse of central political author-
ity  in  China  precluded  any  functioning  of 
centralized water administration. Still, reform-
ers among China’s political elites retained the 
ideal of centralized control – realizing the refor-
mulation  of  centralized  management  during 
the 1930s, in the Nationalist period.
With the nominal reunification of the coun-
try  by  the  Nationalist  Party  after  1927,  the 
new government embarked on an ambitious 
‘reconstruction’ campaign to promote national 
strength.  Consistent  with  Imperial  patterns, 
Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist govern-
ment immediately sought sanction to rule by 
‘ordering the waters’ of the empire.
Coupled  with  this  traditional  concern  of 
stabilizing  the  agricultural  economy,  the 
Nationalist government’s state-building efforts 
were  heavily  influenced  by  the  trend  toward 
growing  state  capacity  in  many  countries 
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re-established centralized institutions to manage 
the water on the North China Plain. In 1933, 
the national government established Huanghe 
shuili  weiyuanhui  (the  Yellow  River  Water 
Conservation Commission, or YRWCC) having, 
in  1932,  organized  the  National  Economic 
Commission  (NEC),  whose  purpose  was  to 
promote modern industrial growth by improve-
ments in agricultural production and marketing. 
The formation of the NEC and its goals were 
familiar patterns engendered by the worldwide 
economic depression. As a supra-bureaucratic 
economic planning and coordinating body, the 
NEC had a number of analogues in different 
countries suffering from the worldwide depres-
sion, as state intervention in the economy was 
deemed necessary to optimize allocation and 
utilization of resources. The NEC underwent a 
series of reorganizations in mid-1933, which 
gave it broad jurisdiction over water conserv-
ancy and other reconstruction activities aimed 
at reviving the agricultural infrastructure (Anon., 
n.d.).
Another  significant  change  in  water 
management  during  the  late  19th  and  early 
20th centuries was the potential of water to 
serve modern industrial development. Although 
the specific goal was indeed industrial develop-
ment, the more instrumentalist view of water 
serving state-sponsored economic growth (i.e. 
agricultural growth) during the Imperial period 
provided the basic assumption. Although small, 
China’s modern economic sector experienced 
sustained  growth  in  the  late  19th  and  early 
20th  centuries.  Several  prominent  Chinese 
industrialists  in  the  early  20th  century  advo-
cated  active  water  management  policies  to 
promote cotton production and effective water 
transport  to  and  from  industrial  enterprises 
centred in the Yangtze River delta region.
A third important development during the 
early Republican period, which established a 
pattern  that  would  largely  be  consistent 
throughout 20th-century Yellow River manage-
ment, was the introduction of modern hydrau-
lic science into China. Initially introduced by 
foreign technical experts, a strong nationalistic 
tendency  soon  served  to  impel  the  develop-
ment of native talent. Based on European and 
American  models,  engineering  training  insti-
tutes  were  founded  that  trained  Chinese 
students in fundamental engineering practices, 
such as surveying. One example is the Hehai 
Engineering  Institute  (presently  HeHai 
University)  in Nanjing, founded by Zhang Jian, 
whose students would come to provide a cadre 
of  well-trained  technicians  in  the  years  to 
come.
The  development  of  a  cadre  of  hydraulic 
engineering and technical professionals during 
the first several decades of Republican China 
reflected increasing levels of technical education 
during  this  period  (Strauss,  1998).  Technical 
personnel  in  positions  of  policy  planning 
included members of the commission itself, as 
well as directors of the Engineering Office and 
senior engineers. These individuals all received 
advanced training in engineering in the USA or 
Europe. Most of the engineering personnel at 
both the low and mid-levels received training in 
their specialties from the growing number of 
engineering departments at colleges and univer-
sities in China. In 1935, there were a total of 37 
institutions of higher education offering degrees 
in civil and other fields of engineering (Huang, 
1986). Included in this number were institutions 
such  as  the  Qinghua  University  and  Shuili 
gongcheng  zhuanmen  xuexiao  (the  former 
Water  Conservancy  Training  Institution)  in 
Nanjing, which became part of Guoli zhongyang 
daxue (National Central University).
The last broad development of Yellow River 
management  during  the  early  to  mid-20th 
century was the pattern of developing foreign 
partners in water management. This develop-
ment, however, reflected the troubled relation-
ship that China had with the USA and European 
powers. In some ways, the power of the tradi-
tional role of water and the cultural significance 
of the Yellow River in China also mitigated the 
success of international cooperation. An early 
effort was led in 1914 by the American Red 
Cross,  which  attempted  to  secure  an  agree-
ment for a loan to pursue an aggressive water 
management  scheme  on  the  North  China 
Plain.  Ultimately,  the  plan  failed  because  of 
problems related to leadership of the project 
and over differing conceptions about the tech-
nical  approaches  to  water  management  in 
China.  The  Chinese  leader  of  the  project, 
Zhang Jian, suggested that the American chief 
engineer simply did not understand the special 
nature of China’s water and traditional meth-
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special nature of China’s water and a certain 
reverence to past Chinese accomplishments in 
managing water continued to be an undercur-
rent even as China intensified these sorts of 
transnational cooperative efforts over the next 
decades (Pietz, 2006).
Transnational  cooperation  continued  to 
develop during the Nationalist period. In early 
1931, the government invited the directors of 
the League of Nations’ Economic and Financial 
Section  and  its  Communications  and  Transit 
Section to visit China to advise on reconstruc-
tion  projects  (National  Economic  Council, 
1934). In addition, the Board of Trustees of the 
Returned British Boxer Indemnity Commission 
designated that 66% of the money from the 
British Boxer Indemnity be returned to China 
to  assist  water  conservancy  projects.  Finally, 
the  United  Nations  Relief  and  Rehabilitation 
Administration sponsored Yellow River manage-
ment  operations  following  the  end  of  World 
War II. In all, the record of international coop-
eration in Yellow River management during the 
20th century was spotty. But China’s pattern of 
seeking these partnerships suggests a general 
trend  in  the  internationalization  of  China’s 
water management.
The ability of the Nationalist government to 
realize  its  Yellow  River  conservancy  plans 
during the 1930s was conditioned by difficulty 
in controlling resources at the local level. In 
other words, it could organize and plan but it 
struggled  to  build.  Several  projects  were 
completed but on a smaller scale and beyond 
schedules  originally  envisioned.  This  was 
primarily  due  to  inadequate  labour  conscrip-
tion and the inability to enforce work discipline. 
The  government  tried  campaigns  of  moral 
suasion and the dispatch of Nationalist troops 
to ensure compliance with its goals, but projects 
were persistently obstructed by the inability to 
mobilize conscripted labour.
Basin development since 1949
Yellow River management was in a shambles 
by the time of the Communist victory in 1949. 
In  large  measure,  difficult  conditions  in  the 
lower  portions  of  the  valley  were  severely 
aggravated  by  Chiang  Kai-shek’s  order  to 
destroy the southern dykes of the Yellow River 
near Huayuankou in 1937. This decision was 
intended  to  slow  the  advance  of  Japanese 
troops  from  the  north.  The  massive  flood 
towards  the  lower  Huai  River  valley  indeed 
brought a pause to the Japanese invasion, but 
the longer-term consequences were to destroy 
much  of  the  conservancy  works  that  the 
Nationalist government had managed to build 
during the prior decade. Although there were 
some  projects  initiated  after  the  end  of  the 
Pacific War in 1945, the state of the Yellow 
River was indeed precarious when Mao Zedong 
led the communists to power in 1949.
The developments described above during 
the Nationalist period, namely centralization, 
modern  industrial  development,  introduction 
of modern science and technology, and inter-
national  cooperation  in  water  management, 
suggest that hydraulic engineering during this 
period was increasingly reflective of standards 
and practices that prevailed in the industrial-
ized countries of the time. One need only look 
to the institutional model of river management 
in  China  during  the  Nationalist  period  (the 
Tennessee Valley Authority) to get an under-
standing  of  the  types  of  ‘mega-project’  that 
China was moving towards. Does the history 
of Yellow River conservancy under the Chinese 
Communist Party after 1949 suggest continui-
ties with these trends? The answer is yes for 
much of the post-1949 period. Beginning in 
1958, however, with the onset of the Great 
Leap Forward, China modified this orientation 
towards the grand project by introducing small-
scale projects that emphasized local adminis-
tration,  mass  mobilization,  a  celebration  of 
traditional notions of water conservancy (i.e. a 
certain  anti-modernism)  and  self-reliance. 
Thus, after 1958 there was a dual character to 
Yellow  River  engineering:  mega-projects 
combined with small-scale installations.
Looking back at such diverse approaches to 
Yellow  River  engineering,  one  is  certainly 
tempted  to  come  to  some  conclusion  as  to 
which paradigm best served the goals of river 
management. The problem, of course, is defin-
ing these goals. There were multiple goals, and 
respective goals, it was argued, could be best 
achieved by different approaches. The purpose 
of the following examination of Yellow River 
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ing  approaches  to  river  management  but  is, 
instead, intended to delineate areas of continu-
ity and change. One significant difference in 
Yellow  River  management  effort  after  1949 
was the degree of local political control attained 
by the new government, and hence the ability 
to sufficiently mobilize labour for conservancy 
projects. In other important respects, however, 
the  decade  after  1949  reflected  broad  con  - 
tinuities and discontinuities with earlier Yellow 
River management efforts. Institutional struc-
ture,  modern  technology  and  international 
cooperation were all issues that would be at   
the centre of fierce debates over the Yellow 
River.
Institutional structure: centralization and 
decentralization
One of the key policy debates after 1949 was 
over  the  institutional  structure  of  the  Yellow 
River control. In its most distilled manner, the 
debate was over whether water management 
could best be pursued with a centralized struc-
ture. Immediately after 1949, the government 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had, 
by and large, assumed the institutional structure 
of the Yellow River Conservancy Com  mission 
(YRCC, the successor to the YRWCC), as it 
had  been  established  in  1946  during  the 
Nationalist era.
The  first  large-scale  water  management 
plan adopted by the government after 1949 
was focused on the Huai, not the Yellow, River. 
This plan clearly signalled the degree to which 
water  management  immediately  after  1949 
would  be  centrally  planned  and  financed. 
Begun in 1950, the plan called for the creation 
of  nine  upstream  reservoirs,  strengthening 
dykes  in  the  middle  and  lower  reaches,  and 
improving  the  storage  (Hongze  Lake)  and 
drainage capacity in the lower portions of the 
river.  State  expenditures  for  the  Huai  River 
project during the 1950s were high. Between 
1949 and 1952, state spending on the Huai 
River  scheme  was  64%  of  all  government 
expenditures on river management in China 
(Vermeer, 1977). Water officials felt that imme-
diately rectifying the Huai River was critical to 
addressing long-term social and political disrup-
tion in the valley.
The  Huai  River  plan  provided  the  basic 
blueprint for the Yellow River plan adopted by 
the government. In 1955, the Technical and 
Economic Plan for Yellow River Comprehensive 
Utilization was submitted to the state council 
by the YRCC. This was probably the first ever 
comprehensive  development  plan  for  the 
basin, and focused on power generation in the 
upper reach, flood control in the middle reach 
and  irrigation  downstream.  The  ambitious 
plan, approved by the First People’s Assembly 
in July 1955, envisioned, among other items, 
the  construction  of  an  astounding  46  large 
dams on the Yellow River’s main stem (Greer, 
1979). It is interesting to note that, probably 
because of Soviet influence and aid, the water-
engineering  efforts  in  the  early  1950s  were 
relatively capital intensive rather than labour 
intensive, as had traditionally been the case in 
Chinese  water  development  (Chi,  1965).  At 
the basin level, the YRCC was responsible to 
the  Ministry  of  Water  Conservancy  and  was 
the representative of centralized control over 
the  breadth  of  the  basin.  Although  labour 
mobilization  remained  the  responsibility  of 
provincial  and  sub-provincial  institutions,  the 
Yellow River Commission held overall coordi-
nating functions over technical elements of the 
engineering plans.
Beginning in 1958, however, water manage-
ment administration experienced a strong trend 
toward  decentralization.  Corresponding  with 
the communalization push, administration and 
spending on Yellow River projects increasingly 
became  the  responsibility  of  provincial  and 
local governments or the communes. This shift 
from central to local control was influenced by 
several factors: incorporation of small projects 
alongside  large  ones,  the  increasing  labour 
element of overall project design and execu-
tion, and the primacy given to local irrigation 
projects that were more suited to local control 
(Wu and Fan, 1993).
Science and technology: modern hydraulic 
engineering and mass mobilization 
Behind the plans of the early People’s Republic 
of China for the development of the Yellow 
River basin was a strong belief in the ability of 
human  ingenuity  to  overcome  nature.  This 
belief  emanated  from  the  tremendous  pride 
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victory in the Chinese Civil War and the estab-
lishment of ‘New China’, and the success in 
stopping the advance of US and UN forces in 
the Korean peninsula. If the Chinese people 
could defeat feudalism and imperialism, why 
would not it also be possible to conquer the 
Yellow River? Why would it not be possible to 
use the will of the people to make the river ‘run 
clear’ for the first time in history? The then 
commissioner  of  the  YRCC,  Yang  Huayun, 
presented such visions during a field trip to the 
Yellow  River  by  Chairman  Mao  through  a 
promise:  the  Yellow  River  would  be  made 
peaceful  for  at  least  300  years  through  the 
construction  of  the  planned  large  dams.  A 
somewhat  more  realistic  assessment  of  the 
potential  to  control  the  river  is  attributed  to 
Mao in his suggestion that the Yellow River 
problems could be ‘well handled’ although not 
necessarily fully resolved; in this respect, the 
actions of the government were to follow the 
ambitious plans.
An example of the resolve to develop the 
river is seen in the name of the first major irri-
gation  project  under  the  new  development 
plans, the People’s Victory Canal, located in 
Henan  province.  This  project,  which  still 
provides the name to a brand of cigarettes, was 
designed to divert Yellow River water by gravity 
to  irrigate  almost  100,000  ha  of  farmland 
(Zhang  and  Shangshi,  1987).  Signalling  the 
symbolic and real significance of such under-
takings, Chairmen Mao visited the project in 
October 1952, when he officially opened its 
diversion gates. Irrigation and dam construc-
tion continued through the late 1950s under 
the  slogan  ‘big  diversion,  big  irrigation’. 
However,  the  primary  means  to  complete 
projects shifted from capital to labour, probably 
in large part due to the withdrawal of Soviet 
aid.  In  fact,  the  decision  made  in  1957  to 
‘depend on the masses’ and rely more on local 
capital in water construction projects can be 
seen  in  some  ways  as  the  beginning  of  the 
nationally  disastrous  Great  Leap  Forward, 
which began in 1958.
Although voluntarism was a critical element 
of the regime’s ruling psychology, science and 
technology  were  still  valorized  during  the 
decade of the 1950s. During the first period, 
the ambitious Yellow River engineering plans 
were,  in  part,  predicated  on  data  and  plans 
gathered and formulated by the technical staff 
of  the  Nationalist  government’s  YRCC. 
Although the number of technical specialists 
throughout China was limited, large numbers 
of such experts were heavily recruited by the 
new  government’s  YRCC  after  1949  to 
par  ticipate  in  some  of  the  nation’s  premier 
projects  (Vermeer,  1977).  So,  by  the  mid-
1950s, newly minted technical experts from a 
growing  number  of  technical  institutions  in 
China joined with experts who had received 
their training and work experience during the 
Nationalist  period  and  were,  together,  vital 
participants  in  the  conceptualization  of  the 
Yellow River engineering scheme.
The orientation towards technical expertise 
and  notions  of  modern  hydraulic  practices 
came under attack with the onset of the Great 
Leap Forward policies in 1958. As an auxiliary 
to the rectification campaigns such as the Anti-
Rightist Movement, which saw the discrediting 
of many water conservancy technical experts 
and the move towards greater local administra-
tion of water control projects, these projects 
themselves  increasingly  became  conceptual-
ized and executed by subunits of the People’s 
Communes  (usually  the  production  brigade). 
The mantra became cheaper, quicker, better, 
etc., as Yellow River conservancy projects were 
the result of local initiative designed to meet 
local problems. The ideal was indeed not to 
conform  to  the  abstract  notions  of  modern 
hydraulic practices, but projects were designed 
to fill practical needs and were to be executed 
through the sheer power of the human will, 
that  is  to  say  by  a  massive  mobilization  of 
labour.
International cooperation and self-reliance
The pattern of seeking international technical 
and financial assistance established during the 
Nationalist  period  was  continued  during  the 
first decade of the PRC. After 1949, however, 
American, Dutch and German engineers were 
replaced by technical experts from the Soviet 
Union. Indeed, up to the onset of the Great 
Leap Forward, all water conservancy projects 
in China were advised by Soviet engineers.
Perhaps the best-known example of Soviet 
technical cooperation was the construction of 
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Sanmenxia reservoir was created behind the 
first significant dam in history to be built on the 
main  stem  of  the  Yellow  River.  However, 
because of the failure of the Soviet engineers 
to appreciate the nature of the sediment load 
in the river and the Chinese enthusiasm of the 
period to carry the project forward, the dam 
was  woefully  unsuited  and  the  reservoir  was 
silted within only a few years of construction. 
This, in turn, caused the waters of the Yellow 
River  to  back  up  into  the  Wei  River  basin, 
where they inundated land and threatened the 
ancient city of Xian with flooding. The failure 
of Sanmenxia, the similar failure of early irriga-
tion projects and the famine which occurred in 
the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward were 
shocks  to  the  leadership  of  the  People’s 
Republic  in  Beijing  as  well  as  to  the  YRCC 
(Greer, 1979; Becker, 1998). Together, these 
events caused a new sense of realism in policy 
and dampened the enthusiasm for pure engi-
neering  solutions  to  development  problems 
and programmes. Better effort was made to 
understand  the  role  of  sediment  in  reservoir 
operations; dam construction plans were modi-
fied; and the number of new reservoirs to be 
constructed  was  reduced.  Drainage  develop-
ment and irrigation system rehabilitation were 
also begun, and farmers were slowly re-convinced 
of the potential value of irrigation construction.
Soviet advisors packed up and returned to 
the Soviet Union by 1960. Beneath the mantra 
of  self-sufficiency  after  1960,  Yellow  River 
management was to be guided by the inspira-
tion of the masses. The Cultural Revolution, 
which  lasted  from  1966  to  1976,  brought 
political chaos to China, including the Yellow 
River basin. Somewhat surprisingly, the moder-
ately revised development plans of the 1950s, 
and heavy government investment in the basin, 
continued despite the chaos, without substan-
tial debate (Stone, 1998). Giant power-gener-
ating reservoirs were constructed in the upper 
basin;  a  soil-conservation  campaign  created 
new terraced fields on the Loess Plateau of the 
middle  reach;  and  irrigation  diversions  were 
substantially  expanded  in  the  lower  reach, 
especially in Shandong and Henan provinces. 
Meanwhile,  village-based  water  management 
systems,  including  canal  maintenance  and 
water allocation between neighbouring villages, 
were shaped in the basin, although they were 
structured based on the political overtones of 
the time.
The Contemporary Setting: Change and 
Response
With the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, Deng 
Xiaoping came to power and helped to intro-
duce a wide-ranging set of reforms that swept 
through China in the 1980s (Meisner, 1999; 
Naughton, 2003). The commune system that 
had been established in villages was abolished 
and  a  rural  household  responsibility  system 
moved production decisions and power towards 
individual  farmers  (Ash,  1988).  Government 
planning and control became more decentral-
ized and, as also occurred in the agriculture 
sector, public investment in the water sector 
declined. Environmental awareness later started 
to grow and a more politically liberal atmos-
phere  allowed  people  to  review  past  basin 
strategies and lessons. In 1984, the state coun-
cil  approved  the  Second  Yellow  River  Basin 
Plan,  which  listed  soil-erosion  control  in  the 
middle  reach  as  the  most  important  policy 
objective, as opposed to power generation and 
flood control, as had been emphasized in the 
1954 plan.
Changing political economy
Following these changes, the late 1980s and 
early 1990s saw the arrival of a new water era 
for China. In the Yellow River, this was reflected 
in two ways. First, the rule of law was given 
added  relevance.  Second,  economic  growth 
placed increasing demand on water resources, 
in  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  terms. 
Together, these and other factors caused funda-
mental changes in both perceptions of appro-
priate  water  policy  and  management,  and, 
increasingly, in water management practice.
The major legal landmark for water policy 
was the 1988 Water Law, which provided the 
basic  framework  and  principles  for  water 
management in the 1990s. This was followed 
by  related  legislation,  including  the  Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law, the Soil 
and Water Conservation Law, and the Flood 
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istrative rules and ministerial regulations related 
to water were also passed, along with a number 
of  other  laws  at  least  indirectly  related  to 
water.
This move towards legalism took place at a 
time of dynamic economic growth and struc-
tural change, which began in the early 1980s. 
Increasing liberalization of markets and foreign 
investment helped to sustain rapid economic 
growth.  Industrial  output  increased  dramati-
cally. Increasing agricultural labour productivity 
and de facto and de jure changes in residency 
rules freed people from the farms and allowed 
rapid  urbanization.  While  population  growth 
has slowed, expansion continues and, impor-
tantly,  rising  affluence  has  caused  dietary 
changes which favour meats and contribute to 
massive growth in feed grain use, with concom-
itant increases in crop water demand.
New challenges for the river
The key factors driving Yellow River manage-
ment in the new era are thus not water itself 
but rather the larger economic and social envi-
ronment, which has shifted pressure and focus. 
While  flood  control  is  still  important,  water 
stress is now probably the number one issue 
for most basin authorities and residents. How 
water stress rose in prominence can be seen by 
looking  at  three  factors:  a  decline  in  water 
supplies, an increase in demand and a growing 
awareness of environmental water needs.
On  the  supply  side,  runoff  substantially 
decreased in the 1990s, as shown in Fig. 5.2. 
One question is whether the decline is caused 
by secular declines in long-term precipitation 
levels  brought  about,  perhaps,  by  global 
climatic change. As a similar, but apparently 
less severe, dry spell to that which occurred in 
the 1990s also occurred from 1922 to 1932, 
it is suspected by some that the Yellow River is 
now at the tail-end of a 70-year cycle, and that 
rainfall  levels  and  river  flows  will  therefore 
begin climbing in the near future. However, the 
figure graphically shows that the runoff decline 
is not a phenomenon of only the 1990s, but 
that  other  factors  must  also  be  at  work. 
Possibilities include changes in land use, which 
have altered rainfall/runoff ratios (Zhu et al., 
2004), and increased irrigation (Yang et al., 
2004),  including  groundwater  irrigation, 
perhaps  in  part  as  a  response  to  declining 
surface  supplies.  Although  a  slowing  of  the 
problem is evident in the early 21st century, 
consistent with near average rainfall (YRCC, 
2007), it is debatable whether this is evidence 
of a turnaround. There is no question, however, 
that  the  reduced  runoff  has  contributed  to 
supply constraints.
Even if runoff levels do increase, they might 
well be offset by decreases in effective supply 
due to pollution. Water pollution, in general, 
has been called the number one environmental 
issue  in  China  (Jun,  2004).  For  the  Yellow 
River,  the  declining  state  of  water  quality  is 
exemplified in Fig. 5.3, which shows changes 
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in percentages of the river’s length classified 
under the Chinese system to be in the lowest-
quality grade (V) or even worse (V+) – levels 
unsuitable for most direct human use. Nearly 
half the river now falls into one of these cate-
gories, and the Yellow River is now perhaps 
the second most polluted river in China.
One major pollutant source is industrial and 
domestic  waste  discharged  into  the  Yellow 
River’s main stem and tributaries. While there is 
substantial  discharge  from  all  provinces, 
Shaanxi  contributes  over  one-quarter  of  the 
total, and the Wei River tributary contributes 
the largest share, almost 30% of the basin total. 
Two other important pollution sources are the 
unmeasured discharge from rural township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) and non-point pollu-
tion sources from agriculture. Beginning in the 
1980s,  TVEs  developed  rapidly  throughout 
China and have often been allowed to remain 
out of compliance from wastewater laws and 
regulations because of their limited technology 
and financial levels, difficulty in monitoring their 
discharge, and the general trend in decentrali-
zation of economic control and management. 
From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, farm-
ers substantially increased their use of fertilizers 
and pesticides, with the result that a considera-
ble  fraction  of  residues  now  enters  the  river 
with return flow from irrigation.
On the demand side, total use (depletion) 
has  increased  only  somewhat  over  the  past 
one and a half decades (Table 5.1), in large 
part because there is little additional water to 
develop. However, there has been substantial 
change in the geography of use, with upstream 
regions  consuming  more  and  downstream 
regions less. Sectorally, there have also been 
moderate reductions in agricultural use, more 
than offset by dramatic growth in industrial and 
domestic  depletion.  Partially  in  response  to 
declining  surface  supplies  and  increasing 
demand,  groundwater  pumping  has  also 
increased  dramatically  since  the  late  1980s. 
Available data from 1980 to 2002 show that 
groundwater  abstraction  increased  by  5.1 
billion m3 billion, or 61%, reaching 13.5 m3. 
However, since groundwater data are notori-
ously difficult to collect, especially for agricul-
ture, where most use occurs, it is possible that 
actual  use  is  even  higher  than  the  figures 
suggest (Wang et al., 2007a). In fact, the lower 
Yellow River basin is part of a now-infamous 
groundwater drawdown problem in the North 
China Plain, which has been suggested to be a 
threat to a substantial part of China’s future 
food supply (Foster and Chilton, 2003). Even 
using formally collected statistics for the most 
recent period available (Table 5.2), combined 
surface  water  and  groundwater  depletion  is 
Fig. 5.3.  Severely polluted length of the Yellow River (% classified as class V or V+). Source: Yellow River 
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now equal to nearly 80% of total withdrawals, 
which are themselves equal to nearly 90% of 
annually renewable water resources.
The  outcome  of  declining  supplies  and 
increasing  demand  has  already  been  the 
seasonal desiccation of portions of the Yellow 
River, discussed at the beginning of this chap-
ter. From 1995 to 1998, there was no flow in 
the lower reach for some 120 days each year, 
and in some cases flow ended over 700 km 
from the sea, failing even to reach Shandong 
province.  This  cut-off  inflow  has  important 
repercussions  to  basin  function  for  three 
reasons. First, it obviously limits the availability 
of surface water for human use in downstream 
provinces and, less obviously, reduces ground-
water recharge in the lower reach (because of 
the  raised  channel,  discussed  further  below, 
this impact may be outside formal basin bound-
aries). Second, it negates the competence of 
the river to carry its heavy sediment load to the 
sea,  potentially  resulting  in  a  more  rapidly 
aggrading and flood-prone channel than would 
otherwise exist (although low flows also tend to 
be  associated  with  lower  sediment  loads). 
Third, it has clear consequences for the ecol-
ogy of the downstream areas and, in particular, 
for the Yellow River delta and coastal fisheries. 
The reduction in flow, coupled with success in 
flood  control  in  the  past  five  decades,  has 
caused a retreat of the delta shoreline, intru-
sion of salt water, and increased salinity and 
lowering sea water temperature in the Bohai 
estuary.  Further  complicating  matters,  the 
Shengli  petroleum  field,  the  second  largest 
petroleum oil source in China, is located in the 
delta and competes with the trickling river flow 
for environmental needs.
Table 5.1. Yellow River water depletion (billion m3) by sector and reach, 1988–1992 and 
2002–2004. Source: Cai, 2006.
Years Reach Total Agriculture Industrial Domestic
1988–1992 Upper 13.11 12.38 0.51 0.22
Middle  5.44   4.77 0.38 0.28
Lower 12.18 11.24 0.55 0.38
Basin 30.72 28.39 1.45 0.89
2002–2004 Upper 17.54 15.71 1.42 0.41
Middle   5.71   4.16 0.97 0.58
Lower  8.44   7.04 0.82 0.58
Basin 31.69 26.91 3.21 1.57
Difference Upper   34%   27% 179%  84%
Middle    5% −13% 155% 108%
Lower −31% −37%  49%  54%
Basin     3%   −5% 121%  77%
Table 5.2. Yellow River resources, withdrawal and  
depletion (billion m3), 2004–2006.
Annual water resources 55.5
Withdrawal
Total 48.9
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Since the 1998 strengthening of the 1987 
Water Allocation Scheme and the operationali-
zation of the Xiaolangdi dam, discussed below, 
the  YRCC  has  managed  to  nominally  end 
absolute flow cut-off, an important accomplish-
ment. Even so, it is now clearly established that 
environmental water demands have not been 
adequately  included  in  existing  allocation 
schemes.  According  to  basin  managers,  the 
primary environmental water use in the Yellow 
River is for sediment flushing to control poten-
tially devastating floods, and it has been esti-
mated that this would require about one-quarter 
of the Yellow River’s flow (Zhu et al., 2004). 
The special challenge of flood control in the 
lower  reach  is  caused  when  sediment  trans-
ported from the middle reach begins to settle 
as the river spills on to the flat North China 
plain, producing a naturally meandering and 
unstable channel (Ren and Walker, 1998). It is 
calculated that roughly 1 trillion t of sediment 
enter  the  Yellow  River  each  year.  Of  these, 
400 million t are calculated to be captured by 
two  large  reservoirs  and  various  irrigation 
diversions, 100 million t are believed to settle 
within the lower reach, and an additional 100 
million t are flushed to the sea through dry-
season minimum flow. To flush the remaining 
400 million t, an environmental water require-
ment of 14 billion m3 (3.5 billion m3 of water 
per 100 million t of sand), which is more than 
one-quarter of the recent flow, is currently esti-
mated  to  be  necessary  (Giordano  et  al., 
2004).
To control the impact of that sediment which 
is not flushed, successive river managers over 
millennia  have  constructed  levees  to  contain 
the  Yellow  River.  While  such  structures  may 
hold the channel in the short term, their success 
depends on continually raising the levee walls 
as new sediment elevates the level of the chan-
nel constrained within. Over time, the process 
of levee raising has contributed to a ‘suspended’ 
river,  in  which  the  channel  bottom  is  above 
ground level, sometimes by more than 10 m 
(see Fig. 5.4). Since the founding of the People’s 
Republic, the levees have held, but obviously 
the levee-raising solution cannot continue indef-
initely.  The  current  comprehensive  flood 
management plan comprises a range of inter-
related strategies. These include extensive soil 
and  water  conservation  programmes  in  the 
upper and middle river reaches (particularly in 
the Loess Plateau); the construction of multi-
purpose reservoirs; adjustment and strengthen-
ing  of  levees  in  the  lower  river  reach;  the 
development and improvement of flood-reten-
tion basins; the implementation of development 
and building controls in flood-prone areas; and 
planning measures, such as the relocation of 
families presently living in areas of high flood 
risk, such as the inner flood plain (Giordano et 
al., 2004).
In the more ‘traditional’ sense of ecological 
use,  Chinese  scientists,  and  the  Chinese  in 
general,  increasingly  recognize  the  environ-
mental  services  that  high-quality  water  flow 
brings. In the case of the Yellow River, these 
are largely discussed in terms of flow mainte-
nance  for  biodiversity  protection  and  suste-
nance of wetlands and fisheries at the mouth of 
the river, and for dilution and degradation of 
human-introduced pollutants. That concepts of 
environmental flows and values have changed 
is  evident  in  the  water-utilization  accounts 
provided by the YRCC. The environment as a 
user of water was first included in basin water 
accounts as recently as 2004. While the most 
recent figures place environmental use at only 
2% of total depletion, a more realistic figure 
would be likely to approach one-third of annual 
flow (Zhu et al., 2004).
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 Institutional response
With  effective  supply  decrease,  increases  in 
demand  from  traditional  users  and  growing 
recognition of environmental needs, the Yellow 
River Basin is now effectively closed in most 
senses of the term. As a result, there is a clear 
need for water policy to shift away from a singu-
lar  emphasis  on  flood  control  and  resource 
development, and towards comprehensive basin 
management strategies. Such a new direction in 
thinking was, in fact, reflected in Article 1 of the 
1988 Water Law, which stated that the docu-
ment was ‘formulated for the rational develop-
ment, utilization, economization and protection 
of  water  resources,  for  the  prevention  and 
control of water disasters and for the realization 
of sustainable utilization of water resources in 
order to meet the needs in national economic 
and social development’. In other words, water 
management in China in the 1990s, harkening 
back to the Tang dynasty edicts, was officially 
going to take a more comprehensive approach, 
which  would  include  concepts  of  economic 
value  and  trade-offs,  resource  protection  and 
sustainable development, among others.
To carry out such changes in management, 
however, would require a movement in institu-
tional structures. While the YRCC was already 
ostensibly serving as the river basin authority, 
in practice its powers for basin management 
and  planning  were  limited  and  unclear. 
However,  the  changes  in  thinking  brought 
about in part by the 1988 Water Law slowly 
began  to  be  reflected  in  the  management 
mandate of the YRCC. For example, in 1997, 
the  state  council  approved  the  ‘Outline  of 
Yellow  River  Harnessing  and  Development’, 
which, though still calling for the construction 
of 36 additional large dams, began addressing 
the issues of comprehensive utilization of the 
basin water resources. In 1998, the state coun-
cil, the Ministry of Water Resources and the 
National  Planning  Committee  issued  the 
‘Yellow River Available Water Annual Allocation 
and Main Course Regulating Scheme’ and the 
‘Management  Details  of  Yellow  River  Water 
Regulating’, leading the way to the first basin-
wide,  main-course  flow  regulation,  which 
began the following year.
Perhaps more fundamentally, the Ministry 
of Water Resources brought forward ideas for 
the conceptual transformation of water resource 
development  and  management  in  China,   
from  engineering-dominated  approaches  to 
approaches  based  on  demand  management 
and the value of water resources (a shift from 
emphasis  on  gondchengshuili,  engineering 
water  benefits,  to  ziranshuli,  broader  water 
resources  benefits)  (Boxer,  2001).  Following 
this shift, concepts such as water pricing, water 
rights and water markets were further discussed 
and tested, and are now beginning to have an 
impact on water management across China, 
including the Yellow River basin.
Changing mechanisms and adaptation
The overarching changes in institutional struc-
tures  and  approaches  brought  new  mecha-
nisms through which water users have to, or 
choose to, use the resource. Following from 
the  water-resource-based  approach  and  the 
overarching change in political economy, calls 
for the use of water pricing as a mechanism to 
regulate use have now become almost univer-
sal in official discussions of water policy change. 
While the meaning and impact of water pricing 
in  China,  and  elsewhere,  are  contested,  the 
use of water pricing as a policy tool is at least 
premised on the assumption that it will provide 
incentives for farmers, the largest water user 
group, or, in practice, their direct water suppli-
ers, to reduce water use and increase efficiency 
(Lohmar et al., 2007). A confounding issue, 
however, is that it is farmers who have benefit-
ted least from China’s economic growth, and 
increasing rural incomes is now also a major 
policy goal. Thus the government is struggling 
with ways in which pricing can be used as a 
tool for water savings and investment, while at 
the same time protecting or improving farmer 
welfare. As a result, water price increases are 
being discussed in terms of broader agricultural 
reform  policies,  which  include  reductions  in 
rural taxation rates and new rural investments.
Often connected to water pricing reform is 
the  establishment  of  water  user  associations 
(WUAs). As with pricing, devolution of at least 
some  irrigation  management  control  to  local 
levels  fits  in  with  the  overall  push  in  China 
towards  market  principles,  as  well  as  with   
‘global’ trends in water management paradigms. 
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international  organizations  in  the  funding  of 
Chinese projects to create and support WUAs 
in the Yellow River and elsewhere. In theory, 
WUAs place management closer to the actual 
uses and therefore improve service and provide 
a mechanism for both fee collection and, there-
fore,  sustained  investment  in  operations  and 
maintenance  (Lohmar  et  al.,  2007).  This  is 
expected  to  result  in  better  long-term  use  of 
water, as well as improved farmer outcomes. 
In practice, the utility of water pricing and 
WUAs as efficiency- and livelihood-enhancing 
tools is still the subject of debate. For example, 
it has been suggested that, given the low level 
of current prices, the level of increase needed 
to induce demand response may not be politi-
cally feasible, and the initial result of pricing 
may thus simply be one of a welfare transfer 
away from farmers without associated changes 
in water-use levels or practices (Yang et al., 
2003; Barnett et al., 2006). Some empirical 
analyses have shown that this is not necessarily 
the  case  (Huang  et  al.,  2006;  Liao  et  al., 
2007);  however,  even  these  analyses  high-
lighted the incompatibility of agricultural water 
prices  with  rural  poverty-alleviation  goals.  A 
second issue, perhaps especially important in 
the Yellow River’s lower reach and the associ-
ated basins of the North China Plain, is that 
direct water pricing can, at present, only be 
applied  to  state-controlled  surface  water 
supplies,  not  to  privately  accessed  ground-
water. Some of the implications as related to 
water use are discussed further below.
In  addition  to  direct  effects  on  water-use 
decisions,  increased  prices  and  irrigation 
management reform are also hoped to provide 
indirect incentives for the adoption of water-
saving technologies. There is, in fact, evidence 
since the 1980s of increasing use of such tech-
nologies, including field levelling, plastic sheet-
ing, canal lining and sprinkler irrigation (Blanke 
et al., 2007). However, adoption still seems to 
be confined mostly to low-cost options appro-
priate for individual household use only. It has 
also been suggested that, even in the face of 
increasing scarcity, the water-related incentives 
for water users and managers to adopt most 
technologies are still simply too low.
To address this issue, new approaches are 
being  sought.  For  example,  there  is  at  least 
one ongoing experiment with large-scale ‘water 
trading’, in which industry invests in agricul-
tural  water-savings  technology,  and  other 
farmer benefits, in exchange for access to the 
water saved. This experiment is taking place 
between farmers in the Hetao irrigation district 
in  Inner  Mongolia  (the  largest  in  the  Yellow 
River basin), and in the downstream industry 
near Baotou city.
There is also evidence that, even without 
sufficient incentives to adopt water-saving tech-
nologies,  farmers  are  adapting  to  changing 
water and market circumstances in other ways. 
For example, as formal surface water alloca-
tions  have  declined,  farmers  have  switched 
from low- to high-value crops, a phenomenon 
made profitable by the rising demand for vege-
tables, fruits and meat in growing cities, or by 
changing farming practices (as highlighted by 
Moya et al., 2004, in the Yangtze basin).
There is, however, a question on the extent 
to which these responses to planned (e.g. pric-
ing)  and  unplanned  (e.g.  declining  surface 
deliveries) actions result in real water savings. 
For  example,  reduction  in  the  agricultural 
application of surface irrigation can, in some 
cases,  simply  reduce  groundwater  recharge, 
recharge that would later have been pumped 
and used again elsewhere. Kendy (2003) and 
Kendy  et  al.  (2003)  have  highlighted  this 
outcome for an area of the North China Plain, 
where virtually all annually renewable water is 
used (depleted) and groundwater tables are fall-
ing with agricultural and urban expansion. As 
Kendy et al. (2003) show, while water might 
be  used  and  reused  more  wisely,  bringing  a 
balance between water supply and demand can 
only come from reduced use. With almost no 
water reaching the sea, it could be argued that 
the  same  holds  true  for  the  Yellow  River  in 
general.
Engineering not forgotten
Changing institutional structures and options 
for individual response to the new water chal-
lenges in the Yellow River have been closely 
connected with China’s evolving political econ-
omy over the past quarter century. But China 
has, of course, long been famous for the use of 
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management.  Thus  it  should  come  as  no 
surprise that engineering solutions still form a 
large  part  of  official  efforts  to  manage  the 
Yellow  River,  even  in  the  new  environment. 
These  continuing  engineering  efforts  can  be 
put into three general categories – landscape 
change, water control and water mobilization.
In terms of landscape change, perhaps the 
most important is related to the Loess Plateau 
in the Yellow River’s middle reach. Large-scale 
engineering efforts to transform the landscape 
of the Loess Plateau began in the 1950s and 
have included sediment-retention dams, reveg-
etation and strip farming. Perhaps the most 
visually stunning means, which highlights the 
true magnitude of the input and the impact on 
the  land  surface,  has  been  the  creation  of 
terraces on the steeply sloping gullies, easily 
visible with the naked eye even from commer-
cial flights. While the early efforts at transfor-
mation of the plateau were couched in terms 
of agricultural output increases, they are now 
promoted on the basis of sediment reduction 
and poverty alleviation. By the turn of the 21st 
century, somewhat more than one-third of the 
farmland in the most erodible areas was consid-
ered  to  have  been  brought  basically  under 
control.
Related at least in part to engineering efforts 
at  sediment  control  has  been  the  continued 
construction  of  large-scale  dams  for  water 
control. Most prominent of these is the recently 
completed  Xiaolangdi  dam,  located  in  the 
lower  middle  reach,  the  largest  dam  on  the 
Yellow River and second in China only to the 
Three Gorges. While a multi-purpose project, 
the dam’s most heralded feature is its possibly 
unique  system  of  tunnels  and  underground 
powerhouses, which make it possible to flush 
sediment  through  the  creation  of  controlled 
floods.  While  the  dam  has  been  financed  in 
part with foreign funds and constructed with 
the involvement of foreign engineers, it was 
built with a thoroughly Chinese understanding 
of the Yellow River’s problems, showing that, 
since Sanmenxia, much has been learned in 
terms of both engineering skill and the manage-
ment of international relations. In fact, the dam 
has been considered a major success and has 
even managed to avoid the criticism by inter-
national  NGOs  levelled  against  many  other 
large-scale  water-engineering  projects  in 
China. This may, in part, be because an inter-
national  environmental  expert  panel  was 
included in the project, perhaps a first for such 
a significant project in China (Gunaratnam et 
al., 2002).
Beyond Xiaolangdi, at least two dozen addi-
tional dam projects on the Yellow River and its 
tributaries are still planned. However, swamp-
ing any of these projects in terms of scale and 
impact,  and  certainly  in  controversy,  is  the 
effort  to  mobilize  water  in  the  south–north 
water-transfer scheme. While formally started 
late in 2002, the scheme was initially concep-
tualized in the 1950s (Greer, 1979) to move 
50  billion  m3  of  water,  approximately  the 
annual  flow  of  the  Yellow  River,  from  the 
Yangtze basin in the south to the Yellow River 
and the North China Plain. If completed as in 
present  plans,  the  south–north  transfer  will 
involve three routes, known by their relative 
geographic  position  –  eastern,  middle  and 
western. The eastern and middle routes cross 
the  Yellow  River,  before  delivering  most  of 
their planned water further north. The western 
route  would  transfer  water  directly  into  the 
Yellow River. Because of the costs per unit of 
water moved, the diversion can only be justi-
fied  on  the  basis  of  domestic  and  industrial 
demand. None the less, it can still be argued 
that agriculture is an indirect beneficiary, since 
the new water availability would reduce pres-
sure  on  diversions  from  agriculture  (Berkoff, 
2003). In terms of direct impact on the Yellow 
River itself, the outcomes are not clear. Most of 
the planned transfers through the eastern and 
middle routes will be used outside the basin. 
The  transfers  from  the  western  route  would 
increase Yellow River flows directly, with the 
greatest  benefit  to  provinces  in  the  middle 
reach. However, as this route is the most costly 
and difficult to build, it is not clear whether it will 
ever be con  structed.
While the south–north transfer is in many 
senses  a  classic  engineering  project  of  the 
hydraulic mission era, it is being justified on 
economic grounds. In fact, firms are expected 
to buy and market the water. Thus, even what 
might in the past have been thought of as a 
pure engineering endeavour now also has the 
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Old tensions revisited and continuing 
transformation
The closure of the Yellow River basin has come 
at a time of, and in large part because of, larger 
economic and political change within China. 
The resulting management challenge brings to 
light again an age-old governance tension in 
China on the balance between central and local 
power. In essence, the necessary shift toward 
basin-scale management considerations implies 
a  role  for  central  authority,  even  if  with  a 
broader  range  of  social  input  in  decision 
making. At the same time, economic liberaliza-
tion,  even  with  ‘Chinese  characteristics’, 
implies decentralized authority and the use of 
individual-oriented market incentives to drive 
resource use and conservation.
The  potential  conflict  this  can  cause  for 
water management is evidenced in the dichot-
omy  in  the  authority  and  decisions  between 
surface water and groundwater use. Allocation 
of surface water in the Yellow River remains 
the  mandate  of  the  YRCC  and,  with  recent 
improvements in bureaucratic operation, moni-
toring  ability  and  engineering  control,  it  has 
been able to manage allocations between prov-
inces reasonably well, even in the face of grow-
ing scarcity.2 The end of Yellow River flow cuts 
is partial evidence. However, rapid growth in 
groundwater  use  over  the  last  one  or  two 
decades (Wang et al., 2007b), along with the 
growth of private tube-well ownership (Wang 
et al., 2005) since 1979, has weakened the 
meaning of that control. For example, Molden 
et al. (2007) have shown that farmers in the 
Zhanghe irrigation district of the Yellow River’s 
lower  reach  responded  to  declining  surface 
water allotments by switching to self-supplied 
groundwater. The overall water result was not 
so much a change in the volume of water used, 
as was intended by the allocation reduction, 
but rather a change in the source of that use. 
The options and choices of individuals in effect 
nullified  the  ability  of  the  YRCC.  This  is  a 
conflict likely to surface in other areas as well. 
While it is not yet clear where the final balance 
of power will lie or how legal and regulatory 
change, and enforcement, will help to take the 
best from each approach, the history of adap-
tion in the Yellow River to date suggests that 
solutions will be found.
Conclusions and Implications
To  many an observer, the events reflected in 
the post-1949 history of Yellow River manage-
ment may indeed suggest much that was novel, 
and much that was unprecedented, in Chinese 
history.  It  is  our  argument,  however,  that  to 
look at this period in such a discrete manner is 
to neglect important historical continuities that 
can be viewed as an entire 20th-century effort 
to  devise  some  type  of  political  and  social 
system to replace the Imperial system that fell 
in 1911. Much of this 20th-century effort was 
informed by the values and images of water and 
the Yellow River, as these evolved during the 
Imperial period. Although an examination of 
Yellow  River  conservancy  certainly  reflects 
broad and often bitter disagreement about insti-
tutional arrangements, China’s role in the world 
and state–society relations, from the perspec-
tive of the post-Mao period there remain impor-
tant continuities with patterns that were initiated 
and developed during the past. Despite funda-
mental differences in political form among the 
various Chinese state-building projects of the 
20th  century,  each  state  was  fundamentally 
driven by similar modernizing assumptions, and 
each sought to draw selectively upon multiple 
historical  meanings  of  the  Yellow  River  and 
water in similar ways.
Since  the  fall  of  the  Imperial  system  in 
1911, China has sought to reconstruct a state 
system able to ensure national survival and to 
pursue the goals of renewed wealth and power. 
Lasting for much of the last century, China’s 
search for political form has expressed itself in 
experiments from one end of the 20th-century 
political spectrum to the other: representative 
democracy,  warlordism  (decentralization), 
quasi-fascism, communism and, most recently, 
capitalism  with,  what  the  government  calls, 
Chinese characteristics. Transcending all these 
political–economic boundaries was water. More 
to  the  point,  a  major  consideration  of  each 
successive  state-building  effort  in  the  20th 
century was how to effectively manage water 
to  serve  the  goals  of  nation  building  and 
modernization. During the 20th century, every 
Chinese state sought to address the hydraulic 
breakdown on the North China Plain that had 
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Republican  government  after  1911,  the 
Nationalist state after 1927, and the commu-
nist  government  after  1949  all  sought  to 
assume the historical legitimacy conferred by 
effectively  regulating  the  Yellow  River  water. 
Although there were fundamental differences 
in political ideologies and organization during 
each  political  experiment  during  the  20th 
century, there were historical themes that tran-
scended  these  boundaries.  For  example,  the 
quest to establish a vigorous modern national 
identity among the peoples of the empire was 
a goal, transcending political–economic divides, 
of virtually every Chinese elite.
Water management in the 20th century was 
also informed by fundamental assumptions and 
goals  that  cut  across  the  traditional  political 
boundaries. Several pan-20th-century develop-
ments  included  faith  in:  (i)  administrative 
centralization;  (ii)  modern  industrial  develop-
ment; (iii) modern science and technology; and 
(iv) transnational cooperation. In turn, many of 
these assumptions and goals were informed, or 
promoted,  by  selective  views  of  water  that 
existed in the Imperial period. Traditional views 
of water, such as the politically legitimizing role 
of  ‘ordering  the  waters’,  centralized  water 
management and the entire Confucian notion 
of active manipulation of water to serve the 
broader  goals  of  statecraft,  were  never  far 
below  the  surface,  and  infuse  contemporary 
China’s predilection for an activist government 
role in managing water on the North China 
Plain. The Confucian traditions that premise 
good government on the ability to ‘control the 
waters’  continue  to  animate  the  tendency 
within the YRCC to promote engineering solu-
tions to water-scarcity issues. One need only 
offer  the  South  to  North  Water  Diversion 
Project as the latest supporting evidence of this 
bias. In contrast, a growing sensibility in China 
of environmental degradation has spawned a 
nascent environmental movement, which has 
promoted  non-engineering  approaches  (e.g. 
conservation) to water issues. In the rhetoric of 
this  movement,  one  clearly  sees  an  implicit, 
and occasionally explicit, re-emergence of an 
aesthetic that is informed by traditional Taoist 
sensibilities. The continuing existence of these 
sensibilities is likely to mean that China has the 
capacity to be flexible in its management poli-
cies – able to execute shifts from engineering 
and non-engineering approaches by selectively 
calling upon historical and philosophical sanc-
tion.
The historical tension between centralized 
control and local autonomy continues to define 
the challenge of managing water in contempo-
rary  China.  The  imperatives  of  economic 
reform have entailed a significant devolution of 
central  administrative  power  in  China  since 
1978. Water planners recognize the historical 
lesson of effective central presence in manag-
ing the Yellow River, but efforts to successfully 
mediate local and regional interests have been 
difficult. Negotiating and enforcing water allo-
cation compacts between provinces continues 
to be a major challenge. Below the provincial 
level, local governments are caught between 
serving  central  mandates  and  local  constitu-
ents. By and large, pollution and groundwater 
exploitation  continue  to  increase  under  the 
pressures of local economic development. This 
historical and contemporary tension between 
centre  and  locality  will  continue  to  define 
China’s attempt to implement a national water 
strategy well into the future.
Since  1978,  the  YRCC  has  deepened 
commitments  to  internationalization  that 
emerged  during  the  20th  century.  Although 
periods  like  the  Great  Leap  Forward  have 
witnessed  water  management  premised  on 
local initiative and local technical knowledge, 
the current patterns of internationalization are 
the consequence of the state’s promotion of 
modern science and technology. Indeed, much 
of  the  content  of  international  technical 
exchange  and  capital  was  embedded  in  the 
context  of  engineering  solutions  adopted  by 
the state, and state involvement in scientific, 
technical and financial networks has also intro-
duced the range of experiences, engineering 
and otherwise, that nations and regions have 
undergone in water management.3 Similarly, 
the emphasis on market justifications for both 
water investment and management is largely 
premised  on  international  practices.  Indeed, 
one  might  suggest  that  with  the  historical 
emphasis on ‘ordering the waters’ in China, 
coupled with China’s current commitment to 
international experience, we may see a certain 
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approaches  to  Yellow  River  management, 
which  may  well  represent  models  for  other 
regions of the world.
In  the  more  immediate  realm,  the  entire 
context of the Yellow River basin’s closure has 
intensified the competing interests over water 
resources since the well-publicized ‘shock’ of 
the basin drying up in 1997. At the very centre 
of  China’s  attempt  to  formulate  institutional 
arrangements and responses lie the fundamen-
tal  tensions  arising  from  expanding  urban 
populations, burgeoning industrial production 
and  consumer  demands  for  greater  food 
resources. The trajectory for the Yellow River 
basin  in  the  context  of  water  scarcity  will 
include  adjustments  in  utilization,  allocation 
and institutional responses, all shaped by the 
historical context of river and water manage-
ment outlined above.
Notes
1    Just  above  the  railway  bridge  linking  modern 
Zhengzhou with Ximxiang, i.e. just west of the old 
Bian canal.
2    Under  the  system,  the  YRCC  controls  all  key 
surface water reservoirs and surface water abstrac-
tion points and assigns use quotas on behalf of the 
central  government  to  each  basin  province  and 
autonomous region, plus Hebei and Tianjin. The 
quotas  are  adjusted  proportionally  each  year, 
based  on  expected  water  availability.  However, 
the  system  is  more  nuanced  than  this  simple 
explanation  suggests  and  provides  opportunities 
for negotiation and adjustment, based on immedi-
ate  conditions.  See  Zhu  (2006)  for  additional 
details. 
3    For  an  example  of  such  commitments  note  the 
series  of  International Yellow  River  Symposiums 
held since 2000.
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Introduction
The Colorado River of the American Southwest 
is  among  the  most  studied,  contested  and 
valued rivers in the world, annually providing 
water and electricity to roughly 30 million resi­
dents, generating 11.5 billion kWh of hydro­
electricity, and irrigating more than 3 million 
acres (1.2 million ha) of crops (Adler, 2007). 
This is remarkable in many ways, not least of 
which  being  the  observation  that,  just  150 
years  ago,  Lieutenant  Joseph  C.  Ives 
(1861:110) concluded his exploration of the 
basin with this remarkably misguided assess­
ment:
The region last explored is, of course, altogether 
valueless. It can be approached only from the 
south, and after entering it there is nothing to 
do but to leave. Ours has been the first, and will 
doubtless be the last, party of whites to visit this 
profitless locality. It seems intended by nature 
that the Colorado River, along the greater 
portion of its lonely and majestic way, shall be 
forever unvisited and undisturbed.
How does a river change from being ‘alto­
gether valueless’ to becoming critically impor­
tant  in,  roughly,  the  span  of  two  human 
lifetimes? The answer lies not so much with the 
river itself, or even in the lands drained by the 
river, but in how human ingenuity and institu­
tions have shaped how value is created and 
measured. The combination of an arid, sunny 
climate with abundant lands having good soils 
would,  without  irrigation,  indeed  be  only  of 
limited  human  value.  But  irrigation  –  aptly 
deemed ‘reclamation’ in the American West – 
has transformed the region, first for the benefit 
of  farming,  and  more  recently  for  booming 
sunbelt cities such as Las Vegas, Phoenix, Los 
Angeles and Denver. As part of this transfor­
mation, the jagged mountains, massive canyons 
and  vast  deserts  that  once  made  the  region 
inhospitable  are  now  viewed  as  amenities 
worthy  of  reverence  and  protection.  It  is  a 
region,  and  a  history,  full  of  contrasts  and 
paradoxes,  with  a  future  being  shaped  by  a 
continuous stream of newcomers, including 37 
million  visitors  annually  to  Las  Vegas  and  5 
million to the Grand Canyon, and welcoming 
nearly  one  million  new  permanent  residents 
annually to the seven Colorado River states.
Given the rate of change in the Colorado 
River basin, it is difficult to predict the future 
with any confidence, especially since an unwel­
come new era is emerging: an era of limits. It 
is increasingly unrealistic to accommodate new 
demands in the basin simply by drawing on 
unused supplies, as users already exist to utilize 
every drop of the Colorado; the river has not 
consistently  reached  the  ocean  for  decades. 
Rather, meeting new, mostly urban, demands 
requires  actions  that  resonate  through  the 
water community in some way: for example, 
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drawing on surplus flows in wet years, transfer­
ring water from agricultural to urban users in 
normal years, and tapping reservoir storage in 
dry years. This last scenario has been particu­
larly  evident  in  recent  years;  reservoirs  that 
were 90% full in 2000 were less than half their 
capacity by 2004.1 While much of this decline 
can be rightly attributed to the onset of drought 
(particularly severe in 2002), other conspira­
tors  have  been  population  growth  and  the 
corresponding  expansion  of  the  water  infra­
structure to serve these new populations. From 
1920 to 1990, the population of the Colorado 
River basin states increased more than seven­
fold,  giving  way  to  an  even  more  explosive 
growth in the 1990s, when four basin states 
(Nevada, Arizona, Colorado and Utah) led the 
USA in percentage population growth, while 
another  (California)  led  in  terms  of  absolute 
population  growth  (Census  Bureau,  2001; 
Grand Canyon Trust, 2005).2 In 2004, one 
senior  official  estimated  that  the  size  of  the 
population relying on water from the Colorado 
River had increased by 26% in the past decade 
(Griles, 2004). Also impressive is population 
growth in the final reaches of the river, across 
the border in Sonora and Baja, Mexico. While 
drought conditions may end at any time, rapid 
population  growth  is  expected  to  continue, 
and, additionally, the wealth of recent research 
suggests that climatic change will hit this region 
harder  than  most  –  reducing  streamflows 
anywhere from 11 to 45% by 2100 (Christensen 
and Lettenmaier, 2006; Hoerling and Eischeid, 
2007).3 This is the backdrop against which irri­
gation, urbanization and environmentalism are 
now colliding, all within the context of laws, 
customs and values shaped over a remarkably 
short time­frame.
Physical and Environmental Setting
The Colorado River is primarily fed by snow­
melt originating high in the Rocky Mountains 
of Colorado and Wyoming. Every spring and 
summer, this water races downhill in a gener­
ally south­west direction, pulling in tributaries 
from New Mexico and Utah to form the main 
channel slicing through arid lands in Arizona, 
Nevada,  California  and  a  small  section  of 
Mexico (Fig. 6.1) (for general summaries, see 
Carothers and Brown, 1991; Pontius, 1997; 
Gleick et al., 2002; Project Wet, 2005). Many 
maps of the Colorado show the 632,000 km2  
basin  as  ending  at  the  US–Mexico  border  – 
undoubtedly  a  politically  motivated  decision, 
but actually not terribly inaccurate as over 95% 
of the basin is in the USA. The overwhelming 
majority of management decisions and engi­
neering works are located in the USA, and the 
river ends soon after crossing the international 
border, disappearing completely in most years 
into waiting fields before it can reach its natural 
terminus at the Colorado River delta along the 
Gulf of California.
One  of  the  few  qualities  of  the  Colorado 
River that is not on a grand scale is the flow of 
the  river.  For  legal  reasons  (discussed  later), 
main­stem Colorado River flows4 are reported 
at Lee Ferry (or adjacent to Lee Ferry), the mid­
point of the river just downstream of the Glen 
Canyon dam (see Fig. 6.1). Gauging records 
are interpreted with respect to known upstream 
patterns of water storage and consumption to 
estimate the natural (i.e. unaltered) flow. The 
total annual natural flow of the river at this point 
averages  approximately  15  million  acre­feet 
(MAF)5 (roughly 18 billion m3).6 None the less, 
while not among the top 20 US rivers in terms 
of flow volume, the Colorado is still an impres­
sive and welcome asset in what is primarily an 
arid basin. Much of the lower basin, home to 
the most productive agriculture, receives only 
100 mm of precipitation annually. An ambi­
tious programme of hydraulic engineering has 
taken full advantage of these modest and highly 
variable flows (see Fig. 6.2). Along its course, 
the river is now harnessed by roughly two dozen 
significant storage and diversion projects, most 
notably the Glen Canyon dam (forming Lake 
Powell)  and  the  Hoover  dam  (forming  Lake 
Mead),  bracketing  both  ends  of  the  region’s 
signature natural attraction, the Grand Canyon. 
Water storage facilities on the Colorado River 
can hold roughly 4 full years of flow, a tremen­
dous asset in terms of water supply manage­
ment,  but  achieved  at  the  expense  of 
trans  forming the river from an unpredictable 
and sediment­heavy, warm­water stream to an 
elaborate  plumbing  system  of  relatively  clear 
and  cold  water,  flowing  in  highly  predictable 
(and tempered) patterns – described by Fradkin 
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The  environmental  consequences  of  this 
modified hydrograph are felt throughout both 
the basin and the local ecosystems, with native 
fish species providing perhaps the best indicator 
of the environmental costs of river development. 
The construction of water infrastructure, partic­
ularly the Hoover and Glen Canyon dams, has 
created  an  environment  where  non­native 
species have displaced most native species; four 
remaining native fish species (humpback chub, 
razorback sucker, bonytail chub and Colorado 
pike minnow) are listed as endangered (Carothers 
and Brown, 1991; Adler, 2007). Of particular 
salience has been the removal of both sediment 
from  the  river  by  the  storage  reservoirs  and 
water from the system by out­of­basin exports. 
Many  of  the  major  users  of  Colorado  River 
water – including those in southern California, 
Colorado’s Front Range, central Utah, and the 
Rio Grande valley in New Mexico – are located 
outside  the  Colorado  hydrologic  basin.  The 
ecological impact of the resulting changes to the 
volume,  timing,  temperature  and  chemical 
composition (especially the enhanced salinity) of 
flows is further com  pounded by the introduction 
of exotic species, including trout (for the cold­
water  fisheries),  horses  and  burros,  tamarisk 
(aka salt cedar), and plant and animal species 
associated  with  farming  and  ranching  (Adler, 
2007).
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Environmental  restoration  programmes  in 
both  basins  –  the  Upper  Colorado  River 
Endangered Fish Recovery Program and the 
Lower  Colorado  Multi­Species  Habitat 
Conservation Plan – exist to coordinate mitiga­
tion but, ironically, both efforts are explicit in 
allowing still additional river development and 
consumption.  No  ecosystem  is  more  threat­
ened by this accumulation of storage and diver­
sion facilities than the Colorado River delta, 
primarily located in Mexico. Diminished flows 
due to upstream consumption, including long 
time  periods  during  the  initial  filling  of  the 
Mead and Powell lakes, have starved the delta 
of flows, reducing the area covered by wetlands 
to  less  than  a  tenth  of  its  original  728,000 
hectares (Glennon and Culp, 2002). The delta 
now survives on roughly 1% of the river’s natu­
ral flow, this water originating mostly as agri­
cultural return flows and occasional reservoir 
spills – such as the El Niño­inspired floods of 
the early 1980s (Fig. 6.3). Given the increas­
ing water demands, likely decreased flows due 
to  climate  change  and  currently  low  storage 
levels, major reservoir spills may never recur 
(Gertner, 2007). Current efforts to improve the 
efficiency of upstream water­delivery systems 
threaten further reductions in flow.7
An Institutional History of the Colorado 
River Basin
The institutional arrangements of the Colorado 
River basin have evolved over several decades 
of conflict and compromise. Most histories of 
the basin focus on the evolution of the so­called 
‘Law of the River’, a collection of federal and 
state laws and court decisions that, collectively, 
apportion  the  flow  of  the  river  among  the 
seven  basin  states  and  Mexico  (e.g.  see 
Lochhead, 2001, 2003). However, while the 
Law of the River is undoubtedly important and 
is  central  to  understanding  both  the  basin’s 
past and future, it is only one component of 
the overall institutional framework. There are 
many political, social, cultural and environmen­
tal factors which not only fill out the legal skel­
eton provided by the Law of the River but also 
frequently articulate a competing set of values. 
The  result  is  that  the  modern  institutional 
arrangements of the Colorado River are bifur­
cated, and the primary source of this bifurca­
tion is paradigmatic. Specifically, the institution 
features an odd balance of a ‘private commod­
ity’ paradigm, featuring an emphasis on water 
development and the rights of individual rights­
holders, with a ‘public value’ paradigm, empha­
sizing resource protection, value pluralism and 
democratic  (i.e.  collective  and  participatory) 
decision making. Not surprisingly, given their 
inherent incompatibility, these paradigms did 
not evolve simultaneously or in a coordinated 
manner,  but  evolved  rather  sequentially  and 
incrementally. It is against this backdrop that 
new institutional arrangements are now being 
sought, pushed by the harsh reality of a limited 
water supply but constrained by the lack of a 
coherent  vision  regarding  the  appropriate 
goals of water management.
Fig. 6.2.  Reconstructed natural Colorado River flows (at Lees Ferry) (Courtesy Jeff Lucas and Connie 
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In what follows, the institutional history of 
the Colorado River is reviewed in eras defined 
by  these  two  dominant  paradigms,  focusing 
primarily on the major portion of the basin that 
lies within the seven US Colorado River states. 
In contrast to a traditional Law of the River 
history, which begins with the Colorado River 
Compact of 1922, this review begins with the 
arrival of the first Europeans in this part of the 
New World, as this provides the origins of the 
private commodity paradigm, which still largely 
shapes  the  institutional  arrangements  in  the 
Colorado. In these early decades, the conflicts 
between countries, and, later, US states, for 
the bounties of the Colorado occurred within 
this  dominant  paradigm.  Conflicts  thus  typi­
cally  did  not  feature  fundamental  disagree­
ments regarding values or ideologies but were 
primarily distributive in nature – i.e. each party 
wanted to secure as much of the river’s benefits 
as possible – and were focused on issues of 
apportionment,  development  and  consump­
tion, while systematically devaluing non­mone­
tary, public and systemic values of the river.
Evolution and reign of the private commodity 
paradigm
Early exploration and settlement 
The origins of the region’s private commodity 
paradigm  can  be  traced  back  to  the  post­
Columbian era of European expansion into the 
New World. The first wave of European explor­
ers  in  the  1530s  comprised  the  Spanish 
conquistadors,  most  prominently  Francisco 
Vasquez de Coronado, who led the ultimately 
unsuccessful  search  for  the  mythical  Seven 
Cities  of  Cibola,  thought  to  contain  mineral 
riches similar to those in the Inca Empire of 
Peru and the Aztec Empire in Mexico (Waters, 
1946;  DeVoto,  1952;  Brandon,  1990). 
Finding  no  gold,  these  excursions  ultimately 
gave way in the 1600s to Spanish missionary 
entradas, aimed at bringing Christianity to the 
region.  Much  like  the  conquistadors,  the 
missionaries greatly improved the geographic 
knowledge  of  the  lower  Colorado  basin  but 
were  otherwise  unsuccessful,  as  the  padres 
could  claim  few  souls  and  only  one  mission 
(San Xavier, near modern­day Tucson, Arizona) 
survived  after  missionary  efforts  were  aban­
doned in 1781. By the 1800s, the English and 
French had replaced the Spanish as the major 
European  influences  in  the  region,  this  time 
concentrated  in  the  upper  basin.  Like  the 
Spanish  earlier,  these  were  not  immigrants 
looking for homesteads but were entrepreneurs 
looking to extract wealth – in this case, beaver 
skins for the European hat industry (Waters, 
1946; DeVoto, 1952).
By  the  1840s,  the  fur  industry  was  in 
decline,  but  global  forces  were  still  shaping 
events in the Colorado River basin. As Waters 
(1946:185) writes:
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Across all Europe – in France, Austria, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy – geysers of unrest 
broke out. In an unparalleled outpouring of 
human emotion the tide swept over Europe, and 
kings ran before it in terror. All of South and 
Central America rose in revolt against their 
Spanish masters, establishing their 
independence. In North America, Mexico broke 
free from Spain and then the Republic of Texas 
from Mexico. The United States, declaring war 
against Mexico, took most of the Colorado River 
basin including what was to become Nevada, 
Utah, California and most of Arizona, New 
Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming.
Soon,  almost  the  entire  Colorado  River 
basin became the legal domain of the USA, 
with the obvious exception being the failure to 
acknowledge the sovereign rights of the indig­
enous  peoples  (known  as  Indians  or  Native 
Americans). Dozens of tribes are indigenous to 
the region, including Apaches, Navajos, Hopis, 
Zunis and Utes. Beginning with the conquista­
dors, each wave of Anglo settlement occurred 
with little regard to native peoples, cultures and 
rights, a tradition that improved only margin­
ally  under  US  control,  as  wars  and  treaties 
forced  great  reductions  in  territories  under 
tribal control. Addressing the so­called ‘Indian 
problem’, however, was insufficient by itself to 
stimulate Anglo settlement of the basin, and if 
the  USA  had  learned  anything  from  the 
European competition for the New World, it 
was that the key to holding land was promot­
ing  settlement  (DeVoto,  1952).  Given  that 
settlement of arid territories is innately tied to 
water management, water policy thus became 
a  tool  of  national  security  and  national 
economic development.
It was in this context that gold deposits were 
first  discovered  in  the  West,  prompting  the 
California  Gold  Rush  of  1849,  followed  a 
decade later by similar gold rushes in Colorado 
and Arizona (Waters, 1946). Succeeding where 
the conquistadors had failed over 300 years 
earlier,  thousands  of  entrepreneurs  flooded 
into the region from across the globe in search 
of  mineral  wealth.  Eventually,  the  mining 
‘boom towns’ evolved more diversified econ­
omies or went bust as mineral reserves were 
exhausted or spread too thin among compet­
ing  miners,  but  the  legacy  of  the  boom  on 
water resources has endured, largely due to the 
evolution  in  the  mining  camps  of  the  prior 
appropriation  doctrine  of  water  allocation, 
since  adopted  and  practised  in  all  of  the 
Colorado  River  states  (and  beyond)  (Pisani, 
1992).
Four  elements  of  prior  appropriation  are 
particularly noteworthy (Tarlock et al., 2002; 
Kenney,  2005).  First,  unlike  the  riparian 
doctrine practised in the eastern USA, water 
rights  established  under  prior  appropriation 
are not linked in any way to land ownership, 
thereby  ensuring  that  western  development 
was not limited to stream corridors but can, 
instead, reach wherever the combined forces 
of  engineering  and  economics  can  provide 
water services. Second, water rights established 
through  prior  appropriation  are  limited  to 
legally recognized ‘beneficial uses’, which until 
recently  only  included  industrial,  agricultural, 
municipal and domestic uses, while excluding 
most environmental uses. Third, prior appro­
priation  water  rights  are  a  form  of  private 
property right, which can be bought and sold 
with relatively few restrictions, the primary one 
being that no transfer can be permitted that 
‘injures’ other legally established prior appro­
priation rights. Fourth, and most significantly, 
the prior appropriation doctrine is based on 
the tenet of priority and, specifically, the notion 
that the first person to beneficially use a water 
source should, in perpetuity, retain the right to 
continue to use the same volume of water (and 
for the same uses) every year.
Perhaps the best way to understand prior 
appropriation is to consider how a ‘call on the 
river’ works. A ‘call’ is the term used to describe 
a situation when insufficient water is available 
in a given year to satisfy the needs of all parties 
with  recognized  water  rights.  The  origin  of 
these rights can be traced back to the initial 
settlement of the region and the first uses of 
water for recognized purposes. Over time, an 
inventory  of  these  uses  was  developed,  and 
each ‘right’ was recorded with respect to the 
location of use, the amount of use, the purpose 
of use and the first date of use. While the details 
vary somewhat among the western states, each 
generally  established  a  water  management 
agency to record and monitor the exercise of 
these  rights,  with  these  efforts  organized  at 
sub­state  scales  defined  by  the  major  river 
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drought, and begins when a water rights­holder 
complains  to  the  state  agency  about  the 
unavailability of water. To satisfy the call, the 
administrator orders some users to completely 
cease  diversions,  beginning  with  the  most 
junior  (the  youngest  rights),  followed  by  the 
second most junior, and so on, until the avail­
able supply again matches the volume of the 
remaining rights. Note that this is not a system 
based  on  sharing  or  proportional  cutbacks; 
junior water rights are cut off in their entirety, 
one by one, until the remaining rights­holders 
can use their rights in their entirety. In prac­
tice, this can be highly complex, as seniors and 
juniors  are  scattered  throughout  a  basin,  in 
different reaches and sub­basins. A particularly 
challenging  situation  arises  when  the  most 
senior  users  are  far  downstream,  as  this 
requires  the  upstream  juniors  (perhaps  in  a 
different sub­basin) to allow water to flow past 
their  diversion  structures  to  ensure  that  the 
downstream senior is satisfied. Administering 
these programmes is a challenge to legal insti­
tutions, engineering systems and social systems, 
but  provides  the  benefit  of  encouraging  and 
protecting early investments in water projects 
(Kenney, 2005).
The priority concept not only provided a 
strong incentive to rapid settlement but also 
enshrined  the  key  elements  of  the  private 
commodity  paradigm  –  i.e.  the  notion  that 
water is an economic commodity which should 
be  privately  owned  and  manipulated  for  the 
benefit of entrepreneurial capitalism. It is worth 
noting that this approach to water allocation 
and  management  differs  significantly  from 
what was observed in many of the first agrarian 
settlements  in  the  West,  particularly  the 
Mormon communities that sprang up in Utah 
in  the  late  1840s,  the  Hispanic  acequia 
communities of northern New Mexico, or any 
of the Native American communities (Waters, 
1946;  Maass  and  Anderson,  1978).  These 
communities all featured collective or central­
ized control of water resources, an approach 
strongly endorsed by western visionary John 
Wesley Powell. Powell – best remembered for 
his exploration of the Colorado River in 1869 
– was one of the first men to openly question 
the logic of the private commodity paradigm, 
instead arguing for small communal societies 
nourished by the careful and sustainable utiliza­
tion of the region’s limited natural resources 
(Powell, 1890; Stegner, 1953). Powell’s well­
reasoned  argument  in  favour  of  moderation 
and community control was widely ignored.
Following the US Civil War of the 1860s, a 
large and restless eastern population was ready 
to heed Horace Greeley’s famous advice and 
head west, and did so at the urging of a national 
government that provided a variety of home­
steading programmes designed to promote an 
agrarian West, a popular national goal (Pisani, 
1992). Many homesteaders soon discovered, 
however, that the small land allotments (often 
just 160 acres, or 65 ha), lacking reliable water 
supplies, were simply not suited to farming. It 
is estimated that two­thirds of all homesteaders 
failed,  often  leading  to  the  consolidation  of 
land in the hands of banks and other ‘empire 
builders’, who found large tracts well suited to 
low­density ranching (Stegner, 1953). Where 
agrarian communities flourished – particularly 
in  pockets  of  California,  Arizona,  Utah  and 
Colorado  –  it  was  because  of  their  location 
along perennial streams that were well suited 
to the construction of water storage and diver­
sion works. If agrarian settlements were to take 
hold on a large scale, then water development 
on a large scale seemed the obvious answer.
Apportionment and lower basin development
By the early 1900s, it was apparent that the 
dream of an agrarian West – viewed by the 
progressive national government as more ideo­
logically  desirable  than  mining  or  ranching 
economies – would require development of the 
West’s  large  river  systems,  particularly  the 
Colorado River. The Reclamation Act of 1902 
was  thus  enacted  to  bring  the  financial  and 
technical resources of the federal government 
to  task,  initially  under  a  funding  mechanism 
designed to recoup costs from project benefici­
aries, but eventually evolving into a programme 
of  blatant  subsidies  and  political  favours 
(Worster, 1985; Reisner, 1986; Wahl, 1989). 
Many of the initial targets of the federal recla­
mation programme were in the lower Colorado 
River basin, where fertile soils, long growing 
seasons and favourable topography provided 
an ideal opportunity for large­scale irrigation, if 
only  the  flow  of  the  river  –  once  termed  a 
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(USBR,  1946)  –  could  be  controlled  by 
upstream storage. Existing irrigation develop­
ments along the Palo Verde, Yuma, Imperial 
and Mexicali valleys (in the Arizona–California–
Mexico  border  region)  had  not  only  already 
demonstrated  the  potential  for  irrigation  but 
had also shown the vulnerability of these oper­
ations to flooding and siltation.
Large­scale  river  development  could  not 
proceed, however, until an understanding was 
reached regarding the legal apportionment of 
the river’s flow among the seven US states and 
Mexico.  Owing  to  political  unrest  in  Mexico 
and a reluctance of water interests in the USA 
to acknowledge any obligation by the upstream 
nation  to  maintain  flows  to  Mexico,  it  was 
quickly  decided  that  an  apportionment  was 
needed just between the states of the upper 
basin  (Colorado,  New  Mexico,  Utah  and 
Wyoming)  and  the  lower  basin  (Arizona, 
California  and  Nevada)  (Hundley,  1975). 
Despite the fact that the prior appropriation 
system was already in effect (intrastate) in each 
of the seven US Colorado River states, it was 
argued by the upper basin that this approach 
would not be equitable at the interstate scale, 
given that the lower basin was being settled at 
a much faster rate. The upper basin states thus 
wanted a permanent reservation of water for 
their use (regardless of when that use would 
eventually occur), and unless they got this, they 
would use all means necessary to block any 
apportionment and, more importantly, any of 
the desired lower basin developments – partic­
ularly the Hoover dam. Thus, the seeds of a 
very hard­fought compromise were sown, and 
a new institutional mechanism – the interstate 
compact  –  was  unveiled  to  produce  the 
Colorado River Compact of 1922, the first of 
nearly  two  dozen  water  allocation  compacts 
now  in  existence  in  the  American  West 
(Hundley, 1975; Tyler, 2003).
As case­specific solutions to interstate water 
allocation  disputes,  each  compact  is  unique, 
but the Colorado River Compact is particularly 
unusual, in that it features an apportionment of 
specific, long­term (decadal) volumes of water 
rather than annual percentages or standards 
requiring the maintenance of a constant mini­
mum  flow  rate  at  the  state  line.  The  key 
element of the compact is found in Article III(d), 
which requires the states of the upper basin to 
release 75 MAF of water every 10 years past 
Lee Ferry (see Fig. 6.1) to the lower basin (or 
an annual average of 7.5 MAF), which seemed 
a modest burden, given that the annual flow of 
the river was estimated at this time to at least 
exceed 16 MAF and perhaps to be as high as 
20–22  MAF  (Hundley,  1975).  The  roughly 
two decades of gauging data available suggested 
an  average  flow  of  16.8  MAF.  However,  as 
shown  earlier  in  Fig.  6.2,  this  estimate  has 
proven to be highly flawed, as gauging records 
and  tree­ring  studies  both  suggest  the  long­
term flow of the river is approximately 15 MAF 
(Woodhouse et al., 2006).
This error can potentially work to the disad­
vantage of the upper basin states, given the 
downstream release requirement. In a manner 
very analogous to a call on a prior appropria­
tion regime, in an extended dry period, if satis­
fying the lower basin delivery obligation meant 
insufficient water remained to serve upper basin 
users, then those users would presumably be 
prevented from diverting and using the water as 
it flowed through these headwaters states. This 
situation has never happened, in part due to 
two protections provided to the upper basin. 
First, the compact’s 10­year accounting method 
allows reduced deliveries in dry years, as long as 
they are offset by higher deliveries in wet years 
(within  any  10­year  period).  Second,  as 
discussed later, a major storage reservoir (Lake 
Powell) now exists just upstream of the delivery 
point,  allowing  the  upper  basin  to  maintain 
steady downstream deliveries even when faced 
with highly variable inflows – at least as long as 
water remains in storage. This capability has 
been exploited to create a hydropower­focused 
water management regime that keeps releases 
relatively constant, which ironically eliminates 
much of the flexibility inherent in the 10­year 
accounting method.
The compact was ratified8 as part of the 
federal Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 
which authorized the Boulder dam, renamed 
the Hoover dam, and the All­American canal, 
so named since it would divert water from the 
river to agricultural users in southern California, 
in a structure that would not cross over the 
international  line  (unlike  an  existing  canal, 
which was being used by both Mexican and 
American interests). It also provided an inter­
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states of 4.4 MAF to California, 2.8 MAF to 
Arizona and 0.3 MAF to Nevada.9 This element 
of the Boulder Canyon Project Act has been 
the  subject  of  considerable  litigation,  mostly 
resolved in Arizona v. California (1963), but 
has survived intact. With these provisions in 
place, construction of the Hoover dam (along 
the Arizona–Nevada border) was completed by 
1935  at  a  cost  of  US$49  million  (in  1935 
prices) and at least 96 lives. The project has 
dramatically reduced the flood danger down­
stream, while providing over 26 MAF of stor­
age  capacity  (in  Lake  Mead)  and  2000 
megawatts  of  hydropower  capacity.  Soon 
thereafter, in 1941, the Parker dam was built 
downstream on the river (along the Arizona–
California border), to provide a diversion point 
for the Colorado River aqueduct, which provides 
municipal  and  industrial  water  to  southern 
California  cities  (Fig.  6.1).  As  seen  with  the 
other lower basin projects, the Parker dam was 
fraught with controversy, with Arizona unsuc­
cessfully using both litigation and the Arizona 
National  Guard  in  a  futile  attempt  to  slow 
California’s use of the river (Mann, 1963).
The apportionment of the Colorado River 
was completed in the 1940s in two separate 
actions.  First,  a  1944  Treaty  with  Mexico 
(Mexican Water Treaty of 1944) apportioned a 
minimum of 1.5 MAF/year (roughly 10% of 
the river’s natural flow) to be delivered at the 
international border. This is water in addition 
to the 7.5 MAF allocated annually to both the 
upper and lower basins, and thus increased the 
overall annual apportionment of the river to 
16.5 MAF. Initial discussions with Mexico in 
1910 had been based on a potentially equal 
division of flows at the border, an arrangement 
that had disintegrated by 1923 to the point 
where the USA suggested it was not obligated 
to provide any delivery (based on the infamous 
but ultimately insignificant Harmon Doctrine) 
(Hundley, 1966). The deal enacted was, thus, 
yet another hard­fought compromise and was 
tied to another apportionment decision regard­
ing the shared Rio Grande River, where Mexico 
has  the  strategic  advantage  of  being  the 
upstream party on the critical reach (Hundley, 
1966).
The second apportionment decision of the 
decade  came  in  the  Upper  Colorado  River 
Basin Compact of 1948, which apportions the 
upper  basin  share  among  the  four  states  as 
follows: 51.75% to Colorado, 23% to Utah, 
14% to Wyoming and 11.25% to New Mexico. 
Percentages  are  used  since  the  amount  of 
water reserved for the upper basin is theoreti­
cally 7.5 MAF/year, but due to the flawed flow 
assumptions  used  in  the  Colorado  River 
Compact  and  the  new  delivery  obligation 
promised to Mexico – both of which must be 
satisfied  before  the  upper  basin  can  take  its 
apportionment – it is widely assumed that the 
flows  available  to  the  upper  basin  may  not 
consistently  exceed  6  MAF  (Tipton  and 
Kalmbach, 1965).10 This compact also featured 
the establishment of an Upper Colorado River 
Commission  to  monitor  consumption  levels 
and,  if  necessary,  interpret  and  enforce 
complex rules for sharing upper basin short­
ages.  This  has  never  been  necessary;  upper 
basin  consumption  has  never  exceeded  4 
MAF/year  (see  Table  6.1).  Exactly  how  the 
Upper  Colorado  River  Commission  would 
calculate  and  enforce  shortages  among  the 
four states remains to be seen, especially since 
no curtailment of upper basin uses is likely to 
be initiated by the commission until legal ambi­
guities  regarding  the  full  Colorado  River 
Compact are first addressed. The rules of the 
upper basin compact generally call upon each 
state  to  curtail  water  uses  in  proportion  to 
levels of use in the preceding years, although 
exactly  how  this  would  be  implemented  by 
state  agencies  within  each  state  is  a  further 
source  of  uncertainty.  Given  recent  drought 
conditions,  several  upper  basin  states  have 
initiated these discussions.
Omissions in the apportionment scheme 
Before  moving  forward  with  a  discussion  of 
upper basin and Arizona water development, 
still nested within the private commodity para­
digm, it is worth noting that the seven­state and 
international  apportionment  of  the  Colorado 
River, as completed in 1948, left many issues 
unresolved for future generations. The appor­
tionment framework is not only based on flawed 
flow assumptions and ambiguities about how 
future  shortages  would  be  handled,  but  also 
contains several notable substantive omissions. 
Many of these omissions have not been fully 
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decades until crises and changes in the para­
digm provided a more conducive policy­making 
environment. Four of these omissions include 
Indian  water  rights,  environmental  flows, 
groundwater and water quality.
The basic apportionment is nearly silent on 
the  issue  of  Native  American  (Indian)  water 
needs, with the exception of language in Article 
VII  of  the  Colorado  River  Compact  –  later 
repeated in many subsequent compacts – stat­
ing  that  ‘nothing  in  this  compact  shall  be 
construed  as  affecting  the  obligations  of  the 
United States of America to Indian tribes’. This 
language was inspired by the landmark Winters 
decision  in  1908  (Winters  v.  United  States, 
1908),  which  established  as  precedent  the 
federal responsibility to provide tribes relegated 
to reservations with the water resources needed 
to  sustain  these  new  tribal  homelands. 
Translating  this  principle  into  actual  water 
management in the Colorado River basin is an 
ongoing process, subject to considerable debate 
and  litigation,  especially  in  the  lower  basin, 
where  the  vast  majority  of  the  basin’s  large 
reservations are located. Arizona, in particular, 
features  several  tribes  with  Colorado  River 
rights  of  great  seniority,  as  these  rights  are 
defined  as  originating  with  the  dates  of  the 
Indian treaties or the establishment of reserva­
tions, actions that typically took place before 
widespread  homesteading  by  Anglos. 
Additionally, these rights can be quite large, as 
they have since been defined as the amount of 
water that would be needed to irrigate all the 
‘practicably irrigable acreage’ within the reser­
vation.11 By some estimates, large reservations 
– such as the Navajo reservation in north­east­
ern Arizona – could conceivably be awarded 
the entire flow of the Colorado River under this 
calculus. Politically, this outcome is unaccepta­
ble to the non­Indians that would be displaced, 
so  the  ‘solution’  has  been  to  withhold  from 
tribes the financial resources needed to develop 
water projects until they agree to settlements 
that  dramatically  scale­back  the  size  of  their 
rights (Burton, 1991; Thorson et al., 2006). 
Table 6.1.  Colorado River main-stem consumption and deliveries to Mexico (thousand acre-feet).
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Upper basin (UB)
Colorado   1,789   1,754   1,993   2,102   1,711   2,383   1,856
New Mexico     293     424     393     362     387     337     466
Utah     616     670     759     784     792     774     853
Wyoming     278     353     351     520     436     421     405
UB total   3,001   3,220   3,541   3,803   3,366   3,953   3,618
Lower basin (LB)
Arizona   1,208   1,035   1,032   2,117   2,029   2,643   2,429
California   4,937   4,680   4,710   5,163   4,837   5,258   4,344
Nevada     154     228     373     311     350     450     292
LB Total   6,299   5,943   6,115   7,591   7,216   8,351   7,065
Evaporation   2,093   2,063   1,841   1,598   1,703   2,102   1,360
Total USA 
consumption
11,393 11,226 11,497 12,992 12,285 14,406 12,043
Delivered to Mexico   1,656   6,143 13,396   1,676   1,838     2,145   1,725
Note: UB totals include minor deliveries in north-eastern Arizona (not shown). Data for 2005 are provisional; 
evaporation losses, in particular, are very rough estimates. During the current drought, inflows have been 
approximately 62% of the 30-year average in 2000, 59% in 2001, 25% in 2002, 51% in 2003, 49% in 2004, 
105% in 2005, 71% in 2006, and 68% in 2007; 2008 was expected to be an average or above-average 
year. Data are compiled from the Bureau of Reclamation statistics, primarily the Consumptive Use and 
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While the ethics of this approach are certainly 
debatable, the effectiveness is undeniable; many 
Navajos, for example, still do not have potable 
domestic water supplies in their communities. 
In contrast, several tribes have negotiated settle­
ments  tied  to  the  Central  Arizona  Project 
(discussed in the following section), which now 
delivers  approximately  0.55  MAF  annually 
(about  one­third  of  project  capacity)  to  tribal 
lands in central Arizona.12
Another largely unresolved issue is the need 
for environmental flows. As suggested earlier in 
the discussion of the Colorado River delta, the 
reservation  of  water  for  environmental  flows 
was not explicitly provided for in either compact 
or in the treaty, with the exception that each 
jurisdiction retains great latitude in how appor­
tioned water is used internally. States can, theo­
retically,  reserve  a  component  of  flow  for 
environmental needs, but the incentive to do so 
is limited by the lack of any assurance that other 
states would follow suit and, more importantly, 
by the evolution of water allocation rules during 
an  era  and  paradigm  where  environmental 
protection took a back seat to water develop­
ment. In the Colorado basin (as in many other 
places), protecting the environment was seen 
as  something  that  could  wait  until  the  basic 
sustenance needs of homesteading populations 
could be assured. As discussed later, this era did 
not arrive in this basin until the 1970s.
Groundwater is also not mentioned in the 
apportionment scheme, a common (and often 
problematic)  omission  in  western  water 
compacts generally, but one that has thus far 
been tolerable in this case, since the centre­
piece of the Law of the River is the require­
ment to deliver a fixed volume of surface water 
at a given point (Lee Ferry) and, subsequently, 
the  apportionment  of  that  surface  water  to 
three  states  (and  eventually  Mexico)  down­
stream.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  overall 
basin, how groundwater is managed upstream 
is largely irrelevant as long as the delivery obli­
gation is satisfied. Similarly, groundwater use 
in the lower basin is an important issue – over­
drafting in Arizona is a chronic problem – but 
is largely outside the scope of the Law of the 
River, which has been interpreted by the courts 
as  not  applying  to  lower  basin  tributaries. 
Groundwater  law  is  extremely  complex  and 
non­uniform across (and sometimes within) the 
basin states, with most regimes awarding rights 
based on either priority (as done with surface 
water) or land ownership, or some combina­
tion thereof (Bryner and Purcell, 2003).
Finally, water quality is also omitted from 
the apportionment scheme, which has prima­
rily been an issue due to the accumulation of 
salts as the river moves downstream. This is a 
result of natural processes and human activi­
ties,  including  out­of­basin  imports  of  fresh­
water  in  the  upper  basin,  saline  irrigation 
return flows and evaporation from reservoirs. 
At one point in the 1960s, excessive salt in the 
river resulted in a brief international incident 
with Mexico, which convincingly argued that 
its apportionment could not be satisfied with 
water too salty for irrigation. In response, the 
treaty  was  modified  in  1973  to  reflect  this 
understanding,  and  an  ongoing  remediation 
programme was established under the Colorado 
River  Basin  Salinity  Control  Act  of  1974 
(Holburt, 1975; Adler, 2007).
Upper basin and Arizona development
With the completion of the basic basin­wide 
apportionment  through  the  Mexican  Treaty 
and  Upper  Basin  Compact,  and  given  the 
economic boom that followed the end of World 
War II, the states of the upper basin mobilized 
to pursue their share of federal water develop­
ment funds. Arizona was also now in line for 
water projects, having seen the futility in spend­
ing decades unsuccessfully fighting Californian 
projects. In fact, the first of the big post­war 
project proposals was for the Central Arizona 
Project (CAP), a vast aqueduct that can convey 
approximately  1.5  MAF  of  water  from  the 
main stem (on the Arizona–California border) 
to  inter  ior  regions,  including  the  cities  of 
Phoenix and Tucson, traversing over 541 km 
and  732  m  in  elevation.  The  project  was 
designed  to  ease  groundwater  overdrafting 
problems throughout the state. Included in the 
CAP  proposal  were  dams  at  Bridge  (or 
Hualapai) and, later, Marble canyons, bracket­
ing Grand Canyon National Park, to provide 
the  hydropower  (and  the  hydropower  reve­
nues) necessary to support the project in terms 
of both electricity (for pumping) and economic 
subsidies for the intended market of both agri­
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This idea of using ‘cash register’ hydroelectric 
dams to subsidize water deliveries was eagerly 
embraced by upper basin users, who sought to 
implement the concept on their own forthcom­
ing projects.
While  the  economic  and  environmental 
merits of the CAP were debated in Congress, 
the upper basin pursued projects, first gaining 
resumption  of  work  on  the  Colorado–Big 
Thompson  Project13  (initiated  in  1938  but 
delayed by World War II), and then initiating 
congressional consideration of the multi­faceted 
Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP). After 
initial discussions, it was determined that the 
CRSP would consist of five cash register dams 
and 15 ‘participating projects’ (i.e. regional irri­
gation  systems),  and  would  use  the  new 
economics proposed in the still­pending CAP 
bills to achieve what the General Accounting 
Office has since calculated as a 100% subsidy 
for the participating projects – truly a stunning 
fall for a programme that still claims to be fee 
based, but only a slightly larger subsidy than the 
system­wide reclamation project average.14 In 
Congress, the CRSP bill enjoyed the support of 
the upper basin states and Arizona, but was 
opposed by a coalition of southern California 
water  interests,  fiscal  conservatives  and  envi­
ronmentalists (Terrell, 1965b).
The emergence of environmentalism as a 
political force in Colorado River politics was 
largely  a  new  phenomenon,  foreshadowing 
the eventual emergence of the public values 
paradigm. At issue in the CRSP bill was the 
proposal to build the Echo Park dam inside the 
Dinosaur National Monument (along the Utah–
Colorado border). Ultimately, securing passage 
of the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 
1956 meant abandoning the Echo Park dam 
proposal in exchange for an enlarged project 
at Glen Canyon – a Faustian bargain that is 
now  widely  regretted  among  environmental 
interests, due to the submergence of the spec­
tacular  canyons  that  characterize  the  Glen 
Canyon  region  (Terrell,  1965b).  The  dams 
authorized by CRSP provide nearly 34 MAF of 
storage  capacity  in  four  major  units  –  Glen 
Canyon  on  the  Colorado  River  in  Arizona, 
Flaming Gorge on the Green River in Utah, 
Navajo on the San Juan River in New Mexico, 
and the Curecanti (now the Aspinall) Unit on 
the Gunnison River in Colorado. Eleven partic­
ipating projects were also authorized to use the 
stored water, a great irony to many, given that 
the US Department of Agriculture was actively 
working elsewhere in the country at this time 
to take 40 million acres out of production to 
ease national crop surpluses (Terrell, 1965b).
Still additional projects in the upper basin 
(and elsewhere) were authorized in 1968 when 
the  CAP  legislation  was  finally  enacted.  As 
seen in the CRSP process, the passage of the 
Colorado River Basin Project Act meant aban­
doning  the  environmentally  controversial 
‘Grand Canyon dams’, this time traded for a 
massive  coal­fired  power  plant  (the  Navajo 
Generating Station), which ironically impedes 
visibility of the canyon spared from the dam 
builders. Perhaps more than any other exam­
ple,  the  coalition  building  and  deal  making 
associated with the act embodies the distribu­
tive  politics  epitomized  by  western  water 
conflicts, as Arizona got its long­desired CAP 
only by conceding to California a junior water 
priority for Colorado River flows serving the 
project,  and  adding  language  authorizing 
projects  in  Nevada  (the  Southern  Nevada 
Supply Project), Utah (re­authorization of the 
Dixie Project and provisional authorization of 
the Uintah Unit of the Central Utah Project), 
New Mexico (authorization of Hooker dam or 
alternative), and Colorado (authorization of the 
Dolores,  Dallas  Creek,  San  Miguel,  West 
Divide, and Animas–La Plata Projects) (Ingram, 
1990).15  Overall,  the  Colorado  River  Basin 
Project Act legislation features a palpable lack 
of  internal  consistency  or  financial  integrity, 
and marks the high water mark for the private 
commodity paradigm.
The era of the public values paradigm
The successful efforts to block the Echo Park 
and the Grand Canyon dams were the precur­
sors of a larger movement which fundamen­
tally altered the legal, political and ideological 
foundations of the Colorado River. Until this 
point, the battles for the Colorado River, while 
heated  and  protracted,  were  among  parties 
that viewed the resource through a common 
lens, emphasizing development, entrepreneur­
ialism and private control. Sustaining the polit­
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adherence  to  three  related  myths:  (i)  the 
economic argument that the federal reclama­
tion programme pays for itself in user fees, a 
claim  that  is  more  than  true  for  the  multi­
purpose dams but only rarely a reality for the 
irrigation  projects;  (ii)  the  notion  that  these 
efforts  worked  to  the  benefit  of  the  family 
farmer  and  other  individual  entrepreneurs, 
when in reality the benefits largely accrued to 
empire­builders  such  as  banks,  railroads  and 
corporate agriculture; and (iii) the notion that 
the economic benefits of water development 
were so vast and fundamental as to render any 
concern over ecological impacts, the loss of 
environmental services, or the deterioration of 
other  instream  values  as  inconsequential 
(Fradkin, 1981; Reisner, 1986). Adhering to 
these now discredited myths fuelled numerous 
political  careers  and  widespread  economic 
development, and undoubtedly helped achieve 
the national goal of western settlement, but it 
also created something heretofore missing from 
the region: an urban constituency drawn to the 
aesthetic and environmental amenities of the 
region,  supportive  of  public  lands  and  other 
collective resources, and emphasizing quality of 
life over return on investment. It is more than a 
little ironic that aggressive water development 
activities  in  the  West  have  created  the  infra­
structure necessary to support approximately 
55 million residents in the Colorado River basin 
states – up from 4 million just a century earlier 
(see Fig. 6.4) – and the subsequent rise of an 
‘ethic of place’ (Wilkinson, 1990), based prima­
rily on a public values paradigm.
The federal environmental movement
Efforts to reconcile these two competing world­
views take place in several arenas. One of the 
most controversial has been the evolution of 
federal environmental policy. Unlike the conser­
vation movement of the early 1900s and the 
associated focus on the scientific utilization of 
natural resources (Hays, 1959), modern envi­
ronmentalism has a strong preservationist ethic, 
which questions the underlying logic of utilitari­
anism, and also has a strong urban, aesthetic 
and public­health orientation (Paehlke, 1989). 
These threads run through several national laws 
enacted  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s, 
including, among others, the Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act of 1968, the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, the Clean Water Act of 
1972,  and  the  Endangered  Species  Act  of 
1973 (Rasband et al., 2004). These acts, all 
applicable  in  the  Colorado  River  basin,  are 
forceful articulations of preservation, modera­
tion and deliberative decision making, and all 
feature new opportunities for citizens to partici­
pate in decision making through both formal 
decision­making processes and a rapidly grow­
ing  variety  of  ad  hoc  collaborative  efforts 
(Kenney et al., 2000). Of particular salience in 
Fig. 6.4. Population growth in the Colorado River basin states (1900–2007). (Courtesy Brad Udall.)136  D. Kenney
the  basin  has  been  the  Endangered  Species 
Act, which effectively blocks new developments 
found to jeopardize the continued existence of 
threatened and endangered species, and which 
has forced many operational modifications to 
existing projects. Federal legislation enacted in 
this era and focusing on public lands manage­
ment also articulates similar public values prin­
ciples,  a  notable  observation  given  that  over 
half the Colorado River basin is federal public 
lands – a figure that jumps to almost three­quar­
ters if tribal lands are included.
Still notably absent from this body of federal 
environmental legislation are rules requiring, as 
a matter of course, the reservation of water 
instream  for  environmental  flows.  Unless 
necessary in a given river stretch to protect an 
endangered species or to sustain the purposes 
of  a  federally  reserved  area  (e.g.  a  waterfall 
associated with a national park), federal laws 
generally defer to the tradition in state water 
law of allowing water users to consume rivers 
in their entirety. Western states now provide 
some mechanisms for devoting water rights to 
instream flows, but these tend to be very limited 
in scope, often relying on water rights that are 
junior to traditional consumptive users (Gillilan 
and Brown, 1997). To the extent that rivers in 
arid regions of the American West retain some 
perennial flows, the cause is often the presence 
of  senior  water  rights­holders  downstream, 
which precludes some upstream (junior) diver­
sions, or, on a larger scale, the existence of 
interstate  compacts  that  require  the  mainte­
nance  of  specified  flow  levels  downstream. 
Since most demands on the Colorado River 
are in the lower reaches of the river, both legal 
requirements  and  economic  patterns  ensure 
that  water  flows  remain  relatively  high 
(com  pared with unaltered flows) until reaching 
major diversion structures, mostly in California 
and Arizona. What is not maintained, however, 
are  the  peak  flows  needed  to  sustain  the 
geomorphology  and  habitat  characteristics 
required by native species. Major environmen­
tal restoration programmes in the upper basin, 
in the Grand Canyon reach (of the lower basin), 
and proposed efforts in the delta, for example, 
are all based around the desire to restore peri­
odic peak flows, a goal that often runs counter 
to the purpose of constructing and operating 
water­storage reservoirs (Adler, 2007). To the 
extent that progress is made on these environ­
mental  issues,  it  usually  takes  the  form  of   
reservoir operational changes, including well­
publicized  (but  very  isolated  and  temporary) 
flood releases from the Glen Canyon dam. The 
actual removal of dams has been discussed, but 
is  not  an  idea  that  has  taken  root  in  the 
Colorado basin.
In addition to substantive changes in water 
management, federal environmental laws also 
reshape the governance landscape. A strong 
theme running through most modern environ­
mental legislation is a distrust of federal natural 
resource agencies, especially those accustomed 
to producing natural resource commodities. As 
a  result,  agency  decision­making  processes 
were reformed to be more specified and trans­
parent  than  ever,  with  public  participation, 
benefit–cost studies and environmental assess­
ments as required elements, and with abundant 
opportunities for judicial review of decisions. 
Additionally, many natural resources agencies 
at  all  levels  of  government  have  found  it 
increasingly worthwhile to work collaboratively 
with groups of public and private stakeholders 
on  a  variety  of  natural  resource  issues.  The 
so­called ‘watershed initiatives’ are one expres­
sion of this phenomenon, mostly of the 1990s 
(Kenney et al., 2000). These groups have been 
much more active in the small watersheds of 
the  Pacific  Northwest  than  those  of  the 
Colorado basin, and have found much more 
success dealing with water­quality issues than 
the water­supply disputes that characterize the 
more arid regions of the West, including the 
Colorado  River  basin,  where  the  seniority 
concept is often viewed as an impediment to 
collaborative problem solving. None the less, 
they  are  one  additional  element  of  the 
Colorado’s  evolving  institutional  framework, 
encouraging a greater consideration of envi­
ronmental and other public values as part of 
water management. 
These  changes  in  law  and  governance, 
combined with the demographic transforma­
tion of the region associated with its sudden 
urbanization, have presented a particular chal­
lenge for the region’s primary dam builder and 
traditional  enabler  of  the  private  commodity 
paradigm:  the  Bureau  of  Reclamation.  A 
re  organization and temporary name change to 
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(1979–1982)  was  one  attempt  to  publicly 
embrace an evolving focus from water devel­
opment to management. Similarly, the agen­
cy’s  need  to  rethink  its  constituency  was 
perhaps firstly and most clearly articulated in 
its Assessment ’87 report, in which it noted:
As irrigated agriculture becomes a smaller part 
of its mission, the Bureau needs to identify all of 
its constituencies. At the same time, however, it 
must assure agricultural interests that they are 
not being abandoned where there is a legitimate 
need for a continuing Federal presence. By 
working with new constituencies in potential 
partner arrangements, the Bureau can make an 
easier transition to an effective resource 
management organization.
 (USBR, 1987)
Although still an agency dominated by water 
resource  engineering,  by  most  measures  the 
Bureau of Reclamation has been successful in 
evolving its mandate to include substantial foci 
on  water­system  efficiency,  environmental 
mitigation, conflict resolution and urban water 
issues. A similar evolution has taken place in 
the other branches of the federal government. 
In Congress, key natural resource committees, 
once routinely dominated by powerful western 
defenders  of  reclamation  programmes,  now 
often  feature  members  sceptical  of  (if  not 
openly hostile to) environmentally and econom­
ically  unsound  reclamation  programmes  that 
are  blatantly  contradictory  to  the  values 
expressed by their increasingly urban constitu­
encies. Also, since the federal environmental 
movement,  support  for  additional  subsidized 
western irrigation projects has been spotty at 
best among most presidential administrations, 
first,  and  perhaps  most  famously,  demon­
strated by President Carter’s ‘hit list’ of recla­
mation  projects  unveiled  in  the  late  1970s, 
followed  soon  after  by  President  Reagan’s 
much less­publicized, but ultimately more effec­
tive, efforts to discourage questionable projects 
by the use of less­generous federal cost­sharing 
requirements (Reisner, 1986). To be politically 
viable,  modern  federal  reclamation  projects 
typically  need  to  be  small,  feature  extensive 
environmental mitigation elements, and be tied 
to Indian water rights settlements, such as the 
Animas–La Plata Project, nearing completion 
in  south­western  Colorado  (Pollack  and 
McElroy, 2001).
States, markets and the evolving role of 
agriculture
Although  the  Colorado  River  states  have 
enacted several state laws consistent with the 
public values paradigm, the level of activity has 
generally  trailed  that  of  the  federal  govern­
ment, perhaps in part due to the very fact that 
federal  programmes  now  effectively  cover 
issues of pollution and species protection, and 
also due to the observation that the state’s role 
in water issues has generally been limited to 
administering prior appropriation rights, estab­
lished,  in  most  cases,  decades  before  the 
modern  environmental  movement.  Layering 
public interest protections and new efficiency 
standards on top of already established rights is 
a difficult task, which most states have been 
reluctant to tackle; rather, the more common 
focus is on establishing modest instream flow 
programmes (within the framework of priority 
rights) and adding terms to newly established 
or modified rights (Kenney, 2001). Of particu­
lar  concern  are  rights  transferred  from  one 
user to another – often in the modern era from 
agricultural  to  urban  users.  Outside  some 
so­called  ‘water  banking’  activities,  the  legal 
transfer  of  water  rights  between  Colorado 
River states is nearly non­existent and remains 
a highly delicate topic, but market­based water 
transfers within states are commonplace, and 
are the primary tool used to adapt the alloca­
tion of water in this region transitioning from 
rural to urban.16
The growing frequency of water transfers in 
the western states says a lot about the past, 
present  and  future  of  irrigated  agriculture, 
although  the  message  is  far  from  clear 
(MacDonnell, 1999). Despite the emergence 
of several large cities highly dependent upon 
Colorado  River  flows  (e.g.  Las  Vegas,  Los 
Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix, Tucson, Denver, 
Albuquerque, Salt Lake City), the greater part 
– probably more than two­thirds – of Colorado 
River flows are still used in agriculture.17 The 
most productive areas are in southern California 
and western Arizona, which produce roughly 
80%  of  the  winter  vegetables  of  the  USA 
(Project Wet, 2005). In the upper basin, much 
of the agricultural activity is focused on produc­
ing cattle feed; it has been argued that cattle 
are the single largest consumer of Colorado 138  D. Kenney
River water (Fradkin, 1981). Thus, while the 
political  might  and  economic  importance  of 
the  agricultural  sector  have  declined  signifi­
cantly, agriculture is still an important player in 
Colorado River water issues. Increasingly, agri­
culture plays two, largely contradictory, roles 
in western water issues: first, as a ‘water source’ 
for cities wishing to purchase rights to sustain 
ongoing population growth; and second, as a 
cultural and aesthetic amenity that urban dwell­
ers often wish to sustain. Similarly, the view­
point  of  irrigators  towards  water  markets 
features  two  seemingly  incongruent  threads: 
first, that water markets provide an essential 
revenue stream for financially strapped or retir­
ing  farmers;  and  second,  that  the  collective 
impact of markets can be a detrimental force 
undermining the viability of rural communities 
(Howe et al., 1990). Not surprisingly, western 
state  legislators  are  frequently  caught  in  a 
dilemma of trying to streamline water transfers 
(to increase the efficiency and utility of trans­
fers) while trying to ensure that transfers offer 
protection to third parties and public interests, 
typically defined to include rural communities 
dependent  on  farming  economies  and,  less 
frequently,  on  environmental  resources 
(National Research Council, 1992).
Living with Limits: a New Era for the 
Colorado?
The challenge
For  several  decades,  water  demands  on  the 
Colorado River have roughly matched the full 
available yield of the river, with most consump­
tion happening in the last third of the basin. 
According  to  records  provided  by  the  US 
Bureau of Reclamation, from 1996 to 2000 
(prior  to  the  current  drought),  annual  water 
consumption  (depletion)  averaged  approxi­
mately 15.5 MAF: 8.0 in the lower basin, 3.7 
MAF in the upper basin, 1.8 MAF in Mexico, 
and 2 MAF lost through reservoir evaporation 
(USBR, 2004).18 Table 6.1 provides additional 
statistics on patterns of water consumption at 
5­year  intervals  (not  averages).  Particularly 
noteworthy in Table 6.1 is the rise in demand 
throughout  the  1980s  and  1990s  and, 
conversely, the sharp decline (evident by 2005) 
after  the  onset  of  aggressive  drought­coping 
measures. Figures provided for Mexico are for 
deliveries, not consumption, although in most 
years the two values are comparable, given the 
tradition of full use in the basin.
Notwithstanding  the  important  long­term 
challenges of finding water for environmental 
restoration and for some Indian communities 
with unresolved water rights claims, in most 
other respects, this tradition of full use is not 
inherently problematic, as long as the least reli­
able component of water yield is only used as a 
supplemental  supply  (ideally  for  low­valued 
uses) and not as the baseline supply supporting 
urban  growth.  Unfortunately,  this  is  not  the 
situation in many pockets of the basin, as rural 
uses  generally  precede  urban  uses  (and  thus 
rank higher within states’ prior­appropriation 
systems). This is an unusual situation, but it is 
one  that  can  be  remedied.  As  noted  above, 
state water laws provide an important mecha­
nism to reallocate water (and the risk of short­
ages) through voluntary agricultural to urban 
water  transfers,  ranging  in  form  from  the 
dozens  of  small  transactions  occurring  each 
year  along  Colorado’s  Front  Range  to  the 
massive deals in southern California that have 
weaned urban areas off surplus flows (i.e. flows 
in excess of the state’s apportionment) through 
complex  conservation  and  transfer  arrange­
ments with major irrigation districts. But, ulti­
mately,  the  efficacy  of  this  strategy  for 
managing water supply risk in particular locales 
in  the  Colorado  River  basin  is  shaped  and 
limited by the larger interstate rules of water 
allocation codified in the Law of the River and, 
perhaps more importantly, by the realization 
that the overarching challenge in the basin is to 
acknowledge and live within the limits of the 
river. This challenge has a particularly complex 
flavour in the Colorado River basin due to the 
river’s overallocation.
In theory, the Law of the River provides the 
framework within which water budgets can be 
established and shortages allocated, if neces­
sary, between the Colorado River states and 
Mexico. However, as noted earlier, the appor­
tionment  found  in  the  Law  of  the  River  is 
flawed in many ways, as it annually allocates 
16.5 MAF (7.5 MAF for each basin and 1.5 
for Mexico) from a river that yields, at best, 15 
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allocated has been widely understood for many 
decades but has become more difficult to ignore 
as urban growth results in larger (and firmer) 
water demands and as drought conditions have 
gripped the basin. Several trends suggest this 
situation  could  worsen;  population  growth, 
climatic  change  and  energy  development  all 
suggest  further  stress  on  water  resources. 
Faced  with  these  pressures,  states  such  as 
Colorado and Arizona, which historically have 
not used their full apportionments, continue to 
pursue additional development and consump­
tion of the river. To not do so would ease stress 
on  the  river  but  only  by  imposing  burdens 
(limits) on their own residents for a situation 
that others have primarily created and benefit 
from, and from which the Law of the River is 
supposed  to  provide  protection.  Somewhat 
ironically, this expansion of use has become 
more  realistic  as  problems  of  overuse  have 
forced California to scale back its use to its 
legal apportionment (from 5.2 to 4.4 MAF/
year).19 But the calculus remains unchanged: if 
all states pursue plans that target consumption 
at the level of their legal apportionments, and 
if those apportionments are collectively more 
than the river provides, then the situation is 
inherently unsustainable. This reality is particu­
larly troublesome in an era of climatic change; 
even a modest 10% reduction in flows would 
provide a tremendous challenge to the regional 
water budget.
Solutions?
The  twin  forces  of  drought  and  growing 
demands,  and  the  net  impact  of  declining 
reservoir storage (see Fig. 6.5), prompted the 
federal government in 2005 to warn the states 
that they needed to develop a plan for sharing 
shortages or the federal government would do 
so  independently.  Ironically,  despite  all  the 
nuanced  language  in  the  Law  of  the  River, 
there had always been much ambiguity in how 
shortages in the lower basin should be handled. 
While  the  Upper  Basin  Compact  provides 
some  rules  and  establishes  a  commission  to 
calculate and enforce shortages in that part of 
the  basin,  the  legislation  apportioning  lower 
basin  shares  does  not  explicitly  address  the 
allocation of potential shortages and does not 
establish a commission to address the issue. 
The Supreme Court in the Arizona v. California 
(1963) litigation appointed the Secretary of the 
US Department of Interior to make these deci­
sions  when  necessary,  and,  in  2005,  the 
Secretary made it clear that her preference was 
to  ratify  a  scheme  developed  by  the  states 
rather than to impose her own solution.20 For 
the states, this was a formidable political chal­
lenge, as no state official wanted to agree to a 
reduction  of  its  apportionment  or  to  any 
change  in  the  management  of  reservoirs  or 
water accounting that modified the reliability of 
that  apportionment.  Political  careers  in  the 
Fig. 6.5. Storage in Lakes Powell and Mead, 1985–2007.140  D. Kenney
American West have been historically built on 
the  ability  of  leaders  to  obtain  more  water 
(Reisner,  1986;  Ingram,  1990).  Voluntarily 
agreeing to take less could be viewed publicly 
as failure and even as immoral, as the ‘rights­
based’ tradition of water law in the West makes 
it very difficult to consider compromise or shar­
ing (Wolf, 2005). The situation was, at best, a 
zero­sum game and explained why resolving 
the problem had been deferred for decades.
Through  an  elaborate  planning  and  deci­
sion­making process centred around a docu­
ment  known  as  the  Environmental  Impact 
Statement (EIS), the states and federal govern­
ment in 2007 concluded a contentious negoti­
ation modifying reservoir operations (for Lakes 
Powell and Mead) and specifying rules for shar­
ing shortages in the lower basin (USBR, 2007). 
The  new  rules  call  for  water  storage  to  be 
balanced more equally between the two main 
reservoirs, and prescribe a schedule of lower 
basin curtailments should storage in Lake Mead 
fall  below  specific  elevations.  Following  the 
political  compromise  made  back  in  1968, 
which  subordinated  the  water  right  of  the 
Central Arizona Project to other lower basin 
users, it is the CAP that will bear the brunt of 
shortages.  As  before,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Interior  is  empowered  to  administer  the 
programme and retains sole decision­making 
authority should water levels drop below the 
levels described in the shortage­sharing sched­
ule.  Although  many  issues  about  apportion­
ment and shortage sharing remain, these new 
rules address the most pressing omissions in 
the legal framework.
The reservoir operations and shortage­shar­
ing rules were the most debated elements in 
the EIS process; however, the new rules also 
address mechanisms (and incentives) for supply 
augmentation and conservation (USBR, 2007). 
These elements may be the linchpins to future 
progress,  as  including  these  elements  allows 
the states to maintain the goal of additional 
development and use of the river, and trans­
form the politics back to a positive­sum situa­
tion.  In  the  past,  the  key  to  positive­sum 
bargaining  in  the  basin  was  to  expand  the 
available benefits (i.e. water and power) through 
new storage and conveyance facilities, and by 
excluding public value proponents from deci­
sion  making.  Today,  the  situation  is  more 
complex, as far fewer opportunities exist for 
increasing yield through new storage, and envi­
ronmental interests are an entrenched stake­
holder,  empowered  by  both  law  and  public 
sentiment. The result has been the emergence 
of  an  unusually  rich  suite  of  strategies  for 
increasing  yields  and  avoiding  (overcoming) 
limits, highlighted by efforts to eliminate reser­
voir  spills  (and  associated  overdeliveries  to 
Mexico), marketing of water salvaged through 
conservation programmes, the eradication of 
water­loving tamarisk and Russian olive trees, 
weather modification (i.e. cloud seeding), desal­
ination,  the  proposed  importation  of  water 
from  neighbouring  basins,  and  compensated 
fallowing of agricultural land.21
Each of the augmentation and conservation 
strategies  raises  a  host  of  difficult  legal  and 
political issues; by comparison, the engineer­
ing and economic challenges are almost incon­
sequential.  One  emerging  issue  is  best 
expressed  as  the  ’efficiency  paradox’,  which 
refers  to  the  observation  that  ‘inefficiencies’ 
associated  with  leaky  canals,  reservoir  spills, 
inefficient irrigation practices and other system 
losses are often the primary source of water for 
valued  environmental  resources,  such  as  the 
Colorado River delta, the Salton Sea (in south­
ern California) and many other sites of high 
ecological  importance.  If  these  interests  are 
considered – i.e. if the paradigm of decision 
making is broadened to include environmental 
values  –  then  these  efforts  are  not  truly  an 
augmentation strategy offering mutual benefits 
but are merely a zero­sum reallocation from 
public environmental interests to water users. 
Thus, while not as obvious as a debate over a 
new dam, this movement toward ‘conservation 
and augmentation’ strategies on the Colorado 
River  is  none  the  less  another  paradigmatic 
conflict and brings into question whether the 
full meaning of limits, restraint and sustainabil­
ity will ever take hold in this basin.
As seen in intrastate water politics, the role 
of agriculture is also a prominent consideration 
in  the  future  of  regional  (interstate)  water 
management. For example, California’s recent 
efforts to scale back its overall consumption to 
its  legal  apportionment  has  primarily  been 
achieved through the reallocation of water from 
agricultural  to  urban  users,  with  damages  to 
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(these are voluntary transactions) and by effi­
ciency  programmes  that  allow  most  farming 
operations to continue with less consumption 
(but with less recharge of the Mexicali aquifer 
used  in  Mexico  and  less  runoff  for  regional 
sinks, such as the Salton Sea, which is a critical 
habitat  for  migratory  waterfowl).  Agricultural 
interests in California and the other lower basin 
states are also implicated by the emerging ICS 
(Intentionally  Created  Surplus)  programme, 
which allows water saved through ‘extraordi­
nary’  conservation,  efficiency  projects,  land 
fallowing and river augmentation to be trans­
ferred  to  other,  mostly  urban,  users  (USBR, 
2007).  Notwithstanding  the  environmental 
issues  associated  with  the  efficiency  paradox 
and the hesitancy of regional leaders to embrace 
concepts of limits and sustainability, these ICS 
efforts offer many benefits to cities struggling to 
serve growing populations and farmers looking 
to stabilize (or even augment) revenues while 
responding to concerns about the high level of 
water use in agriculture.
Concluding Thoughts
The Colorado River of the south­western USA 
remains  one  of  the  world’s  most  intriguing 
natural  resources,  valued  as  a  critical  water 
supply in an arid and suddenly populous region, 
and a source of natural beauty and grandeur 
few other rivers can match. It is also one of the 
world’s most overstressed rivers, burdened by 
high expectations and by an institutional frame­
work lacking in vision, coherence and sound 
assumptions about what is, and what should 
be,  available  to  the  community  of  farmers, 
cities and other water interests. Once immersed 
in these institutional issues, it is difficult to be 
optimistic about the river’s future, particularly 
as  growth  and  climatic  change  further  chal­
lenge  traditional  management  solutions,  and 
regional (basin­wide) forums of planning and 
action are largely non­existent. Many organiza­
tions  –  including  the  Upper  Colorado  River 
Commission – exist with an interest in particu­
lar Colorado River issues and subregions, but 
there  remains  no  river  basin  organization 
within which to study, consider and facilitate 
fundamental change in the basin. This institu­
tional  deficiency  has  been  noted  by  several 
authors, who argue that the establishment of a 
basin­wide  commission  would  be  a  valuable 
first step in framing, debating and ultimately 
addressing  the  issues  in  the  Colorado  basin 
that transcend the interests and authorities of 
any  given  state  or  interest  group  (e.g.  see 
Kenney, 1995; Morrison et al., 1996; Getches, 
1997). The basin states have not been recep­
tive to these proposals, in part due to concerns 
about  establishing  mechanisms  that  may 
increase the influence of Indians, Mexico, the 
federal government or environmental interests 
in basin politics.
Ultimately, a new way of doing business will 
need to emerge in the basin – either incremen­
tally or in a dramatic rush, perhaps triggered 
by empty reservoirs – and regardless of what 
that ‘new way’ looks like, it seems certain that 
few interests will be transformed as fundamen­
tally as the agriculture sector. Even today, in a 
service area of over 30 million residents and a 
period of water stress, agriculture still consumes 
the greater part of the Colorado River water, 
often for uses that, in economic terms, are of 
low value. Ironically, this is perhaps the best 
long­term hope for this basin, as this provides 
an opportunity for market­based water reallo­
cations, which could sustain cities and the most 
profitable farms for several decades. Agricultural 
to urban water reallocations are already seen 
throughout  the  basin,  especially  in  southern 
California, and are finally emerging at a larger 
regional  scale  in  the  lower  basin,  through 
water­banking  schemes  and,  potentially,  the 
emerging ICS programme.
Water marketing, however, while probably 
more  ecologically  benign  than  the  efficiency 
projects,  comes  with  several  hidden  costs. 
Disentangle  markets  from  legal  constraints, 
and economic subsidies and the cities, indus­
trial users and some instream uses (particularly 
hydropower) would find ample supplies; some 
farmers would enjoy needed revenue; and the 
highest­valued agriculture, particularly for fruits 
and vegetables, would continue uninterrupted 
for decades as lower­value feed crops were first 
phased out. Probably fairing less well would be 
non­market  and  public  values  (e.g.  environ­
mental  resources)  and  rural  communities 
dependent  on  lost  farming  economies. 
Additionally, the promise of the Colorado River 
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certain amount of water should be reserved for 
each  region  of  the  basin,  in  perpetuity,  to 
support local lives and lifestyles, regardless of 
whether  they  were  economically  competitive 
with  those  in  other  regions.  If  not  for  this 
arrangement, farmers in Wyoming, for exam­
ple, would never be competitive for water with 
casinos in Las Vegas. Perhaps that is fine; at 
the least, it is explicit in identifying that trade­
offs need to be made if the region is ever to live 
within its means. That, after all, seems to be 
the  biggest  omission  in  the  current  arrange­
ments, and in the current discussions on how 
to move forward. What should Colorado River 
allocation,  management  and  use  look  like, 
given inherent limits in water supply and the 
imperative  to  consider  traditionally  excluded 
parties  –  the  environment,  tribes,  Mexico  – 
better in decisions? If history is a guide, then 
this is a question that is likely to exceed the 
capabilities  of  existing  institutional  decision­
making  forums,  political  leaders  and  para­
digms. There is work to be done.
Notes
1  These statistics are compiled from data recorded 
by the US Bureau of Reclamation: http://www.
usbr.gov/uc/water/crsp/cs/gcd.html.
2  Population  statistics  are  compiled  by  the  US 
Census Bureau and distributed online at www.
census.gov.
3  These figures come from recent studies using the 
general  circulation  models  (GCMs)  associated 
with  the  fourth  Intergovernmental  Panel  on 
Climate Change (IPCC) assessment. A summary 
of these and other relevant studies is provided in 
Appendix U of USBR, (2007).
4  Lower  basin  tributaries  are  much  smaller, 
perhaps  2–3  MAF  (million  acre-feet)  but  are, 
more importantly, legally considered as outside 
the apportionment and management scheme of 
the Colorado River.
5  Estimating  long-term  natural  (i.e.  unaltered) 
streamflows at Lee Ferry is an inexact science, 
coloured  by  technical  and  political  complica-
tions. Generally, these efforts fall into two general 
categories: those based on actual stream gauges 
(usually beginning in 1906) and those based on 
tree-ring reconstructions (which can go back as 
far  as  the  year  762)  (see  www.colorado.edu/
resources/paleo/lees/). Estimates based on actual 
stream gauges are primarily offered by the Upper 
Colorado  River  Commission  and  by  the  US 
Bureau of Reclamation, and usually fall in the 
range of 15.1–15.3 MAF/year (e.g. see UCRC, 
2004; USBR, 2006). Slight differences generally 
reflect how many of the recent drought years are 
included in the analysis. Those based on tree-
ring reconstructions suggest a lower long-term 
average.  For  example,  the  landmark  study  by 
Stockton and Jacoby (1976) suggested an aver-
age as low as 13.4 MAF/year. More recent recon-
structions from 1490 to 1997 by Woodhouse et 
al. (2006) and from 762 to 2005 by Meko et al. 
(2007) suggest an annual value of 14.7 MAF.
6  Water volume in the western USA is measured 
in acre-feet. One million acre-feet (MAF) = 1.233 
billion m3. Throughout the rest of this chapter, 
the  MAF  unit  is  used  exclusively,  despite  its 
unfamiliarity  outside  the  western  USA,  as  the 
flow and apportionment numbers expressed in 
MAF units have great familiarity and significance 
in the region, and are of a convenient scale. 
7  Of  particular  concern  are  efforts  to  line  the 
All-American canal to reduce cross-border seep-
age and to construct a Drop 2 reservoir to catch 
main-stem overdeliveries to Mexico (with most 
of the ‘conserved’ water going to San Diego and 
Las Vegas). On the Colorado, seepage, reservoir 
spills  and  other  ‘inefficiencies’  are  often  an 
important  source  of  water  for  environmental 
resources.  In  most  cases,  water  managers  are 
under no obligation to continue these flows, and 
face powerful incentives to capture this water to 
serve growing human demands.
8  In order to take full effect, a compact must be 
signed by the negotiators, ratified by the legisla-
tures of each of the participating states, and then 
be  ratified  by  the  federal  government.  The 
Colorado River compact was signed by the states 
in 1922, but was not officially ratified until it 
was accepted (ratified) by Congress in the 1928 
legislation. The process was highly unusual in 
that  Congressional  ratification  occurred  before 
Arizona ratified the agreement, which did not 
occur until 1944. The delay, in large part, could 
be  traced  to  a  long-standing  dispute  between 
Arizona and California, which was not resolved 
until the conclusion of the Arizona v. California 
litigation many years later.
9  As noted later, rules for allocating shortages were 
not established until 2007.
10  The 6 MAF value is produced by subtracting 7.5 
MAF (the lower basin apportionment) and 1.5 
MAF (the Mexican apportionment) from a likely 
average yield of 15 MAF. It is only if the river’s 
yield  is  16.5  MAF  or  higher,  as  originally 
believed, that the upper basin receives the full 
apportionment of 7.5 MAF. The most controver-
sial part of this analysis is the treatment of the   The Colorado River: Prospects  143
Mexican apportionment, which is to be reduced 
in some proportional (but otherwise unspecified) 
way to uses by the USA in a drought crisis. Since 
the  Mexican  obligation  is  a  relatively  small 
amount  of  water,  any  interpretation  does  not 
invalidate the observation that the upper basin is 
the primary entity harmed by the overallocation 
of flows.
11  Many of the key elements of tribal water rights in 
the  Colorado  River  basin  were  established  as 
part of the Arizona v. California (1963) litigation, 
which established the ‘practicably irrigable acre-
age’ standard for measuring rights, reiterated the 
great  seniority  of  these  rights  and  quantified 
rights  for  five  lower  main-stem  tribes  at  over 
900,000 acre-feet. Since tribal water rights are 
subtracted from the apportionments of the states 
in which they are located, there is a zero-sum 
competition  for  Colorado  River  flows  among 
Indians and non-Indians within each basin state.
12  CAP allocations are listed at http://www.cap-az.
com/docs/SubcontractStatusReport_03_13_08.
pdf.
13  As  the  name  implies,  the  Colorado–Big 
Thompson  Project  diverts  water  from  the 
Colorado River main stem in western Colorado 
to the Big Thompson River in eastern Colorado, 
using the Adams tunnel to avoid the necessity of 
pumping water over the continental divide. The 
exceedingly  complex  project,  completed  in 
1956, exports roughly 260,000 acre-feet/year to 
a  mix  of  agricultural  and  municipal  interests 
along Colorado’s Front Range (Tyler, 1992).
14  Overall, the General Accounting Office (GAO, 
1981,  1996)  and  Water  Resources  Council 
(1975) estimate federal irrigation project subsi-
dies in the range of 82–98%.
15  This type of political behaviour is often called 
logrolling,  and  occurs  when  legislators  from 
various  jurisdictions  all  agree  to  support  each 
other’s proposed projects in their home districts. 
In this way, a project with only local appeal can 
gain the support of a broad base of legislators.
16  It  is  worth  noting  that  Nevada  has  been  the 
primary entity promoting interstate water trans-
fer mechanisms, such as the water banks and the 
intentionally  created  surplus  (ICS)  programme 
(discussed later), as it is the only basin state that 
already uses its full apportionment exclusively 
for municipal uses (e.g. Las Vegas), and is thus 
very limited in its ability to support urban growth 
based on water transfers from agriculture.
17  Compiling water and water-use statistics in the 
Colorado River basin is notoriously difficult for 
many  reasons,  including  the  separation  of 
administrative responsibilities between the upper 
and  lower  basins,  and  the  differing  traditions 
regarding the inclusion (or exclusion) of tributar-
ies and the accounting of water (and water uses) 
once  exported  from  the  hydrologic  basin. 
Additionally, patterns of water use can change 
significantly  year  to  year;  figures  are  updated 
frequently, and there is rarely agreement on any 
single  set  of  statistics  as  being  ‘official’  or 
formally accepted. With these caveats, the best 
available data come from the Consumptive Uses 
and  Losses  Reports  issued  by  the  Bureau  of 
Reclamation  (see  www.usbr.gov/uc/library/
envdocs/reports/crs/crsul.html).  Unfortunately, 
these  reports  are  not  very  useful  for  tracking 
main-stem use of Colorado River water in lower 
basin  agriculture,  which  is  shifting  rapidly  – 
particularly in southern California. Statistics for 
the upper basin suggests that agricultural land 
area and water consumption have both increased 
by  about  10%,  from  the  1981–1985  to  the 
1996–2000 period, comprising in both periods 
about  68%  of  all  upper  basin  consumption. 
These values have probably dropped in recent 
years due to drought conditions.
18  During the current drought, this total level of use 
has been reduced by efforts in California to scale 
back overuse (to its legal apportionment), by a 
reduction in the amount of spills and overdeliv-
eries to Mexico, and through reduced evapora-
tion from reservoirs that are currently at unusually 
low  levels.  Collectively,  these  efforts  have 
re-balanced  the  system-wide  water  budget  at 
least  temporarily,  assuming  average  yields  –  a 
condition  that  has  existed  in  only  one  year 
between 2000 and 2007.
19  The so-called ‘4.4 Plan’ is implemented as part 
of  the  Quantification  Settlement  Agreement 
(QSA) and is described in The Colorado River 
Water  Delivery  Agreement  (text  available  at 
www.saltonsea.water.ca.gov/docs/crqsa/crwda.
pdf).
20  As  part  of  the  litigation,  a  Special  Master 
employed  by  the  court  suggested  that  lower 
basin shortages be apportioned in ratios match-
ing the apportionment; thus, California’s share of 
reductions would be 4.4/7.5, Arizona’s 2.8/7.5 
and  Nevada’s  0.3/7.5. The  court  rejected  this 
approach as being overly rigid.
21  An  inventory  of  augmentation  options  was 
recently compiled in research commissioned by 
the  Southern  Nevada  Water  Authority  and  is 
summarized  at:  www.snwa.com/assets/pdf/
augmentation_summary.pdf.144  D. Kenney
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Introduction
Owing to its geographical location, Tunisia is 
under the influence of a Mediterranean climate 
in its northern part and a Saharan climate in 
the southern part. This climatic discontinuity 
results in a strong variability in water availabil-
ity and defines three agro-climatic zones: (i) the 
northern area, with its forestry and agricultural 
vocation,  which  includes  the  Medjerda  (the 
only permanent river) and provides 82% of the 
country’s  surface  water;  (ii)  the  semi-arid 
centre,  initially  a  wide  rangeland  with  large 
plantations,  characterized  by  violent  and 
sporadic  runoff;  and  (iii)  the  southern  area 
(62% of the country), where settlements are 
concentrated  around  water  sources  (springs, 
oases)  and  where  people  live  on  extensive 
pastoralism. Tunisia has many aquifers, storing 
720 Mm3 each year in the northern and central 
areas and 1250 Mm3 in the south of the coun-
try (DGRE, 1995).
In spite of this contrasting geo-climatic situa-
tion, Tunisia has always found ways to make the 
best out of limited resources, in particular during 
Carthaginian, Roman and Arabic times, when 
the country was known for its urban develop-
ment  and  flourishing  agricultural  production. 
Transfers of water have been implemented since 
antiquity and water shortages are an old chal-
lenge, which Tunisia has managed through its 
extensive traditional know-how (Treyer, 2002). 
With a population of approximately 10 million 
and  the  availability  of  water  resources  below 
500 m3/capita/year, Tunisia has been able to 
meet the needs of its various economic sectors, 
even during severe droughts: coverage of drink-
ing water supply reaches 100% in cities and 
more than 80% in rural areas, without ration-
ing, even in periods of shortage.
This  has  been  achieved  through  policies 
defined  in  the  1970s,  when  the  Tunisian 
government built works to develop and regu-
late water resources, transferring water from 
the hinterland to the coastal areas, out of a 
concern for equity and economic development. 
This  strategy  equipped  the  country  with  an 
extensive water infrastructure, comprising 29 
large  dams,  200  tanks,  766  lake-reservoirs, 
more than 3000 boreholes and 151,000 wells. 
This  ensured  the  satisfaction  of  agricultural 
needs (80% of the overall consumption) and 
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allowed  the  development  of  mass  tourism 
along the coast, an activity characterized by a 
seasonal demand for good-quality water.
The  central  area  has  not  been  directly 
impacted by the growth of tourism but it has 
undergone  changes  through  its  relationship 
with  the  coastal  area  (called  the  ‘Sahel’)  in 
terms of labour migration, water transfers and 
emergence  of  new  markets  for  agricultural 
produce. Kairouan, the main town in this area, 
is located above an aquifer which collects the 
water of three river basins (Zeroud, Merguellil, 
Nebhana) draining the Tunisian central high-
lands. These basins were first closed by dams 
(constructed between 1965 and 1989) designed 
to protect Kairouan from exceptional floods. 
The Merguellil basin was also the target of vari-
ous soil and water conservation works from the 
1960s onwards, which formed a part of succes-
sive  regional  development  plans  and  water 
resources  management  policies.  However, 
water users and other stakeholders played a 
very small part in these strategies – which were 
planned  and  implemented  by  the  central 
administration  –  and  these  are  nowadays 
increasingly questioned and challenged.
The Merguellil basin provides an ideal case 
study to analyse the effect of the progressive 
establishment of water infrastructure, its use by 
various segments of the population and their 
impact on the spatial and social distribution of 
water resources. In spite of costly investments, 
the water tables of the aquifers of the upper 
basin and of the Kairouan plain are dropping 
at an increasing rate. The Merguellil basin also 
provides the opportunity to examine the modes 
of governance, as well as the economic and 
regulatory  tools  which  might  assist  in  the 
control of access to water resources. 
Characteristics of the Merguellil Basin
Environmental context
Located  in  semi-arid  central  Tunisia,  the 
Merguellil basin is one of the three main river 
basins  of  the  southern  side  of  the  Tunisian 
ridge,  flowing  into  the  Kairouan  plain.  The 
upper part of the Merguellil basin, upstream of 
the El Haouareb dam, has a surface area of 
1180 km² and is delimited by a succession of 
djebels (mountainous ridges). The El Haouareb 
dam itself is anchored in two lateral djebels 
(Aïn El Rhorab and El Haouareb). The lower 
Merguellil basin, limited to the north by Djebel 
Cherichira and to the south by Draa Affane, is 
part of the large Kairouan plain, which covers 
3000 km2 (Fig. 7.1).
The  altitude  in  the  upper  basin  varies 
between 200 and 1200 m, with 33% of the 
area between 200 and 400 m, 36% between 
400 and 600 m, 20% between 600 and 800 
m and 11% higher than 800 m. In the lower 
basin, the altitude of the plain decreases stead-
ily from 200 to 80 m in Kairouan. The moun-
tain ranges in the upstream basin consist of 
sedimentary  deposits,  with  a  large  predomi-
nance of limestone (sometimes dolomite). They 
may be covered by other deposits (sand, sand-
stone, sandy clay) from the Miocene epoch, 
especially in the El Ala area.
Soil texture varies from clay to sand. In the 
upper basin, the main soil types include shal-
low soils over a calcareous crust and deep soils 
over sandstone. The highest parts of the basin 
have  forests  and  scrubs  (Kesra  forest). 
Overgrazing  and  land  clearing  have  greatly 
damaged large areas, and natural vegetation 
has been replaced by species of lesser interest 
with regard to both economic use and protec-
tion against erosion.
Many forms of erosion can be observed in 
the Merguellil basin. Among them, erosion in 
gullies prevails, not only in sandy areas with 
poor vegetation but also in some clayey areas. 
Soil erosion is obviously higher in areas with 
steep slopes (sometimes over 12%). According 
to a recent study, arable lands threatened by 
soil erosion total 670 km2.
The  mean  temperature  is  19.2°C  in 
Kairouan (a minimum of 10.7°C in January 
and a maximum of 38.6°C in August). Winter 
is  cool  in  the  north-west  of  the  basin  and 
temperate  elsewhere.  In  the  upper  basin, 
temperatures  are  below  10°C  between 
December and February (e.g. 5.7°C in Makthar 
in  January)  and  around  25°C  in  July  and 
August. The relative humidity varies between 
70 and 55% in winter and between 40 and 
55% in summer. Between May and August, the 
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evapotranspiration (Penman) is close to 1600 
mm in Kairouan and decreases with altitude.
Rainfall
Rainfall  measurements  in  and  around  the 
Merguellil basin are very variable in terms of 
record  period,  completeness,  reliability  and 
representativeness.  The  first  measurements 
started before 1900 but these are very few. 
Information on rainfall became relatively abun-
dant only after 1970. The mean annual rainfall 
is about 300 mm in the plain and increases up 
to 510 mm in the upper part of the basin, with 
a gradient of about 20 mm per 100 m of alti-
tude. The two rainiest months are October and 
March. As is common in semi-arid areas, rain-
fall varies widely in time and space: since 1925, 
extreme  values  measured  in  Kairouan  were 
703  mm  in  1969/70  and  108  mm  in 
1950/51. Analysis of rainfall series shows a 
slight decrease in yearly values between 1976 
and 1989, but no trend that could be statisti-
cally considered as being beyond normal vari-
ability.
Surface runoff
The total length of Wadi Merguellil down to 
Kairouan is about 90 km. The Merguellil basin 
is endoreic (with no outlet to the sea) and its 
rivers have sporadic flows, which may be very 
violent. This ephemeral regime is a fundamen-
tal  characteristic  of  the  regional  hydrology: 
about 80% of the annual flow is produced in 
12  days.  Before  the  construction  of  the  El 
Haouareb  dam,  the  largest  floods  of  Wadi 
Merguellil  reached  the  El  Kelbia  sebkha,  a 
large salt lake located close to the sea, which 
often  dried  up.  The  smaller  floods  used  to 
vanish in the Kairouan plain by both evapora-
tion and infiltration to the aquifer.
Surface  runoff  is  observed  through  a 
network of five stations covering different sub-
basins. The El Haouareb reservoir represents a 
good  hydrological  ‘integrator’  of  the  whole 
Fig. 7.1.  Location of the study area, limits of the upper and lower sub-basins and of the different aquifers 
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upper basin, as witnessed by the dam water 
level (Fig. 7.2).
For  the  period  1989–2005,  the  mean 
annual flow of Wadi Merguellil, estimated at 
the El Haouareb dam, was 17 Mm3, with a 
minimum of 2.5 Mm3 in 2000–2001 and a 
maximum of 37.6 Mm3 in 2004–2005. These 
values can be compared with the exceptional 
flood of autumn 1969, estimated at about 175 
Mm3, with a peak flow of over 3000 m3/s, 
resulting in a severe inundation of the Kairouan 
plain,  with  high  human  and  material  losses 
(Bouzaïane and Lafforgue, 1986).
Outflow  from  the  El  Haouareb  reservoir 
consists of evaporation (25%), pumping and 
releases (12%), and uncontrolled infiltration to 
the karst aquifer (63%). Because of this excep-
tional karstic loss, dam releases are very limited 
and the dam has completely dried up several 
times. The dam has never spilt and the highest 
water level was reached in February 2006.
Groundwater
Three  small,  interconnected  aquifers  (Aïn 
Beidha, BouHafna, Haffouz–Cherichira) can be 
found in the lower part of the upper Merguellil 
basin (Fig. 7.1). Depending on place and time, 
they interact with the drainage network in both 
directions:  springs  supplying  rivers  or  floods 
recharging alluvium and linked aquifers.
The  Kairouan  plain  aquifer  represents  a 
much larger water storage because of its hori-
zontal extent and a thickness of up to 800 m of 
alluvium  and  colluvium  (Nazoumou,  2004). 
Water  table  levels  are  regularly  measured  in 
more than 100 piezometers (the oldest meas-
urements  date  back  40  years).  Some  level 
recorders  complement  these  monthly  meas-
urements, as well as physical and chemical field 
measurements and geochemical and isotopic 
analyses.  Changes  in  the  plain  water  table 
levels reflect the variability of recharge (e.g. a 
rise of up to 10 m after the 1969 exceptional 
flood) and the ever-increasing rate of pump-
ing.
Water resources and their changes with time 
The Merguellil basin has been under an ever-
growing  human  pressure  for  40  years.  This 
pressure has taken different forms:
•	 The	1969	catastrophic	flood	led	to	the	con	 	
struction of the Sidi Saad dam in the Zeroud 
valley in 1981 and of the El Haouareb dam 
in the Merguellil valley in 1989 (and to the 
north,  the  Nebhana  dam,  built  in  1965). 
This significantly increased evaporation and 
reduced infiltration in the Kairouan plain. 
Part  of  the  reservoirs’  water  is  pumped   
to supply public irrigation schemes down-
stream of the dam.
Fig. 7.2. Water level of the El Haouareb dam (because of siltation, the lowest levels, recorded in 1994, 
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•	 The	Kairouan	plain	aquifer	was	previously	
fed by the rapid infiltration of flood water, 
which was the major component of its water 
budget, and by lateral groundwater inflows 
from adjoining aquifers. Since 1989, the El 
Haouareb  dam  has  stopped  most  of  the 
Merguellil  flow  (dam  releases  have  repre-
sented only 6% of the dam water) and the 
plain aquifer is now recharged by the hori-
zontal transfer through a karstic system that 
mixes  water  from  the  Aïn  Beidha  aquifer 
and  from  the  dam  reservoir.  Isotopic 
ana  lyses (Ben Ammar et al., 2006) showed 
that releases from the dam (i.e. post-1989) 
have not flowed further than the first 7 km 
downstream of the dam. Present groundwa-
ter dynamics are largely driven by pumping 
for irrigation use (Fig. 7.3).
In the upper basin, the overexploitation of 
the BouHafna aquifer and the subsequent drop 
in  groundwater  levels  were  believed  to  be 
responsible for the declining base flow observed 
in Wadi Merguellil (Kingumbi, 2006). An alter-
native explanation links this decrease in river 
flow to the expansion of soil and water conser-
vation  (SWC)  works  in  the  upstream  basin 
(Lacombe, 2007).
To reduce siltation in the reservoirs of the 
three  large  dams  in  the  region,  SWC  works 
have been implemented in each upper basin. In 
the Merguellil basin in particular, they currently 
consist of 25,000 ha of contour-ridged terraces, 
45 small tanks and five larger lakes. Presently, 
more than 20% of the upper basin area has 
been affected by conservation works.
Another important change in water resources 
in the Merguellil basin is the development of 
pumping from both surface water and ground-
water. The first public irrigation schemes were 
implemented in the 1970s. During the 1980s, 
private wells were subsidized and their number 
rapidly increased, from 100 in the 1960s to 
about 5000 at present. Abstraction of ground-
water is not only very intense in the Kairouan 
plain  but  also  occurs  at  a  lower  rate  in  the 
upstream part of the Merguellil basin. At the 
same  time,  the  increase  in  population  and 
expansion of water supply networks has led to 
much larger withdrawals from aquifers, upstream 
and downstream. Moreover, the export of water 
to urban areas and tourist activities along the 
coast are other major factors contributing to the 
present overexploitation of aquifers.
Development and Settlement of the 
Basin through History
An ancient history characterized by  
invasions
From prehistoric times, Tunisia has taken part 
in Mediterranean agrarian civilizations founded 
Fig. 7.3.  Long-term changes in the water table level of the Kairouan plain: upstream piezometer M7 (upper 
curve) recorded the main regional events (climate and pumping), while downstream piezometer M14 (lower 
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on cereals (maize, barley) and small cattle (small 
ox, grey donkey, sheep). The common olive 
tree and the carob tree were known by the first 
inhabitants of the country, the Berbers, along 
with the wild vine, the fig tree and the almond 
tree,  which  are  thought  to  be  indigenous 
species. But it was the Phoenician coloniza-
tion, around 800 b c, which brought the tech-
niques of arboriculture, and multiplied orchards 
and gardens, as testified by the famous treatise 
written by Magon during the 3rd century b c.
Rome colonized the northern part of Tunisia 
in 146 b c, and the centre and the south later 
on. Its presence until the 5th century a d led to 
a refining of Carthaginian farming techniques 
and the development of very sophisticated irri-
gation  schemes  (Géroudet,  2004a).  Tunisian 
maize and olive oil were essential condiments 
in Roman food. In the same way, the tech-
niques  of  breeding  and  craft  industry  devel-
oped:  the  orange-red,  sigillated  ceramics 
produced in the heart of the area were found in 
the whole Mediterranean basin as of the end of 
2nd century a d.
In the Merguellil region, Romans populated 
the  mountainous  zones  in  particular  (Kesra, 
Makthar, El Alaa, Djebel Ousselet) and devel-
oped olive trees. They were grown at higher 
altitudes, in sandy soils, with low densities (five 
to six trees/ha) and were surrounded by small, 
low  walls  to  ensure  good  water  supply 
(Géroudet, 2004a). The Romans had a good 
command of many hydraulic techniques and 
constructed  many  cisterns,  tanks  and  aque-
ducts. Nowadays, farmers still collect the fruits 
of ‘Roman olive trees’.
Between  the  fall  of  the  Roman  and 
Byzantine  empires  and  the  French  coloniza-
tion, the countryside was regularly plundered 
by successive invasions by tribes coming from 
Arabia  (in  particular  starting  from  the  7th 
century), and from the south of Egypt (Beni 
Hillel in 1051). This latter tribe devastated the 
south and the heart of the country, destroyed 
the  city  of  Kairouan  and  the  countryside  – 
cutting down part of the old Roman olive trees 
–  and  destroyed  water-harvesting  structures. 
Fertile areas were thus abandoned and seden-
tary populations hid in the mountains: livestock 
breeding  replaced  agriculture.  There  was  no 
notable improvement of agriculture under the 
Ottoman  Empire,  when  the  heavy  taxes 
imposed on peasants limited agricultural devel-
opment (Géroudet, 2004b).
Founded in 670 a d by Oqba Ibn Nafaa, the 
city of Kairouan is located on a rich alluvial 
plain and close to a sebkha, which was used as 
a water reserve and pasture for the horses and 
camels of armies. One century later, the city 
was  connected  by  underground  conduits  to 
large reservoirs located a few kilometres apart 
(Qsar  Al  Mâ)  and  supplied  by  neighbouring 
wadis (Mahfoudh et al., 2004). The Aghlabides 
(800–909  a d) enlarged these reservoirs, and 
Kairouan  was,  by  then,  the  intellectual  and 
political centre of the Maghreb.
Spatial settlement during the 18th and 19th 
centuries
Historical records from the 18th century reveal 
a  tribe-based  society  where  individuals  only 
exist as a member of a tribe. The history of its 
founder,  of  his  migrations  and  then  of  his 
descendants belongs to the history of the tribe 
and makes it possible to legitimize the occupa-
tion of a particular piece of land. The exten-
sion of the territory occupied by these tribes 
was  not  measured  and  natural  topographic 
elements provided only landmarks. Boundaries 
were  social:  the  territory  of  the  tribe  ended 
where  that  of  another  tribe  started.  Certain 
tribes  have  an  affiliation  to  a  marabout   
(religious leader); others have neither a founder 
nor a history of migration and this is the case 
with the Berber tribes.
Livelihoods  combined  a  concentration  of 
agricultural production on limited areas where 
water was accessible with an extensive exploi-
tation of dispersed pastoral resources (Genin et 
al.,  2006).  Rangelands  were  collective  and 
croplands were at the disposal of all, protected 
against foreign invasions by the whole tribe. 
Rules  for  cultivated  land,  gardens  and  water 
use  varied  according  to  groups  and  natural 
conditions. Since Roman times the local popu-
lation has acquired a good technical know-how 
concerning the control of stream flows and the 
enhancing of infiltration using small-scale land 
and water conservation works.
In  such  a  contrasting  environment,  the 
inventoried  techniques  are  very  diverse: 
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land, works in the wadis to slow down the flow 
(jessours), small tanks to store water in summer, 
canals to divert and spread flood flow (mgoud), 
water  collectors  with  controlled  and  directed 
flow (meskat), groundwater tapping, and distri-
bution by irrigation channels or seguias.
The rudimentary aspect of these works was 
compensated  for  by  a  sophisticated  social 
management  of  water  based  on  the  seguia, 
which is used as a dividing, conveyance and 
final distribution channel, regulated by elabo-
rate and precise customary rights. The same 
social group selected the site and the charac-
teristics  of  the  works,  and  organized  their 
maintenance and their exploitation.
Conditions  of  access  to  water  structured 
these rural tribes into groups of owners (water 
and land), and beneficiaries without property 
rights  and  generally  marginalized,  who  pro-
vided  labour  for  construction,  maintenance   
and man  age  ment of these infrastructures. The 
cohabitation  of  these  two  social  groups  was 
defined by a set of rules referring to water prop-
erty,  its  distribution  and  maintenance  of  the 
works. These rules were accepted by all and 
specified the statutes and the roles of each indi-
vidual in the tribe. Even if water often remained 
‘the friend of the powerful’ (Bedoucha, 1987), 
there was a coherence between technical tools 
and  management  goals,  which  ensured  the 
overall performance of the system.
French protectorate (1881–1956) and 
evolution of societies
More centred on the north and the Sahel, the 
French  presence  in  the  Merguellil  area  was 
limited  to  only  two  large  properties:  the  El 
Haouareb farm (3700 ha) and the Ousseltia-
Pichon  farm  (8000  ha).  Their  contribution 
remained technical in nature, with the develop-
ment of strictly rainfed arboriculture. However, 
colonization modified the basin landscape, as 
tractors and modern ploughs partially destroyed 
the fesguias,1 the seguias, the terraces and the 
small  stone-wall  reservoirs  which  obstructed 
passage, thus increasing erosion.
Tribal  structures  changed  little  by  little. 
Generalization of schooling made the prevail-
ing  social  order  anachronistic,  with  younger 
generations rarely agreeing to return to agricul-
tural work. Demographic growth caused strong 
pressure on natural resources, and successive 
intergenerational divisions resulted in strategies 
of  both  agricultural  intensification  and  land 
expansion through clearing, with a consequent 
clear degradation of natural resources.
These external intrusions often came with 
radical technological innovations, which gener-
ally remained the prerogative of certain classes 
within rural societies, leading to a form of dual-
istic agriculture. This implied notable changes 
in the social relationships regarding property, 
access  to  resources  and  their  exploitation 
towards productive ends. The reproduction of 
rural  societies  was  affected  by  processes  of 
adjustment and the end of a social model based 
on access to water governed by rules defined 
and enforced by local communities.
Independence and the development of  
large-scale hydraulics works
Post-independent Tunisia sought to structure 
space and sedentarize its population through 
the development of hydro-agricultural schemes. 
Collective decision making would be entrusted 
to the government and the administration, and 
would thus free individuals from the tribal struc-
ture (Bachta et al., 2005; Bachta and Zaibet, 
2006). The state built a large hydraulic infra-
structure to capture, transfer and allocate water 
resources.  This  intervention  can  be  broken 
down into three phases (Feuillette et al., 1998), 
followed by a period of reflection.
Technical investments
The construction of large infrastructural works 
was based on a logic of better distributing water 
resources between areas and of multiple uses 
in order to accelerate the development of the 
country, by increasing agricultural production 
in the northern area (considered as the ‘bread-
basket of the country’), then by transferring the 
surplus towards coastal areas to feed the main 
centres of population, the tourist industry and 
key zones of high-value irrigated agriculture.
Legal and incentive measures
In parallel, authorities created legal regulations 
(the Water Code) which transformed the legal 154  P. Le Goulven et al.
status of the resource (public, inalienable and 
imprescriptible), established new rights of use 
and  entrusted  their  implementation  to  the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Centralized institutions 
were created to implement national strategies 
at  a  regional  level:  sectoral  general  directo-
rates,  regional  development  offices,  and  a 
national  company  (SONEDE)  for  domestic 
water supply and sanitation (WS&S).
Technical investments were encouraged by 
incentives to intensify water use and by allow-
ing easy and cheap access to the resource to 
priority uses: to ensure water supply and sani-
tation to all, to stabilize rural incomes in order 
to limit rural outmigration, to ensure food secu-
rity  and  to  develop  both  export  agriculture 
(citrus fruits) and tourism.
The economy phase
Mobilization of water resources slowed down 
because  the  cost  of  construction  increased. 
Authorities strengthened regulation and state 
control  (including  the  collection  of  fees)  and 
also improved technical management of exist-
ing hydraulics works (interconnections between 
works,  multiple  uses,  optimization  of  alloca-
tion). Water demand is high and diversified but 
there is yet no way of calling into question the 
use  made  of  the  resource.  The  difficulties 
encountered in the collection of operation and 
maintenance  (O&M)  fees  in  public  irrigation 
schemes contributed to the extinction of the 
development  offices  in  1986  and  to  their 
replacement by the Regional Commission for 
Agricultural  Development  (CRDA)  and  local 
associations of collective interest (AIC) institu-
tions,  whose  attributions  were  defined  by 
amendments to the Water Code in 1987:
•	 AICs	are	endowed	with	a	legal	status	and	
are created on the initiative of the users or 
the  administration.  A  yearly  management 
agreement must be signed with the admin-
istration. AICs cover the O&M costs of the 
hydraulic  infrastructure  put  under  their 
responsibility. The revenue comes from the 
contributions  of  the  members,  subsidies 
from the CRDA, and the sale of water.
•	 The	 CRDA	 is	 a	 structure	 created	 by	 the	
1989 decentralization law and established 
at the level of the gouvernorat.2 It is a pluri-
disciplinary structure composed of sections 
(arrondissements),  which  represent  most 
national  general  directorates.  Supervision 
of the AIC is one of the missions of the 
CRDA that receives the fees for the use of 
water.  The  water  resources  section  is  a 
water  police,  which  establishes  fines  and 
lawsuits and transmits them to the police 
chief for processing by a civil jurisdiction.
Forthcoming shortages and ad hoc policies
At the end of the 1990s, various national stud-
ies forecast a substantial discrepancy between 
water  demand  and  water  supply  by  around 
2010. This led Tunisia to strengthen its control 
of  water  demand,  using  technical  tools 
supported by complementary economic, legal 
and institutional measures:
•  Pricing policy: the price of agricultural water 
doubled between 1989 and 1996. Pricing 
of  domestic  water  follows  a  block-tariff, 
consumption by hotels being charged at the 
higher block level.
•  Incentives  for  water  savings:  laws   
and decrees were promulgated to encour-
age irrigators to save water; localized irri-
gation was subsidized up to 60%; and the 
state  rehabilitated  infrastructure  in  public 
schemes.
•  Reinforcement  of  collective  management: 
AICs were turned into groups of collective 
interest  (GIC),  with  extended  roles  and 
responsibilities.  The  authorities  hoped  to 
achieve  financial  disengagement  and  the 
collection of fees through the AICs.
•  Small  and  medium  hydraulic  works:  in 
1995, the legislation on SWC defined vari-
ous  types  of  work  to  be  implemented: 
tabias and vegetated benches on the top of 
the slopes to fight erosion and to increase 
water infiltration into the soil; short-lifespan 
tanks  with  no  technical  management  to 
control  siltation  of  larger  dams  (1000 
planned,  more  than  400  built  in  2000); 
larger  tanks  linked  to  human  uses  (203 
planned, more than 100 completed); and 
water  structures  to  infiltrate  water  or  to 
spread flood water. These small works offer 
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resources in the basin. They should increase 
storage capacity by using underground stor-
age, slow down erosion and protect larger 
reservoirs by trapping part of the sediments. 
However, they decrease the flow to down-
stream dams, and the management of the 
basin becomes more complex since it must 
integrate a whole set of superimposed water 
management schemes.
Impacts of public policies on the  
Merguellil basin
From  1956  to  1962,  reafforestation  works 
and construction of tabias were carried out to 
help  solve  unemployment  problems.  From 
1962  to  1973,  a  development  plan  for  the 
upper  basin  was  designed  under  USAID 
auspices but its implementation – without local 
participation – was not a success. From 1974 
to  1980,  due  to  opposition  from  peasants, 
SWC works were carried out only on state land 
and forests.
In 1989, the El Haouareb dam was built, 
just  before  Wadi  Merguellil  reaches  the 
Kairouan plain. This dam, oversized to protect 
Kairouan from extreme floods (such as that of 
1969),  supplies  the  El  Haouareb  irrigation 
scheme and recharges the downstream aquifer 
through continuous seepage. The rights to use 
the  aquifer  are  assigned  by  the  state,  which 
established  15  public  irrigation  schemes 
supplied with groundwater wells as part of its 
policy to settle nomadic groups.
From 1990 onwards, the SWC directorate 
set  up  a  decennial  strategy  (1991–2000), 
focused primarily on the treatment of hill slopes 
and the construction of small tanks (Fig. 7.4). 
Currently,  17%  of  the  basin  is  occupied  by 
terraces made out of dry stone or by terraces 
with total flow retention (tabias), in particular 
in the very fragile Zebes and Haffouz sub-basins 
(Ben Mansour, 2006). The upper basin also 
includes about 30 small tanks (with a capacity 
lower than 0.5 Mm3), built and managed by 
the SWC directorate, which store 2.5 Mm3/
year on average, and five larger tanks, built by 
the dam directorate and managed by the SWC 
directorate. With a storage capacity above 1 
Mm3,  these  tanks  receive  annual  average 
contributions  of  2.8  Mm3.  These  reservoirs 
were initially built to trap sediments but author-
ities later tried to select reservoir sites close to 
the population and exploitable land.
The development of water infrastructure in 
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the  Merguellil  basin  illustrates  the  impact  of 
successive public policies well, with the notable 
exception  of  groundwater  wells,  which  have 
proliferated since 1974 in both upstream and 
downstream aquifers, despite official prohibi-
tion. The wells are deepened by a local manual 
technique (forage à bras) as the water table 
drops, without intervention of the CRDA water 
police because authorities prefer to turn a blind 
eye  to  these  practices  and  to  encourage 
regional agricultural development.
Present Agriculture and Water Uses in 
the Merguellil Basin
The  Merguellil  basin  overlaps  with  seven 
administrative districts (delegations) belonging 
to two gouvernorats (Siliana and Kairouan). In 
1994, the population in the study area totalled 
102,600, 85% of which resided in the gouver-
norat  of  Kairouan  (Géroudet,  2004c).  The 
pattern  of  settlement  between  delegations  is 
almost identical in the censuses of 1974, 1984 
and  1994,  except  for  the  population  of 
Chébika, which almost doubled between 1974 
and 1994 (Fig. 7.5). However, the last census, 
in 2004, showed an inversion in the demo-
graphic trends, which had been characterized 
up to that point by a regular increase in popu-
lation. A decrease in the remote rural popula-
tion of the basin (approximately 85% of the 
total) is now expected.
Deep wells tapping several aquifers in both 
the upper and lower parts of the basin ensure 
supply  of  drinking  water  to  this  population. 
Small water supply schemes supplying isolated 
communities are managed locally, while large 
ones are managed by the SONEDE national 
company.  However,  more  than  80%  of  the 
water  pumped  for  domestic  consumption  is 
exported  out  of  the  basin  area  towards  the 
large  cities  on  the  coast.  Withdrawals  for 
domestic use represent more than half of the 
withdrawals in the upper basin and less than 
one-third in the lower basin. Industrial use is 
marginal (less than 2% of the total).
We  focus  hereafter  on  agricultural  water 
uses. Small-scale farming prevails in the basin 
(55% of farms are under 5 ha, 81% less than 
10 ha). In the majority of cases, division of land 
at inheritance remains oral and farmers thus 
do not have ownership titles, which prevents 
them from getting bank loans. Many farmers 
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are trying to continue farming but on landhold-
ings  that  are  too  small  to  be  economically 
viable and hence either engage in pluri-activity 
or try to migrate.
Agricultural development of the basin 
upstream and assessment of water uses 
An investigation of 5045 farm units in Haffouz 
district, carried out in 2002 by the CRDA of 
Kairouan,  identified  eight  main  cropping  sys   
tems, including irrigated systems (arboriculture 
and olive trees, olive trees alone, cereals, winter 
vegetables,  summer  vegetables)  and  rainfed 
systems  (arboriculture  and  olive  trees,  olive 
trees,  cereals).  This  survey  also  identified  a 
typology of farming systems that can be consid-
ered as representative of the upper basin.
Types of farms and crops in Haffouz district in 
2002
Farms are divided into seven types according 
to their cropping patterns. The first four types 
are based on dry farming and include types T1 
(farms  cultivating  mainly  olive  and  almond 
trees); T2 (farms cultivating cereals with a large 
proportion of fallow and rangeland); and T3 
and  T4  (both  cultivating  mainly  cereals  and 
olive  trees  but  with  different  average  areas: 
45.2 ha for T3 and 6.8 ha for T4). The last 
three types refer to irrigated cropping: T5 (irri-
gated vegetable cropping in rotation with olive 
trees and orchards); T6 (irrigated cereals); and 
T7 (irrigated olive trees and orchards).
The first four types make up about 90% of 
the farms in the district (T1 and T4 alone total 
80% of farms), while farms based on irrigated 
crops are very few: types T5, T6 and T7 repre-
sent only 12% of the farms and are mainly 
found  in  the  sectors  (sub-subdistricts)  of 
Haffouz, Khit El Oued and Aïn Beidha (Fig. 
7.6). Type T7 includes most of the irrigated 
farms, which are concentrated in only a few 
douars  (settlements).  The  analysis  clearly 
shows a strong spatial heterogeneity of farm-
ing  systems,  related  to  strong  differences  in 
access to irrigation water. 
The major part of the agricultural area is 
cultivated with rainfed crops (cereals and olive 
trees). The extent of fallow lands, linked to the 
mode of rainfed (dry) farming, explains the low 
cropping  intensity,  between  57%  and  98%, 
with an average of 73%. In most sectors, irri-
gated crops make up less than 10% of the agri-
cultural area, except in Haffouz, where they 
correspond to nearly 40% of the cropped area. 
Vegetables and irrigated cereals are cultivated 
in rotation with olive and almond trees.
Agricultural uses of water in the upper basin 
are little developed: irrigated crops cover only 
2700 ha out of 33,000 ha of cultivated land. 
Perennial crops and olive, almond and apricot 
trees cover 1700 ha, while summer vegetables 
are planted on less than 400 ha. Distribution 
and types of uses depend on access to water. 
Irrigation with surface water (by pumping from 
Wadi Merguellil in particular) is very unpredict-
able in summer. Aquifers are very localized and 
the drilling of wells less convenient than in the 
plain downstream because of the relief.
Assessment of flows
Using  studies  on  the  El  Haouareb  dam 
(Kingumbi,  1999)  and  calculations  made  on 
small  tanks  (Lacombe,  2007),  a  first  assess-
ment of surface water and green (soil) water in 
the upper area can be made for the 2000–2004 
period (Fig. 7.7):
•	 Out	 of	 409	 Mm3  of  rainfall,  175  Mm3 
(43%)  are  lost  by  evaporation,  including 
41% by evapotranspiration of the natural 
vegetation and 2% from small dams and the 
El Haouareb dam.
•	 The	larger	part	of	rainwater	(89%)	is	stored	
as green water: 48% is consumed by culti-
vated areas, rangelands and forests, on a 
total  area  of  605  km2,  and  41%  by  the 
natural vegetation.
•	 Runoff	 water	 accounts	 for	 only	 11%	 of	
rainfall;  once  evaporation  in  the  dam  is 
deducted the quantity of water which can 
be used for productive purposes amounts 
only to 7.8% of the basin inflow.
This shows the paramount importance of 
dryland farming, which uses the soil storage 
capacity (600 Mm3 for the basin, based on a 
reserve of 100 mm) and whose storage effi-
ciency (88% for daily rainfall under 15 mm) is 
important  (Dridi,  2000).  If  rainfed  cereal 
























Fig. 7.6. Density of irrigated crops in 2002 in the central part of the Merguellil basin.  The Wadi Merguellil Basin, Central Tunisia  159
average, 2.6 t/ha, were to be replaced by an 
equivalent production under irrigation, an area 
of 6500 ha (at 4 t/ha) would be needed, which 
would  require  14  Mm3  of  blue  (renewable 
runoff and groundwater) water, which is 44% 
of the amount exported today. This gives an 
idea of the interest in seeking drought-resistant 
varieties (Luc, 2005).
Agricultural development and water use 
downstream of the El Haouareb dam
Types of farms and cropping patterns
An exhaustive farm inventory and a first clas-
sification resulted in the identification of eight 
main farming systems:
•	 The	first	three	types	mostly	combine	rainfed	
agriculture  with  livestock  (more  than  1.5 
sheep/ha)  and  are  characterized  by  their 
dominant crops: olive trees (type T1), cere-
als (T2), and cereals intercropped with olive 
trees (T3). When water is available in farm 
types T1 and T2, summer vegetables are 
irrigated  either  in  association  with  olive 
trees (T1) or alone (T2).
•	 Types	T4	and	T6	have	a	cropping	pattern	
made up of approximately 20% of rainfed 
crops, exclusively of cereals in T4, and 80% 
of irrigated crops. T4 farms grow olive trees 
with  cereals  and  intercropped  irrigated 
vegetables;  T6  farms  have  the  same  irri-
gated crops but without olive trees.
•	 Types	T5,	T7	and	T8	are	exclusively	irrigat-
ing.  T5  is  primarily  made  up  of  summer   
vegetables	 cropping	 in	 full	 field;	 T7	 is	
primarily olive trees intercropped with some 
summer vegetables, and T8 shows an im   
portant proportion of fruit-bearing orchards, 
alone or together with olive trees.
The  proportion  of  irrigated  crops  varies 
from 24% in the Houfia sector to 88% in the 
Chebika  sector.  The  proportion  of  summer 
vegetables,  alone  or  intercropped  with  olive 
trees, varies between 11% of the cropped area 
in the Houfia sector and nearly 40% in the 
Ouled Khalf Allah sector.
With  the  exception  of  the  Houfia  sector, 
which distinguishes itself by its strong propor-
tion of rainfed crops, agricultural development 
is rather homogeneous in the plain downstream 
of  the  El  Harouareb  dam.  All  sectors  have 
access to irrigation water, either through public 
Fig. 7.7. Assessment of average flows of the upstream zone of Merguellil basin (2000–2004) (E, evaporation; 
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schemes or through private wells and boreholes 
pumping water from the Kairouan aquifer.
This  results  in  a  cropping  pattern  that 
includes  70%  of  irrigated  crops,  with  30% 
devoted to summer vegetables (melons, water-
melons, peppers and tomatoes). This cultiva-
tion of summer vegetables is the mainstay of 
irrigation development because it yields hand-
some revenues. Its development is associated 
with the adoption of drip-irrigation, which is 
subsidized by the state at the level of 60% of 
capital costs for small farmers. This irrigation 
technique is also very labour saving, and asso-
ciated  fertigation  allows  farmers  to  strongly 
increase yields and therefore incomes.
Farmers can increase their areas cultivated 
with summer vegetables, but these crops are 
very  risky  and  sensitive  to  market  variations 
and vagaries. For example, prices of melons 
and watermelons are divided by three between 
the first early productions and the main produc-
tion season, approximately one month later.
Assessments of flows
In Table 7.1, the accounting of green water 
considers the whole area of the main plain, 
excluding 27,350 ha of djebels (Table 7.1). 
In the lower basin, more than 60% of rain-
fall is consumed by crops (Fig. 7.8). For non-
cultivated  areas,  the  overall  consumption  of 
rainwater is estimated at 25.2 Mm3. Volumes 
abstracted  from  the  Kairouan  aquifer  for 
municipal and industrial uses represent a total 
of  15  Mm3  (values  given  by  the  Kairouan 
CRDA).
Only the contributions from rainfall and the 
dam are measured values, while other variables 
are  estimated.  Urban  abstraction  represents 
almost half of agricultural use. Since water is 
Table 7.1.  Assessment of green water consumption according to rainfall.
Year  Dry Average Wet
Total contribution of rainfall in Mm3 49.2 82.3 99.8
Total green water consumed in Mm3 30.5 52.2 60.1
Total green water consumed (% rain) 62.0 63.4 60.2
Fig. 7.8. Assessment of average flows in the lower Merguelli basin (1994–2003) (ET, evapotranspiration; 
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exported and there is no return flow to the 
aquifer, this amounts to a net loss for the zone. 
The  main  inflow  is  rainfall  and  groundwater 
flows from the upper basin; the contribution of 
the dam through releases of surface water is 
very  limited.  Observations  of  aquifer  levels 
confirm  the  imbalance  between  inflow  and 
outflow and point to a shortfall of 17.4 Mm3, 
with  agriculture  as  the  main  cause  for  this 
imbalance  (net  consumption  of  21.9  Mm3) 
(Luc, 2005).
Competition for water between agriculture 
and other activities is very strong in the plain, 
but all sectors do not face the same constraints. 
Drinking water supply is a priority according to 
the Water Code, and abstraction is supposed 
to  be  done  only  through  authorized  and 
con  trolled boreholes. Agricultural use in public 
schemes is also based on controlled ground-
water abstraction, but the administration has, 
in  fact,  very  little  control  over  private  wells. 
These wells are deepened in order to follow 
the decline of the aquifer and have spread out 
in the area, despite renewed prohibition. They 
came along with changes in agricultural prac-
tices through the introduction of melons and 
watermelons,  both  of  which  ensure  a  hand-
some income to farmers. 
Assessment of flows in the entire basin
Most of the agricultural production in the upper 
basin is based on green water and its contribu-
tion is also very substantial in the plain. In such 
a  context,  it  is  interesting  to  increase  the 
volume of water stored in the ground and to 
make better use of it. For blue water at a global 
level, withdrawals for municipal and industrial 
use (27 Mm3) and irrigation (34 Mm3) are of 
the same order of magnitude and almost exclu-
sively withdrawn from aquifers that are overex-
ploited. The replacement of dryland farming 
by irrigated crops would jeopardize the balance 
of the aquifers and affect the export of drinking 
water to the Sahel zone.
Assessment  of  the  lower  basin  is  more 
complex. The aquifer drops but its functioning 
is poorly known. The basin being closed, with 
no natural outflow except the sebkha and the 
sea in case of extraordinary events, all the blue 
water  available  is  currently  mobilized  and 
depleted. To build further tanks and dams in 
the  upper  basin  would  be  tantamount  to  a 
re-appropriation and redistribution of existing 
(and already used) resources. The only water 
which is not yet fully mobilized is green water. 
Because of farmers’ aversion to risk, produc-
tion of dry farming is limited, even in wet years. 
Thus, substantial progress is possible by devel-
oping crop varieties with better resistance to 
drought and stress and by improving cropping 
techniques,  for  example  dry  farming  and 
mulching.
The  very  significant  amount  of  water 
ex    ported  for  domestic  use  induces  a  real 
competition for water and could place farmers 
in a difficult situation in case of shortages, since 
drinking water is a national priority.
Impacts and Valorization of Installations
After reviewing the status of main crops in the 
basin, we now turn to the assessment of the 
impact  of  water-harvesting  structures  in  the 
upper basin. This is done through the compar-
ison of the water flows before (1989–1996) 
and after (1997–2005) the implementation of 
SWC works.
 Impacts of installations on the allocation of 
water 
The  analysis  of  runoff–rainfall  relationships 
showed that the expansion of SWC infrastruc-
ture on 21% of the upper basin area between 
1989–1996 and 1997–2005 induced a drop 
of 41–50% in the runoff to downstream areas 
(Lacombe, 2007). This confirms the efficiency 
of  water-harvesting  techniques  (Nasri,  2007) 
and their capacity to reduce runoff towards the 
dam. But this, of course, comes at the detri-
ment of the users of the Kairouan aquifer, who 
have seen water tables dropping by between 
0.25 and 1 m/year since the 1980s (Feuillette, 
2001).
Assessments of the tabias
Dridi  (2000)  showed  that  soil  depth  seldom 
exceeds 1 m. Below this, limestone or the rock 
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water. The recharge of aquifers by tabias is 
probably non-existent, and the water stored in 
the  unsaturated  zone  is  taken  up  again  by 
evapotranspiration (Favreau et al., 2001). By 
collecting  surface  water  charged  with  sedi-
ments, the tabias create wet and fertile lands 
close to the ditches (Fig. 7.9) and increase soil 
moisture  downstream  of  the  bunds.  Roose 
(2002) showed that olive trees make the best 
use of the tabias in central Tunisia, with a line 
of trees planted downstream of the bund and 
two upstream.
In  the  upper  catchment,  areas  provided 
with tabias are cereal fields or rangelands for 
cattle (Dridi, 2000; HAR, 2003). Areas already 
cultivated  are  generally  not  equipped  with 
tabias because they do not allow the passage 
of bulldozers. Today, the crops for which tabias 
are likely to be further developed are cereals. 
Mechergui (2000) showed that by increasing 
storage  of  green  water  by  more  than  20%, 
tabias can increase yields from 1 t/ha to 1.5 t/
ha. But these potential benefits are compen-
sated  for  by  losses  in  cultivated  area  and  in 
output due to increased difficulties in treating 
and harvesting the product. On the basin scale, 
the  agronomic  benefits  derived  from  tabias 
can thus be considered as virtually nil (Lacombe, 
2007),  although  their  impact  on  erosion  is 
probably positive.
Assessment of tanks
In the upper basin, 47% of the 46 tanks are 
exploited by 270 farmers, who irrigate 669 ha 
(vegetables  (2%),  olive  trees  (69%),  almond 
trees  (14%),  and  other  trees  (15%)),  which 
corresponds to an average of 5.9 farmers/tank 
and 12.5 farmers/exploited tank. In 63% of 
the cases, water is abstracted by engine-driven 
pumps, and in the remaining cases irrigation is 
done by gravity, water sometimes being trans-
ported by cisterns.
The yield output of olive trees irrigated by 
tanks is low (4.5 kg/tree), compared with yields 
in  the  plain  (25  kg/tree,  and  10  kg/tree  in 
non-irrigated  situations;  Feuillette,  2001). 
Limiting  factors  are  related  to  conditions  of 
shallow soils and a harsher climate at a higher 
altitude, which increase the likelihood of harm-
ful frosts. Irrigation of olive trees is especially 
useful  in  periods  of  drought,  to  save  young 
seedlings. Consequently, the agronomic valori-
zation  of  tanks  cannot  be  assessed  only  in 
terms of volumes withdrawn and intended for 
irrigation. Volumes of water applied are low, in 
particular for the almond and the olive trees, 
and  the  use  of  cisterns  is  constraining  and 
expensive.
Global assessment of the upper catchment 
before and after implementation of SWC
Over the 1989–1996 period, the average flow 
of the Merguellil was 20 Mm3/year at the level 
of the El Haouareb dam (Fig. 7.10, left part). 
Over the 1997–2005 period, only 70% of this 
flow reached the dam. Water balance studies 
carried  out  on  tanks  showed  that  the  latter 
captured a sixth of the total volume harvested 
by all structures, the remainder being collected 
by tabias. This has resulted in a new distribu-
tion of collected flows (Fig. 7.10, right part).
In  this  assessment,  the  tabias  were  not 
forested,  in  accordance  with  the  situation 
observed in 2005. In addition, frequent passage 
of  livestock  on  the  bunds  is  responsible  for 
early degradation of tabias. At the basin level, 
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most  of  the  water  harvested  is  transformed 
into evapotranspiration, without any significant 
agronomic benefit. As for tanks, it is assumed 
that percolation losses are passed on to the 
aquifers, where they can be exploited through 
pumping.  This  assumption  is  based  on  the 
studies by Grünberger et al. (2004), who found 
evidence of a transfer from the El Gouazine 
tank  to  the  alluvial  aquifers  of  downstream 
valley bottoms.
Even accounting for the inaccuracy of these 
assessments,  it  remains  clear  that  water-
harvesting  structures  result  in  reductions  of 
infiltrated  and  abstracted  flows  of  14  and  5 
percentage units, respectively, and an increase 
in evaporation flows from 2 to 46%, lost for 
any use. On the basis of an annual production 
of  about  20  Mm3/year  in  the  basin  area, 
upstream SWC works therefore induce a loss 
of 3.8 Mm3/year of water to evaporation. This 
volume  would  make  it  possible  to  irrigate 
between 374 and 910 ha of vegetable cultiva-
tion with two harvests, in summer and winter.
If all the bunds were forested, as an ideal 
way to make use of collected water, one would 
obtain an increase of 25% in the agricultural 
value compared with the current situation, and 
a  reduction  of  only  6%  of  evaporation 
compared  with  the  situation  without  tabias. 
But this assumption is based on the planting of 
1,310,000 olive trees in three lines separated 
by 10 m and with enough roots to exploit all of 
the unsaturated zone.
Water productivity in the upper and lower 
basins
The  econometric  analysis  carried  out  by 
Albouchi (2006) on the upper and lower parts 
of  the  Merguellil  basin  for  the  1994–2003 
period examined the use of four factors mobi-
lized in the aggregate production of the basin:
•  Land: if the agricultural area is larger in the 
upper zone, irrigation is less developed (7% 
of cultivated land, against 26% in the lower 
basin).  If  water  is  not  used  efficiently, 
continuous expansion will increase pressure 
on  water,  in  particular  in  the  lower  part. 
Intensification of farming systems remains 
limited in the two zones, with a cropping 
intensity  of  68%  upstream,  against  87% 
downstream.
Fig. 7.10.  Change in flow distribution in the Merguellil basin (1989–1996 versus 1997–2005) (LACH: 
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•  Water:  water  consumption  strongly 
in  creased in the two zones, from 5.5 to 9 
Mm3 in the upper basin and from 13.5 to 
34 Mm3 in the lower basin, i.e. increases of 
65% and 152%, respectively. In contrast, 
we can observe a drop in water consump-
tion  per  hectare  on  irrigated  land  in  the 
downstream part, but withdrawals are still 
at 3859 m3/ha, against 2315 m3/ha in the 
upper basin. This lower application of water 
upstream  reflects  a  still  ‘extensive’  and 
recent irrigation, but farmers are increas-
ingly  attracted  by  crops  with  high  added 
value.  Downstream  irrigators  are  already 
specialized  in  such  products  and,  rather, 
seek to save water in order to expand their 
plots.
•  Labour: agricultural employment, including 
available family labour and occasional hired 
labour, increased by approximately 13% in 
the two zones because of the expansion of 
irrigated areas and of the limited mechaniza-
tion of agriculture. Increases in employment 
and per hectare labour input are higher in 
the  lower  basin  (twice  the  values  for  the 
upper basin), which can be explained by the 
intensity  of  labour  demand  in  vegetable 
cultivation.  Farms  in  the  upper  part  are 
characterized by lesser integration into the 
market, and resort to the abundant family 
labour and seasonal migrations to the lower 
basin, when occasional labour may amount 
to 60% of all labour requirements.
•  Capital: capital is limited to the use of vari-
able inputs; collected data evidenced a more 
intensive use of capital in the lower part, 
203  Tunisian  Dinars  (DT)/ha  versus  82 
DT/ha in the upper part, which reflects the 
differential level of intensification. Produc-
tion  of  cereals  and  vegetables  is  higher 
downstream (12,550 t and 56,280 t, against 
12,240 t and 7740 t upstream), due to the 
irrigation of the former (maize, barley) and 
to a better technical control of the latter. 
However, tree and animal production are 
still higher upstream, because of the impor-
tance of olive trees and because all herds 
(sheep, goats, cattle) are larger.
The net income is understandably higher in 
the downstream part, with a 10-year observa-
tion average value of DT 12.3 million. In the 
upstream part, this income only totalled DT 2.5 
million and was even negative during the first 4 
years of observation, showing that the land and 
family labour factors were not valued at market 
prices. This can explain the migration of young 
people from the upper to the lower part of the 
basin, where irrigation allows for the remuner-
ation  of  all  factors  and  the  accumulation  of 
profit.
The price of irrigation water varies between 
0.08 and 0.12 DT/m3 over the whole zone of 
study, while average water productivity is 0.18 
DT/m3  upstream  and  0.39  DT/m3  down-
stream. This shows the existence of rents in 
the two zones, particularly downstream, where 
revenue is accumulated in the value of land. 
The analysis also indicates that there is consid-
erable potential to improve the economic effi-
ciency of the two zones and to increase the 
generated overall income. A first estimate of 
the determinants of efficiency discards factors 
like specialization, integration into the market, 
availability of fodder or the degree of technical 
assistance,  which  are  statistically  non-signifi-
cant. The effect of water saving is significant 
but weak, which can be explained by a poor 
command  of  these  recently  introduced  tech-
niques and by a tendency to expand irrigated 
areas  rather  than  to  intensify  cultivation  on 
them (Bachta et al., 2000). Access to credit 
has a strong positive effect on technical, alloca-
tive  and  economic  efficiency;  according  to 
some farmers, the lack of financing is much 
more  constraining  than  the  lack  of  water. 
Producers  having  access  to  credit  generally 
have better information on the prices of prod-
ucts and of production factors, and are more 
motivated to adopt new technologies. Finally, 
small-scale farming negatively influences both 
technical  and  economic  efficiency,  which 
suggests that a land policy designed to prevent 
or limit the fragmentation of farms would be 
desirable.
According to the analysis, continued imple-
mentation of SWC works in the upper basin 
without attendant public support would lead to 
a drop of overall gross product in the basin. 
Further construction would deprive the most 
productive  downstream  zone  of  part  of  its 
water  supply  and  would  accentuate  pressure 
on the aquifer. This loss can be mitigated by 
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(land reform, access to credit), but none of the 
scenarios  considered  is  able  to  reverse  the 
conclusions of the analysis.
Prospective Analysis
Possible or planned changes 
There is often confusion between hydrological 
variability, which is naturally very high in the 
Mediterranean  region,  and  climate  change. 
Until now, no statistically significant change in 
rainfall has been observed at the Mediterranean 
scale  (Cudennec  et  al.,  2007),  although 
depending on authors and methods, opposite 
conclusions were proposed in countries such 
as  Spain  and  Italy.  An  overall  worsening  of 
rainfall  in  the  Mediterranean  basin  remains 
hypothetical. At the Tunisian scale, the study 
of 43 long data sets of rainfall (Sakiss et al., 
1994)  did  not  find  any  consistent  trend. 
Changes  that  could  be  identified  at  an  even 
smaller  scale,  such  as  central  Tunisia  (e.g. 
Kingumbi et al., 2005), have to be put in the 
context of this overall stability.
Present  global  circulation  models  do  not 
represent the Mediterranean climate with satis-
fying accuracy, especially with regard to the 
extreme rainfall variability in time and space. 
Whatever the future climate in Tunisia, climatic 
changes in other parts of the world may also 
affect  the  study  area  in  indirect  ways.  The 
recent  worldwide  rise  in  cereal  prices,  for 
example,  partly  linked  to  droughts  in  North 
America and Australia, led to a quick and unex-
pected increase in the Tunisian fixed prices.
The previous sections showed that the most 
important and rapid changes in regional water 
resources are consequences of human activi-
ties on the environment, and the induced redis-
tribution of water in time and space, between 
blue water and green water, groundwater and 
surface water, and upstream and downstream 
parts  of  the  basin.  New  conservation  works 
planned  by  the  authorities  consist  of  three 
dams  and  bench  terraces  over  30,000  ha, 
which will further decrease the river flow, the 
inflow  to  the  El  Haouareb  dam  and,  conse-
quently,  the  recharge  of  the  Kairouan  plain 
aquifer.
Concerning  the  uses  of  water,  Tunisia  is 
characterized  by  a  recent  fast  demographic 
growth  (population  has  doubled  since  1970 
but is now levelling off), a concentration of the 
population in the coastal urban centres and a 
seasonal peak in the flux of foreign tourists (6 
million/year). The increases in population and 
in the standard of living, and improved cover-
age of water supply in rural areas, have resulted 
in a continuous rise in domestic water demand. 
At the local scale, the Merguellil basin experi-
enced a continuous demographic growth up to 
1994, but the 2004 census showed a more 
complex  evolution  in  recent  years.  While 
Kairouan  and  its  surroundings  continue  to 
grow,  an  exodus  of  the  rural  population 
towards towns close to Chébikah and Haffouz 
is observed. This trend, caused by social and 
economic problems, is likely to continue in the 
next decades, according to the pattern widely 
observed in the Mediterranean basin.
These local and regional trends will increase 
the demand for water transfers towards urban 
and tourist centres of the Sahel, which already 
amount to 12 Mm3/year, as well as withdraw-
als for the local population and industries (pres-
ently 15 Mm3/year). But the water demand for 
agriculture  is,  and  will  remain,  the  biggest 
problem. With the integration of Tunisia into 
the  world  agricultural  markets,  the  growing 
demand  from  local  and  tourist  populations, 
vegetable farming – a very water- and labour-
intensive activity – should continue to expand, 
together with plantations of new fruit species 
in  demand  on  the  world  market  (almonds, 
apples, etc.).
The future of SWC works
The SWC works of the upper basin are not 
completely  satisfactory:  a  large  part  of  the 
harvested water is lost by evaporation and very 
few new water uses have developed. In theory, 
the  planting  of  1.3  million  olive  trees  would 
allow full use of the harvested water, but this 
number should be doubled to make the tabias, 
planned up to 2011, profitable. This hypothe-
sis  appears  quite  unrealistic,  in  particular 
because they require regular maintenance. In 
the absence of maintenance, they are damaged 
by breaches, which automatically cause other 
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succession of ruptures accentuates the runoff 
concentration  and  leads  to  the  formation  of 
gullies. Erosion in areas of SWC works without 
maintenance is then even worse than in natural 
conditions. Studies on small tanks in El Gouazine 
showed that, 8 years after their construction, 
these SWC works had already lost 60% of their 
storage capacity. The runoff coefficient and the 
sediment  transport  went  back  to  their  initial 
values  before  the  SWC  works  (Nasri  et  al., 
2004).
Under such conditions, there is little likeli-
hood  that  the  remaining  population  of  the 
upper basin will undertake the maintenance of 
plantations and conservation works, especially 
when people were not consulted during their 
construction, or even opposed them, thus forc-
ing authorities to build them on public land.
Small tanks were initially established to trap 
sediments and to protect the El Haouareb dam. 
They fulfil their role properly since their average 
lifespan is about 20–25 years. Currently, only 
some of the largest and well-located tanks are 
exploited in an intensive way. In general, there 
is no collective management, with each irrigator 
using pump sets subsidized by the government 
to abstract water from the tank. Intensification is 
limited  because  the  risk  of  water  shortage  is 
high, especially during drought years. Setting up 
water  user  associations  is  not  expected  to 
change this situation, especially given the fast 
sedimentation of the reservoirs.
It  is  often  said  that  global  warming  will 
increase the frequency of extreme events, in 
particular droughts lasting several years, with 
more irregular rainfall. If such changes occur, 
they would be detrimental to the lifespan of 
SWC works (via breaching, faster filling) and to 
their usefulness, because ditches are not able 
to store water to bridge rain events. However, 
the  El  Haouareb  dam  would  be  of  greater   
interest  in  stopping  exceptional  floods  and 
reassuring rural and urban populations down-
stream in the Kairouan plain. It is large enough 
to  undergo  sedimentation  and  subsequent 
reduction in storage for many years.
One can thus imagine the future with an 
extensive use of most of the basin upstream 
(rainfed  farming  of  olive  trees  and  cereals, 
grazing lands) and an intensive exploitation of 
land endowed with groundwater resources, on 
an area that would guarantee water supply for 
a sequence of drought years. In addition to its 
protective role against flooding of the city, the 
El Haouareb dam would only be used to trans-
fer water to the Kairouan aquifer. The manage-
ment of water in the zone would be, in fact, 
essentially  limited  to  the  management  of 
groundwater.
Groundwater management
Dynamics of the upper basin aquifers (Haffouz, 
Aïn Beidha, BouHafna) are insufficiently known 
(recharge,  connections),  but  the  first  models 
available  emphasize  their  fragility.  They  are 
exploited by private wells, without any control 
on  withdrawals,  and  also  supply  the  Sahel 
region  with  domestic  water.  The  Kairouan 
plain  aquifer  supplies  about  15  well-based 
public schemes and thousands of private wells, 
manually  deepened  if  necessary  when  the 
water  table  drops.  Although  formally  a 
protected area, the Kairouan aquifer remains, 
in fact, a free-access collective resource: restric-
tive regulations are not respected and hand-
dug  boreholes  are  always  more  numerous, 
even in public schemes. Farmers attempt to 
free themselves from the rigidity of water turns 
and  directly  access  groundwater  to  cultivate 
melon  and  watermelon  with  drip-irrigation. 
Law enforcement is difficult because the water 
police function is entrusted to the institution in 
charge of regional development, which chooses 
to preserve social peace in an area struck by 
unemployment  rather  than  to  safeguard  the 
long-term durability of the system.
Water  shortages  are  not  imminent,  given 
the thickness of the aquifer, but the continuous 
drop in the groundwater level will make access 
to  water  more  and  more  difficult  for  small 
producers; those located at the aquifer margins 
will see their resource disappear. In addition, 
the  deeper  layers  of  the  aquifer  have  lower 
transmissivity  and  a  higher  mineral  content. 
Water quality will most likely deteriorate in the 
long term.
Aware of the importance of aquifers, Tunisian 
authorities explore various recharge techniques, 
even  if  this  will  probably  not  be  sufficient  to 
offset  overdraft.  The  El  Haouareb  dam  loses 
most of its water through karstic cracks, which 
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of recharge of the Kairouan plain aquifer. This 
saves  water  from  evaporation  and  smoothes 
inter-annual  climatic  fluctuations  (the  storage 
capacity of the Kairouan plain aquifer is much 
higher than the dam’s, by more than an order of 
magnitude).  The  rest  of  the  dam  water  is 
pumped  for  irrigation  and  also  evaporates. 
Keeping water in the dam for satisfying the irri-
gation demand is a short-term approach, but is 
not pertinent at a regional scale. A more proac-
tive management would include dam releases in 
spring, in order to save a part of the dam water 
presently lost by evaporation (five times higher 
in July than in January). According to our calcu-
lations, about half of the released volumes would 
be gained by the Kairouan plain aquifer: since 
1989, 24 Mm3 could have been saved, which is 
greater  than  the  mean  annual  groundwater 
inflow to the Kairouan aquifer from the dam 
and the upstream Aïn Beidha aquifer over the 
same period. Obviously, such an improvement 
would  only  bring  a  limited  amount  of  ‘new’ 
water into the regional water budget, but this is 
the  most  efficient  solution  in  a  region  where 
water resources are scarce and already overex-
ploited.
Alternative solutions should also be searched 
for. Urban and tourist centres of the Sahel coast 
could  turn  to  desalination  of  seawater  for 
domestic supply, as in several other Mediter-
ranean areas. The price of desalination strongly 
dropped  with  the  development  of  reverse 
osmosis (between €0.5 and €1.00 per m3). For 
instance, the Balearic Islands and the Canaries 
resort to desalination to meet the demand of 
the  tourist  season,  as  does  Andalusia,  which 
runs several plants in order to avoid conflicts 
between tourist and agricultural activities.
The overexploitation of the aquifers in the 
basin cannot be stopped without an effective 
management  of  agricultural  demand  and  its 
acceptance by the population. An agent-based 
simulation  model  was  used  to  test  various 
management policies (Feuillette et al., 2003) by 
representing  the  interactions  between  water 
supply  and  demand,  investment  strategies  of 
farmers  and  their  decisions  to  dig  wells,  and 
interactions between farmers. A first scenario 
simulates the impact of adoption of drip-irriga-
tion systems, as advocated by the authorities. 
The model revealed an increase in farm income 
but  a  very  clear  rise  in  pumping  and  in  the 
number of wells. Ground-truthing showed that 
the farmers make a benefit after 1 year only 
because  the  drip  system  is  subsidized  by  the 
government by up to 60%. This enables farm-
ers to grow melons and watermelons, sold at a 
good price to the hotels on the coast, 100 km 
away.  In  the  following  years,  farmers  try  to 
increase production by all means: extension of 
the  irrigated  area,  renting  of  additional  land, 
increase in the power of pumps, digging of new 
wells, etc. The shift to micro-irrigation, without 
attendant measures, would compound the over-
exploitation of the aquifer, i.e. the exact oppo-
site  of  the  expected  outcome.  Additional 
simulations  showed  that  the  combination  of 
drip-irrigation and a very high pricing of water 
when used beyond a given quota gives the best 
results:  reasonable  profit-making  by  farmers 
through a better valorization of water combined 
with  a  substantial  reduction  in  total  with-
drawals.
To  enforce  regulation,  the  administration 
can try to control current individual dynamics by 
strengthening control: electrification of all the 
pump  sets,  systematic  installation  of  three-
phased electric meters and political support to 
the national electric company to recover fees. 
Such proposals are obviously difficult to imple-
ment.  The  administration  can  also  initiate  a 
process of turning management responsibilities 
over to water user associations at the borehole 
level. Faysse (2001) showed the collective bene-
fit resulting from the application of flexible rules 
by  an  association  of  irrigators.  Concerning 
deep-well-based  irrigation  schemes,  manage-
ment  by  associations  with  increasingly  broad 
attributions, and the disengagement of the state 
at the CRDA level, gradually become the rule. 
However, the adoption of a more participatory 
management could be temporarily hindered by 
difficulties  in  identifying  supportive  interest 
groups. The support of users, who have long 
been kept away from management, will proba-
bly come up with the awareness of the fragility 
of the aquifer, regarded until now as an inex-
haustible resource crossed by large underground 
rivers.
Conclusion
Located in the heart of Tunisia in a semi-arid 
zone, the Merguellil basin belonged, until the 168  P. Le Goulven et al.
19th  century,  to  a  tribe-based  society. 
Agricultural modes of production typical of this 
Mediterranean  environment  combined  a 
concentration  of  investments  on  the  limited 
areas  where  water  was  accessible  with  an 
extensive  exploitation  of  scattered  pastoral 
resources.
During the French protectorate, the arrival 
of a few colonists induced a first modification 
of land use, but the most important changes in 
land and water resources development policies 
happened  after  independence,  when  the 
appearance of the basin was deeply modified: 
closing of the basin by the El Haouareb dam in 
1989, and implementation of water-harvesting 
structures and small tanks since the 1980s.
The Merguellil basin is typical of the prob-
lems faced in Tunisia and in the Mediterranean 
basin in general: limited water resources; inter-
mittent flows; strong increase in, and diversifi-
cation  of,  demand;  strong  human-induced 
hydrological  changes;  competition  between 
declining upstream rural societies and a more 
dynamic urban/tourist downstream, or coastal, 
zone; and very localized uses of overexploited 
aquifers.
The  soil  and  water  conservation  (SWC) 
works in the Merguellil basin, planned at the 
national level and implemented without consul-
tation or participation of the users, are conse-
quently  very  poorly  exploited.  These  works 
result in a reduction of infiltration and abstrac-
tion and in a substantial increase in losses by 
evaporation. By reducing surface runoff, they 
also decrease the inflow to the El Haouareb 
dam  and,  consequently,  the  recharge  of  the 
Kairouan  aquifer,  which  is  used  in  a  very 
productive way.
The  SWC  works  are  likely  to  deteriorate 
with time because the administration has not 
planned any maintenance and the population 
hardly  feels  concerned.  In  the  near  future, 
management  of  aquifers  will  be  the  central 
issue, because of their pivotal role in support-
ing intensification of irrigated production and 
supplying cities. The remainder of the basin 
will  probably  remain  confined  to  extensive 
farming:  rangelands  and  rainfed  farming  of 
cereals and olive trees.
To restore a balanced use of the aquifers 
without impacting the development of the area 
too  much,  the  administration  will  have  to 
implement  demand-management  policies,  an 
uphill battle with very few successes recorded 
worldwide.
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Notes
1    Fesguias are big public water tanks with a capacity 
that can reach hundreds of cubic metres.
2    Gouvernorat, or wilaya in Arabic: administrative 
region directed by a governor appointed by the 
president. There are 24 gouvernorats in Tunisia.
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Introduction
This chapter analyses historical irrigation and 
river  basin  developments  and  narratives  to 
demonstrate  particular  dimensions  of  water 
competition in the Great Ruaha River basin in 
southern Tanzania. Alongside this, we identify 
three interrelated scalar and emergent dynamic 
behaviours revealed as a part of basin develop-
ment. These ‘systems’ behaviours relate to the 
growth and coalescing of areas of smallholder 
irrigated farms since the late 1950s. The three 
concepts  are  termed  ‘parageoplasia’,1  ‘non-
equilibrium  behaviour’  and  ‘share  modifica-
tion’. These insights provide additional layers 
to the ideas captured in Molle’s (2003) concep-
tual  framework  for  river  basin  development, 
specifically  on  the  demand–supply  equation, 
where we bring additional thinking to his allo-
cation ‘third way’ and on the nature of basin 
development. While exploring the broad narra-
tive of growth in water demand, we explore 
further dimensions arising from a highly vari-
able  inter-/intra-annual  water  availability, 
which  affects  the  distribution  of  water  and 
impacts of this growth curve, as informed by a 
sub-Saharan environment.
As well as explaining the concept's terms, 
we argue that the ideas revealed by this case 
study  might  have  application  to  smallholder 
irri  gation  elsewhere  in  savannah  agro-ecolo-
gies in Africa. The chapter explores how this 
analysis leads to new insights – particularly in 
relation  to  adaptation  to  climatic  change 
expressed through increased variability of rain-
fall and river flow (Milly et al., 2008).
Context
The allocation and equity of division of water 
between sectors in certain kinds of basins is 
particularly  difficult  when  rapid  growth  in   
one  sector  establishes  a  basin-wide  potential 
towards  disequilibrium.  The  term  disequilib-
rium is used in the rangelands’ ecological sense 
(Sulllivan  and  Rohde,  2002),  pertaining  to 
dramatic changes in inputs such that a medium-
term,  predictable  resource  offtake  from  a 
climax  ecology  is  denied.  Explored  in  more 
detail  by  Lankford  and  Beale  (2007),  basin 
disequilibrium occurs because of external and 
internal perturbations of water catchments and 
linked interconnections be  tween upstream and 
downstream  water-use  systems.  Externally 
derived perturbations arise via a variable water 
supply, expressed through climate and weather, 
bringing  inter-  and  intra-seasonal  fluxes  of 
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drought and wetness, potentially further exac-
erbated by climatic change. Internal perturba-
tions  occur  due  to  feedback  connections 
between linked sectors or systems where water 
abstraction and depletion occur – particularly 
in the irrigation sector, where depleted quanti-
ties are both large and highly variable inter- an 
intra-seasonally.  Both  types  of  perturbations 
pose  problems  for  the  management  of  river 
basins,  particularly  the  ‘equilibrium’  expecta-
tion that the quality and quantity of water are 
either  only  mildly  varying  or  predictable  or 
both, and can be managed accordingly.
Unrealized or unfounded expectations about 
the  slow  and/or  predictable  behaviour  and 
development  of  basins  in  turn  generate 
  challenges for dividing water between sectors 
such as rural and urban areas, industries that 
use water, agriculture and tourism. While many 
of these flux-related issues are relevant to water 
governance institutions globally, problems are 
particularly acute in semi-arid developing coun-
tries in Africa, where a particular type of water 
resource  instability  exists.  This  environment 
should be contrasted with the characteristics of 
temperate,  humid  flood-plain  river  basins  of 
richer developed nations, shown on the left in 
Fig. 8.1. Typically, in northern Europe, greater 
stability  and  predictability  are  conferred  by 
natural  means  (temperate/oceanic  rainfall 
patterns, use of groundwater aquifers and low 
daily  evaporation  rates)  and  artificial  means 
(river-training  works,  storage,  piped  reticula-
tion, prediction and hydrological information 
via  a  network  of  monitoring  stations).  This 
supply-side  predictability  and  stability  allows 
society to monitor rising demands and there-
fore determines the ‘sustainable’ gross abstrac-
tion  of  water  and  hence  environmental 
headroom (Carnell et al., 1999). A regulatory 
approach to water, providing water rights to 
users, is achievable under such circumstances. 
Such a situation is further mollified by the fact 
that the underlying economy is not irrigation 
based (the UK uses 2% of fresh water for irri-
gation (Weatherhead, 2007)) and can invest in 
less water-intensive activities (e.g. light industry 
or  service  sectors),  thereby  reducing  the 
demand for water. 
However, the right side of Fig. 8.1 shows 
that instability in semi-arid Africa arises from 
the interplay of combined natural and institu-
tional factors: high climate variability; minimal 
natural  and  artificial  storage  buffering;  direct 
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and immediate access to water for agriculture, 
often fed by gravity in a series of intakes; and 
significant abstraction and depletion rates, aris-
ing  from  high  evaporative  demands  coupled 
with  water  spreading  for  irrigation.  Here  we 
observe  a  particular  characteristic  of  such 
en  vironments, where actual use follows supply 
closely, sometimes up to 100% of what is avail-
able. As water supply declines during the dry 
season or drought, so does usage, often over 
several orders of magnitude – in other words, 
daily  demand  for  one  area  might  vary  from 
5–10  m3/s  in  the  main  rainfall  season  to 
0.50–0.1  m3/s  in  the  dry  season.  In  this 
en  vironment,  demand  is  a  function  of  liveli-
hoods that are immediately dependent on natu-
ral resources, with few options for switching to 
an  economy  that  is  less  reliant  on  water.  In 
addition to the large area of potentially irrigable 
land, this is one reason why potential demand 
is so high and why usage closely follows supply. 
Moreover,  river  flow  and  rainfall  monitoring 
networks  and  mechanisms  for  mitigating  or 
sharing varying and declining resources tend to 
be  weak  (Donkor,  2003),  which  undermines 
both transparency and predictive and risk-based 
responses.  In  these  conditions,  a  normative 
regulatory approach to river basin management 
is much more problematic.
Added to this comparative analysis are the 
three  key  solutions  to  managing  water  suf  -
ficiency – supply, demand and allocation (share) 
management  –  each  taking  a  part  and  role 
during river basin development. As rivers close, 
and when the fixes of supply-side infrastruc-
tural development become increasingly expen-
sive,  attention  turns  to  issues  of  demand 
management,  water  conservation  and  water 
allocation (Molle, 2003; Molden et al., 2005). 
Consequently,  governments  and  NGOs,  as 
well as the academic community, seek new and 
innovative understandings of the governance 
of demand management and of the means to 
share  limited  but  varying  amounts  of  water 
between  users.  This  chapter  explores  the 
trajectory of the Ruaha River basin and stresses 
the  challenging  specificities  of  sub-Saharan 
African environments.
The growth of smallholder irrigated farms in 
the Usangu plains, in the Great Ruaha basin, 
from approximately 1000 ha in 1960 to an 
area of between 20,000 and 40,000 ha in the 
present day, with an associated rise in water 
competition,  provides  three  insights  on  river 
basin systems and, as a consequence, new entry 
points for the refinement of irrigation and river 
basin  management.  These  ideas  illu  strate  re  - 
lated, but separable, issues that inform systems 
policy. Brief descriptions are given below, and 
illustrated in Table 8.1 and Figs 8.2 and 8.3. 
The chapter explores the ideas and their impli-
cations for river basin management in greater 
detail;  captured  in  Fig.  8.3,  they  illuminate 
other possibilities related to, and building upon,   
the S-shaped model of basin development.
Parageoplasia 
This  term  applies  to  non-local  externalities 
created by upstream water depletion in a river 
Table 8.1. Three basin behaviours observed in southern Tanzania. 
Idea  Observation  Resulting from  Outcomes  Policy implication
Parageoplastic   Exported aridity  Increased area of  Altered behaviours  Discern parageoplastic  
  behaviour     downstream with     dry- and/or wet-    and outcomes    links followed by basin 
	 	 specific	timing,		 	 season	irrigation	 	 downstream	 	 or	local	solutions 
    quantity and quality    upstream 
    dimensions      
Non-equilibrium   Fluctuating area of wet-  Climatic and weather  Supply–demand  Rethink irrigation planning 
	 systems	and		 	 season	irrigation	 	 variability	leading	to	 	 equation	non-linear,		 	 methods	to	allow	  
  behaviour    between upper and     changes in rainfall and    complicating    abstraction to mirror 
	 	 lower	limits	 	 runoff	amounts	 	 allocation		 	 runoff	flux
Share		 Uneven	proportional	 Poorly	conceived	 Changing	inequity	of	 Remodel	or	refit	irrigation 
	 modification	 	 division	of	varying	river		 	 irrigation	design	 	 supply	between	 	 intakes	to	improve	  
	 	 flows	between	sectors		 	 and	installation	of		 	 sectors	 	 proportional	division 








Fig. 8.2.  Concepts of basin behaviours resulting from growth of irrigation.
Fig. 8.3.  Depiction of basin behaviours via a supply and demand hydrograph.
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basin,  prompting  new  behaviours  as  down-
stream  users  react  to  water  shortages. 
Parageoplasia is captured in Fig. 8.2, where a 
downstream wetland experiences water short-
age.  The  example  in  this  chapter  is  of  dry-
season water shortages in the Ruaha National 
Park, caused by irrigation abstraction 100 km 
further upstream. Parageoplasia is defined as 
depletion or usage causing external symptoms 
of water shortages in a locality elsewhere in the 
basin.
Non-equilibrium behaviour 
This is observed when demand closely follows 
and matches supply intra- and inter-seasonally. 
Figure 8.3 shows this as the demand (dotted) 
line rising and falling in line with the supply line. 
This occurs in southern Tanzania because the 
irrigated area rapidly increases to approximately 
40,000 ha in a wet season (with normal rainfall) 
from about 5000 ha in the dry season (Lankford 
and Beale, 2007). By contrast, an ‘equilibrium’ 
situation might be characterized as one where 
demand is more restricted, so that an enlarged 
supply cascades a surplus to downstream users 
(or, in other words, where demand increases by 
a maximum of 50–100%, rather than 800% in 
the non-equilibrium case). Figure 8.3 demon-
strates a rising trend of increased wet-season 
demand over time – notice the volu  metric cap 
increases each year as more intakes are devel-
oped or modernized; the figure also shows that 
the  area  between  the  solid  and  dotted  lines 
diminishes over time, indicating that the propor-
tional abstraction cap increases with time, result-
ing  in  less  water  passing  downstream  (see 
Lankford and Mwaruvanda, 2007).
Share modification 
This  describes  purposive  or  inadvertent 
changes  in  shares  of  water  between  sectors 
and/or  users  in  the  face  of  a  declining  or 
increasing flow rate resulting from existing or 
redesigned (new) river flow division infrastruc-
tures.  Modification  of  shares  is  particularly 
prevalent with conventional designs of irriga-
tion intake infrastructures combined with highly 
varying flows. On the other hand, proportional 
designs of river infrastructures help to repro-
duce the shape of the river flow curve propor-
tionally  between  the  offtaking  canal  and  the 
downstream section of river.
 In summary, these phenomena are realized 
through  the  evolving  trajectory  of  the  case 
study basin via three main facets: (i) the growth 
of irrigation area and demand over time; (ii) the 
presence  of  a  variable  sub-Saharan  climate; 
and (iii) a combined effect of both the choice 
(intentional or otherwise) and density of infra-
structure  technology  mediating  the  share  of 
water between sectors. 
Study Area and Background
Water resources and location 
Tanzania faces perceived (and sometimes real) 
water scarcity problems at local levels despite 
the fact that, on average, it has abundant water 
resources to meet most of its present needs. 
However, while a third of these resources lie in 
highland areas, with precipitation in excess of 
1000 mm, about one-third of Tanzania is arid 
or semi-arid, with rainfall below 800 mm. The 
major  river  systems  constitute  the  principal 
surface water resources of the country, with 
mean annual runoff of about 83 billion m3 and 
an  estimated  groundwater  recharge  of  3.7 
billion m3. Half of the surface runoff flows into 
the  Indian  Ocean  from  the  Pangani,  Wami, 
Ruvu,  Rufiji,  Ruvuma,  Mbwemkuru  and 
Matandu river systems. The remainder drains 
northward, into Lake Victoria, westward, into 
Lake  Tanganyika,  and  southward,  into  Lake 
Nyasa. Some of the runoff also flows into inter-
nal drainage basins with no sea outlets. These 
include the Lake Rukwa and central Internal 
Drainage basins.
However, greater demand for water for irri-
gation  and  the  long  dry  season  (June  to 
October) result in low river flows and seasonal 
scarcity (World Bank, 1996). As evidenced by 
the case study in this chapter, this has resulted 
in conflicts between hydropower and irrigation 
sectors,  between  irrigation  and  livestock 
sectors,  and  between  upstream  and  down-
stream water users within the irrigation sector. 
Tanzania also lacks the economic resources to 
harness water and to overcome the extreme 
temporal and spatial variability in rainfall and 
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The Great Ruaha River catchment (GRRC) is 
located in south-west Tanzania (Fig. 8.4). It has 
a catchment area of 83,979 km2 and a popula-
tion of 480,000, according to the 2002 national 
population  census  (TNW,  2003).  Headwaters 
rise in mountains to the south, in the Poroto 
and Kipengere ranges, and drain onto the allu-
vial  Usangu  plains.  The  catchment  can  be 
divided into three major agro-ecological zones, 
which have different characteristics. The upper 
zone (1400–2500 masl) is semi-humid to humid, 
highly  populated  and  has  high  rainfall,  deep 
soils  and  intensive  agricultural  production.  In 
this zone, both rainfed and irrigated agriculture 
is  practised  all  year  round.  The  intermediate 
middle zone (1160–1400 masl) is charac  terized 
by a high concentration of irri  gation systems on 
alluvial fans, and here a limited presence of dry-
season  irrigated  agriculture  is  an  important 
means of livelihood. Therefore, this is an area of 
high  competitive  water  demand  and  hence 
persistent water conflicts.
The lower zone (1000–1160 masl) is semi-
arid with alluvial soils, with a low population 
density and a high concentration of livestock, 
particularly cattle. Here, the Great Ruaha River 
(GRR)  and  other  tributaries  pass  through 
seasonally inundated grassland and permanent 
swamps,  which  are  ecologically  significant, 
supporting a considerable biodiversity, notably 
its extremely high bird-life diversity (SMUWC, 
2001). The GRR discharges from the northern 
end of the plains at NG’iriama, an outlet of the 
permanent Ihefu swamp. The catchment area 
at this point is 21,500 km2, and is commonly 
termed  the  Usangu  basin,  synonymous  with 
the  upper  Great  Ruaha  River  catchment 
(UGRRC). About 30 km further north, the river 
passes through the Ruaha National Park, and 
from  there  further  north-east  to  Mtera  and 
Kidatu reservoirs. During the dry season, from 
July to November, the river is the major source 
of water for much of the wildlife in this park.
As is the case in most of sub-Saharan Africa, 
the livelihoods of the majority of people in the 
Great  Ruaha  River  catchment  are  largely 
dependent on agriculture. However, the area is 
characterized by high variability (with an aver-
age  annual  coefficient  of  variation  of  24%), 
uncertainty, and poor and uneven distribution 
of  rainfall  during  the  crop-growing  seasons 
(SMUWC, 2001; Rajabu et al., 2005). Despite 
the fact that the rainfall regime is unimodal, 
with a single rainy season (with a mean annual 
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areal rainfall over the UGRRC of 959 mm), the 
onset and duration of the rains vary from zone 
to zone and both are unpredictable in timing. 
Whereas the rainy season for the upper zone 
(highlands)  runs  from  October  to  May,  the 
rainy  season  for  the  middle  and  lower  (the 
plains)  zones  runs  between  November  and 
April. Of particular consequence for cropping 
on the plains is the fact that rainfall is between 
500  and  700  mm  on  average,  a  marginal 
amount  for  rainfed  maize,  and  necessitating 
supplementary irrigation for rice production.
Further  analyses  of  the  causes  of  hydro-
logical changes and background to the area can 
be read in a number of additional articles (van 
Koppen et al., 2004; Lankford et al., 2007; 
McCartney et al., 2008), while ad  ditional infor-
mation  on  the  prevailing  political  and  insti-
tutional context can be found in Lankford et al. 
(2004).
Farming systems and water users
As a strategy to cope with the uncertainty and 
poor  distribution  of  rainfall  during  the  crop-
growing season, the local farming systems in 
the  UGRRC  have  constructed  diversions  to 
abstract water from rivers for supplementary 
irrigation  in  order  to  minimize  risks  of  crop 
  failure.  There  are  three  types  of  irrigation 
systems, which are:
1. Traditional systems, which comprise village 
irrigation, based on the diversion of perennial 
or seasonal flows, used mainly for the produc-
tion  of  rice,  vegetables  and  other  relatively 
high-value  crops.  These  are  self-sustaining 
systems,  initiated,  financed,  developed  and 
owned by the farmers themselves, without any 
external assistance.
2. Improved traditional systems are traditional 
systems  that  have  received  government-  or 
donor-assisted  interventions  to  improve  the 
headworks and water control structures, and, 
on occasion, farmer training.
3. Modern large-scale schemes that comprise 
large-scale  farms  (such  as  Kapunga,  Mbarali 
and Madibira rice farms) built with the aid of 
international finance.
In nearly all of these systems, basin irrigated 
rice (paddy) is grown, to the extent that the 
Usangu  basin  contributes  about  15%  of  the 
rice production in Tanzania and supports the 
livelihoods of about 30,000 poor households 
in Usangu (Kadigi et al., 2003).
Below the irrigation systems are the seasonal 
wetlands of the Usangu plains, containing the 
permanent  wetland  of  the  Ihefu,  an  area  of 
about 80–120 km2. The seasonal and perma-
nent  wetlands  once  contained  significant 
numbers  of  fisherfolk  and  livestock  keepers, 
but following their forcible removal by govern-
ment authorities as a result of the formalization 
(gazetting) of the Usangu Game Reserve, these 
numbers have been greatly reduced. An exami-
nation of the contribution to the local economy 
is  conducted  and  implications  of  this  inter-
vention are described below.
Further  downstream,  the  total  power- 
generating capacity of the Mtera and Kidatu 
plants is 284 MW, which is 51% of the total 
hydropower capacity of Tanzania (TANESCO, 
2008).  A  fuller  history  of  this  hydropower 
development  is  given  below,  along  with  an 
analysis of the water management of the two 
dams.
After Mtera, the Kilombero Sugar Company 
abstracts water from the river for irrigation and 
cane processing. The company is located in the 
flat, fertile areas at the base of the Udzungwa 
mountains in the Msolwa and Lower Ruembe 
valleys in the Morogoro region of Tanzania. The 
mean  annual  rainfall  in  this  humid  region  is 
1347 mm, although moisture deficits are evident 
from June to December. Thus while crop mois-
ture requirements are generally satisfied by rain-
fall between the months of January and April, 
irrigation is required to maximize growth during 
the remainder of the year and to allow planting 
operations to take place in the dry months. The 
sugar company has a year-round water right of 
8.5 m3/s from the Great Ruaha River.
Hence,  six  main  river  water  users  from 
upstream  to  downstream  can  be  identified: 
domestic water users, in the high catchment 
and  plains;  irrigators,  mainly  on  the  plains; 
pastoralists  and  fisherfolk,  in  the  seasonal 
wetlands and the Ihefu; wildlife and tourists, in 
the Ruaha National Park; electricity producers, 
at  the  Mtera  and  Kidatu  power  plants;  and 
sugarcane producers.
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high user groupings: irrigated users and down-
stream users, split on the basis of  level of ab  - 
strac  tion of water into a first group of irrigation 
systems  on  the  plains  (mostly  rice  growers), 
and  a  second  group  comprising  water  users 
downstream of the main irrigation area on the 
plains (fisherfolk and wildlife in the wetlands, 
tourists and wildlife in the national park, and 
power  generators).  There  are  domestic  and 
irrigation water users upstream of the plains 
and irrigators in the mountain watersheds, but 
these are minor in extent and quantity of water 
use, given higher rainfall and lower evapora-
tion rates at these altitudes. These users are 
not shown in Fig. 8.4.
Water accounting2
Utilizing the water-accounting methodology of 
the International Water Management Institute 
(IWMI) (Molden, 1997; Molden et al., 2001), 
we have generated a ‘finger diagram’ of water 
flows for a normal-to-wet hydrological year in 
the Usangu basin (Fig. 8.5). It should be recog-
nized that the non-linear behaviour of the catch-
ment, with variable surface areas of irrigation, 
wetlands and storage by the Mtera hydro  electric 
dam/reservoir, imply a highly variable model of 
water flows and partitioning. The finger diagram 
(Fig. 8.5) should not be interpreted as a static 
model  of  water  apportionment.  The  key 
features are as follows:
1. The  calculations  represent  surface  flows 
only.3  Catchment  precipitation  and  green 
water  evapotranspiration  are  not  included. 
With regard to losses in groundwater, studies 
by the Sustainable Management of the Usangu 
Wetland and its Catchment (SMUWC) project 
and  observations  on  the  ground  show  that 
water losses of about 10% occur when rivers 
transit  the  geological  fault-line  of  the  East 
African Rift Valley from the high catchment to 
the plains. While this water supports perennial 
flows  in  the  Mkoji  subcatchment  and  some 
domestic  use  elsewhere,  little  of  it  creates  a 
water table that can be used for substantial irri-
gation withdrawals or flow augmentation. The 
Usangu  plains  are  typical  African  savannah 
plains  rather  than  flood  plains  in  the  Asian 
sense. Thus groundwater losses are shown as 
losses from the gross inflow rate.
2. Two  types  of  beneficial  depletion  occur: 
non-process (not intended), via evaporation of 
water from the wetland, and process, via net 
irrigation demand, and domestic and livestock 
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use.  Irrigation  losses  represent  the  principal 
non-beneficial  depletion  (occurring  mainly 
through non-recovered losses to groundwater 
and  unproductive  evapotranspiration).  Live-
stock usage relates only to calculations of drink-
ing water – note that green (soil) water is not 
calculated. These rates are shown in Fig. 8.5.
3. The fourth flow is a committed outflow to 
provide storage in the Mtera reservoir for evap-
oration  and  discharge  through  the  Mtera 
turbines, which annually have a potential useful 
power-generating requirement of a flow of 96 
m3/s. This discharge flow and the dam evapo-
ration  combine  to  establish  approximately 
3800  Mm3  annually.  Hydrological  analyses 
show  that  56%  of  this  is  contributed  by  the 
upper Great Ruaha catchment, approximately 
2130 Mm3. This value very closely corresponds 
to the determination of the outflow of 2130 
Mm3 at the exit of the Usangu wetland (in other 
words the surplus water to that utilized in the 
UGRRC).  This  demonstrates  the  analysis  by 
Yawson et al. (2003) that, during an average 
hydrological year, flows to hydropower storage 
are sufficient to meet generating needs, despite 
the common assertion that upstream irrigation 
is in direct competition with hydropower (Kikula 
et al., 1996; Mtahiko et al., 20064).
Introduction to policy stakeholders
In  addition  to  the  users  mentioned  in  the 
pre  vious  section,  throughout  this  chapter  a 
number of key stakeholder groups are discussed, 
many of whom have converged and overlapped 
in influencing policy and providing supporting 
services  to  water  management  in  the  basin. 
They are briefly introduced here.
In 1996 (partly as a response to hydropower 
electricity power cuts during the mid-nineties), 
perceiving  water  resources  manage  ment  in 
Tanzania  to  be  hampered  by  uncoordinated 
planning  for  water  use,  incomplete  policies, 
inadequate water resources data and inefficient 
water use, the government of Tanzania, with 
the assistance of the World Bank (1996), initi-
ated  a  sustained  programme  of  reform. 
Tanzania  adopted  a  river  basin  management 
approach for water resources management, in 
which the country was divided into nine river 
basins  for  water  resources  administration. 
These  are  Pangani  River  basin,  Wami/Ruvu 
River basin, Rufiji River basin, Ruvuma River 
basin, Lake Nyasa basin, the Internal Drainage 
basin,  Lake  Rukwa  basin,  Lake  Tanganyika 
basin and Lake Victoria basin. To manage each 
of these basins, a basin water office was created. 
The main activities of the basin water offices 
include: (i) regulating, monitoring and policing 
of  water  use  in  the  basin;  (ii)  issuing  formal 
water rights; (iii) facilitating and assisting in the 
for  mation of water user associations; (iv) billing 
and collection of water user fees; (v) awareness 
creation  of  water  users  regarding  water 
resources  management;  and  (vi)  monitoring 
and  control  of  water  pollution  (NORPLAN, 
2000; Mutayoba, 2002).
A substantial programme of reform, centred 
on two pilot basins, the Pangani and the Rufiji, 
was implemented through the decade from the 
mid-1990s onwards, through the River Basin 
Management  and  Smallholder  Irrigation 
Improvement Project (RBMSIIP), via a loan of 
US$21 million.5 The smallholder component 
of RBMSIIP was deployed principally via the 
local district council (Mbarali), with significant 
assistance  from  the  zonal  irrigation  office, 
located in Mbeya, and central support from the 
Ministry of Agriculture in Dar es Salaam.
In the late 1990s, the UK’s Department for 
International  Development  (DfID)  assisted 
RBMSIIP  via  a  technical  assistance  project 
implemented  by  consultants.  The  project, 
SMUWC,2 determined the cause of the hydro-
logical changes in the GRRC and contributed 
to  the  development  of  water  strategies  that 
could be applied in other basins with wetlands 
in  Tanzania.  Despite  its  significant  scientific 
findings, and also incorporating stakeholders, 
the project was discontinued in 2001, when 
DfID switched to development assistance via 
budget support. In recognition of this break, 
the Knowledge and Research division of DfID 
(KaR), with the assistance of the IWMI, funded 
a small project from 2001 to 2005, termed 
RIPARWIN (Raising Irrigation Productivity and 
Releasing Water for Intersectoral Needs),2 and 
designed  to  complete  some  of  the  studies 
started by SMUWC.
From  2000  onwards,  an  increasingly 
import  ant role has been taken by the World 
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its  ongoing  project,  the  Ruaha  Water 
Programme.  In  addition,  the  environmental 
group ‘Friends of Ruaha’6 has played a number 
of political advocacy roles in drawing attention 
to the consequences of water management.
The Mbarali District Council also was a key 
player. Despite a counter-productive effect on 
meat revenues, Mbarali district (almost synony-
mous with the Usangu plains, see Fig. 8.4) was 
a key advocate of gazetting the Usangu Game 
Reserve. Furthermore, because of the council’s 
developmental concerns, manifested by support 
for irrigation, it sought to diminish the conflicts 
between  rice  growers  and  cattle  keepers  by 
removing the latter and by siding with the main-
stream governmental view that the river should 
be restored to year-round flow through the con  -
struction of improved intakes (also a counter- 
productive  move  for  reasons  explained  else    -   
where in the chapter).
Historical Trends and Changes  
in the Basin 
As Table 8.2 testifies, the upper Great Ruaha 
basin has seen many changes over the last 50 
years  or  so,  mostly  related  to  population 
increases associated with greater utilization of 
natural  resources.  Associated  with  this  have 
been  major  land-use  changes.  The  natural 
vegetation of the alluvial fans has been largely 
cleared and replaced with rainfed and irrigated 
cultivation  and  grazing  areas.  Other  events 
listed  in  Table  8.2  are  discussed  below  and 
elsewhere in the chapter.
 
Growth in population, livestock and  
irrigated area
Between 1950 and 2003, the population in 
the UGRRC increased from less than 50,000 
to  approximately  480,000  (TNW,  2003), 
largely through in-migration from other regions 
of  Tanzania.  This  growth  has  also  been 
mirrored in the expansion of the largest urban 
conurbation, Mbeya, just outside of the catch-
ment in the south-west.
In the plains, most people are farmers, culti-
vating rainfed and irrigated plots, but a smaller 
number  are  pastoralists,  who  have  brought 
more cattle into the plains. Livestock numbers 
also increased, although these probably peaked 
Table 8.2.  Summary of historical events occurring in the upper Great Ruaha catchment. 
Period  Events and notes











1992  Kapunga is constructed; weirs across Chimala river
1992–2000	 Post-Kapunga	and	Chimala	river	changes,	continued	expansion	of	rice,	construction	of	 
	 	 	 upgraded	intakes,	introduction	of	widespread	dry-season	irrigation,	Madibira	 
	 	 	 constructed	in	1998.	Estimated	total	area	of	rice	at	end	of	1999	=	approximately	 
	 	 	 40,000	ha
1996	 RBMSIIP	project,	which	was	the	forerunner	to	the	wider	Water	Sector	Support	Project	 
	 	 	 with	funding	from	2007	to	2012	(both	World	Bank	funding)
1999–2001	 SMUWC	project	(DfID	funding)
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in  the  early  1980s,  at  around  550,000.  In 
2000, the number of cattle was estimated at 
around  300,000  head,  with  about  85,000 
other livestock (SMUWC, 2001). The pastoral-
ists moved into the Usangu catchment in search 
of pastures, following long periods of drought 
or competition over resources in their home 
villages. The areas include central and northern 
areas of the country, namely Dodoma, Singida, 
Shinyanga and Arusha regions, although com 
monly  they  are  known  collectively  as  the 
Sukuma. The numbers of cattle, goats, donkeys 
and sheep in the catchment has been a source 
of scientific debate for the last 10 years. While 
regional authorities proffered a figure of one 
million  cattle  (largely  to  support  arguments   
 that the plains were being degraded by over-
stocking),  various  study  reports  give  different 
levels  of  the  stock  in  the  catchment.  The   
livestock  census  conducted  in  1984  showed   
for Mbarali district a herd of about 513,600 
animals,  of  which  438,000  were  cattle 
(SMUWC, 2001).
During  this  50-year  period,  the  area  irri-
gated  in  the  wet  season  has  increased  from 
approximately 3000 ha to 40,000–44,000 ha 
(Fig. 8.6), although the area varies significantly 
from year to year, depending on rainfall. In dry 
and wet years, the total area can swing from 
20,000 ha to 40,000 ha, respectively. It is this 
growth in area that has led to increased compe-
tition and conflict over water, particularly in the 
dry season, and has led to the emergence of 
the three behaviours seen and characterized in 
this chapter.
The bar line in Fig. 8.6 indicates the extent 
of varia  bility in the area under cultivation from 
wet to dry years (SMUWC, 2001, adapted).
Environmental changes downstream
Many of the environmental changes in the area 
were associated with this growth of irrigation; 
however, most publicly noted has been rapid 
hydrological change. This is testified by visible 
changes in the flow of the major river draining 
the plains. The Great Ruaha River used to be 
perennial – river flow lasted throughout the dry 
season. However, since the early 1990s, the 
discharge through the Ruaha National Park has 
altered, becoming seasonal, with flows ceasing 
during part of the dry season. This cessation is 
explained by water levels in the eastern wetland 
dropping below the crest of the rock outcrop at 
NG’iriama (see Fig. 8.4), resulting in the wetland 
being unable to feed the river downstream. An 
analysis of flows measured at Msembe Ferry, a 
gauging station located approximately 80 km 
downstream of NG’iriama, indicated an increas-
ing frequency and extension of zero flow peri-
ods between 1990 and 2004 (Kashaigili et al., 
2006) of between 15 and 100 days, depending 
on rainfall and upstream abstraction, with no 
discernible upward or downward trend during 
that time. Coinciding with low flows in the mid-
1990s were a series of electricity power cuts 
from Mtera and Kidatu, fuelling speculation that 
upstream irrigation was depleting water destined 
for  downstream  ecological  and  economic 
purposes.
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Other  environmental  changes  include  an 
encroachment of cultivation into the wetland 
and a marked decline in wildlife species – most 
striking  of  all  is  the  replacement  of  wildlife 
herds by cattle. The combination of cultivation 
and grazing has resulted in a reduction of grass 
species and a concomitant rise in woody shrub 
species, which otherwise would have been kept 
at bay by natural flooding and grassland fires; 
both suggest a progressive degradation of the 
alluvial  fans  and  plains.  In  the  highlands, 
changes  have  perhaps  been  less  dramatic. 
However, ever-increasing areas have been, and 
are  still  being,  converted  to  cultivation  and 
settlement; erosion on steep slopes is advanced 
in places; and even where the woodland is rela-
tively  intact,  it  has  been  exploited  for  the 
important timber species.
An  analysis  of  declining  dry-season  flows 
and wetland area shows that between 1958 
and  2004  the  dry-season  minimum  area 
decreased significantly, but there was no clear 
trend  in  the  wet-season  maximum  area. 
Overall,  the  dry-season  minimum  area  was 
found to have decreased from an average of 
about 160 km2 (1958–1973) to approximately 
93  km2  (1986–2004),  i.e.  a  proportional 
decrease of approximately 40% (Kashaigili et 
al., 2006). Average dry-season inflow to the 
Usangu wetland (the Ihefu) between 1986 and 
2004 was estimated to be 76 Mm3, compared 
with  200  Mm3  between  1958  and  1973. 
Although rainfall over these two periods was 
not  exactly  the  same,  this  nevertheless  indi-
cates  a  reduction  of  dry-season  flows  of 
approximately 60%, and in some months (e.g. 
September  and  October)  the  reduction  was 
closer  to  70%  (Kashaigili  et  al.,  2006). 
However,  these  data  cover  the  period  when 
the gate closure programme was coming into 
effect  and  so  slightly  underestimate  historic 
water withdrawals. Flow measurements made 
by the SMUWC project at the end of the dry 
season in 1999 found that 91% of upland flow 
was being abstracted and, overall, it was esti-
mated that, on average, 85% was being with-
drawn in low-flow months (SMUWC, 2001). 
More recent studies conducted in 2003 and 
2004  in  the  Mkoji  subcatchment,  the  most 
heavily utilized for irrigation, continue to show 
dry-season abstraction levels in excess of 90% 
on some rivers (Rajabu et al., 2005).
Mtera–Kidatu hydropower
The  presence  of  nearly  50%  of  Tanzania’s 
electricity generation downstream of the upper 
Great Ruaha catchment has imposed a particu-
lar  character  to  the  debates  and  narratives 
about water development and management in 
the basin, and thus we provide here a historical 
background  to  the  development  of  hydro-
electricity.
In response to growing electricity demand, 
the  decision  to  construct  the  Kidatu  hydro-
power station was taken by the government of 
Tanzania in 1969. The 204 MW Kidatu dam 
and hydropower plant was the first phase of the 
Great Ruaha Power Project, funded via loan 
agreements  between  the  Tanzanian  govern-
ment, the Tanzania Electric Supply Company, 
the Swedish government and the World Bank, 
with the Swedish company SWECO as energy 
consultant. As the demand for electricity further 
increased, phase two of the Great Ruaha Power 
Project was considered by constructing a dam 
at Mtera. The government agreed to the pro- 
posal,  as  the  purpose  of  this  reservoir  was 
essentially as an upstream reservoir to ensure 
there  would  be  sufficient  water  reserved 
throughout the year, and especially during the 
dry  season,  to  supply  Kidatu.  By  December 
1980,  Mtera  dam  was  completed.  Following 
further  consultations,  it  was  proposed  that 
another smaller power station of 80 MW should 
be built at Mtera, an addition not originally fore-
seen in the planning of the 1960s. The water 
stored in the reservoir would generate power 
before flowing downstream to Kidatu to gener-
ate  204  MW  of  power  again.  The  80  MW 
Mtera power station became Phase III of the 
Great Ruaha Power Project and started operat-
ing in 1989.
Mtera  has  a  total  storage  of  about  3600 
Mm3 and a live storage of 3200 Mm3, when, at 
the maximum (full) supply, the water level is 
698.50 masl. The minimum water supply level 
allowed for normal power generation is 690.00 
masl. Below this level, down to the bottom at 
686.00  masl,  is  a  ‘dead  storage’  volume  of 
about 500 Mm3 of water, which may be used 
only when there is an emergency such as a 
national  power  crisis.  Although  SWECO’s 
report indicated that the water in ‘dead stor-
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added  that  emptying  the  reservoir  below 
690.00 masl would have adverse effects on the 
ecosystems that had developed in and around 
the  dam.  The  reservoir-operation  simulation 
conducted by SWECO in 1964 illustrates that 
about 25% of the inflow into the reservoir was 
lost by evaporation because of the ratio of the 
very large surface area to the volume.
Irrigation governance narratives
Associated with changes in the basin are narra-
tives  regarding  irrigation  development  and 
governance. There is not enough space here to 
deal with a wider treatment of the Tanzanian 
political economy in a post-colonial era, par  ticu-
larly the agrarian impacts of the socialist govern-
ment of Julius Nyerere arising from villagization 
and farming collectivization. Instead we concern 
ourselves with two narratives that pertain to irri-
gation and basin development: first, agricultural 
growth and modernization from 1960 to 1990 
and then, linked to it, a narrative of efficiency, 
environmentalism and water reallocation during 
the period 1995–2005. The former spans the 
period in which water and land were seen to be 
abundant, while the latter drew from percep-
tions  regarding  a  finite  supply  of  water  and 
concerns  over  power  cuts,  described  in  the 
previous section.
1960s to 1990 – expansion and 
modernization of irrigated agriculture 
The  contemporary  tension  between  the  two 
agendas of developmental modernization and 
environmental  protection  can  be  traced  to 
government intentions from 1960 to the 1980s 
to utilize the water resources of the upper Great 
Ruaha  for  irrigation.  The  key  development 
projects  of  the  formal,  state-run  irrigation 
schemes  of  Mbarali  (1972)  and  Kapunga 
(1992), plus the concerted efforts to ‘improve’ 
traditional intakes, can be traced to the 1978 
Hazelwood  and  Livingstone  study  of  the 
economic options available to the government 
of Tanzania in developing the Usangu plains 
(Hazelwood and Livingstone, 1978a), commis-
sioned  by  the  Commonwealth  Fund  for 
Technical  Cooperation  (CFTC).  The  request 
came as a ‘pre-feasibility study with the aim of 
elucidating the nature of development problems 
of  the  plains,  determining  the  appropriate 
pattern of development, assessing the potential 
for  development  and  identifying  projects  for 
detailed  feasibility  study’  (Hazelwood  and 
Livingstone, 1978a: vol. 3). The objective is 
stated as ‘to assess the potential of Usangu for 
development and for contributing to national 
economic goals’, while it also says ‘that its total 
programme should be seen as a long term plan 
for the eventual full exploitation of the resources 
of  Usangu’  (Hazelwood  and  Livingstone, 
1978a). The ongoing concerns in the 1960s 
and 1970s with generating economic growth in 
the region, typified by the study by Hazelwood 
and Livingstone, were heralded in 1961 by the 
FAO Rufiji basin study (FAO, 1961) and a US 
Bureau  of  Reclamation  (USBR,  1967)  study 
offering similar visions of large-scale irrigation 
development, limited only by water availability 
and labour, and unencumbered by economic, 
social  or  environmental  constraints  (Palmer-
Jones and Lankford, 2005).
Although the formal schemes for Mbarali 
and Kapunga amount to a total of 6800 ha, 
there can be no doubt that the Hazelwood and 
Livingstone  work  stimulated  further  develop-
ments in the region. Some are directly attribut-
able to this work: for example, prior to 1978, 
16 intakes of informal schemes were concrete 
but since then an estimated 40 intakes have 
been upgraded by a variety of donors, includ-
ing the government of China, JICA, the World 
Bank and FAO. This probably allowed an addi-
tional 10,000 ha of rice to be cultivated, and is 
certainly one major reason for the growth of 
irrigation from 17,500 ha, recorded in 1978, 
to nearly 40,000 ha, recorded by SMUWC in 
2000. This hectarage makes Usangu one of 
the single most significant rice-producing areas 
in Tanzania, contributing 15% of the national 
total (Kadigi et al., 2003). Other major projects 
were followed through: the Madibira scheme 
(3000 ha) was directly supported by Hazelwood 
and Livingstone and saw its first irrigated plant-
ing in 1999/2000. Overall, the development 
of  natural  resources  has  sustained  very  high 
population growth in the Mbarali district, with 
4–5% annual growth rates. 184  B. Lankford et al.
1990s onwards – irrigation efficiency, 
environmentalism and allocation
Irrigation efficiency is of significant importance 
in the discourse on irrigation and river basin 
management in Tanzania, and since the mid-
1990s it has been at the heart of attempts to 
reallocate water downstream to meet hydro-
power and wetland water requirements. Raising 
water-use efficiency was the key rationale for 
the River Basin Management and Smallholder 
Irrigation Improvement Project, initiated in the 
RBMSIIP project funded by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 1996).
Setting  aside  the  incorrect  claims  for 
upstream  water  originating  from  powerful 
interests allied to power generation (as serious 
though that may be), the economic return on 
the US$22 million loan to the government of 
Tanzania was predicated upon the argument 
that water saved in irrigation through raising 
efficiency would pass through the turbines at 
Mtera/Kidatu,  generating  considerable  finan-
cial and economic benefits. The single tenet 
underlying gains in efficiency was that if tradi-
tional intakes were improved by the use of a 
sluice  gate,  set  in  concrete  headworks,  this 
would give control over abstraction and thus 
reduce the volume taken into irrigation systems 
during wet periods. The project also matched 
intake  improvements  with  ‘demand  manage-
ment’ through the selling of water rights, as 
this would regulate upstream demand and send 
more water downstream.
Interestingly, this discourse was initiated in 
the 1970s when Hazelwood and Livingstone 
explored  differences  between  the  Mbarali 
system (perceived to be modern and to have 
adjustable  headworks  control)  and  traditional 
farmers  who  employed  traditional  intakes 
made  of  local  materials  (Lankford,  2004a). 
Hazelwood  and  Livingstone  (1978b:207) 
demonstrate  prevailing  views  regarding  the 
waste of water by smallholders: 
The possibility exists of controlling agricultural 
practices of peasants particularly at the time at 
which they plant, because an efficient irrigation 
system requires a considerable degree of water 
management. It is true that in the area with 
which we are dealing the limited peasant 
irrigated cultivation that at present takes place 
uses irrigation constructions which are largely 
unplanned and not professionally designed, and 
for which there is effectively no control or 
administration of the distribution of water. But 
this system is very wasteful in its use of water, it 
is also wasteful of land because cultivable areas 
are lost through flooding, and it is inequitable in 
its allocation of water between individual 
farmers.
The  contribution  of  Hazelwood  and 
Livingstone to this debate should not be under-
estimated. By publishing figures early on, they 
affected, perhaps even underwrote, the present-
day view that smallholders are less efficient than 
larger-scale  farmers  (JICA,  2001;  Kalinga  et 
al., 2001). The case study in Usangu provides 
an  example  of  the  errors  in  scientific  under-
standing of irrigation efficiency. The RBMSIIP 
was based on the premise that the project could 
raise  efficiency  from  15  to  30%,  allowing 
substantial reallocation of water, as the quote 
below from the appraisal report explains, and 
that  this  would  be  achieved  by  improving 
intakes,  selling  volumetric  water  rights  and 
training farmers.
 In order to illustrate this effect, the ‘savings’ in 
water which result from the improvement of 
some 7000 ha of traditional irrigated area under 
the project (this includes both basins) are valued 
using their capacity to generate electricity in the 
downstream turbines. An average ‘in the field’ 
requirement of 8000 m3 of water, for one ha of 
rice production, implies withdrawal of 53,300 
m3 from the river, with an irrigation efficiency of 
15 percent. Following improvements in 
irrigation infrastructure and an increase in 
irrigation efficiency to 30 percent, the 
withdrawal requirement from the river drops to 
26,700 m3 per hectare. This releases some 
26,700 m3 for every hectare of improved 
irrigation, to be used for hydropower generation 
downstream. For this exercise, the water is 
valued at US 5 cents per m3, the valuation for 
residential electricity use (34 percent of all 
electricity use, an intermediate point between 
the two alternate values) 
(World Bank, 1996:42).
Yet closer measurement indicates that effec-
tive  efficiency  was  probably  in  the  region  of 
45–65%, precisely because of reuse of drain 
water  by  tail-enders  (Machibya,  2003).  The 
erroneous assumptions contained in this quote 
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losses were depleted from the basin; (iii) improv-
ing intakes would reduce losses; and (iv) savings 
would automatically move downstream to the 
hydropower reservoirs. The failure to ground-
truth some of these assumptions is evident in 
that the project went ahead as planned.
The  fact  that  the  RBMSIIP  programme 
sought  to  increase  efficiency  by  upgrading 
intakes  rather  than  by  tackling  in-field  water 
management is indicative of the viewpoint of 
Hazelwood and Livingstone that it is the lack of 
control  at  the  headworks  river  intake  that 
reduces efficiency. This understanding fails to 
recognize that farmers use high flows to cascade 
water  through  their  system,  expanding  the 
cultivation  area  at  tail-end  reaches,  which  in 
turn places an efficiency emphasis on cascade 
management rather than what is happening at 
a single point on the river intake.
Environmental governance stakeholders  
and impacts
Arguably,  the  upper  Ruaha  has  become  a 
cause célèbre for a number of individuals and 
organizations. Foremost has been the interest 
shown by WWF, an international NGO in the 
restoration of year-round flows via the estab-
lishment of its Ruaha Water Programme. This 
programme  has  been  working  closely  with 
local stakeholders to improve water manage-
ment, with the aim of returning the river to 
year-round flow by 2010. It is also thought that 
WWF successfully obtained high-level support 
for environmental interventions by the govern-
ment of Tanzania, manifested by the promise 
by former President Sumaye (speaking at the 
Rio +10 preparatory meeting, 6 March 2001, 
London)  to  re-establish  ‘year-round  flow’  by 
2010.
The  government  of  Tanzania,  via  the 
Ministry  of  Tourism  and  Natural  Resources 
(which also manages the Ruaha National Park), 
agitated for the gazetting of the Usangu wetland 
and surrounding plains into a Game Reserve, 
thereby  legitimizing  the  removal  of  human 
inhabitants  from  the  area  (Moirana  and 
Nahonyo, 1996). Thus, in March 2006, the 
government,  through  the  office  of  the  vice 
president, issued a statement declaring to evict 
pastoralists and agro-pastoral and smallholder 
communities from the Usangu catchment and 
Kilombero  valley  in  Mbarali  and  Kilombero 
districts,  respectively  (PINGOs,  2006).  The 
reasons  put  forward  mainly  included,  inter 
alia, environmental degradation as a result of 
overstocking  beyond  the  carrying  capacity, 
land-use conflict between different user groups, 
and poor agricultural and irrigation techniques. 
The  statement  further  pinpointed  issues  of 
scarcity of water flows in the Ruaha River and 
subsequent low water levels at the Mtera dam 
(low hydropower productivity). Omitted from 
these  reasons  were  the  perceived  territorial 
advantages of drawing the wetland and plains 
into the larger Ruaha National Park and the 
financial gains to the government via the licens-
ing of game hunting. 
In the period from May 2006 to May 2007, 
large numbers of Sukuma agro-pastoralists and 
Taturu and Barabaig pastoralists and their live-
stock were evicted from the Usangu plains in 
the  Mbarali  district,  Mbeya  region  (IWGIA, 
2008). It is reported that most have now moved 
to Kilwa and Lindi districts. It is estimated that 
more than 400 families and 300,000 livestock 
were involved in this move, and that a large 
number of livestock died or were lost in the 
process. The same action was taken against 
the fisherfolk of the Usangu wetland, including 
the  impounding of bicycles and other belong-
ings.  Although  some  surreptitiously  remain, 
most have returned to their villages and fields, 
dispersed throughout the Usangu basin.
This  action  has  potentially  reversed  two 
opportunities for the management and sharing 
of  environmental  services  and  benefits.  The 
first is that taxes on livestock and meat sales 
through  the  Mbarali  town  livestock  market 
generated an estimated 52% of district council 
income  in  1998  (livestock  taxes  generated 
US$0.2  million;  SMUWC,  2001).  Then,  as 
now, there appears to be no contingency plan 
in place to suggest how such an income fore-
gone might be compensated for.
Second,  the  removal  of  wetland  livestock 
keepers and fisherfolk precludes the establish-
ment of a co-management plan for the Usangu 
wetland. Such a plan could have allowed local 
people to stay in the area in return for channel-
ling  and  directing  water  flows  through  the 
wetland in order to ensure a small dry-season 
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show that an exit flow of 0.5 m3/s could be 
generated  by  a  reduction  in  the  dry-season 
wetland area of approximately 10% (McCartney 
et al., 2007). A co-management plan would 
then generate environmental benefits for the 
district council, the Ruaha National Park and 
local  people.  Although  this  idea  has  been 
proposed to local stakeholders since the year 
2000,  sadly  there  has  been  little  sign  of  its 
uptake.
Summary
Thus, in summary, the upper Great Ruaha has 
experienced new and changed ‘drivers’ of water 
abstraction: increasing area of irrigation in both 
wet and dry seasons, a rising number of irri-
gation intakes, and a shift in the design of irri-
gation intakes from traditional to an ‘improved’ 
(but conventionally designed) intake. This has 
led  to  a  variety  of  symptoms  of  problematic 
water sharing, declining downstream flows and 
a  rise  in  competition  over  water.  Associated 
with these trends have been a number of govern-
mental and non-governmental interests in the 
region, which, among other discourses of natu-
ral resource governance, focused on interven-
tions  that  first  helped  to  drive  up  water 
abstrac  tion from rivers for irrigation and, second, 
attempted  to  redress  the  balance  of  supply 
between agriculture and downstream needs.
Interactions and Competition
Introduction
In this section, we explain some of the other 
interactions and conflicts found in the upper 
Great Ruaha, taking the opportunity also to 
explore the political construction of upstream 
scarcity to explain electricity shortages, and to 
briefly outline the three concepts that appear 
to be central to understanding how the basin 
might be managed.
Hydropower claims for upstream water
Here, we explore the ‘water scarcity’ claims by 
the representatives and allies of Mtera–Kidatu 
of overuse of upstream water. A series of anal-
yses  demonstrates  that  despite  claims  by 
power-generation authorities, the power cuts 
experienced from 1992 onwards were largely 
due  to  improper  dam  operation  and  not  to 
upstream depletion of water – put simply, low 
water  levels  at  Mtera  have  recurred  almost 
every year, regardless of the year being dry or 
wet.
In  1992  and  1994,  the  Mtera  reservoir 
experienced water shortages for the first time 
since  commissioning  and,  consequently, 
TANESCO  was  forced  to  impose  electricity 
rationing,  with  serious  consequences  for  the 
country’s production and economy. Reflecting 
its  unexpected  suddenness,  there  have  been 
controversies over the causes of the low water 
level.  The  scantiness  of  existing  data  often 
meant  that  their  interpretation  became 
informed  by  the  partisan  interests.  It  was 
argued, often via the national press, that the 
power cuts and water shortages were caused 
by  droughts  or  by  upstream  water  use  and 
other  impacting  activities.  The  activities 
accused were rice irrigation, deforestation and 
soil  erosion  in  catchment  areas,  and  valley-
bottom  agriculture  along  streams.  However, 
other analyses pointed to the operation of the 
reservoir, as explained below.
In  2004,  the  situation  became  so  critical 
that the Mtera reservoir was operated by utiliz-
ing the dead storage. The move was sanctioned 
by  the  government,  despite  advice  to  the 
contrary  from  the  Rufiji  Basin  Water  Office 
(RBWO) and the ministry responsible for water. 
In  fact,  the  then  Minister  for  Water  and 
Livestock Development, on learning that there 
were low inflows and very little water in the 
Mtera reservoir, issued a decree that the power 
company should not use any more water from 
Mtera  beyond  the  dead  storage  level.  This 
announcement by the minister was not heeded. 
We  do  not  have  information  regarding  why 
this was the case, but one might assume that 
the government deemed power generation to 
be the more expedient decision.
Faraji  and  Masenza  (1992)  carried  out  a 
hydrological study for the Usangu plains. They 
compared monthly and annual flow volumes 
entering  during  the  years  1989–1992  and 
found  that  the  amounts  that  went  into  the 
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range of the long-term mean. They concluded 
that, although irrigation had increased over the 
years, its effects did not show up in the volumes 
that  went  into  the  Mtera  reservoir.  They 
suggested the combined management of the 
two  reservoirs  was  an  important  dimension, 
given that, although irrigation was not invoked 
as a problem during the period 1980–1988, 
critically, there was no power generation facil-
ity at Mtera.
A  DANIDA/World  Bank  study  (1995) 
analysed  30-year  annual  flows  of  the  Great 
Ruaha. The results also gave no evidence either 
of a trend towards decreased runoff from the 
basin  or  of  any  aggravating  impact  on  the 
droughts  in  1965/67,  1975/77,  1981/82 
and  1991/92.  They  were  unable  to  link 
upstream  activities  directly  with  decreasing 
water levels in Mtera.
Investigations  and  analyses  conducted  by 
SMUWC (2001) revealed that, although there 
was widespread and significant abstraction of 
water for irrigation in the Usangu catchment, 
the critical impact period was in the dry season. 
However, volumetrically, most of the reservoir 
recharge occurs during a period of 3–4 months 
in the rainy season, and thus dry-season flows 
had always been very small and added little to 
the total flow. SMUWC argued that the Mtera 
reservoir receives most of its flow during the 
peak rainfall months, and power generation is 
dependent on the storage and management of 
that flow during the remaining, dry, part of the 
year.  The  study  also  refuted  strongly  held 
beliefs  (Kikula  et  al.,  1996)  that  changes  in 
rainfall and, in particular, deforestation were 
causes of reduced base flows of rivers flowing 
off the escarpment.
Since  the  commissioning  of  the  Mtera 
  reservoir, there have been enormous changes 
in both the demand and supply of electricity in 
the country, not adequately adapted to by the 
dam operators. The mismanagement of water 
in the Mtera–Kidatu system was confirmed by 
a further study on the system. Yawson et al. 
(2003; see also Machibya et al., 2003) investi-
gated  possible  causes  for  the  failure  of  the 
Mtera–Kidatu reservoir system within the Rufiji 
River  basin  in  Tanzania  in  the  early  1990s. 
Application of the TALSIM model (Froehlich, 
2001) to the Mtera–Kidatu system revealed the 
presence of unaccounted for or unnecessary 
spillage  from  the  reservoirs.  They  proposed 
that the core issue regarding the error-prone 
management of the Mtera–Kidatu system was 
that  flows  generated  within  the  intervening 
catchment (i.e. the catchment between Mtera 
and Kidatu) were neglected, while simultane-
ously pursuing a policy to generate maximum 
power  most  of  the  time.  Mtera  should  only 
generate power during the dry season, utilizing 
water being released to Kidatu. They concluded 
that if these rules (also rec  ommended by the 
consultants,  SWECO  (1994))  were  followed, 
then Mtera would not have gone dry in the 
1991–1994 period. The validity of this asser-
tion was tested with the TALSIM 2.0 model 
and an efficiency of 95% was achieved, indicat-
ing a very good correlation with the investi-
gative techniques employed in the study.
Parageoplastic behaviour
The salient feature of Usangu’s parageoplastic 
behaviour is that the growth in rice area did not 
generate  symptoms  of  downstream  water 
shortages  during  the  wet  season  but  it  did 
during the dry season. The total mean annual 
flow into the Ihefu under natural conditions is 
estimated  to  be  approximately  3330  Mm3. 
Currently,  average  annual  water  withdrawals 
are estimated to be approximately 820–830 
Mm3, just slightly more than the mean annual 
volume of evapotranspiration from the wetland 
(790 Mm3) but less than the net loss (of approxi-
mately 390 Mm3) once rainfall received by the 
wetland is taken into account. However, both 
the annual and dry-season volumes abstracted 
vary considerably from year to year, both in 
absolute terms and as a proportion of the flow. 
Hydrological analyses using linear regression 
confirm  a  statistically  significant  decreasing 
trend in dry-season flows (Fig. 8.7), based on 
the Student’s t-test). While there is a downward 
trend  in  total  annual  flows  over  the  same 
period, this is not statistically significant. Thus, 
while  the  basin  witnessed  the  most  visible 
changes in dry-season flows, the flow volumes 
during this period represent just a small propor-
tion of the total annual flow (of approximately 
6–10%).
The declining wetland area is also associ-
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Although  systematic  surveys  have  not  been 
recorded, there is widespread agreement that 
the  hydrological  change  has  considerably 
altered the ecology of the park near the river. 
Lack  of  water  directly  caused  the  death  of 
hippopotami, fish and freshwater invertebrates, 
and  disrupted  the  lives  of  many  others  that 
depend on the river for drinking water. The 
WWF reports that freshwater oyster popula-
tions have disappeared from the river, along 
with the clawless otters that lived on them. It is 
estimated  that  for  animals  that  must  remain 
within 1 km of water to survive (e.g. buffalo, 
waterbuck and many waterbirds), the lack of 
water has reduced the dry-season habitat by 
nearly  60%  (Coppolillo  et  al.,  2004).  The 
movement  of  animals  outside  the  park  in 
search of water has led to increasing conflict 
with local human populations and the death of 
some animals. Overcrowding of hippopotami 
in shrinking water pools has led to eutrophica-
tion  and  anoxic  water,  as  a  result  of  which 
many  animals  have  succumbed  to  infectious 
diseases (Mtahiko et al., 2006).
To summarize, the parageoplastic connec-
tion  between  upstream  irrigation  and  down-
stream shortages in the Ruaha National Park 
arose  from  excessive  abstraction  of  water 
through an increasing number of modernized 
intakes in the dry season. Although the area of 
dry-season irrigation was measured by SMUWC 
at approximately 5000 ha, large amounts of 
water  were  abstracted  inadvertently  through 
concrete intakes and ‘spilled’ on to fields that 
had been cultivated but harvested by that time, 
leading  to  unproductive  evaporation.  The 
  presence  of  wet-season  rice  combined  with 
modernized intakes appeared to increase the 
total length of the season of abstraction. Thus 
the rice-irrigating season has increased from 
approximately  150–200  days,  observed  by 
Hazel and Livingstone, to 250–350 days, seen 
in the last decade.
Non-equilibrium behaviour and basin 
governance 
The second basin behaviour revealed by the 
case study is the inter-annual swing in the rice 
cultivated area, from approximately 20,000 to 
40,000 ha, also mirrored in individual farmed 
areas,  which  change  from  a  fraction  of  a 
hectare in a dry year to many hectares in a wet 
year. A second intra-annual fluctuation takes 
place  when  the  wet-season  area  cultivated 
shrinks  to  approximately  3000–5000  ha 
during  the  dry  season,  seen  as  a  core  area 
made possible by the perennial rivers found on 
the plains. 
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Figures 8.2, 8.3 and 8.6 show this dynamic 
in various ways. The considerable change in 
cultivated area is forced by three factors: (i) a 
highly varying river flow; (ii) a large amount of 
irrigable land on the plains; and (iii) the ability 
of a large number of intakes to abstract more 
water when the rivers increase in supply, up to 
a cap set by the limitations of the intake dimen-
sions. The dynamic is termed ‘non-equilibrium’ 
because it establishes an environment that does 
not lend itself to predictable regulatory water 
management,  thus  providing  a  remarkably 
different context in which to frame and formu-
late irrigation planning. This contrast between 
equilibrium  and  non-equilibrium  thinking  is 
captured in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3 proposes that marked contextual 
differences exist between equilibrium and non-
equilibrium irrigation and water management. 
The key issue is how the management of the 
plateau  part  of  the  river-basin  development 
curve is theorized (assuming that in the earlier 
stages of development, supply outstrips demand 
in  both  equilibrium  and  non-equilibrium 
contexts).  For  example,  in  equilibrium  basins 
(or basins deemed to behave within predictable 
parameters)  supply  can  be  raised  by  adding 
storage, and demand management is fostered 
through regulatory and price-based reforms. In 
non-equilibrium  basins,  while  these  measures 
might apply in theory and be adopted in prac-
tice, their intended outcomes of creating further 
headroom are either limited or unpredictable. 
Thus, in a basin where the upward potential for 
unmet demand is so large (e.g. say because of 
irrigable land), additional storage may not bring 
intended equitable benefits for all users if the 
distribution  of  that  additional  water  is  not 
governed  adequately  or  hard-wired  into  the 
infrastructure. The use of normative irrigation 
planning pro  cedures in widespread use (FAO, 
1998) can lead to designs of abstraction head-
works  that  significantly  desiccate  catchments 
during  the  dry  season  when  river  flows  are 
negligible  (Lankford,  2004b).  Furthermore, 
demand management in a basin where demand 
already ‘crashes’ due to a natural supply deficit 
must also be carefully considered.
Particular  dimensions  of  the  River  Basin 
Management Project (the RBM component of 
RBMSIIP)  applied  to  the  non-equilibrium 
Usangu basin throw light on the ill-considered 
design of the project. The Rufiji Basin Water 
Office  (RBWO),  supported  by  RBMSIIP, 
designed a water rights system (see also MWLD, 
2002)  in  order  to  effect  regulatory  demand 
management, which was wholly unsuitable for 
the basin for a variety of reasons (van Koppen 
Table 8.3.  Comparing equilibrium and non-equilibrium irrigation and river basin governance.
  Equilibrium  Non-equilibrium
Observation  Irrigation area and demand for   Irrigation area and demand for water 
	 	 	 water	are	fixed	within	limitations	 	 	 vary	widely	with	supply 
Inter-annual	area	of		 Fluctuates	<100%	 Fluctuates	<1000%
    irrigation   
Irrigable	land	 Constrained	by	planning,	soil	type,		 Large	area	of	high	potential	land 
      gradients or zoning restrictions      available
Climate	 Tends	to	be	temperate,	tropical		 Tends	to	be	semi-arid	with	a	high 
	 	 	 oceanic,	which	reduces	water		 	 	 coefficient	of	variation	of	rainfall	 	  
      availability 
Irrigation planning  FAO-type methodology for   Requires a river-centred approach 
	 	 	 determining	fixed/adjustable		 allowing	for	proportional	intakes	 	  
      peak irrigation demand 
Water	rights	and	permits	 Defined	by	quanta	(e.g.	l/s)	 Defined	by	proportions	of	river	flow	(%)
Basin	development	curve	 S-shaped,	rising	to	a	stable	 S-shaped	to	high	variable	supply/ 
      plateau      demand curve
Supply,	demand,	share		 Adding	storage,	applying	 Storage	and	demand	management, 
	 	 management	 	 	 demand	management		 	 	 share	modification	
River basin governance   Suggests normative forms of   Suggests modular and localized models 
      regulatory management       to meet local apportionment190  B. Lankford et al.
et al., 2004, 2007; Lankford and Mwaruvanda, 
2007). The key reason the adopted system was 
faulty was its choice of a fixed quanta for a 
water right (e.g. 250 l/s). This specified flow 
rate implied that the water abstracted into an 
irrigation system in the Usangu would be meas-
ured. Yet, with the exception of the Mbarali 
intake  and  occasional  record  keeping  at  the 
Kapunga intake, no intake is monitored in this 
fashion, principally because there is no evidence 
for the existence of flow measurement struc-
tures.7 The consequences of this are that farm-
ers  do  not  regulate  (throttle  back)  their 
abstraction when they exceed their water right, 
in terms of either discharge or annual volume. 
For abstraction during the wet season, it should 
be noted that many intake dimensions do not 
correspond with the formal entitlement, either 
in the initial design stage or by further flow cali-
bration (Rajabu and Mahoo, 2008). It should 
also  be  stated  that  the  water  rights  are  not 
calculated systematically using any meaningful 
algorithm – not least because command areas 
fluctuate and an excessively high rice water duty 
of 2.0 l/s/ha is widely employed. Studies by 
SMUWC (2001) found that the water duty was 
closer to 1.0 l/s/ha because irrigation is mostly 
supplemental to the 600 mm or so of annual 
rainfall.  Thus,  having  paid  their  water  right, 
there  is  no  mechanism  for  farmers  not  to 
exceed  their  right.  This  situation  becomes 
untenable in the dry season, when river flows 
are a tenth or less of their wet-season flows, 
leading to officially sanctioned water rights and 
concrete  intake  designs  that  far  exceed  the 
actual water avail  able. Indeed, the hydrological 
conditions in which some water rights might 
apply  accurately  in  combination  with  other 
water rights on a stretch of river to cumulatively 
add up to an irrigation sector cap (therefore 
giving rise to a surplus for downstream needs) 
are statistically quite rare because the river fluc-
tuates  markedly  above  or  below  the  level  at 
which demands were calculated. At most, the 
system can be employed administratively as a 
record of intakes, names and owners.
Managing the allocation of water in dif  ferent 
contexts  also  suggests  a  rethink,  given  that 
normative regulation is questionable in a non-
equilibrium  context.  To  explain  this,  a  new 
dimension to water allocation – share modifi-
cation – is explored in the next section.
Share modification
Modification describes implicit and unintended 
contemporaneous  changes  in  the  share  of 
water between users or sectors as a result of a 
changing supply being modulated by existing 
institutional  and  infrastructural  architecture 
(Lankford,  forthcoming).  Thus,  while  ‘allo-
cation’ applies to longer-term applications of 
intersectoral sharing, or where an equilibrium 
climate (e.g. oceanic, temperate) exists, modifi-
cation of shares of water has greater relevance 
to  non-equilibrium,  pulse-driven  semi-arid 
climates. The upper Great Ruaha case study 
shows that when supply variability is marked, 
leading  to  greater  amplitude  of  hydrological 
events, and abstraction infrastructure is ‘fixed’, 
share  modification  and  its  management 
become  more  important.  Here,  a  variable 
water  supply  (where  supply  increases  or 
decreases  over  orders  of  magnitude  within 
relatively short periods of time) ‘forces’ dispro-
portionate shifts in usage in different sectors, 
depending on how users differentially abstract 
an increasing or decreasing rate of supply. This 
can be seen as a modification of the supply 
variability upon the proportions of shares to 
users and intakes.
Share modification is best explained via the 
case study typical of the Mkoji subcatchment in 
the Usangu, where an intake of say 250 l/s 
continues to abstract that fixed amount in the 
face of a declining river flow supply. Thus, if the 
flow rate declines from a peak of about 3000 
l/s during the wet season down to about 50 l/s 
during the dry season, the 250 l/s abstraction 
leads to a concomitant reduction in downstream 
supply,  and  eventually  to  a  zero  flow.  This 
behaviour contrasts with a proportional abstrac-
tion, where the intake takes might be re  designed 
to  abstract  a  percentage  of  whatever  flow  is 
present, so that the surplus percentage flows 
downstream.  It  is  the  application  of  many 
intakes  in  the  Usangu  with  fixed  abstraction 
design parameters that leads to an uneven allo-
cation of water between upstream irrigation and 
the downstream wetland during the end of the 
wet season, which runs into the dry season.
Another interesting example of share modi-
fication  that  influences  water  distribution 
between  the  wetland  and  the  downstream 
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Park arises via the natural rock outcrop that 
holds back the wetland water, leading to zero 
flows in the river when the water level drops 
below the sill level. The SMUWC and the WWF 
Ruaha projects both considered that installing 
a weir or a pipe with an adjustable sluice gate 
would enable more water to be held back in the 
wetland and also provide some controllability 
of  distribution  of  environmental  flows.  This 
type of infrastructure provides additional levels 
of  proportionality  to  an  otherwise  on/off 
system. 
Conclusions
In the last 60 years in the Great Ruaha basin, 
modernist and progressive narratives regarding 
water  development  and  conservation  have 
reified into local and external donor initiatives 
and  projects.  The  period  1950  to  the  mid-
1980s was marked by an expansionist, devel-
opmental narrative, resulting in the construction 
of  formal  irrigation  systems  with  large  engi-
neered  headworks  to  abstract  river  water. 
While  we  might  not  judge  harshly  those 
de  cisions taken, given the era in which they 
were formulated, we can be much more critical 
about  a  continuing  and  related  set  of  ideas 
around regulatory, efficiency and technological 
improvement  approaches  to  river  basin 
management that have contemporary signifi-
cance.  From  the  last  quarter-century  to  the 
current  day,  we  see  that  ideas  of  irrigation 
headworks’ construction are still promulgated 
as a part of an ‘efficiency’ and volumetric water 
rights narrative, resulting in an era of contested 
solutions  in  attempting  to  balance  allocation 
between multiple calls on limited water.
An unforeseen complex set of interlinked 
dynamics has emerged as a result of evolving 
abstraction and depletion of water in this highly 
variable river basin. Upstream access to water 
was further captured by irrigated agriculture, 
partly led by state interventions such as publicly 
owned  schemes  and  donor-funded  improve-
ment programmes using justifications based on 
intake  upgrading  and  irrigation  efficiency, 
resulting in inequitable and inefficient allo  cation 
across the river basin, and the prompting of 
new  behaviours  downstream  as  downstream 
users react to non-local, internal and external 
hydrologic perturbations.
Using  three  ideas,  we  have  critiqued  the 
ef  ficiency and water management found in the 
Great  Ruaha  catchment.  In  studying  the 
responses of users along these interlinked river 
sub-basins the authors coined the term ‘para-
geoplasia’  to  explore  how  distant  symptoms 
and behaviours arise from non-local depletion. 
Simply put, headwork designs that aimed to 
regulate upstream water abstraction during the 
wet season led to unforeseen dry-season para-
geoplastic impacts some 50–300 km further 
north in the wetland and the Ruaha National 
Park.
Using ideas of non-equilibrium water theory, 
we see that attempts to use fixed volumetric 
water rights to regulate flows in an environ-
ment where flows vary weekly, monthly and 
seasonally through several orders of magnitude 
were  also  misplaced.  Instead,  proportional 
water rights and headwork structures should be 
regarded  as  a  starting  point  for  upstream–
downstream water allocation and distribution.
Related  to  this,  water-share  modification 
contrasts further the differences between equi-
librium  and  non-equilibrium  environments. 
Share  modification  describes  the  differential 
uneven  apportionment  of  water  to  intakes 
sequenced on a river as a result of the inter-
action between a declining or increasing flow 
rate over time and the design parameters of 
the headworks. A series of proportional intakes 
would  result  in  a  more  even  distribution  of 
water shares than a series of fixed or regulated 
orifice  intakes,  with  a  percentage  of  flow 
designed to pass downstream to the wetland.
How  do  these  ideas  relate  to  river  basin 
development?  They  underline  the  high  level 
of  interconnectedness  between  differing  sub  -
systems behaving in unforeseen ways in differ-
ent  periods  of  the  hydrological  calendar.  In 
particular,  theories  that  underpin  water 
resources development during a growth phase 
of a river basin (in this case headworks designed 
using  unrealistic  water  duties  supported  by 
standard  irrigation  design  methodologies) 
might store up problems for governing water 
during  the  plateau  phase  of  a  river  basin’s 
development. Additional signals of wet and dry 
periods bring a variable supply of water to a 
basin, which imposes further challenges in the 192  B. Lankford et al.
management of demand and allocation. If the 
plateau phase is not stable or varying within 
predictable  peaks  and  troughs,  but  is  highly 
dynamic, then demand management has to be 
rethought, because the basin is more driven by 
a  non-equilibrium  collapse  of  demand  with 
supply. This, in turn, means that the basin, in 
the absence of large-scale storage or ground-
water, has to welcome expansion of demand 
during wet years but facilitate a contraction of 
demand across all users during dry periods. In 
a maturely developed basin such as the upper 
Great  Ruaha,  these  effects  and  behaviours 
point significantly to proportional water rights 
and infrastructure as the key departure point 
for managing surface water flows, combined 
with domestic provisioning for dry periods. 
A  key  problem  is  nevertheless  the  vexed 
issue of how to cap an upper limit of irrigation 
abstraction during wet seasons so that water 
passes downstream for other sectors. While an 
individual proportional intake can be designed 
with an upper flow limit, the problem of growth 
of the number of intakes, seen in the recent 
past, remains a risk in the future, regardless of 
the approach to individual intake design. The 
RBWO  is  considering  an  approach  which 
provides a single volumetric water right to a 
subcatchment (acting as the volumetric cap) so 
that the user association decides how to share 
this out among users. With this in place, it will 
then  be  necessary  to  revisit  a  catchment’s 
intakes to ensure that intra-intake shares are 
coordinated and that the catchment as a whole 
provides  a  downstream  proportion  during 
times other than the wet season. A fuller expla-
nation  of  an  approach  to  volumetric  and 
proportional  caps  is  given  in  Lankford  and 
Mwaruvanda, 2007. It is not yet clear how this 
will be fully adopted by Usangu farmers and 
supported by local government services. 
Thinking wider afield and more generically, 
our  ability  to  select  governance  theories  for 
future phases of the basin trajectory in different 
types of basins will be paramount, not least 
because  basin  interconnectedness  will  grow, 
uncoordinated experimentations with storage 
and  river  infrastructure  will  continue,  and 
hydrometeorological  extremes  –  and  transi-
tions between those extremes – may become 
more commonplace in sub-Saharan Africa.
Notes
1   This word is coined from Greek: ‘para’ meaning 
beyond, ‘geo’ meaning earth or land, and ‘plasia’ 
meaning something made or formed. The term is 
inspired  by  the  concept  of  ‘paraneoplasticity’, 
derived from medical research into cancer, which 
describes how, in the body, other cancer-related 
tumours start to occur remotely from the first and 
main tumour. 
2   There is not enough room to describe in detail the 
productivity  analyses  of  water  conducted  by  the 
RIPARWIN  (Raising  Irrigation  Productivity  and 
Releasing  Water  for  Insectoral  Needs)  project, 
which  was  funded  by  DfID  (UK  Department   
for  International  Development)  and  succeeded 
another DfID-funded project, SMUWC (Sustainable 
Management  of  the  Usangu  Wetland  and  its 
Catchment). It is worth mentioning, however, that 
productivity  is  highest  for  localized  livelihoods 
supported by livestock, brick-making and domestic 
uses, averaging at around US$1.00/m3 of depleted 
water (Kadigi et al., 2008). In addition, the produc-
tivity of irrigated rice (US$0.02/m3 of water ab  strac-
ted) can be compared with the value of water when 
it is used to generate and sell electricity – generat-
ing about ten times the amount, or US$0.2/m3. 
3   The runoff coefficient for the basin was calculated 
by  SMUWC  (see  Note  2).  It  studied  three  time 
windows  in  its  hydrological  analysis;  pre-1974, 
1974–1985 and 1986–1998. The runoff coefficient 
for the first window is 14%, while it is 9% for the 
second window and 13% for the third window. If 
the heavy flooding years of 1998 and 1968 are 
excluded  from  calculations,  then  the  resulting 
runoff coefficients are 12, 9 and 10%, respectively, 
for the three windows.
4   The paper by Mtahiko has a number of errors in it, 
including citing the SMUWC study for asserting 
that upstream irrigation resulted in less water for 
hydropower. 
5    Recently, the World Bank (2007) has upgraded its 
assistance  to  Tanzania  with  a  US$200  million 
Water Sector Support Project.
6    See www.friendsofruaha.org
7    Flow can be measured from the properties of the 
intake  flume  combined  with  knowledge  of  the 
head difference of water levels, taking the long-
crested weir sill height as a datum. In reality, flow-
gauging plates are not installed or monitored.   The Great Ruaha River, Tanzania  193
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Introduction
Oases  pose  a  particular  challenge  to  water 
resources  development:  they  are  tightly 
dependent upon the sources of water that they 
are able to access and strongly constrained in 
their growth by the utter scarcity that comes 
with  aridity.  Some  of  the  oases  –  think  of 
Marrakesh,  Samarkand  or  Baghdad  –  are 
located in desert or semi-desert areas but are 
supplied by a river that starts its course in rain-
ier, and often distant, regions. For such large 
cities, the time eventually comes when expan-
sion of both the city and its surrounding fields 
and orchards, which thrive on the association 
of sun, water and dry air, encounters the limits 
established by nature.
Esfahan, in central Iran, is one such city. 
The story of Esfahan, with its rich and long 
history, and of its lifeblood, the Zayandeh Rud 
River, vividly illustrates the challenges faced by 
societies in situations of water scarcity. In the 
past, user communities have developed robust 
institutions  to  share  springs,  qanats  (human-
made underground galleries that drain aquifers), 
intermittent streams, or river flows. Yet, basin 
closure – a state where all resources are fully 
committed and where water only reaches the 
terminus  of  the  basin  in  exceptional  years  – 
coupled  with  the  expansion  of  state  power, 
characterized by the reshaping of waterscapes 
by  large-scale  interventions,  has  made  local 
systems dependent on decisions taken at other 
scales.  Competition  for  resources  and  basin 
closure  generate  both  increased  hydrological 
interconnectedness between users and entan-
glement of governance and legal management 
regimes.
This chapter first describes the physical and 
human  setting  of  the  Zayandeh  Rud,  then 
reviews  ancient  and  recent  water  resources 
development in the basin, and finally reflects 
on  the  hydrological,  social  and  institutional 
consequences of basin closure. The Zayandeh 
Rud basin provides a vivid account of an oasis 
buying  respite  by  implementing  successive 
water imports from neighbouring basins. It also 
offers a textbook illustration of both the pro  cess 
of continuing river basin overbuilding and its 
consequences.
Physical and Human Context
The Zayandeh Rud basin covers 41,500 km2 in 
the centre of Iran (Fig. 9.1). The river rises in 
the bleak and craggy Zagros mountains (north-
west of the basin), which reach over 4500 m, 
traverses the foothills in a narrow and steep 
valley, and then bursts forth onto the plains at 
an  altitude  of  some  1800  m.  However,  the 
splendour of the river is short lived: reduced 
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towards  the  east  by  natural  seepage  losses, 
evaporation  and  more  recent  extractions  for 
irrigation,  and  urban  and  domestic  uses,  the 
river eventually dies out in the Gavkhuni lake, a 
vast expanse of white salt that forms the bottom 
end of the basin, lying at an altitude of over 
1200 m. In this naturally confined (or endoreic) 
basin, the flows reaching the lake are now much 
reduced compared with natural conditions, and 
there  are  extended  periods  when  no  water 
flows in the tail reach of the river (Fig. 9.1).
The total length of the river is some 350 
km, but it is the central 150 km of the flood 
plain  to  the  east  and  west  of  Esfahan  that 
provides the basis for intensive agriculture and 
large  settlements.  Along  this  strip  soils  are 
deep and fertile, predominately silts and clay 
loams, and slopes are gentle, ideal for the irri-
gated agriculture built up over many centuries. 
The river indeed forms an oasis in the desert 
(Murray-Rust and Droogers, 2004).
The  climatic  conditions  in  the  mountains 
are markedly different, as shown by data from 
Kuhrang,  which  lies  just  to  the  west  of  the 
Zayandeh Rud basin (Fig. 9.1). Situated at an 
elevation  of  almost  2300  m,  precipitation 
  averages 1500 mm, much of it in the form of 
snow,  and  snow  remains  on  the  ground 
throughout winter, only melting when tempera-
tures warm up from April onwards (Murray-
Rust and Droogers, 2004). In contrast, the city 
of Esfahan only receives 130 mm of rainfall 
each year, on average (Fig. 9.2).
The primary source of water in the basin is, 
thus,  the  upper  catchment  of  the  Zayandeh 
Rud. Lateral tributaries joining the river in the 
plains  are  mostly  non-perennial,  have  little 
regional importance and do not reach into the 
main part of the basin, except during winter 
months and rare flash floods, although subsur-
face runoff accrues to the main stream. Runoff 
generated  in  the  upper  basin  is  strategically 
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stored in the Chadegan reservoir, constructed 
just above the point where the Zayandeh Rud 
enters the flatter parts of the basin (Fig. 9.1). 
From September until February, inflows only 
average between 50 and 75 Mm3 per month 
(20–30 m3/s), reflecting both the dry condi-
tions of summer and then the cold conditions 
dominated  by  accumulation  of  snow  in  the 
upper parts of the basin. From March onwards 
snowmelt  increases  and  discharges  normally 
peak in April or May, with average flows of 
125–150 m3/s. In June and July, the discharge 
slowly declines to the low-flow conditions. The 
peak  flows  from  April  to  June  provide  the   
basis  for  widespread  downstream  irrigation 
using simple diversion structures. 
The  Zayandeh  Rud  basin  has  seen  a 
dramatic  population  increase  in  the  past  45 
years.  According  to  the  1956  census,  the 
population in the basin was some 420,000, 
while in 2000 the total population was esti-
mated at 2.3 million. This is an annual growth 
rate  of  5.9%.  Figure  9.3  shows  population 
growth in the basin and in Esfahan since 1956, 
projected to 2020 with a 2% annual growth 
rate from 1996 onwards. Growth has not been 
uniform.  The  fastest  growth  was  between 
1956 and 1986, averaging close to 7% a year, 
but in the past 15 years it has slowed down to 
2–2.5%  a  year.  Initially,  Esfahan  city  grew 
faster than the rest of the basin, but this is no 
longer the case: The growth rate of Esfahan is 
close to 2%, while outside the city it has risen 
to 2.5–3% a year.
Early Water Use in the Zayandeh Rud 
River Basin
Although water use around Esfahan is as old as 
the city itself and although there are records of 
water  management  dating  back  to  the  3rd 
century b c, when Ardeshir of Babak (the founder 
of the Sassanid dynasty) sent an engineer to fix 
the ‘disorders [that] appeared in the regulation 
of the Zayandeh Rud waters’ (Hossaini Abari, 
2006), historical documents on water use are 
scarce. Rusteh (1889), for example, who wrote 
in the early 10th century, mentioned that water 
use  was  unrestricted  up  to  the  district  of 
Alandjan,  while  the  distribution  to  the  down-
stream  districts  of  Djay,  Marbin,  Alandjan, 
Baraan, Rud and Rudasht was organized follow-
ing ‘rules established by Ardeshir Ibn Babak’. 
Hawqal, four decades later, also reported that 
the  sharing  of  the  Zayandeh  Rud  water  was 
‘calculated so that no water would be lost’.
The earliest-known detailed regulation of the 
Zayandeh  Rud  was  unearthed  by  Lambton 
(1938). Riparian rights in the 16th century are 
described in detail in a tumar (an edict) attri-
buted to Sheikh Bahai, which specifies the water 
apportioned each month to each boluk  (district) 
and village. The river was managed by a mirab 
(water master) elected by 33 boluk (representa-
tives), who selected six assistants, who, in turn, 
appointed maadi salars, heads of each maadi 
(main run-of-river diversion canal) that branched 
off the river. According to Lambton (1953), the 
introduction of the edict states that:
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(…) the competent authorities of the State 
should appoint a few persons of the reliable and 
aged men to establish, under the signatures of 
the exalted and honourable mostawfis and the 
confirmation of the kadkhodas and rish-safids of 
the boluks which share the water of the 
Zayandeh Rud, honestly and to the best of their 
knowledge, the shares and lot of each village 
and hamlet in each boluk, according to its 
capacity and need, and to enter in the registers 
under guarantee, so that regulation (of the 
waters) should be put into execution.
Water was divided into 55 primary shares, 
which were further subdivided ‘into 276 second-
ary shares associated with the major irrigation 
canals or maadi and into 5105 tertiary shares 
at  the  village  level’  (Hossaini  Abari,  2000). 
Managers were paid by users, in due propor-
tion to the amount of water received, and were 
dispensed with if their services were judged to 
be  unsatisfactory  (Hossaini  Abari,  2006). 
Where  there  was  no  maadi,  water  could  be 
lifted from the river or from drains using animal-
driven Persian wells (Murray-Rust and Droogers, 
2004).  The  application  of  the  tumar  was 
discontinued by invasions and some rulers, but 
was renewed in 1927, when about 500 rights-
holders met to demand the reinstatement of the 
rules. With some modifications in the 1930s, 
these  were  enforced  until  the  early  1970s 
(Pirpiran, 2007).
In  lateral  valleys,  such  as  the  Mourhab 
valley, which rejoins the Zayandeh Rud’s left 
bank west of Esfahan (see Fig. 9.1), the use of 
surface water was also socially controlled. In 
the 1960s, the water of the Mourhab River 
was allocated according to rules that villagers 
also  trace  back  to  Sheikh  Bahai.  The  rules 
determine  which  village  can  divert  which 
proportion  of  the  river  flow  during  which 
period, and they were equally enforced by a 
powerful mirab.1
The village of Jalalabad, located in the lower 
part  of  the  Mourhab  valley  (see  Fig.  9.1), 
provides a very good picture of water rights 
and management at the village level (Molle et 
al., 2004). The main sources of supply to the 
village  until  the  1960s  were  two  qanats,  in 
addition  to  whatever  surface  water  could  be 
diverted from the Mourhab River according to 
the rules. Land was apportioned among the six 
main lineages of the village in the beginning of 
the last century, and up to the present, qanat 
water rights have been defined at the plot level, 
in  terms  of  minutes  of  use  per  6-day  turn. 
These rights can be reallocated among plots, 
temporarily lent, ceased or leased, or perma-
nently  sold  and  transferred.  No  one  in  the 
village is aware of the full details of the system. 
This striking lack of centralized control goes 
together with a strict adherence to the estab-
lished rights and schedules. Spooner (1974b) 
posits that this can be partly ascribed to the 
fact that since ‘any disturbance of the temporal 
distribution  systems  affects  all  shareholders 
adversely, the normal premium on social order 
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is increased’. Out of equity, each lineage was 
given plots both at the beginning and at the 
end of the canal system. Maintenance of the 
ditches was undertaken collectively and that of 
the qanat was entrusted to specialized work-
ers; these workers, as well as the water masters, 
were paid by the users themselves, a system 
still in use.
More generally, qanats were considered as 
the private property of those who had invested 
in their excavation. Owners could be individu-
als, groups of families, or wealthy merchants, 
as in the case of Najafabad city, which used its 
wealth to tap the water of 17 qanats distant 
from the city by as far as 100 km and collected 
by a canal that follows the Mourhab valley and, 
even today, irrigates the lush gardens of the 
city.  Rules  have  defined  protected  areas  to 
prevent conflicts between qanat users (Foltz, 
2002). Areas like those of Borkhar, north of 
Esfahan, were well known for their high density 
of qanats (see Fig. 9.4). 
Ancient  water-use  systems  thus  involved 
village ditch managers, system overseers and 
valley mirabs (in both the main and the lateral 
valleys), who were all nominated and paid by 
the users in their jurisdiction, with well-accepted 
and well-enforced rules for sharing the resource. 
The cultivation area and irrigation doses were 
attuned to the available river flow and to the 
discharge  of  the  qanats,  which  served  as 
‘phreatic barometers’ (Lightfoot, 2003), their 
flow varying in line with the level of the aqui-
fers. Likewise, gardens formed the core of the 
irrigated  area  but  were  not  over  extended  so 
that they could stand water shortages. In case 
of excess surface water, short-cycle crops were 
cultivated on adjacent lands; this was the way 
to deal with the variability of the resource. As 
far as one can judge from available evidence, 
the  system  appears  to  have  been  strongly 
based on local governance and quite resilient. 
Hydrological interconnectedness was not criti-
cal because the density of qanats was regu-
lated, and lateral valleys would contribute both 
surface flow to the Zayandeh Rud in excess 
years and a subsurface flow at least during a 
large part of the year.
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Recent Water Resources Development in 
the Basin
Large-scale state interventions
Agricultural  and  urban  development  in  the 
Zayandeh  Rud  basin  has  always  been  con  -
strained by water availability. But the history of 
the  basin’s  water  development  is  not  (yet)  a 
story of limits. It shows that demand – largely 
generated by expansion of irrigation schemes 
– always exceeded supply, despite the succes-
sive  increases  in  available  water  brought  by 
reservoirs and interbasin transfers. ‘New’ water 
was, each time, committed outright.
The basin resources were first augmented in 
1953, when a first interbasin tunnel diverted 
water from the Kuhrang River to the Zayandeh 
Rud basin, adding 340 Mm3/year to a natural 
runoff  of  about  900  Mm3  (Abrishamchi  and 
Tajrishy, 2002). In 1970, the completion of 
the 1500 Mm3 capacity Chadegan reservoir 
(see  Fig.  9.1)  allowed  the  regulation  of  the 
water  regime.  With  these  two  works,  water 
supply and storage in the basin dramatically 
increased. This date also almost coincides with 
the nationalization of water resources in 1968 
(and  the  establishment  of  regional  water 
authorities,  subordinate  to  the  Ministry  of 
Energy) and signals the new power acquired by 
the state to control the lifeblood of the region 
and to design the expansion of the irrigation 
area in the valley, where an area of 76,000 ha 
provided with modern hydraulic infrastructure 
was  established.  Yet,  in  many  cases,  these 
modern schemes were superimposed on the 
ancient  network  of  maadi  and  qanats,  and   
the gains were thus limited, although double-
cropping became possible in most of the valley 
(Fig. 9.4). The maadi system and its attendant 
social organization and local knowledge were 
thus overridden and replaced by a state agency 
in charge of operation and maintenance. The 
intakes  of  most  maadi  were  obstructed  and 
instead  the  river  was  barred  at  two  points 
(Nekouabad and Abshar) by major regulators 
that  distributed  water  to  new,  large  main 
canals, one on each bank of the river. Likewise, 
overseers and heads of maadi were replaced 
by state-appointed technicians. 
With  the  opening  of  a  second  interbasin 
tunnel from the Kuhrang River in 1986, another 
250 Mm3 was made available annually.2 This 
spurred the rehabilitation of the old Rudasht 
scheme, at the tail-end of the valley, and the 
extension of the irrigated area by some 40,000 
ha  (Borkhar  and  Mayhar  schemes).  Part  of 
these  two  districts  was  already  irrigated  with 
groundwater,  but  overexploitation  had  gener-
ated problems of declining water quality, which 
new surface water was first supposed to miti-
gate;  whatever  fresh  water  was  available  in 
excess would be used to expand cultivation.
The increased available supply, in addition 
to  being  committed  to  new  irrigation  areas, 
also met the growing needs of Esfahan (with its 
population  now  totalling  1.6  million,  and  a 
growth rate that reached 5% in some years) 
and of neighbouring industries. The industrial 
sector now needs over 100 Mm3 annually.
In  2009,  an  additional  260  Mm3 will  be 
made  available  through  the  third  Kuhrang 
tunnel, together with 200 Mm3 diverted from 
the  Dez  River  upper  catchment  (the  Lenjan 
tunnel). This will more than double the natural 
annual runoff (see Fig. 9.1). Another tunnel, 
the  Behesh  Abad  tunnel,  is  under  study.  It 
would  bring  700  Mm3  downstream  of  the 
Chadegan dam but would require a very costly 
75-km-long tunnel (Abrishamchi and Tajrishy, 
2002; Morid, 2003).
The evolution of surface water supply and 
use is shown in Fig. 9.5. Inflow into the valley 
(measured at Pol-e-Kaleh station) is completely 
diverted  and  consumed,  except  in  wet  years, 
when part of it reaches the Gavkhuni lake (flow 
at Varzaneh). The additional inflow to be brought 
by the two new tunnels is likely to be fully allo-
cated and consumed as soon as it is made avail-
able. At best, within a few years, they will help 
to replenish aquifers if farmers can use more 
surface water instead of groundwater.
There is no significant year-to-year carry-
over storage in the Chadegan reservoir because 
almost all of the flood water entering the reser-
voir is released prior to the next flood season. 
This maximizes the production from irrigated 
agriculture  (at  the  expense  of  security  in 
supply), and part of the variability in supply is 
handled  by  resorting  to  groundwater.  This 
  buffering  role  of  aquifers  was  critical  in  the 
1999–2001 drought (see later) (Molle et al., 
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able to compensate for dwindling surface water 
in the long run.
State  investments  and  regulation  did  not 
remain confined to the main valley: they also 
expanded into lateral valleys, such as the Hana 
and Mourhab valleys. In the latter, for example, 
in the late 1980s the Ministry of Jihad under-
took the construction of the Khamiran dam, 
with  the  objective  of  increasing  storage  and 
local water use (Molle et al., 2004). The dam 
was completed in 1992 and has a capacity of 
6.8  Mm3.  Instead  of  the  natural  system  of 
  aquifer  recharge  through  the  stream,  which 
had prevailed for centuries, the dam is now 
supplying water to downstream villages through 
a lined canal approximately 40 km long. To 
increase  the  value  and  usefulness  of  the 
Khamiran dam and extend the benefits of the 
Chadegan reservoir to other valleys, a plan was 
drawn up to pump water from the reservoir 
over  the  mountain  ridge  into  the  Khamiran 
dam. In 1991, the Karvan pump station was 
constructed for that purpose, but it faced severe 
technical  problems  and  its  operation  was 
discontinued after some 3 years (Newson and 
Ghazi, 1995).
Local water resource development
Notwithstanding these state-initiated projects, 
villagers at the local level have also been actively 
looking  for  ways  to  respond  to  population 
growth  by  increasing  supply  from  aquifers, 
through qanats or wells. The growing inter-
vention of the state after 1968 came together 
with  a  modernist  ethos  that  considered 
tra  ditional village irrigation as primitive, back-
ward and inefficient (McLachlan, 1988; Ehlers 
and Saidi, 1989). Modernization required tech-
nology and modern water-lifting devices, and 
the development of pumps and wells was seen 
as very advantageous compared with qanats, 
because the fluctuating discharge of the latter 
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was considered as hindering agriculture. This 
considerably boosted the expansion of wells, 
which started in the late 1950s. While in the 
1950s the contribution of tube-wells was negli-
gible  and  existing  qanats  were  serving  1.2 
million ha of irrigated land in the whole of Iran, 
by the mid-1970s wells were already providing 
8  billion  m3  against  9  billion  m3  by  qanats 
(McLachlan, 1988). 
The post-revolution period was marked by 
the continuing development of shallow wells. 
This  was  part  of  a  policy  emphasizing  self- 
reliance and the development of production, 
coupled with a strong stance in favour of popu-
lation growth (which reached a rate of 3.8% in 
the 1980s). This development seems to have 
been  based  on  inadequate  hydrological 
ana  lyses, and villagers got into the business of 
well-digging  despite  reservations  and  aware-
ness  that  qanats  might  be  impacted.  In 
Jalalabad, for example, the wells did bring a 
substantial increase in water supply. Jalalabad 
received  an  authorization  to  sink  eight  wells 
around  the  village,  and  these  were  used  to 
expand the garden area. In addition, villagers 
obtained a permit to dig 15 wells within the 
existing orchards, as a way to boost the avail-
able water per hectare of garden. As a result, 
however,  the  discharge  of  one  of  the  two 
qanats  used  by  the  village  soon  started  to 
  dwindle and eventually dried up. The impact of 
the development of wells on the discharge of 
the qanats confirmed local knowledge about 
the interconnectedness of the different water 
sources.
Studies  conducted  by  the  Esfahan  Water 
Authority (EWA) in 2000 revealed that several 
aquifers were being overexploited, especially in 
some  of  the  irrigated  areas  (Morid,  2003). 
Presently  about  21,200  tube  wells,  1726 
qanats  and  1613  springs  exploit  a  total  of 
3619 Mm3 of groundwater annually. This is 
more than twice the surface water diversions, 
which (although both sources are partly inter-
dependent) gives an idea of the importance of 
groundwater in the Zayandeh Rud basin.
Socio-hydrological Interconnectedness
Despite  the  periodic  transfer  of  additional 
water from neighbouring basins, these changes 
in water resources development and use point 
to a constant overcommitment of resources. 
The  increase  in  the  abstraction  capacity, 
  notably because of the overdevelopment of irri-
gated  areas,  created  a  very  tight  river  basin 
system, where some water paths disappeared 
or were reversed and where users in the basin 
are  increasingly  interdependent.  What  is 
stored,  conserved  or  depleted  at  one  point 
dictates  what  is  available  at  another  point 
further downstream; externalities travel across 
the basin in a way that is blurred by the irregu-
larity and partial invisibility of the hydrological 
cycle  (Molle,  2003).  This  section  illustrates 
several  social/spatial  competitions  and  allo-
cation conflicts which result from this growing 
interconnectedness.
Upstream versus downstream
In  the  absence  of  clear  and  enforced  water 
rights, upstream areas are in an advantageous 
position. In closed basins, new upstream abstrac-
tion merely shifts the benefits of water use from 
downstream to upstream areas. A typical exam-
ple of such a shift in the Zayandeh Rud basin is 
occurring between the Chadegan reservoir and 
Lenjanat (the beginning of the main plain; see 
Fig. 9.1). Traditionally, irri  gation was restricted 
to the narrow valley bottom (to areas which, 
altogether,  might  nevertheless  amount  to 
40,000  ha)  and  occurred  through  gravity. 
Numerous  private,  large  diesel  pumps  now 
abstract water to supply 10,000 ha of nut and 
almond orchards located on the plateau, 150 m 
above  the  valley  floor  (Murray-Rust  and 
Droogers,  2004).  These  orchards,  often  irri-
gated  with  drippers,  may  be  in  the  order  of 
10,000  ha  and  are  rapidly  expanding.  One 
bank of the river belongs to the Chaharmahal-
va-Bakhtiari province, which – in the absence of 
interprovincial  allocation  agreements  –  is 
supporting  this  development,  based  on  the 
perception that the river is also ‘theirs’.
Other  upstream  capture  of  resources  is 
apparent  in  the  unbalanced  share  of  water 
delivered  to  the  different  irrigation  schemes 
(see Fig. 9.4). The Nekouabad schemes receive, 
on average, 39% of the total irrigation supply, 
although they only make up 18% of the irri-
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the  Borkhar  and  Mayhar  schemes  has  also 
reduced the amount of water flowing down-
stream. Increasing water scarcity (and resulting 
soil   salinization) in the downstream area can be 
contrasted with its affluent past: strikingly, in 
the 10th century, Hawqal (1889) reported that 
the [tail-end] districts of Rudasht and Baraan 
constituted ‘an important region in which ten 
mosques can be found. Harvests are abundant 
and all the supply of Esfahan comes from it’ 
(emphasis  added).  Benefits  from  water  use 
have clearly been shifted upstream.
Wells versus qanats
A prime example of reallocation is, of course, 
that  of  wells  depleting  local  aquifers. 
Development of wells is tantamount, at least 
partially, to a reallocation of water from qanat 
(sometimes spring) owners to the well owners, 
and – oftentimes – from collective to individual 
use and management. These owners may or 
may not be the same persons, but those with 
the financial capacity to drill wells tend to get 
the  upper  hand.  The  development  of  wells 
eventually reduces groundwater flows to down-
stream  areas.  Jalalabad’s  farmers,  in  the 
Mourhab valley, understand that groundwater 
is not a static resource and that the issue is 
‘pumping groundwater before it flows down-
stream’, as one of them expressed.
The history of the destruction of qanats by 
wells, in Iran and elsewhere, is documented by 
several  studies  (e.g.  Ehlers  and  Saidi,  1989; 
see  also  Lightfoot,  1996  and  Mustafa  and 
Usman  Qazi,  2007,  for  examples  from 
Morocco  and  Baluchistan,  respectively).  It  is 
likely, however, that in some areas the poten-
tial of ground  water was higher than what the 
qanats were extracting, but insufficient control 
of their number and location eventually led to 
competition with the qanats. The qanats of 
the Borkhar area, for example, a flourishing 
cultivated area north of Esfahan, were destroyed 
by the spread of deep wells sunk to irrigate 
summer crops and orchards (Lambton, 1969).
Qanat  discharges  are  determined  by  the 
height of the water table, which determines the 
length of the water-bearing section (Beaumont, 
1989). Wells, in contrast, ensure a more or less 
constant discharge, irrespective of the depth of 
the water table (at least in a certain range and in 
the short term). They are not only less sensitive 
to variations in the groundwater stocks but may 
also abstract more water out of the aquifer than 
what comes in as recharge. The ‘mining’ of 
aquifers had little short-term impact but proved 
to be unsustainable after a few years, especially 
when the 1999–2001 drought occurred.
Lateral plains versus the main plain
Depletion of groundwater in both the main and 
lateral valleys has inverted the total net under-
ground  flow  to  the  Zayandeh  Rud.  In  the 
Mourhab valley, for example, the cumulative 
impact  of  the  Khamiran  dam  and  the  wells 
and  the  qanats  on  the  groundwater  flow  to 
the  Zayandeh  Rud  itself  has  been  dramatic, 
although  partly  invisible,  since  water  was 
‘retained’ in the valley. Likewise, Gieske and 
Miranzadeh  (2003)  have  estimated  that 
approximately 250 Mm3 out of an annual yield 
of 275 Mm3 of lateral groundwater flow to the 
Lenjanat  alluvial  fan  aquifer  is  now  tapped. 
These  examples  show  how  base-flow  water 
formerly used by agriculture downstream in the 
main valley was reallocated almost ‘invisibly’ to 
provide benefits to upstream farmers.
Further down the valley it is, in all like    lihood, 
the river which now recharges the valley aqui-
fers,  an  aspect  which  is  often  overlooked 
(Morid,  2003).  By  drawing  down  the  water 
table, well users (including the city that sank 
deep wells to irrigate large ‘green belts’ of trees 
planted  ‘for  the  environment’)  not  only  tap 
underground flows that used to contribute to 
the base flow of the river but also ‘drag’ water 
from  the  river  bed  to  lateral  aquifers,  to  the 
detriment of irrigation downstream of Esfahan.
City versus agriculture
As in many regions of the world, the combina-
tion of water scarcity and urban sprawl results 
in water being reallocated out of agriculture to 
the  domestic  and  industrial  sectors.  In  the 
Zayandeh Rud basin such reallocation is left to 
the discretion of the Ministry of Power, which 
controls the allocation of the Chadegan dam 
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from  MPs  or  other  political  consti  tuencies 
(Ghazi, 2003). For example, factories generally 
have no problem in getting supply from irri-
gation canals since their demand is allegedly 
limited and the Ministry can sell water to them 
at  a  much  higher  price.  The  interests  of 
con  struc  tion and landscaping companies noto-
riously involved in kickback practices are also 
more easily catered for (Foltz, 2002).
That priority in allocation is given to non-
agricultural uses was well illustrated in 2001, 
when, at the peak of the drought, diversions to 
agriculture  were  reduced  to  zero  during  the 
whole season and cultivators were left solely 
with  their  groundwater  resources,  despite 
water releases from the dam still amounting to 
39%  of  yearly  average  values  (Molle  et  al., 
2008). Power asymmetries were made patent 
when  business  owners  (and  angry  residents 
alike) in the city asked for water to be released 
from the dam, claiming that national coverage 
of the crisis in the basin (children playing soccer 
in the river bed) was detrimental to the flow of 
tourists which normally converged to the city. 
As  the  attractiveness  of  Esfahan  is  strongly 
related to the spell of its gardens and bridges, 
water  was  released  to  the  Zayandeh  Rud 
  (literally the ‘life-giving river’) to restore their 
magic and save the tourist season.
Greater Esfahan, with its population of 1.6 
million and its current annual growth rate at 
2.3%, receives an increasing share of water, 
estimated at 250 Mm3/year. In the 1970s, the 
Zayandeh Rud basin was the focus of specific 
government  policies  to  increase  industrial 
production outside Tehran. Esfahan was seen 
as  a  prime  location,  particularly  as  the 
Chadegan reservoir had just been completed 
and it was assumed that water supplies would 
be readily available. Between 1975 and 1977 
four major industries were developed (defence 
industries,  Mobarekh  steel  mill,  Esfahan  oil 
refinery and Sepahan cement factory), with a 
total annual demand of 60 Mm3. A polyacrylic 
factory was added in 1980, with a demand of 
an additional 5 Mm3. The war with Iraq halted 
industrial  development,  but  from  1988  to 
1991 more industrial enterprises were estab-
lished, with a total demand of 39 Mm3. Total 
industrial  demand  is  therefore  at  least  104 
Mm3 (Murray-Rust and Droogers, 2004).
But water is also committed to cities located 
in much drier areas (Yazd, Rasfanjan, Kashan) 
and outside the basin. Yazd receives 90 Mm3 
annually through a pipeline, and diversions of 
42 Mm3 to Kashan and Sahr Kurd will soon 
start (Abrishamchi and Tajrishy, 2002; Morid, 
2003). While these cities are more distant from 
the Zagros ‘water-tower’ and their situation is 
somewhat worse, these transfers are also politi-
cal decisions, which are probably not unrelated 
to the fact that Yazd and Rafsanjan are home to 
former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani.
Human use versus nature
Abstraction  of  all  the  water  available  in  the 
river has been the rule since the mid-1960s, 
when  the  basin  closed  and  the  flow  to  the 
Gavkhuni swamp and lake was limited to flood 
periods and excess years (see Fig. 9.5). As a 
result,  the  Gavkhuni  swamps,  an  important 
wetland for migratory birds and registered as a 
Ramsar site, became degraded. Salinity of soil 
and water in Rudasht – the tail-end agricultural 
area – is on the rise; yields are the lowest in the 
valley, and some plots are now left uncultivated 
(Morid,  2003;  Murray-Rust  and  Droogers, 
2004).
More generally, reduced diversions to irri-
gation also means that percolation and leach-
ing  of  salts  have  been  reduced,  while  the 
groundwater used as a substitute is also often 
of poor quality. Soil management becomes a 
central issue as more soils are threatened by 
salinization and by becoming sodic.
With  insufficient  discharges  in  the  river, 
river health has also been impacted, and the 
values  of  biological  oxygen  demand  from 
Esfahan downstream are classified as ‘bad’ (i.e. 
higher than 10) and reach 23 (Pourmoghaddas, 
2006).
Groundwater exploitation versus next 
generations 
Following  the  construction  of  the  Chadegan 
reservoir,  it  appeared  that  water  table  levels 
have risen in many areas, not least in Rudasht,   
at the tail-end. However, data over the past   
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dropping in all parts of the irrigated areas of 
the basin, and in some areas they are dropping 
dramatically. In Najafabad, just west of Esfahan, 
fruit trees planted 10–15 years ago based on 
groundwater irrigation are dying due to rapidly 
declining groundwater, resulting in older wells 
drying up due to the drilling of larger, deeper 
wells for urban and industrial water supplies.
While wells have spread in areas formerly 
exploited through the use of qanats, they have 
also developed in irrigation schemes. Within 
the irrigation systems, the decline of aquifers 
has been more or less constant in the past 6 
years. In Nekouabad left and right banks, aver-
age decline has been 2.5 m/year and 1.5 m/
year, respectively, almost certainly exacerbated 
by domestic and industrial installation of wells. 
In Abshar it has declined by some 0.4–0.6 m/
year, in Borkhar by 0.8 m/year, and even in 
Rudasht, where water quality is poor, ground-
water  tables  have  dropped  by  0.25  m/year. 
This suggests that somewhere around 250–600 
mm/year  are  being  pumped  for  agriculture 
and are not being recharged (Murray-Rust and 
Droogers, 2004).
Aquifers definitely have a crucial buffering 
role in compensating for deficient surface water 
supply in dry years. A fascinating measure of 
their importance was provided in 2001, when 
no water was delivered to irrigated areas but the 
cropping area was still at 60% of its value in a 
normal  year  (Molle  et  al.,  2008).  This  role, 
however, can only be sustained if aquifers are 
replenished;  it  is  hard  to  imagine,  at  the 
moment,  why  and  how  this  could  occur.  In 
addition, it is also unclear to what extent the 
overdraft of the aquifer can continue without 
incurring changes in the water’s salt content.
Main Issues and Responses to  
Basin Closure
Allocation mechanisms and basin 
 governance
The problems of competition highlighted above 
signal a situation in which water is constantly 
reallocated through the decisions of both local 
actors (e.g. spread of wells) and the state (e.g. 
construction  of  irrigated  schemes,  export  of 
water,  etc.),  with  negative  consequences  in 
terms  of  equity  and  environmental  sustaina-
bility, and externalities concentrating on down-
stream rural users, the environment and the 
next  generations.  Overallocation  (due  to  an 
abstraction  capacity  far  above  available 
re  sources) and reallocation (whether implicit or 
explicit, intended or not) are due to both the 
lack of control/monitoring of who gets what 
and  when,  and  the  absence  of  a  system  of 
en  titlement or rights.
The Civil Code, following Islamic Law, gives 
priority  to  established  owners  of  land  over 
newcomers,  and  upstream  over  downstream 
users of water (Ghazi, 2003). Prior appropria-
tion rights were protected by a clause stipulat-
ing that the use of water by newcomers should 
not impact on the interests of existing users. 
However, McLachlan (1988) reports that: 
the legal frameworks from Islamic Law and the 
Civil Code that surrounded water use were 
powerfully supplemented by customary practices 
(‘urf') … These local regulations governed to a 
large degree the access to, and use of, water in 
irrigation within what was a complex 
organization of supply in an uncertain physical 
environment. 
The need to protect springs, wells and qanats 
was addressed by defining a harim, or an area 
with extraction around these sources pro  hibited 
(Foltz, 2002). While these socially controlled 
modes of water exploitation were efficient at 
the scale of communities, they were eroded by 
the  lack  of  control  and  hydrological  criteria 
regarding the drilling of wells.
The nationalization of water resources was 
introduced in 1967 as the tenth point of the 
Shah’s ‘White Revolution’, and regional boards 
were established to assess and control water 
use and to charge for its consumption. The 
1968  Water  Law  was  intended  generally  to 
end  the  traditional  system  of  water  rights, 
based primarily on the riparian doctrine, and 
replace  it  with  a  system  of  rights  based  on 
water-use permits for the purposes of benefi-
cial  and  reasonable  use  of  these  resources 
(Beaumont, 1974). The state thus gained wide 
power  of  control  and  taxation  of  private/
communal ownership. In several instances, the 
state  took  over  the  management  of  minor 
schemes and abolished customary rights, with 
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but this seems to have happened on a case-by-
case basis.
In the valley itself, with the superimposition 
of concrete canals over the network of ancient 
maadi  in  the  early  1970s,  the  state  largely 
overrode the riparian rights enshrined in Sheikh 
Bahai’s regulation. Yet the administration could 
not fully erase these rights, and a study of water 
allocation within schemes has shown that ad 
hoc  distinctions  were  made  between  canals 
built in former maadi areas and those in newly 
reclaimed  areas  (Hoogesteger,  2005).  In  the 
Mourhab valley, traditional rights on the river 
water were equally eroded. The redistribution 
of  water  in  the  Mourhab  valley  after  the 
construction of the Khamiran dam was a non-
transparent process with no direct participation 
of  the  population  concerned.3  Some  villages 
that had developed quite lately and had no right 
to water were allocated part of the water coming 
from the dam. In contrast, other former rights-
holders, like Jalalabad, lost the benefit of the 
river.
The  examples  given  above  make  it  clear 
that some sort of basin-level coordination body 
is needed to analyse hydrological data, estab-
lish transparent allocation schemes (through a 
system of entitlements or otherwise), discuss 
priorities and development plans, and inte    grate 
representatives  from  the  different  socio-
economic sectors. Such participation is, how  -
ever, unlikely to be very effective under present 
circumstances, since representation of the civil 
society is still weak (Namazi, 2000). The state 
is likely to retain full control of the decision-
making  power  of  such  a  vital  resource. 
Establishing a sound water regime at the basin 
level is thus a monumental task, which needs 
governance patterns that are yet to emerge.
Limited scope for (real) efficiency gains
In a basin with hardly any water reaching its 
terminus, water can only be ‘saved’ by limiting 
unproductive  evaporation.  There  are  not  so 
many opportunities to achieve such a reduc-
tion. Conventional conservation efforts impact 
water pathways and merely reallocate water: 
canal lining in Jalalabad ‘saves’ water, which 
can then be spread over a larger area, increas-
ing not only local production but also water 
depletion,  to  the  detriment  of  downstream 
users who were tapping subsurface flows. The 
canal that collects qanat water for Najafabad 
city  has  also  been  lined  to  offset  declining 
supply, thus increasing the flow to Najafabad 
but, at the same time, decreasing groundwater 
recharge in the Mourhab valley.
Little is known about the efficiency of large-
scale irrigation in the valley. In Iran, as else-
where,  gravity  irrigation  is  stigmatized  as  a 
process  wasteful  of  precious  resources  and 
micro-irrigation is held as a natural solution to 
this state of affairs. In the particular setting of 
the  valley,  however,  it  is  dubious  that  much 
improvement  can  be  brought  about:  there 
already exists extremely efficient recycling of 
‘losses’ at the plot level (pumping of groundwa-
ter), at the scheme level (pumping from drains) 
and at the valley level (the return flow from one 
scheme  –  30%  of  gross  diversion  values  on 
average – is part of the supply to the following 
one).
Micro-irrigation is believed to reduce unpro-
ductive soil evaporation, but even this benefit is 
unclear and has been found by some re  searchers 
to be sometimes illusory (Burt et al., 2001).4 In 
any case, there are also a number of constraints 
to the adoption of micro-irrigation. First, not 
all crops (e.g. rice or lucerne) are suitable for 
such a technique; second, the investment cost 
is very high and can never be offset by what-
ever saving in the water bill (Perry, 2001); and 
third, such investments only make sense for 
high-value crops for which security of supply is 
essential (as such, they are more likely to be 
adopted where groundwater is abundant and 
used).
Efficiency  gains  have  also  been  sought  in 
improvements of scheme management. A few 
years ago the government contracted out the 
operation and maintenance of irrigation systems 
to parastatal enterprises, cleverly referred to as 
the  mirab:  as  in  many  other  countries,  the 
ideology of efficiency that favours private rather 
than state operators has allowed former staff 
from state agencies to form their own compa-
nies and to perform the same   service but with 
some  private  benefit  to  themselves  (although 
workers who moved along from one structure 
to the other lost their former state privileges 
and saw their working hours increase markedly; 
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gains are undocumented but the administration 
claims that costs have been cut by 15–20%.
Groundwater control
The control of groundwater use has been prob-
lematic, even though the drilling of new wells is 
checked by the local farmers themselves (who 
do not want to see more local abstraction) and 
by  a  control  of  the  activities  of  drilling 
  companies. The right to access groundwater is 
officially regulated by the granting of permits by 
state authorities. Permits have been adminis-
tered centrally, with limited knowledge of local 
hydrology, transparency and control by inter-
ested populations. This has opened the way for 
bribery and for powerful people to obtain well 
permits thanks to their political clout.
Control  of  groundwater  abstraction  is  an 
intractable  problem  worldwide.  As  supply  in 
public  schemes  becomes  deficient,  farmers 
resort to wells as a compensation. It would be 
politically very hard for the state to parallel its 
failure to deliver reliable water by a crackdown 
on self-funded private wells; indeed, the admin-
istration  acknowledges  that  illegal  drilling  of 
wells  is  a  pervasive  problem  (Hoogesteger, 
2005). Overcommitment of resources and the 
resulting  decline  of  supply  to  agriculture  are 
likely to reinforce the shift to groundwater and 
the dropping of water tables.
Water quality, wastewater and health
With  reduced  flows  and  recurring  shortages, 
and pollution from both agriculture and indus-
tries, the health of the Zayandeh Rud River has 
been affected. The solute content of the irri-
gation  return  flow  into  the  aquifers  and  the 
river,  combined  with  urban  and  industrial 
ef  fluents, is much higher than that of the water 
flowing in the river. The mixing leads to progres-
sively increasing levels of salinity (measured as 
EC, electrical conductivity) and total dissolved 
solids (TDS) along the Zayandeh Rud.
Pourmoghaddas’s  (2006)  study  of  water 
quality in the Zayandeh Rud between 1989 and 
1999 (not including drought years) shows that 
the average value of EC is around 250 mS/m 
before the river enters the plain, rising to 700 
mS/m after receiving industrial ef  fluents and to 
1200 mS/m in Esfahan, increasing to 4500 
mS/m as the river receives return flow from the 
Abshar  irrigation  scheme,  and  peaking  at 
19,600  mS/m  in  the  terminal  reach  of  the 
river. The pattern is similar for non-agricultural 
pollution.  The  concentration  of  the  major 
  cations and anions follows the same increasing 
trend as one goes downstream. The concentra-
tion  of  heavy  metals  (Pb,  Ni,  Cd)  increases 
tenfold as the river passes through Esfahan, to 
levels of 0.1 mg/l for Pb, 0.07 mg/l for Ni and 
0.02 mg/l for Cd (four times WHO’s standards) 
(Vahid, 1996). A sharp decrease in dissolved 
oxygen  (DO)  is  observed  at  the  Pole  Chom 
station, where effluent of the wastewater treat-
ment plant discharges into the river. 
A  hydrochemical  analysis  of  groundwater 
from boreholes along the Zayandeh Rud River 
reveals the same pattern, which is not surpris-
ing as the aquifers are recharged both by the 
river  water  and  by  return  flow  and  leakage 
from the irrigation schemes. A detailed hydro-
chemical  study  of  a  small  subcatchment 
(Lenjanat) along the Zayandeh Rud upstream 
of Esfahan over a 10-year period has shown 
that the groundwater composition is subject to 
long-term trends (Gieske et al., 2000). In some 
parts  of  the  aquifer,  salts  are  being  slowly 
flushed out, whereas in other parts concentra-
tions  are  rising.  It  appears  that  the  ground-
water  composition  is  slowly  changing  in 
response to expanding or variable cultivation 
practices.  Other  studies  on  shallow  wells 
(1.5–9.5  m)  also  showed  that  pollution  has 
been  transferred  from  the  river  to  aquifers 
(Pourmoghaddas, 2006).
Such levels of pollution may create public-
health  hazards,  as  during  the  1999–2001 
drought, when the treatment station of Esfahan 
could  not  handle  the  quality  of  the  incoming 
water, resulting in serious health problems in the 
city. The effluents of Esfahan are also increas-
ingly  reused  by  agriculture,  but  the  health 
impacts  are  not  well  known  at  the  moment. 
Tourist  and  urban  development  around  the 
Chadegan dam not only extracts water from the 
lake but also pollutes it in return, impacting the 
quality of water at its source. In sum, degraded 
water quality results in various health and envi-
ronmental  impacts,  which  tend  to  get  worse 
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Vulnerability to droughts
When basin water resources are overcommit-
ted and fully depleted there is no more slack in 
the system and all the hydrologic variability in 
supply is passed on to users. Since urban uses 
receive priority, agriculture (not to mention the 
environment) has to cope with a supply that 
basically varies each year and bears the brunt 
of climatic variability. The 1999–2001 drought 
has put this fact in sharp relief (Molle et al., 
2008). The third year was very critical, since 
diversions of surface water decreased down to 
39%  of  average  values,  with  the  irrigation 
share at only 3% of its pre-drought average. 
Yet, contrary to this dramatic drop in supply, 
cropping  areas  were  curtailed  by  39%  only, 
although there was a degree of shift to crops 
with  lower  water  requirements  and  average 
yields were slightly affected (by 12%).
Farmers have responded to the drought and 
to pervasive water scarcity in the past 20 years 
in different ways, as illustrated by a study of 
farmers’ coping strategies in the Abshar irri-
gation  system  (Hoogesteger,  2005).  At  the 
outlet level, some user groups defined priority 
rules (e.g. priority to smallholdings) to allocate 
limited water; in others, some farmers ceded 
their share to others and left their land fallow; 
elsewhere,  farmers  joined  together  to  drill 
collective wells. At the individual level, farmers’ 
responses included: increased use of ground-
water by drilling or deepening of wells; use of 
untreated  effluents  from  Esfahan;  a  shift  to 
less-sensitive  crops,  such  as  fodder  maize; 
mi  gration to other regions unaffected by the 
drought to rent land; and lease or sale of land 
(Molle  et  al.,  2008).  Despite  this  adaptive 
capacity,  recurring  shortages  tend  to  affect   
the weakest farmers and to drag them out of 
  business in a context of high unemployment.
Reopening the basin?
The  history  of  the  Zayandeh  Rud  basin  has 
shown repeated resorts to water import as a 
means  of  solving  the  recurring  and  marked 
imbalances  between  supply  and  demand.  At 
first sight this would appear to merely result 
from  population  growth  (Esfahan  sheltered 
refugees  from  western  provinces  during  the 
war with Iraq, when its population grew at an 
annual rate of close to 7%), industrial develop-
ment and the needs of agriculture. This latter 
sector, although subject to irregular supply, still 
totals 66% of water diversions in an average 
year and there are serious questions about the 
reasons for continuing investment in irrigation 
infrastructure.
It seems somewhat contradictory that while 
large-scale  irrigation  systems  established  30 
years  ago  (the  Nekouabad  and  Abshar 
schemes), let alone the traditional systems that 
go back hundreds of years, are struggling to 
get  suf  ficient  water,  new  irrigation  develop-
ments continue apace in the basin. Many of 
the reasons ‘why enough is never enough’ (see 
Molle, 2008, for an examination of the soci-
etal drivers of basin overbuilding) possibly apply 
to the present case. The financial and political 
benefits accruing to a set of decision makers 
and entrepreneurs may have played a role in 
the extension of canals to Borkhar and Mayhar 
areas (Foltz, 2002). At a minimum, the design 
hypotheses and justifications for such works, in 
a context where water is increasingly exported 
to large cities in neighbouring basins, are likely 
to have been dubious.5 While in the current 
situation  of  high  unemployment  agriculture 
remains a sector which cannot be neglected, it 
is  also  not  clear  what  categories  of  farmers 
benefit most from these investments.
All in all, it may well be that this benefit will 
be  very  limited,  since  supply  is  likely  to  be 
limited  and  intermittent.  A  perverse  con  -
sequence of such overdevelopment of irri  gation 
infrastructure, however, is that it ‘mechanically’ 
generates water scarcity, exposes ‘beneficiar-
ies’ to the precariousness of uncertain supply, 
and creates the political conditions for justify-
ing  further  development.  With  this  logic  at 
work, further and highly costly imports of water 
are expected to be effected. It can be equally 
feared that the next abundance of water will be 
absorbed by waiting fields in the Borkhar and 
Mayhar  areas,  and  perhaps  in  new  areas, 
which  will  be  planned  to  raise  the  design 
economic benefits of the new transfer.
While the basin is buying respite at a high 
cost6 (although this cost is largely shifted to the 
national level), one may wonder what the limits 
of such a process are. It is already apparent 
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diversions and that these are only made possi-
ble because of the overriding decision-making 
power of the central government. During the 
drought, for example, people in the lower Dez 
basin  (of  which  the  Kuhrang  is  a  tributary) 
suffered shortages and severe health problems. 
Diversions also take their toll on hydropower 
generation, since the Kuhrang feeds into the 
Karun and its four dams (the first hydropower 
complex  in  the  country).  These  externalities 
imposed on donor basins should certainly be 
considered in order to get a clearer picture of 
the full costs of these transfers.
Conclusions
No doubt sprawling urban oases with growth 
dynamics that largely lie beyond the question 
of  water  availability  are  faced  with  critical 
  challenges.  In  the  Zayandeh  Rud  basin, 
increase in population, decline in farm size and 
agri  cultural  income,  environmental  degrada-
tion  and  growing  sectoral  competition  for 
water  appear  to  be  at  loggerheads  with  the 
finite  and  circumscribed  nature  of  the  water 
generated in the Zagros mountains. Yet, while 
oasis culture is characterized by frugality and 
attention to nature’s limits, the Zayandeh Rud 
basin seems to have developed without a sense 
of  limits.  Esfahan  and  its  surroundings  have 
been  planned  to  become  major  urban  and 
industrial poles during both the Shah and the 
post-  revolution  periods;  irrigation  infrastruc-
ture has been repeatedly overdeveloped, lead-
ing  to  suboptimal  cropping  intensities  and 
forcing farmers to complement canal supply 
with groundwater. At each step of the Zayandeh 
Rud basin development, these contradictions 
were – albeit briefly – dissolved by the construc-
tion of a dam or by an interbasin transfer which 
‘reopened’ the basin. Despite these interbasin 
transfers,  which  double  the  availability  of 
surface  water  in  the  basin  (in  2009),  and  a 
total  use  of  groundwater  estimated  at  3500 
Mm3/year (i.e. 72% of all water use), only less 
than 2% of the natural flow of the river reaches 
the  Gavkhuni  marshes  (Management  and 
Planning  Organization,  2002).  Considering 
the overdraft of aquifers signalled by dropping 
water tables (on average, 2.5 m/year), water 
use in the basin exceeds renewable resources. 
By all definitions, the Zayandeh Rud basin is 
closed.
In such arid areas where land is abundant, 
any  possible  excess  of  water  will  be  readily 
absorbed by waiting fields or expanding culti-
vated land if no regulation control is exercised; 
likewise, unchecked drilling of wells will also 
tend to exhaust aquifers and, in places, cancel 
the historical investments and rights vested in 
the qanats. Imperative demands from neigh-
bouring desert cities with even less available 
supply also contribute to sucking up whatever 
additional water is made available. The basin 
has thus been buying respite by ever-increasing 
capital  investments  in  tunnels,  but  this  logic 
now  collides  with  the  financial  costs  of  the 
works required and the externalities generated 
on donor basins.
The spatial pattern of water resources devel-
opment  induced  a  gradual  shift  of  benefits 
upstream: the Gavkhuni Ramsar site and the 
lush gardens of Rudasht of bygone days are the 
obvious  victims  of  that  shift  of  water  use  to 
upstream  urban  areas,  almond  tree  orchards 
and tourist resorts around the lake. The study 
provides  instructive  and  graphic  examples  of 
how water gets redistributed between surface 
water and groundwater, upstream and down-
stream, the lateral and the main valleys, wells 
and  qanats,  between  villages,  and  between 
rural and urban users. All human interventions 
induce hydrological changes that travel across 
scales and time, and across levels of social and 
political control. This interconnectedness across 
scales  has  critical  implications  for  societies, 
since  it  links  macro-level  management  and 
  decision making to local processes.
The  absence  of  clear  allocation  rules  or 
water rights means that interventions, re-appro-
priation and redistribution, with their impacts 
across scales and social groups, are a sizeable 
reality. The three main losers of this lack of 
overall  control  over  resources  use  in  the 
Zayandeh Rud are, not surprisingly, those most 
commonly affected in closing basins: the down-
stream  users,  the  next  generations  and  the 
environment, in decreasing order of bargain-
ing power. The environment bears the brunt of 
the reduction of flows at a time when more 
water  is  generally  needed  to  dilute  pollution 
and to leach the salt. The next generations are 
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tion of groundwater resources. Agriculture, as 
the residual user, has to deal with a supply that 
basically varies each year. There is no slack in 
the system and the only buffering capacity or 
flexibility is provided by declining aquifers.
A consequence of the closure of the basin 
that cannot be overemphasized is the logical 
impossibility  of  overall  water  conservation, 
except where unproductive evapotranspiration 
can be reduced. Local conservation measures 
are  possible  but  they  necessarily  have  third-
party  impacts.  Therefore,  while  such  local 
measures  may  have  benefits  for  the  users 
involved, they are – just like additional abstrac-
tion or diversions – eventually tantamount to a 
mere  reallocation  of  water  within  the  basin. 
Shifting the benefit of water may be desirable 
or  not,  but  it  is  rarely  explicit  and  raises 
  questions  on  equity,  water  rights  and  third-
party impacts.
The  complexity  of  social  and  hydrologic 
macro–micro interactions makes the state inca-
pable of reordering the basin water regime by 
its sole action or by legislation. Constructing a 
sound  and  sustainable  water  regime  is 
con  tingent upon enabling multi-level govern-
ance patterns, which allow interest groups to 
negotiate  arrangements  that  bring  more 
certainty, social value and equity to the sharing 
of water. This does not mean that the power of 
centralized  management  agencies  should  be 
eliminated. Rather, the nested nature of hydro-
logic scales and the overriding importance of 
dam management and bulk allocation call for 
forms  of  co-management  (Sneddon,  2002), 
with  management  power  and  responsibility 
‘shared  cross-scale,  among  a  hierarchy  of 
management institutions, to match the cross-
scale nature of management issues’ (Folke et 
al., 2007).
In  the  Zayandeh  Rud  basin,  the  challenge 
could be to re-establish the earlier stakeholder-
controlled allocation (when mirabs were elected). 
An ancient source quoted by Spooner (1974a) 
stresses that the mirab ‘must prevent the power-
ful from trespassing on the weak with regard to 
the shares of water’, and referee water disputes 
‘with the confirmation and approval’ of the local 
leaders.  According  to  Hossaini  Abari  (2006), 
‘the  management  of  the  Zayandeh  Rud  was 
entirely in the hands of local people; the system 
was democratic and the government or state 
governors rarely had a direct role’, while Ghazi 
(2003) underlines the strict enforcement of the 
rules.  Whereas  this  management  seems  to 
embody what would nowadays qualify as subsid-
iarity and ‘stakeholder empowerment’, it must 
now be carried out in a much more complex 
physical  and  social  setting  than  in  the  past, 
demanding both an increasing knowledge of the 
basin hydrology and expanded arenas of repre-
sentation and negotiations.
Notes 
1   The  valley  probably  remained  relatively  under-
populated since the invasion and the destruction 
wrought  by  the  Afghans  (circa  1725).  Around 
1900, Zélé Sultan, the governor of Esfahan, tried 
to revitalize the valley by bringing people in from 
other regions (such as Yazd province). It is thus 
doubtful that water-sharing rules were established 
in the 16th century, but this shows the mythical 
role acquired by Sheikh Bahai in the celebration 
of past water wisdom in the area (Pirpiran, 2007).
2   There  are  large  discrepancies  in  the  average 
volumes transferred, according to source: Murray-
Rust and Droogers (2004) refer to 250 Mm3, and 
Abrishamchi  and  Tajrishy  (2002)  to  160  Mm3. 
Morid (2003) reports that tunnels Kuhrang 1 and 2 
(together?) divert 300–400 Mm3 of water per year.
3   This  change  did  not  remain  unchallenged. 
Villagers organized themselves and demonstrated 
against  this  change  in  Tiran  and  other  places. 
These demonstrations ended up with some fatali-
ties,  but  to  no  avail. The  dam  had  a  dramatic 
impact on the hydrology of the Mourhab valley. It 
was probably based on the common – yet radi-
cally  wrong  in  the  present  context  –  idea  that 
surface storage is beneficial because it may regu-
late water that would otherwise flow downstream 
unused. But springs and qanats feed on the huge 
natural  water  storage  provided  by  the  alluvial 
aquifer  of  the  valley. This  natural  reservoir  has 
overwhelming advantages over a dam: (i) it incurs 
no  loss  by  evaporation;  (ii)  it  is  distributed  all 
along  the  valley,  allowing  access  to  almost  all 
villages; (iii) this distribution is free and requires 
no intervention; and (iv) water use was quite finely 
attuned to the available resource. In addition, the 
remaining  flows,  if  any,  were  not  lost,  as  often 
perceived,  but  used  further  downstream  in  the 
main valley.
4   A smaller fraction of the soil surface is saturated 
after  irrigation,  thus  reducing  soil  evaporation 
losses, but more frequent irrigation increases the 212  F. Molle et al.
average  humidity  content  of  the  top  layers;  the 
two effects cancel each other.
5   Satellite  images  confirm  that  the  Borkhar  and 
Mayhar areas only have interspersed cultivation 
and are therefore irrigated far under their design 
levels.
6   While the Kuhrang 1 and Kuhrang 2 tunnels are 
2.8  km  long  each,  the  Kuhrang  3  and  Lanjan 
tunnels are 23 km and 15 km long, respectively. 
The Behesh Abad tunnel, under study, would be 
75 km long (Abrishamchi and Tajrishy, 2002). This 
gives a measure of the corresponding increase in 
costs solely for the drilling of tunnels.
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Introduction
In  many  river  basins,  water  use  for  urban, 
industrial and agricultural growth is approach-
ing, and sometimes even exceeding, the avail-
ability  of  renewable  water  resources.  The 
Krishna River basin in South India is a good 
example: it has witnessed intense water devel-
opment  since  India  gained  independence  in 
1947, resulting in overcommitment of water 
and river basin closure.
A generally accepted definition of a closed 
river basin is a basin where most or all available 
water is committed (Molden, 1997; Falkenmark 
and  Molden,  2008)  and  river  discharge  falls 
short of meeting environmental functions (flush-
ing  out  sediments,  diluting  polluted  water, 
controlling salinity intrusion, sustaining estua-
rine  and  coastal  ecosystems;  Molle  et  al., 
2007). The process of basin closure intensifies 
the  interconnectedness  of  ecosystems  and 
water users across the basin. When river basins 
close, supply development projects and demand 
management reforms eventually tend to result 
in a regional or sectoral redistribution of water, 
along  existing  economic,  political  and  social 
forces (Molle et al., 2007). Early warnings of 
such an evolution are emerging in the Krishna 
basin.  During  the  recent  3-year  drought 
(2001–2004),  surface  water  resources  were 
almost entirely committed to human consump-
tive uses, groundwater was overabstracted and 
the discharge to the ocean was almost nil. The 
absence of any basin-wide strategy for water 
management  has  led  to  an  uncoordinated 
expansion of surface water infrastructure and 
groundwater abstraction.
As the Krishna basin closes, recurring water 
conflicts suggest that there is not enough water 
for all current users and the environment: while 
more water is diverted than ever before, the 
security of supply to all existing users naturally 
declines – fuelling a feeling of scarcity and lead-
ing inevitably to conflicts over access and allo-
cation.
This chapter attempts to unpack the forces 
that drove the closure of the Krishna basin. The 
first section presents the main features of the 
Krishna basin. The second section recounts the 
history of water development in the basin. The 
third  section  provides  a  water  accounting 
method to quantify past and current water uses 
in the Krishna basin. The fourth section describes 
the main policy interventions that have affected 
the basin over the last 50 years, and the fifth 
section  identifies  some  ways  forward  to  slow 
down the process of river basin closure. The 
final section offers some conclusions.
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Human and Physical Setting of the 
Krishna River Basin
The  Krishna  River  basin  is  the  fifth  largest 
river system in India. The Krishna River origi-
nates  in  the  Western  Ghats,  drains  the  dry 
areas of the Deccan plateau, and forms a delta 
before  discharging  into  the  Bay  of  Bengal. 
The main stem of the Krishna River has two 
major tributaries, the Bhima River in the north 
and  the  Tungabhadra  River  from  the  south 
(Fig. 10.1).
The  Krishna  basin  drains  an  area  of 
258,514 km2 in three states (Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka,  Maharashtra).  Most  of  the  basin 
lies on crystalline and basaltic rocks associated 
with hard rock aquifers with low groundwater 
potential. The Krishna River basin is subject to 
both  the  south-west  and  the  north-east 
monsoons; the average rainfall in the basin is 
840 mm, of which approximately 90% occurs 
during the monsoon from May to October. The 
climate of the Krishna basin is predominantly 
semi-arid,  with  potential  evaporation  (1457 
mm a year, on average) exceeding rainfall in all 
but 3 months of the year, during the peak of 
the monsoon. Irrigation is needed for agricul-
tural development (see Biggs et al., 2007, for 
details). In 2007, the basin’s population was 
73  million  (estimates  based  on  GoI,  2001, 
assuming a growth of 1.5% per annum), with 
48 million in rural areas. The rural population 
is highest in the Krishna delta and the central 
west of the basin, and lowest in the centre and 
south-west. The main city is Hyderabad, the 
capital of Andhra Pradesh, which accommo-
dates a population of 7 million.
Water Resources Development and Rural 
Changes in the Krishna Basin
Originally,  water  in  the  Krishna  basin  was 
managed  through  small-scale  and  locally 
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managed  structures  (tanks)  fed  with  water 
diverted from small streams (Wallach, 1985). 
The first large-scale water diversions took place 
in the Krishna delta in the 1850s. Between the 
1850s and 1947, efforts to promote irrigation 
focused on the dry areas of the Deccan plateau, 
and  on  providing  protection  against  the 
droughts  and  famines  which  regularly  struck 
the region. During that period (1850–1947), 
no large-scale expansion of agriculture occurred 
in  the  lower  Krishna  basin,  where  irrigation 
continued to be practised based on local tanks 
(Venot  et  al.,  2007).  The  pace  of  irrigation 
development accelerated with the moderniza-
tion of the Krishna delta project (1954–1957), 
which irrigates 540,000 ha, and the construc-
tion of several multi-purpose reservoirs (irriga-
tion and hydropower production) in the 1970s 
and  1980s  of  which  the  major  ones  were: 
Nagarjuna Sagar (1967) and Sri Sailam (1983) 
in Andhra Pradesh; Bhadra (1953), Malaprabha 
(1973),  Ghataprabha  (1977)  and  Alamatti 
(1990) in Karnataka; and Koyna (1964) and 
Ujjani (1981) in Maharashtra (Fig. 10.1).
At the end of the 1980s and in the early 
1990s, the pace of large-scale infrastructural 
development  levelled  off  (see  Fig.10.2),  and 
attention was directed towards improving the 
management and the performance of existing 
irrigation systems. With the liberalization of the 
economy in the early 1990s, the strong state 
support  to  agricultural  development  slowed 
down (Suri, 2006). However, local private or 
community initiatives (tanks, contour ditches, 
check dams) continued to be heavily promoted 
all over South Asia (Barker and Molle, 2005), 
and  the  Krishna  basin  was  no  exception. 
Simultaneously, scattered irrigated plots multi-
plied due to the availability of private pumps, 
shallow  tube-wells  and  subsidized  electricity; 
Shah et al. (2003) describe this process for 
South Asia).1 The groundwater situation has 
raised much less public concern than dis  appear-
ing  river  flows  but  raises  equally  important 
issues in terms of management.
The total storage capacity in the medium 
and major reservoirs of the Krishna basin multi-
plied eightfold, to reach about 54 billion m3 in 
the early years of the 21st century, i.e. 95% of 
the  pre-1965  river  runoff.  Further,  minor 
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surface irrigation projects and groundwater irri-
gation have also boomed. Although their total 
storage capacity is not well known, minor irri-
gation projects are likely to significantly affect 
the basin water balance: the minor irrigation 
census of 2001 estimated that about 175,000 
minor irrigation structures could irrigate an area 
of about 1 million ha (Mha) in the basin.
As a result of this infrastructural develop-
ment,  the  net  irrigated  area  in  the  Krishna 
basin  increased  more  than  twofold  during 
1955–2000, from about 2.2 to 4.8 Mha, and 
the average cropping intensity rose from 107 
to 118%.2 Cultivating during the dry season 
became more common as irrigation expanded. 
The cropping pattern of the basin dramatically 
changed as rainfed coarse grains (sorghum and 
millet) were progressively replaced by rice and 
cash crops (pulses, oilseeds, chillies, cotton). In 
the early years of the 21st century, about 50% 
of the irrigated area was irrigated with ground-
water, against 36% in 1955–1965: the Krishna 
basin is in transition, with groundwater becom-
ing one of the main sources of water supply for 
the  farmers.  Box  10.1  further  describes  the 
agrarian transformations that have affected the 
rural landscape of the Krishna basin over the 
last 60 years. In a context of basin closure, this 
shift towards more local water control is not 
neutral: it affects existing patterns of water use 
and  spatially  reallocates  water  from  down-
stream to upstream regions.
The discharge from the Krishna River to the 
ocean  gradually  decreased  from  the  1960s, 
providing an indication of river basin closure 
(Figs 10.2 and 10.3). Before 1960, the river 
discharge to the ocean averaged 57 billion m3/
year (i.e. a rainfall:runoff coefficient of 0.29; 
Biggs et al., 2007). Since 1965, it has steadily 
decreased, falling to 10.8 billion m3/year in 
2000, and to almost nil in 2004 (0.4 billion 
m3/year).3  The  high  discharges  observed  in 
2005–2007 (29 billion m3/year, on average) 
illustrate that the Krishna River basin is in tran-
sition:  droughts  intensify  the  interconnected-
ness of water users and lead to water shortages 
downstream. As this might be a harbinger of 
the future, defining management interventions 
for  sustainable  water  use  at  the  basin  level, 
especially during low-flow years, is increasingly 
needed. This requires an identification of the 
spatial  and  historical  dynamics  of  water  use 
and  an  understanding  of  the    drivers  of  the 
closure of the Krishna basin.
Assessing Water Availability and Use in 
the Krishna Basin
Methodology 
The water accounting method presented here 
uses the water balance categories proposed by 
Molden (1997) and is presented diagrammati-
cally in Fig. 10.4. The water balance is based 
on estimates of water depletion and follows the 
principle of mass balance, where total input 
equals the total of outflows and change in stor-
age.
The inflow to the basin includes the mean 
annual  rainfall  P,  measured  from  the  CRU 
(Climatic  Research  Unit,  University  of  East 
Anglia, UK) data set (CRU, 2007) and district 
statistical  handbooks  (GoM,  2005a;  GoAP, 
2006; GoK, 2006), and water transfers enter-
ing the Krishna basin (imports, Tin), estimated 
from government statistics and data from water 
supply projects.
This inflow is partly depleted through evapo-
transpiration  of  vegetation  (Dpl);4  domestic, 
industrial and livestock processes (U);5 water 
transfers  out  of  the  Krishna  basin  (exports, 
Tout); the net change in water storage in newly 
built reservoirs (ΔV)6 and in aquifers (ΔGW). 
ΔGW is estimated as the aquifer recharge (R)7 
minus  the  groundwater  demand  by  ground-
water-irrigated areas (Gwi),8 minus the ground-
water base flow (Bf, estimated as the difference 
between R and Gwi), minus the net ground-
water stock depletion (δs), calculated to close 
the water balance.9
The remainder is the discharge to the ocean 
Qout, measured at the head of the delta, at the 
Prakassam barrage, located downstream of the 
diversions to the canals of the Krishna delta. In 
what follows, the term ‘net inflow’ designates 
the  sum  of  mean  annual  precipitation  and 
imports  to  the  Krishna  basin,  minus  the  net 
groundwater  stock  depletion  (P  +  Tin  −  δs). 
Average annual estimates for periods of 5–10 
years are used. Although inter-annual variability 
is important in terms of management, this chap-
ter  focuses  on  long-term  trends  revealed  by 
average balances.218  J.-P. Venot
A landscape and waterscape dominated by 
rural changes
Figure 10.5 maps the evolution of the Krishna 
basin water balance since the mid-1950s. Four 
main regions have been delineated: the Bhima 
sub-basin  in  the  north-west  (located  in 
Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh); 
the upper Krishna sub-basin (Maharashtra and 
Karnataka);  the  Tungabhadra  sub-basin 
(Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh) and the lower 
Krishna  Basin  (Andhra  Pradesh)  (Fig.  10.1). 
The main trend is a dramatic increase in water 
depletion by irrigation, from 17.1 billion m3/
year  during  1955–1965  to  44.3  billion  m3/
year  during  1990–2000.  This  means  a  19% 
rise in total depletion over the period 1955–
2000.  The  total  depletion  amounted  to  181 
billion m3/year during 1990–2000, i.e. 88% of 
the net inflow to the Krishna basin. Con  sequently, 
the  discharge  to  the  ocean  dramatically 
decreased and amounted only to 10% of the net 
Box 10.1. The Indian agrarian economy: past trends and current challenges.
Gigantic dams (the ‘modern temples of India’ according to Jawaharlal Nehru), shifting cropping patterns, 
the multiplication of small private pumps, and expanding irrigated lands are the most visible signs of the 
transformations that have affected Indian agriculture since the early 1950s. A technological ‘triptych’ 
(irrigation; high-yielding varieties; and widespread use of fertilizers, and, to a lesser extent, pesticides), 
price support policies (for both production and inputs), and institutional reforms (access to credit, land 
reforms, etc.) have been the drivers of a ‘Green Revolution’ (1964 onwards) (Landy, 2008), when the 
annual growth of the agricultural gross domestic product (AGDP) averaged 2.44% (GoI, 2007a) and yields 
tripled for food grains (rice, wheat) and increased fourfold for crops such as cotton, oilseeds and sugar-
cane. But beyond the apparent success story of a booming Indian agriculture, many challenges remain: 
the growth of the agriculture sector has slowed down from the mid-1980s onwards; the overall productiv-
ity of Indian agriculture is low compared with those of China, Vietnam and Thailand; access to food is 
highly unequal; food security is far from being a reality; and more than 250 million Indians are still 
malnourished (IFPRI, 2005; Landy, 2008).
   The agrarian structure has undergone significant changes in the last 50 years. Post-independence land 
reforms aimed at limiting land concentration and consolidating landholdings to create a class of owner–
operators  more  likely  to  invest  in  irrigation  and  modern  agricultural  techniques  (see,  for  example, 
Upadhya, 1988, describing the emergence of ‘farmer–capitalists’ in the Krishna delta). Results have been 
uneven according to the states. The abolition of intermediaries (Zamindars) was relatively successful, but 
tenancy reforms, land redistribution and land ceilings met with less success and most of large owners 
managed to keep their land within the family: in Andhra Pradesh, for example, only 4% of the total sown 
area was redistributed (2% at the all-India level) and 12.5% of unappropriated government land was 
assigned to landless poor (GoAP, 2007; see Mearns, 1999, and Deshpandhe, 2007, for further information 
on land reforms in India). The average farm size in all three states of the Krishna basin is under 1.8 ha 
(which is more than the all-India average of 1.3 ha: in the rainfed Deccan plateau, landholdings are 
  relatively larger but far less productive than in irrigated areas; GoI, 2007b). Marginal and small farmers 
(less than 2 ha) account for 83, 73 and 75% of all farmers in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka 
(without accounting for concealed tenancy), respectively, while indebtedness concerns 82, 55 and 62% 
of the households in these three states, respectively (GoI, 2007b).
   At the macro level, the contribution of agriculture to the Indian economy has decreased from 61% (in 
1950–1951) to 20% (in 2003–2004) of the total GDP of the country. In the Krishna basin, the importance 
of agriculture is highest in Andhra Pradesh (22% of the state GDP and 62% of the total workforce) and 
lowest in Maharashtra (11% of the state GDP and 55% of the total workforce). From 2002–2005, the 
growth of the Indian AGDP was as low as 0.89.10 While other economic sectors are booming (with an 
overall economic growth of 8% and more during recent years), social disparities between rural and urban 
areas and between the agriculture and other economic sectors increase: distress in rural areas becomes 
pervasive due to the lack of non-farm employment. Agricultural growth cannot sustain a quantitatively 
stable rural population anymore and India is facing an agrarian crisis, recently epitomized by highly 
publicized farmers’ suicides: high indebtedness (for annual agricultural expenses, often from the informal 
market), and dependency on volatile cash crop cultivation (oilseeds, cotton, chillies) are seen as some of 
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inflow during 1990–2000 (2% of the net inflow 
was exported to other basins).
Soil moisture and prospects for increased 
basin efficiency
The high level of water depletion as early as 
1955–1965 (69% of the net inflow) highlights 
the  importance  of  rainfed  agriculture  and 
  natural vegetation in the water balance of the 
Krishna basin. Rainfed agriculture has always 
been the main user of water because of its large 
areal coverage in the dry areas of the Deccan 
plateau.  Depletion  in  rainfed  agri  culture  has 
increased slightly since the late 1950s, reveal-
ing  widespread  supplemental  irrigation  of 
formerly rainfed crops. Supplemental irrigation 
takes place through groundwater abstraction or 
diversion  of  small  streams  in  secondary 
upstream  basins  and  is  rarely  re  ported  in 
governmental  statistics.  These      findings  are 
consistent with those of Biggs et al. (2007), 
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who pointed to the widespread nature of small 
irrigated  patches  in  rainfed  areas.  In  1990–
2000, depletion from rainfed agriculture and 
natural vegetation together accounted for 54% 
of the total rainfall in the Krishna basin. These 
values illustrate that sustainable and equitable 
water management – rainfed agriculture is the 
main livelihood for the   poorest communities – 
can only be achieved through an increase in the 
productivity of agriculture in semi-arid, rainfed 
areas. Small-scale supplemental irrigation from 
rainfall is promising, but has to be cautiously 
planned  and  downstream  impacts  carefully 
assessed (see below).
Development of surface water:  
a state-wise approach
The  planning  and  development  of  irrigation 
projects  in  the  three  states  that  share  the 
Krishna water have always led to acute conflicts, 
highlighting the need for formal interstate allo-
cation  rules,  because  no  state  has  ever 
con  sidered the potential third-party impacts of 
its  own  development.  Major  interstate  dis  -
agreements led to the setting up of the Krishna 
Water Disputes Tribunal (KWDT) in 1969, and 
to  the  agreement,  in  1976,  on  formal  allo-
cation  procedures,  which  apportioned  the 
75%-dependable  flow  of  the  Krishna  River 
(58.2 billion m3/year, the value exceeded in 
75% of the years)11 as follows: 15.8; 19.8 and 
22.6 billion m3/year to Maharashtra, Karna-
taka  and  Andhra  Pradesh,  respectively.12 
Andhra  Pradesh  is  also  entitled  to  use  any 
surplus water, with the caveat that it shall not 
acquire  any  formal  right  to  it  (GoI–KWDT, 
1976).13 This formal process of water appor-
tionment did not slow down the pace of infra-
structural and irrigation development. Between 
1955 and 2000, depletion in surface irrigation 
projects increased from 11.2 to 28.4 billion 
m3/year (irrigation is at its highest in the lower 
and upper Krishna basin). The KWDT award 
expired  in  May  2000;  a  new  tribunal  was 
constituted in 2004 and is expected to reach a 
decision for allocating water between the three 
states around 2010. It is crucial that this new 
tribunal  acknowledges  and  quantifies  surface 
water/groundwater interactions, and accounts 
for  small-scale  surface  water  use  (minor  irri-
gation;  rainwater  harvesting  and  watershed 
programmes)  and  groundwater  abstraction, 
which have both skyrocketed during the last 
five decades and have impacted the availability 
of surface water downstream (see below).
Uncoordinated groundwater abstraction and 
small-scale irrigation 
All over India, one of the most striking features 
of irrigation development during the past five 
decades has been the rapid growth in the use 
of  groundwater  (Vaidyanathan,  1999).  This 
trend  was  supported  by  the  government 
through:  (i)  rural  development  projects  that 
targeted  rural  areas  earlier  neglected  by  the 
‘Green Revolution’ (due to the relatively poor 
conditions that prevailed there for agriculture); 
and (ii) policies subsidizing electricity for agri-
cultural uses. According to remote-sensing and 
census data, today groundwater and minor irri-
gated areas cover more land than medium and 
major irrigation projects (Biggs et al., 2007). 
This raises many management issues. Although 
the nature and extent of surface water/ground-
water  interactions  are  not  well  known,  the 
water balance presented in this chapter high-
lights that increasing groundwater abstraction 
(from  5.9  to  18.1  billion  m3/year  between 
1955 and 2000) led to decreasing base flows 
(minus  8.7  billion  m3  between  1955  and 
2000)14  and    aquifer  overdraft  (minus  0.25 
billion m3/year). Scattered surface-water and 
groundwater irrigation developments in upper 
secondary  catchments  significantly  reduced 
surface  water  flows  and  reliability  to  down-
stream  water  users.  In  a  context  of  basin 
closure,  this  shift  towards  more  local  water 
control is tantamount to a re-appropriation of 
water and might raise tensions, as supporting 
minor or major irri  gation has become highly 
political,  because  of  different  social  and 
economic implications (Dhawan, 2006).
The emergence of new large-scale  
water users
Hydroelectricity generation
The increase in electricity needs has led to the 
completion  of  several  hydropower  projects. 222  J.-P. Venot
Major  interbasin  transfers  take  place  in  the 
Western  Ghats  of  Maharashtra  (~3.5  billion 
m3 are transferred each year to the western 
coast  because  of  a  much  higher  head). 
Hydroelectricity generation is a major concern 
for the government of Maharashtra, which is 
contemplating increasing the capacity of these 
transfers. These plans are strongly opposed by 
downstream states because they would reduce 
water  availability  down  the  river  system.  In 
other parts of the basin, hydropower projects 
do not deplete water. They have impacted the 
hydrological regime of the river but reservoirs 
have minimized impacts on downstream agri-
cultural uses (Venot et al., 2007). Given the 
increasing importance of hydropower genera-
tion (and possible related conflicts), there are 
plans to pump the water discharged to produce 
hydroelectricity  back  into  the  reservoirs  for 
further reuse (for example, for this purpose, a 
‘tail pond’ downstream of the Nagarjuna Sagar 
reservoir is under construction). Impacts of the 
growing need for electricity on existing water 
uses and the environment need to be further 
studied.
 
Domestic and industrial uses
Industrialization  and  urbanization  are  fast 
de  veloping in the Krishna basin (van Rooijen et 
al.,  2008).  The  demand  for  domestic  and 
industrial water keeps growing, notably around 
the megalopolis of Hyderabad (with a popu-
lation of 7 million) and around Pune (3 million), 
which  are  increasingly  supplied  from  distant 
sources, by shifting water out of agriculture.
At the basin level, domestic and industrial 
water uses have trebled during the last 50 years 
but still represent less than 1% of all depleted 
water  in  the  Krishna  basin  (and  3%  when 
compared with depletion by irrigation). These 
percentages highlight that intersectoral reallo-
cation  of  water  from  agriculture  to  more 
productive uses is unlikely to shape the future 
waterscape  of  the  Krishna  basin  in  average 
years. However, urban and industrial uses will 
receive priority in case of drought (Molle and 
Berkoff,  2006),  when  intra-  and  inter-basin 
transfers could impact users in rural areas and 
sharpen local conflicts (see Celio, 2008, for a 
case study of Hyderabad).
The environment: a water user in its own right?
Water and infrastructural development to meet 
growing human consumptive uses has resulted 
in significant degradation of various eco  systems. 
Although  the  impacts  of  reduced  flows  on 
ecosystems  are  not  well  quantified,  there  is 
well-documented evidence of downstream en    -
viron  mental degradation in the lower Krishna 
basin, manifesting itself by soil and ground  water 
sali  nization, increasing pollution, disappearing 
man    groves  and  wetland  (the  Kolleru  Lake) 
desiccation (Venot et al., 2008). With increas-
ing evidence of the adverse impacts of water 
and land degradation on people’s livelihoods, 
environmental  concerns  have  started  to  gain 
strength, and the notion of environmental flows 
is  establishing  itself  and  challenges  the  very 
notion  of  ‘surplus  water’  that  is  commonly 
called upon to justify new infrastructure (Molle 
et al., 2007). 
According to a simple desktop assessment 
method proposed by Smakhtin and Anputhas 
(2006) to quantify environmental water needs in 
data-scarce river basins of developing countries, 
preserving the ecosystems of the Krishna basin 
in their current status would require an environ-
mental flow allocation of about 6.5–14.2 billion 
m3/year. Water resources commitment would 
then reach 94–98% (the discharge to the ocean 
averaged  19  billion  m3/year in 1990–2000), 
showing that resources would be fully commit-
ted under average conditions.
Implementing  environmental  flows  is  a 
highly sensitive question and presents a great 
challenge  to  current  water  users  as:  (i)  the 
volumes at stake are large; (ii) the science of 
environmental flows is relatively new; (iii) there 
are recurrent questions on how to assess the 
en  vironmental status of river basins and how 
environmental  degradation  relates  to  altered 
flow regimes; and (iv) preserving the environ-
ment is often per  ceived as anti-poor and anti-
development,  especially  in  the  developing 
world.  In  an  era  of  economic  liberalization, 
which pushes Indian decision makers to seek 
overall growth, the key question is to under-
stand and quantify the benefits that letting a 
given volume of water free to flow to the ocean 
can yield to the society as a whole, while keep-
ing in mind that using this water elsewhere in   The Krishna Basin, South India  223
the  basin  for  other  purposes  also  has  some 
costs and benefits.
Finally, taking up the challenge of environ-
mental  preservation  not  only  requires  main-
taining a given flow to the ocean but also the 
implementation of other policies from the local 
level (regulating farmers’ practices and control-
ling  the  current  mode  of  natural  resources 
extraction)  to  regional  (the  creation  of  inte-
grated  management  zones,  which  would  be 
defined on the basis of agroecological features) 
and  state  (rural  development  policies)  levels 
(Venot  et  al.,  2008).  Putting  environmental 
issues on the Indian agenda of water resources 
policies and reforms is a challenging task and 
requires a shift in the governance structure of 
the sector to allow the poorest communities, 
who often depend on fragile ecosystems for 
their livelihoods, to voice their demands.
Transferring water
In  addition  to  the  water  transfers  from  the 
Godavari basin to Hyderabad, implemented in 
the  1990s,  several  projects  withdraw  water 
from the lower Krishna basin and transfer it 
south-east to irrigate some dry areas of Andhra 
Pradesh (Fig. 10.1) and supply the water-scarce 
megalopolis of Chennai in Tamil Nadu. These 
projects have performed well below expecta-
tions, even at times of abundant water availa-
bility,  and  their  full  implementation  would 
further increase the pressure on the Krishna 
water (Venot et al., 2007).
Foreshadowing the future: the drought of 
2001–2004
Between  2001  and  2004,  rainfall  was  12% 
below  the  long-term  average  in  the  Krishna 
basin. Such droughts of 3 years or more had a 
return period of 1 in 15 years over the last 
century (CRU, 2007) and are likely to herald 
the future average water availability in the lower 
Krishna  basin,  given  continued  upstream 
de  velopment  of  irrigation  infrastructure.  The 
lower Krishna basin, which bears the brunt of 
any intervention upstream, was the region most 
affected  by  the  drought:  its  net  inflow  fell 
dramatically to 57.2 billion m3/year and total 
surface water availability (18.4 billion m3/year, 
including  local  runoff)  was  close  to  the  allo-
cation of the KWDT (18.6 billion m3/year for 
the lower Krishna basin).15 During 2001–2004, 
almost  no  water  reached  the  ocean,  as  the 
basin  consumed  or  stored  99.5%  of  its  net 
inflow.16 Any further development of water use 
in the basin will impinge on existing uses, and 
the consequent reallocation is likely to exacer-
bate competition and conflicts. This happened 
even though the water depleted in surface irri-
gation projects always remained (for all three 
states and for the past 5 decades), within the 
limits of the KWDT award. This observation 
calls for the design and effective implementa-
tion of new allocations, within the framework 
of the present KWDT, which needs to reassess 
the dependability of river flows and account for 
a booming groundwater economy, to provide a 
platform to manage access and use of water 
during  years  of  low  flow.  In  the  following 
section, we highlight why the KWDT has not 
been  instrumental  in  limiting  infrastructural 
development in the Krishna basin.
Past Policy Interventions and  
River Basin Closure
The literature on river basin development iden-
tifies three main ways through which societies 
address their water resources problems: supply 
augmentation,  conservation  strategies  and 
water allocation (Molden et al., 2005). These 
three types of answers are often linked to three 
phases of river basin development, e.g. devel-
opment,  utilization  and  reallocation,  respec-
tively. However, Molle (2003) highlighted that 
different types of societal responses may occur 
concomitantly,  at  different  stages  of  basin 
development, and that their relative importance 
is context specific. The following paragraphs 
describe how and why different interventions 
have  been  combined  (both  spatially  and 
tem  porally)  by  different  users  in  the  Krishna 
basin since the late 1950s and how this has 
resulted in the current overexploitation of water 
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Supply augmentation
Green revolution or rural development?
Societies typically resort to supply augmenta-
tion  projects  to  meet  their  growing  water 
demand.  The  dynamics  of  irrigation  in  the 
Krishna basin reveal the tension between two 
approaches  to  rural  development  in  India, 
regardless of the stage of development of the 
river basin. Since 1947, two main clusters of 
rural  development  policies  have  been  imple-
mented  in  India,  concomitantly  or  otherwise 
(Landy,  2008).  These  two  types  of  policies 
have  translated  into  two  different  modes  of 
access to, and use of, water in different regions 
of the Krishna basin. Broadly, the first group of 
policies aims at ‘efficiency in development’ and 
concentrates financial and institutional invest-
ments on those social groups and areas that 
offer  the  highest  potential  for  development. 
They  are  the  technologies  of  the  Green 
Revolution, adopted in medium and large irri-
gation projects, and, more recently, in attempts 
at  integrating  agriculture  into  agribusiness 
chains.17 The second group aims at ‘equity in 
development’ and advocates rural development 
programmes  through  strong  state  planning 
and public investments in remote areas. They 
are  watershed  and  tank  rehabilitation 
pro  grammes, and minor irrigation projects in 
upper  secondary  catchments  (Landy,  2008). 
This need to balance economic efficiency and 
equity in rural development has been a major 
driver of the spatial distribution of water use in 
the Krishna basin over the last 50 years.
Interbasin transfers
Interbasin  transfers,  often  costly,  generally 
occur  when  the  pressure  on  water  is  at  its   
highest, in order to reopen closed or closing 
river basins. In the Krishna basin, water was 
transferred  out  of  the  basin  as  early  as  the   
mid-1970s  because  of  much  needed  hydro- 
electricity, despite the costs of such projects, 
and at a time when water was considered to be 
  abundant. The first transfers into the Krishna 
basin (from the neighbouring Godavari basin) 
date back to the early 1990s, at a time when 
basin  water  availability  was  still  high  and 
Hyderabad  was  ‘thirsty’.  This  highlights  that 
assessing overall water availability is not enough 
to explain river basin development: sub-basins, 
regions or cities might be ‘closed’ in an open 
river basin. Finally, the creation of the National 
Water Development Agency (NWDA) in 1982 
paved the way for the National River Linking 
Project  (Venot  et  al.,  2007)18  and  the  con  - 
struction  of  the  Polavaram–Vijayawada  link 
between the Godavari and the lower Krishna 
river basins (see below).
Groundwater access
Despite  evidence  of  aquifer  depletion,  free 
access to groundwater remains the rule: a draft 
groundwater  bill  has  been  contemplated  for 
several decades but has not been implemented 
due to its high transaction (political) costs (Shah, 
2007).  Low-cost  electricity  and  preferential 
loans have been the major drivers of significant 
groundwater abstraction since the mid-1980s.
Institutional arrangements and  
conservation strategies
Institutional  arrangements  and  conservation 
strategies  are  generally  associated  with  the 
‘utilization phase’ of river basin development, 
when the focus is on improving efficiency in 
the context of recurring shortages. Public inter-
ventions  in  the  water  sector  are  generally 
designed at the federal or state level and focus 
on measures as diverse as modernization and 
rehabilitation of existing water supply projects, 
technical  on-farm  improvements,  rainwater 
harvesting,  participatory  irrigation  manage-
ment  (PIM),  water-pricing  policies,  private-
sector  participation,  water  legislation  and 
policies, institutional support, etc.
Many  such  reforms  have  been  recently 
implemented  in  the  Krishna  basin  and  are 
clearly driven by growing evidence of an Indian 
water crisis. But other typical demand manage-
ment options have long been relevant and dealt 
with  in  the  Indian  water  sector  long  before 
water  availability  was  seen  as  a  constraining 
factor in the Krishna basin. Therefore, pressure 
on  water  resources  is  not  the  only  motive 
behind the adoption of demand management: 
low return on investments, physical deteriora-
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and inequality within irrigation systems, inter-
national donors and environmental issues have 
also triggered irrigation reforms in the Krishna 
basin.
Institutional initiatives at the federal level
In 1987, the Indian federal government enacted 
its first Water Policy. In 2002, a revised National 
Water Policy was finalized, which incorporated 
the  principles  of  integrated  water  resources 
management  at  the  basin  level  (GoI,  2002). 
These institutional moves are characteristic of 
countries whose river basins are under growing 
stress, but Shah (2007) highlights that ‘nothing 
in the way India’s water sector functions has 
changed as a result of these [policies].’ Following 
the  National  Water  Policy  of  2002,  several 
states  have  issued  their  own  water  policies 
(Karnataka  in  2002;  Maharashtra  in  2003; 
Andhra Pradesh has not yet enacted any such 
policy), but these generally fail to shape relevant 
strategies (Mohile, 2007) and supply augmen-
tation options remain prevalent.
In  contrast,  federal  initiatives  to  enhance 
rural development have had significant impacts 
on irrigation development. The cre  ation of the 
National  Bank  for  Agriculture  and  Rural 
Development (NABARD) in 1982 to facilitate 
farmers’ access to credit is one of these institu-
tional interventions: NABARD has been one of 
the main drivers of the development of ground-
water  abstraction  in  upper  secondary  catch-
ments (through credit for well drilling). Today, 
it is also used as an indirect lever to restrict 
institutional  credit  for  private  investments  in 
areas  where  groundwater  is  overexploited 
(Shah, 2007).
Federal involvement in irrigation programmes
Two  main  types  of  all-India  irrigation  pro  -
grammes  (in  line  with  the  two  different 
approaches  to  rural  development  described 
above) are presented here, and are often asso-
ciated with the idea of demand management 
(conservation,  increased  efficiency),  although 
their implementation in India has led to large-
scale irrigation development.
First, the command area development (CAD) 
programmes were initiated as early as 1974 to 
enhance irrigation efficiency and improve agri-
cultural production and productivity in surface-
irrigation projects. These programmes aimed at 
bridging the gap between the actual irrigated 
area  and  the  existing  irrigation  potential 
(Hashim Ali, 1982). Box 10.2 describes how 
the South India approach to irrigation develop-
ment is at the origin of this perceived underuti-
lization and how local politics led to overbuilding 
in the Krishna basin.
The  CAD  programme  represented  the 
  largest single investment of the World Bank in 
India, the biggest bank client at the time (Wade, 
1976). The programme envisaged a compre-
hensive  approach  to  water  management  but 
mainly  focused  on  interventions  ‘below  the 
outlet’, and did not acknowledge that the insti-
tutional  and  managerial  set-up  of  the  main 
canal  system  was  decisive  in  shaping  water 
Box 10.2. Protective irrigation, local politics and overcommitment of water.
Large surface-irrigation projects in South India have been built along protective lines, i.e. they aimed at 
spreading available water resources thinly over a large area and to a large number of farmers (supplemen-
tary irrigation is implied; see Mollinga, 2003, on protective irrigation). Denying the natural trend towards 
intensification (as population increases and landholdings shrink), protective irrigation is hardly viable in 
the long run. But despite the acknowledgement of these problems, this model of irrigation development 
remains central in South Indian irrigation policies: it provides convenient legitimacy for the state for 
  infrastructural development (on the basis of equity and poverty-alleviation principles), and may even have 
cemented a social justification, called upon by local politicians, for overbuilding. The continued   existence 
of protective irrigation (and promises of large irrigation projects, regardless of water availability and often 
presenting doubtful figures of ‘potential irrigated area’) lies in the populist character of Indian   politics: 
irrigation projects are major means of securing the support of rural constituencies (Ramamurthy, 1995; 
Venot et al., 2007).226  J.-P. Venot
availability  and  farmers’  practices  in  large 
  gravity-fed    irrigation  systems  (Wade  and 
Chambers,  1980;  see  Chambers,  1988  for 
further descriptions of the CAD programmes). 
The  CAD  programmes  (along  with  other 
modernization  projects  such  as  the  National 
Water  Management  Program)  did  receive 
further impetus by the mid-1980s.19 They were 
  relatively successful in increasing the actual irri-
gated area and in reducing conveyance losses 
(thus increasing water use); but the lack of: (i) 
proper operation and maintenance (O&M) of 
the  main  network;  (ii)  coordination  between 
institutions in charge of intervening ‘above’ and 
‘below’  the  outlet  (the  creation  of  the  ICAD 
(Irrigation  &  Command  Area  Development 
Department  aimed  at  enhancing  these  two 
points); and (iii) any involvement of the farmers 
in the design and implementation of the inter-
ventions considered were identified as crucial 
issues  that  needed  to  be  addressed  (IRDAS, 
1996) and would trigger Participatory Irrigation 
Reforms in the late 1990s (see below).
Other federal programmes focus on rural 
development in upper secondary catchments 
through  integrated  watershed  development 
and rainwater-harvesting projects.20 Recently, 
the focus has been on users’ participation and 
aquifer  recharge  (Vaidyanathan,  1999),  but 
irrigation  development  is  implicitly  targeted: 
Aubriot  (2006)  highlights  the  lack  of  any 
demand  management  component  in  these 
projects  and  shows  that  artificial  recharge 
programmes  encourage  farmers  to  deepen 
their wells and further deplete the aquifers.
Participatory irrigation management (PIM)
Since the late 1990s, PIM measures have flour-
ished in the Krishna basin. In 1997, Andhra 
Pradesh was the first Indian state to embrace 
the PIM rhetoric on a large scale, and water 
user associations (WUAs) were created in the 
entire state, with mixed results (Mollinga et al., 
2004;  Nikku,  2006).  In  2005,  Maharashtra 
also initiated a state-wide PIM programme, and 
in Karnataka PIM is being promoted through 
large-scale pilot projects. Gulati et al. (2005) 
identify states’ fiscal deficits (partly due to high 
subsidies for irrigation) and the physical deterio-
ration of low-performing irrigation systems as 
the main motives behind these reforms, not the 
looming  water  crisis.  International  funding 
agencies and domestic debates on ‘underutiliza-
tion’  of  irrigation  potential  were  pivotal  in 
  driving PIM in the Krishna basin.
Water pricing: supply augmentation or 
demand management?
Water pricing and the profitability of irrigation 
systems were major issues in British India, with 
projects  being  identified  as  productive  or 
protective, depending on their rate of return 
(Mollinga, 2003). Bolding et al., 1995, also 
show that the objective of a volumetric water 
pricing shaped the way water supply infrastruc-
tures of large irrigation projects were designed. 
At  that  time,  bulk  allocation  and  crop-wise 
differential  rates  were  identified  as  possible 
options to enhance the financial viability of irri-
gation  projects  through  an  increased  water 
use. Such pricing policies were, for example, 
the rule in the Nira irrigation project of the 
upper Bhima sub-basin (Attwood, 1992).
In independent India, water charges were 
increased several times: significant increases in 
the mid-1970s and mid-1980s were part of 
the CAD programme; the most recent increase, 
in 2001, was part of the PIM package. The call 
for PIM also pushed Maharashtra to return to 
the system of bulk allocation (along with rota-
tional water supply) to manage water demand 
(GoM, 2005b). There are similar recommen-
dations  in  Andhra  Pradesh  and  Karnataka. 
Recent  increases  in  water  charges  have 
improved the cost recovery ratio of most irriga-
tion projects in the Krishna basin – this was 
their main objective, not water savings – but 
the financial viability of state-managed irriga-
tion remains one of the main problems of the 
Indian water sector (Gulati et al., 2005).
Autonomous irrigation agencies: motives  
and expectations 
The involvement of the private sector in irri-
gation management was envisaged during the 
British period to ease the financial burden that 
irrigation  development  represented  to  the 
Crown.  The  experiment  failed  (Atchi  Reddy, 
1990). The creation of financially autonomous 
irrigation  agencies  is  often  referred  to  as  a 
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back  into  irrigation  management,  as  local 
governments face serious financial difficulties, 
with  broad  consequences  for  rural  services. 
Experiences  in  the  three  states  sharing  the 
Krishna water yielded mixed results. In Andhra 
Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh Water Resources 
Development Corporation was set up in 1997 
but has not undertaken any significant activity 
(Madhav, 2007). In Karnataka and Maharashtra, 
financially autonomous irrigation agencies were 
set up in the 1990s to raise financial resources 
from the market to build irrigation structures, 
notably  in  the  Krishna  basin  (Gulati  et  al., 
2005). They were set up to overcome reduced 
budget  allocations  (and  uncertainties  around 
external  funding),21  and  in  response  to  the 
KWDT award, to make sure ongoing projects 
would be completed (and water used) by 2000, 
when the award was to be renegotiated (Gulati 
et  al.,  2005);  these  measures  were  mainly 
about  increasing  supply.  Gulati et  al. (2005) 
studied the achievements of, and the problems 
faced by, the agency entrusted with the task of 
developing the Upper Krishna Project (Alamatti/
Narayanapur dams) in Karnataka. They high-
lighted that the agency had been successful in 
raising  funds  (thanks  to  the  support  of  the 
government of Karnataka) and in completing 
construction  work,  thus  con    tributing  to  river 
basin overbuilding. However, its overall finan-
cial  situation  is  not  good  (the  agency  is  not 
financially autonomous: it does not generate its 
own  income,  which  should  have  come  from 
better  cost  recovery,  and  depends  on  state 
support); there has been little improvement in 
irrigation system management and the agency 
functions as a government line department.
Clearly,  financially  autonomous  irrigation 
agencies have failed to live up to researchers’ 
expectations of demand management; but the 
motive behind the creation of such agencies 
has  always  been  supply  augmentation.  This 
shows the permeability of socially constructed, 
scale-dependent  and  interrelated  categories 
such  as  ‘supply  augmentation’  and  ‘demand 
management’.
While these corporations have mainly been 
about  ‘developing’  large  surface  irrigation 
projects,  the  recent  Maharashtra  Water 
Resources  Regulatory  Authority  Act  of  2005 
makes  them  de  facto  ‘river  basin  agencies’, 
whose work is to be coordinated by a public 
body: the Water Resources Regulatory Authority 
(GoM, 2005b). The law highlights the need for 
integrated  resources  management,  but  river 
basin  agencies  are  mainly  entrusted  with  the 
task of further developing water resources within 
the limits of the state of Maharashtra. Such calls 
for basin-wide water management have a long 
history in India, but much has yet to be done to 
implement the idea (Vaidyanathan, 1999).
Conservation measures
With evidence of a growing water crisis and low 
returns  from  irrigated  agriculture,  several 
on-farm ‘water-saving’ technologies are being 
promoted in India. Two cases in point are: (i) 
the development of drip irrigation (for profitable 
fruit  and  vegetable  cultivation,  notably  in 
Maharashtra), although it remains marginal at 
the all-India level (less than 1% of the total irri-
gated area); and (ii) a new way of cultivating 
rice, known as the system of rice intensification 
(SRI),  which  demands  less  water  and  fewer 
inputs than common paddy cultivation. More 
research  on  the  viability  of  these  techniques 
and the scope for water saving (to be reallo-
cated to other users) is needed.
Challenges to demand management in India
Aubriot (2006) and Shah (2007) underline that 
Indian agricultural and food policies are often at 
loggerheads with the objectives of water demand 
management:  the  public  procurement  system 
ensures  minimal  prices  for  water-consuming 
crops such as sugarcane and paddy (wheat in 
northern India), which together represent 55% 
of all irrigated crops in the Krishna basin (Biggs 
et al., 2007). Rationalizing agricultural policies 
on the basis of water availability is needed, and 
requires a better understanding of the hy  drology 
of the main Indian river basins and of the spatial 
dimension to equity and efficiency in water use.
Water allocation
Water allocation policies are generally associ-
ated with late phases of river basin develop-
ment and ‘mature’ (closing or closed) basins, 
where the pressure on water resources and the 
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conflicts  about  the  sharing  of  the  Krishna’s 
water have brewed since the late 19th century 
(D’Souza, 2006), leading to the setting up of 
the  KWDT  as  early  as  1969.  Formal  water 
allocation was established in 1976, in an early 
development stage of the basin, while harness-
ing water was still the motto of the three states. 
This sharing agreement has been instrumental 
in the overbuilding of the basin.
Questioning the notion of ‘surplus water’
The KWDT allocated the 75%-dependable flow   
of the Krishna River and explicitly recognized 
that all water in excess of this flow had to be 
considered as ‘surplus water’ (and free to be 
used by the downstream most riparian state: 
Andhra  Pradesh).  But  as  environmental  con  -
cerns take centre stage, it has become clear 
that  the  notion  of  ‘surplus  water’  involves  a 
value judgment (Mohile, 2007). Smakhtin et al. 
(2007) also question the notion of surplus water 
from  a  hydrological  point  of  view.  As  river 
basins close, policies, rules and infrastructures 
based on this notion will become increasingly 
counter-productive (Wester et al., 2005): they 
create  new  demands  for  water  already  com  -
mitted and are likely to sharpen conflicts.
Water rights and provisional allocation
There are no clear water-allocation guidelines in 
India, and negotiated agreements, such as the 
KWDT  award,  accommodate  different  water 
rights regimes, depending on the principles that 
each party (here the three states) wants to be 
considered  in  the  allocation  pro  cess  (Mohile, 
2007). The KWDT first endorsed the riparian 
rights of the three states, and within the states, 
bureaucratic  decisions  of  water  allocation 
remained the norm. Second, it explicitly recog-
nized prior appropriation rights by protecting 
existing uses – at the project and state levels – 
and, third, it sanctioned the rights of the states 
to further develop water resources by consider-
ing planned future uses, generally on the basis 
of ongoing projects (Venot, 2008b). The KWDT 
award of 1976 was to be revised in 2000, and 
the states sharing the Krishna water engaged in 
massive  development  of  their  hydraulic  infra-
structure22  (with  serious  economic  and  fiscal 
damage)23 to lay claim on water resources and 
ensure they would be holding a prevailing posi-
tion when the KWDT award was renegotiated 
(Gulati et al., 2005).24 Interstate competition 
unquestionably resulted in overcommitment of 
water. But the politics of water also play a major 
role at other levels (see Mollinga, 2001, for a 
con  ceptual presentation), such as the regional 
level in a single state (see Box 10.3), in shaping 
water availability and use in large river basins. 
The fact that state governments are allocated 
funds  from  the  planning  commission  propor-
tional  to  the  number  of  medium  and  major 
ongoing irrigation projects has also driven infra-
structural development (Sengupta, 2005).25 
Box 10.3. Intrastate politics and overcommitment of water: the case of Andhra Pradesh.
Politics in Andhra Pradesh have strongly influenced water use in the lower Krishna basin. Since India 
gained independence, access to irrigation facilities and state funds for irrigation have been contested by 
the various regions of the state (e.g. Rayalaseema, Telangana and coastal Andhra), which are unevenly 
developed. Government-funded canal irrigation is concentrated in coastal Andhra, while Rayalaseema 
and Telangana mainly rely on groundwater for irrigation (Ratna Reddy, 2006). Despite reduced invest-
ments in the agriculture and irrigation sectors from the mid-1980s onwards, the government of Andhra 
Pradesh has always tried to balance rural development across the three regions of the state to attenuate 
inequities rooted in the natural, historical and political context of Andhra Pradesh, characterized by the 
dominant influence of the coastal region and of its entrepreneurs (Venot et al., 2007). This has led to 
promises of new surface irrigation projects both within and outside the lower Krishna basin, planned on 
the expectation of ‘surplus’ water from the Krishna River. Although these projects comply with the KWDT 
award, they are based on a notion of ‘surplus water’, which needs to be questioned (see above). Preventing 
regional tensions and state implosion – under the pressure of independent claims from all three regions of 
the state – have been major drivers of infrastructural development in the lower Krishna basin (Venot et al., 
2007); political and socio-economic concerns for poor regions have also promoted the overbuilding of 
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Technical limits of the KWDT award
Technical limits explain why the KWDT did not 
prevent the closure of the Krishna basin. First, 
by allocating fixed volumes of surface water on 
the basis of the 75%-dependable flow, it did 
not offer an adapted platform to manage low-
flow years. Second, it neglected the relation-
ships between surface water and groundwater 
systems  and  endorsed  capture  rights,  as  it 
mentioned that the three states ‘will be free to 
make use of underground water within their 
respective territories in the Krishna river basin 
[and that] use of underground water shall not 
be reckoned as use of the water of the river 
Krishna’ (GoI–KWDT, 1976). But groundwater 
abstraction  has  skyrocketed  over  the  last 
decades  and  has  contributed  to  streamflow 
depletion,  notably  in  upstream  river  valleys, 
where shallow alluvial aquifers and river systems 
are highly connected (see above; Hanumantha 
Rao, 2006). The 75%-reliability of the KWDT 
allocations is now jeopardized: irrigation devel-
opment is based on an overestimation of avail-
able surface water (Biggs et al., 2007), also 
highlights that river runoff has decreased for all 
probability levels due to irrigation development) 
and security of supply for existing users is at 
risk. Understanding the interactions between 
groundwater and surface water, especially with 
regard to dry periods, is critical in defining allo-
cation rules that would consider both surface 
water and groundwater resources and cap their 
respective  uses.26  Third,  more  accurate  esti-
mation  of  return  flows  in  irrigated  areas  is 
needed (Biggs et al., 2007): this is a challeng-
ing task, as actual return flows vary with supply, 
due to farmers largely resorting to drain-water, 
especially during low-flow years. Fourth, while 
the KWDT mentioned that ‘beneficial use shall 
include uses […] for domestic, municipal, irri-
gation, industrial, production of power, naviga-
tion,  aquaculture,  wildlife  protection  and 
recreation  purposes’  (GoI–KWDT,  1976),  it 
did not mention the relative shares allocated 
for  these  consumptive  and  non-consumptive 
uses.  As  domestic  and  industrial  demands 
increase  and  potentially  conflict  with  other 
uses, there is a need to formally quantify the 
water entitlement for cities and industries (this 
is likely to be done at the state level, but the 
current  KWDT  tribunal  could  provide  guide-
lines) that are likely to be supplied as they grow 
(Molle  and  Berkoff,  2006).  Environmental 
needs  have  to  be  recognized  and  formally 
quantified as well (at the state and basin levels), 
and water-quality issues need to be considered 
so that productive use of wastewater is main-
tained with minimum hazard to public health.
Local adjustments for water allocation
Local adjustments and the adaptive capacity of 
farmers are major ‘buffers’ in the face of low-
flow  years  (see  Box  10.4),  but  they  remain 
largely overlooked. Further, community man  -
agement and local institutions for water alloca-
tion  and  conflict  resolution  have  all  existed 
Box 10.4.  Farmers’ coping strategies: the case of the Nagarjuna Sagar project.
Nagarjuna Sagar is a large irrigation project (900,000 ha) located in the lower Krishna basin (Andhra 
Pradesh). Inflow to the reservoir has been dramatically curtailed due to upstream water development. 
During the dry years of 2002 and 2003, canal water availability was 20% of the long-term average. 
Consequently, in 2002, the total irrigated area decreased by more than 85%, showing that most farmers 
did not engage in cultivation or lost their crops due to lack of water. In 2003, the cropped area was 77% 
of the area irrigated during years with normal water availability. This illustrates the resilience of irrigated 
farming systems and the ‘learning’ abilities of farmers, who engaged in early rainfed cultivation with the 
monsoonal rains rather than waiting for canal water. Farmers resorted to diverse strategies, such as: (i) 
increasing irrigation efficiency through better land preparation and better O&M of field canals and drains; 
(ii) pumping groundwater (the number of wells dramatically increased in the region); (iii) changing crop-
ping patterns, such as leaving part of the land fallow and planting dry crops such as millet and sorghum 
for self-subsistence; (iv) seeking work outside the agriculture sector; and (v) selling their livestock – a 
primary source of revenue and workforce for the poorest households. There is also anecdotal evidence of 
tampering with the irrigation system and of the collusion of farmers with politicians and employees of the 
Irrigation Department (Venot, 2008c).230  J.-P. Venot
from the earliest stages of river basin develop-
ment in South India (see Mosse, 2003, on tank 
management).  However,  the  73rd  Constitutional 
Amendment  of  1993  (and  the  related 
Panchayati Raj Act) constitutes the first national 
attempt to devolve powers to local bodies: the 
panchayats are notably made responsible for 
local  management  of  water-related  services 
and water bodies. In the field of irrigation, this 
means the O&M of minor irri  gation projects. 
While  much  hope  has  been  vested  in  the 
decentralization  process  for  increasing  the 
  efficiency  of  water  use,  it  is  clear  that  the 
panchayat raj system will be unable to address 
some of the core problems of the water sector, 
which need to be tackled at a regional level 
(Mollinga, 2005). Two of the three states that 
share the Krishna basin provide striking exam-
ples of the limits to the ongoing decentraliza-
tion process in India: in Karnataka, there is a 
trend towards political re-centralization (after a 
period of strong state support to panchayats), 
and in Andhra Pradesh, state poverty-reduction 
programmes  and  the  cre  ation  of  WUAs  are 
thought to have diluted the power and auton-
omy  of  the  panchayats,  as  a  non-elected 
bureaucracy has bypassed locally elected insti-
tutions (Johnson, 2003; Mooij, 2003).
New Challenges and Ways Forward: for a 
New Governance Structure
Supply augmentation projects remain the most 
common option resorted to in order to face 
increasing water demand. The project of inter-
linking the Indian rivers would, for example, 
result in an 11.6 billion m3/year increase in 
water availability in the lower Krishna basin, a 
fifth  of  which  would  be  ‘reserved’  for  the 
Krishna delta to support agriculture, counter-
balancing the observed decline in discharge of 
the Krishna River and limiting environmental 
degradation (NWDA, 2007). This could allevi-
ate  the  situ  ation  of  crisis,  which  is  likely  to 
recur in the near future, but attendant plans to 
expand  irrigation  with  this  transferred  water 
are likely to defeat this objective. The construc-
tion of a diversion scheme from the Godavari 
basin  began  in  2006  and  demonstrates  the 
commitment of the state of Andhra Pradesh to 
this project. A transfer from the Alamatti dam 
to the Pennar River basin to the south-east is 
also contemplated, but plans to develop irriga-
tion en route might result in water being used 
up  before  it  crosses  the  boundaries  of  the 
Krishna basin. Finally, the state of Maharashtra 
is planning transfers from the upper Krishna to 
the upper Bhima sub-basins, to meet irrigation 
water demand in the latter.
However,  as  the  water  sector  faces  new 
challenges, and water management organiza-
tions are expected to focus not only on agricul-
tural  growth  and  increasing  food  production 
but also on broader social (enhancing equity, 
reducing  poverty)  and  environmental  goals, 
there is a need for institutional reforms to trig-
ger a change in the governance structure of 
natural resources. But current water manage-
ment  organizations  are  often  structured  to 
address  past  challenges,  and  are  unable  to 
internalize these new priorities (Merrey et al., 
2007).
Mollinga (2005) identifies the resilience of 
civil-engineering-dominated  water  bureau-
cracies as one of the main obstacles to change 
in the Indian water sector. The Indian water 
resources  governance  structure  and  policy 
process  remains  one  of  centralization  and 
  hierarchy,  inherited  from  the  post-1947 
planned development approach and the struc-
ture of the government administration. Much 
hope was vested in devolution and decentra-
lization  processes,  and  in  PIM  programmes 
(see  above),  but  these  experiments  did  not 
bring  a  socio-political  revolution  in  rural 
governance (Jayal et al., 2006). The Irrigation 
Department is reluctant to devolve its power to 
WUAs (Mollinga et al., 2004). Broader decen-
tralization policies do not challenge the prevail-
ing  dual  system  between  federal  and  state 
levels27  and  seem  to  be  hardly  taken  up  by 
local  popu  lations  (Johnson,  2003;  Mollinga, 
2005).  Radical  changes  in  the  balance  of 
power  in  favour  of  water  users  and  major 
restructuring of hydro-bureaucracies have yet to 
happen (Merrey et al., 2007), and are unlikely 
to  take  place  through  further  institutional 
de  velopment. A shift in the governance struc-
ture would require that the state concentrate 
on its regulatory role because of its responsibil-
ity for providing public goods and for ensuring 
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are to improve effectiveness of the state itself 
and  to  find  the  right  balance  between  state 
action and other institutional actors (Merrey et 
al., 2007). This requires creating political room 
for  mobilization  and  empowerment  of  dis  -
enfranchised  stakeholders  (Molle  et  al., 
2007).
Other challenges to water resources man  -
agement  in  India  are  the  organizational  and 
policy fragmentation (Mollinga, 2005), and the 
highly informal and dispersed character of the 
water economy, with millions of farmers secur-
ing  private  access  to  groundwater  (Shah, 
2007).  Water  and  irrigation  management 
reforms are not linked to broader agricultural 
or rural development policies (which are the 
remit of other governmental departments), and 
have generally focused on single organizations 
(this happens in most countries; Merrey et al., 
2007). The dynamics of agricultural water use 
in the Krishna basin and in India as a whole 
(notably  the  increasing  groundwater  abstrac-
tion) are not reflected in institutional and finan-
cial investments, which are mainly targeted at 
medium  and  large  surface-irrigation  projects 
(although free electricity could be seen as an 
‘investment’ for minor irrigation). While such 
investments are needed, it is crucial to adopt a 
more integrated approach to land and water 
resources  management  (Mollinga,  2005). 
There  are  examples  of  such  approaches  in 
Indian history, notably during the 1980s, when 
Prime  Minister  Rajiv  Gandhi  implemented 
intersectoral development programmes whose 
coordination was taken up at the district level 
(Shah, 2007).
As  demand  for  water  by  different  user 
groups is increasing, river basins are closing, 
and interconnectedness between users intensi-
fies, leading to decreasing security of supply to 
all  existing  users;  allocation  of  water  takes 
centre stage in integrated approaches to water 
resources  management.  However,  existing 
institutions in India are unlikely to offer a space 
for  effective  negotiation  at  relevant  scales 
(Mollinga,  2005);  past  experiences  of  basin 
water allocation (e.g. by the KWDT) did not 
prevent  basin  closure  and  lie  at  the  root  of 
basin overbuilding (see above). These allo  cation 
mechanisms – centred on surface blue water – 
do not allow internalization of the multi-level 
drivers of river basin closure.
The current KWDT tribunal is expected to 
reach  a  decision  by  2010.  At  present,  this 
tribunal mainly involves decision makers and 
bureaucrats from the three states and needs to 
be made more responsive to the demands of 
local communities by involving local users in 
the  negotiation  process  for  both  social  and 
en  vironmental  benefits  (refer  to  Iyer,  2003, 
and Janakarajan, 2007, for the prospects and 
problems related to involving farmers in the 
resolution  of  water-sharing  conflicts).  The 
coming KWDT allocation rules should: (i) be 
defined at the basin level; (ii) be based on a 
comprehensive and transparent understanding 
of the hydrology; (iii) internalize the variability 
of water availability – and give special attention 
to allocation during dry years; (iv) recognize the 
interactions  between  surface  water,  ground-
water and green (soil) water (soil moisture is 
crucial for rainfed agriculture and many liveli-
hoods); (v) estimate long-term reliable supplies 
in any part of the basin in light of actual and 
projected use; (vi) recognize customary rights, 
local strategies and local adjustments (Venot, 
2008a);  and  (vi)  be  implemented  and  moni-
tored  with  a  more  transparent  and  effective 
data collection. The KWDT should also provide 
mechanisms for stopping any project in contra-
diction to the award of the tribunal. As alloca-
tion is likely to take place mainly on economic 
(increasing  water  productivity)  and  political 
grounds, primary attention is to be given to 
equity and environmental principles through a 
reserve for both productive water for the poor 
and the environment (environmental flows). As 
attention  to  environmental  conservation  is 
often  perceived  as  anti-poor  (Merrey  et  al., 
2007), there is a need for an economic and 
social  valuation  of  the  goods  and  services 
provided  by  ecosystems  (see  Pearce  et  al., 
2006); this is one of the most promising ways 
of  making  decision  makers  commit  to  the 
objective of environmental preservation in the 
process of water allocation.
Finally,  sectoral  water  resources  policies 
alone  cannot  slow  down  river  basin  closure. 
There is a need to resort to integrated rural 
development  policies  that  would  ensure  the 
rural  population  alternatives  within  (diversifi-
cation, organic farming, integration in agribusi-
ness  chains,  etc.)  or  outside  the  agriculture 
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Conclusion
Overcommitment of water resources and signs 
of basin closure are apparent during dry   periods 
in the Krishna basin. Overexploitation comes 
along with changing patterns of access to water 
and declining security of supply to all existing 
users, as the basin is almost fully allocated and 
demand  greater  than  supply.  This  inevitably 
leads to conflicts of access and allocation. As 
early as the mid-1970s, through the KWDT, 
the  government  of  India  legislated  for  allo-
cation of water to the three states of Andhra 
Pradesh,  Karnataka  and  Maharashtra.  The 
KWDT award did not offer a means to manage 
crises and low-flow years. On the contrary, it 
encouraged the three states to invest massively 
in  the  development  of  their  hydraulic  infra-
structures, often with dramatic economic and 
fiscal  consequences.  In  parallel  with  supply 
augmentation,  the  three  states  also  imple-
mented water demand management options, 
but almost all these measures had as a prime 
objective  the  bridging  of  the  gap  between 
actual and potential irrigated area, and resulted 
in a further commitment of water resources.
Unpacking the drivers of river basin closure 
requires  going  beyond  a  linear  trajectory  of 
river  basin  development,  where  strategies  of 
supply  augmentation,  demand  management 
and  water  allocation  are  successively  called 
upon. In the Krishna basin, all past interven-
tions combined to lead to the closure of the 
basin. Indian debates on the ‘underutilization’ 
of  the  irrigation  potential  and  the  nature  of 
rural development policies (oscillating between 
equity and growth) lie at the root of the over-
exploitation of water resources in the Krishna 
basin.
River basin closure means that, in hydro-
logic terms, overall basin efficiency is close to 
its  maximum.  The  scope  for  effective  water 
savings  has  become  very  limited:  supply 
augmentation as well as demand management 
options eventually lead to reallocation of water. 
Current  institutions  are  not  adapted  to  face 
these new challenges and deal with basin water 
allocation. A formal and clear apportionment 
of water between different user groups is also 
difficult because of the complexity and limited 
knowledge of the basin hydrology.
What is needed is a new democratic govern-
ance system, allowing for the demands of local 
communities to be voiced through a platform 
of negotiations where state, civil society and 
economic  spheres  could  interact  to  allocate 
basin water. This is a challenging task, which 
goes beyond reforming the water sector and 
requires a broader change in the nature of the 
state  and  democracy  in  India  (Mollinga, 
2005).
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Notes
 1    According  to  the  minor  irrigation  censuses  of 
1994  and  2001,  the  number  of  shallow  tube-
wells in the Krishna basin increased from 35,000 
to 515,000 between 1987 and 2001, while the 
number  of  deep  tube-wells  increased  from 
14,000  to  82,000  during  the  same  period.  In 
2001,  1.1  million  dug  wells  were  registered 
(515,000 in 1987).
 2    Estimates are based on district-wise land use data 
(presented  in  GoAP,  2006;  GoK,  2006;  GoM, 
2005a; EPW, 2005), and on data available online, 
with a subscription, at www.indiaagristat.com
 3    From 1990–2001, the rainfall:runoff coefficient 
was only 0.07 (Biggs et al., 2007).
 4    Depletion from irrigated fields and reservoirs is 
calculated from climatic data and the Penman–
Monteith equation (Allen et al., 1998); depletion 
in  rainfed  ecosystems  is  estimated  using  the 
methods of Ahmad et al. (2006), Bouwer et al. 
(2007) and Immerzeel et al. (2007). To compute 
basin  depletion,  land  cover  is  estimated  from 
land-use statistics at the district level.
 5    Domestic  and  industrial  uses  are  computed 
according to van Rooijen et al. (2008), assuming 
a  water-use  efficiency  of  70%  in  both  sectors. 
Livestock consumption is computed according to   The Krishna Basin, South India  233
Peden et al. (2007) and livestock statistics at the 
district level.
 6    The live storage capacity of existing reservoirs is 
used and replenished every year and inter-annual 
variation of storage in these reservoirs is consid-
ered negligible.
 7    That is, the rain that infiltrates to the ground  water, 
calculated as a constant fraction of precipitation, 
depending on the sub-basin considered, on the 
basis  of  estimates  of  the  National  Water 
Development Agency (NWDA).
 8    Estimated  as  70%  of  all  depletion  in  ground-
water-irrigated areas.
 9    Groundwater outflows to the sea from the Krishna 
delta are ignored.
10   Overall  agricultural  growth  remained  positive 
due to improved productivity in livestock- and 
fish-production  activities,  and  in  cultivation  of 
high-value  fruits  and  vegetables,  but  the  crisis 
affecting  the  crop  sector  (and  marginal  family 
farmers) is even more acute than these macro-
indicators suggest.
11   The KWDT uses the term ‘flow’ to designate the 
‘naturalized runoff’ (i.e. the observed discharge 




(Venot et al., 2007), which is exceeded in more 
than 90% of the years, if data from GoI-KWDT 
(1976) are considered.
12   These  allocations  include  ‘local  runoff’:  the 
KWDT did not only share water from the main-
stem Krishna but also runoff from sub-basins (e.g. 
the  Andhra  Pradesh  allocation  includes  water 
from  sub-basins  that  are  entirely  located  in 
Andhra Pradesh, such as the Musi, Palleru and 
Muneru sub-basins: only 12.8 billion m3/year of 
the  22.6  billion  m3/year  allocated  to  Andhra 
Pradesh has to come from upstream). 
   This  volumetric  apportionment  of  water  is 
known as ‘Scheme A’, and constitutes the default 
scheme to be implemented. Proportional appor-
tionment  of  water  had  been  contemplated  in 
what was called ‘Scheme B’: allocations would 
then  depend  on  water  availability,  and  either 
scarcity, or surplus water, would be proportion-
ally shared by the three states. Scheme B was 
supported  by  upstream  states  and  opposed  by 
Andhra  Pradesh,  and  was  thus  never  imple-
mented (Sajjan, 2005).
13   If upstream states take their ‘share’ (as mentioned 
by the KWDT), there is a high probability (0.25) 
that  the  Andhra  Pradesh  allocation  will  be 
  jeopardized and downstream uses constrained: 
in  these  conditions,  it  is  crucial  for  Andhra 
Pradesh to discuss provisions during years of low 
flow.
14   Declining base flows means that the 75%-depend-
able flow of the Krishna River, as estimated by 
the  KWDT,  is  exceeded  less  than  one  year  in 
two. This is consistent with results from Biggs et 
al. (2007).
15   Naturalized  runoff  from  2001  to  2004  can  be 
estimated at 52.8 billion m3/year (e.g. 9% lower 
than the 75%-dependable flow, as estimated by 
the KWDT); inflow from upstream was about 10 
billion m3/year (i.e. 2.8 billion m3 lower than the 
amount needed for Andhra Pradesh to receive its 
full KWDT   allocation).
    Even though water availability was close to the 
allocation  defined  by  the  KWDT,  the  drought 
had dramatic consequences on downstream irri-
gated agriculture (see Box 10.4); this is because 
diversions  to  downstream  irrigation  projects 
(Nagarjuna Sagar, the Krishna delta) had been – 
for most of their history – much higher than the 
volumes  ‘protected’  by  the  KWDT  (Andhra 
Pradesh  diverts  significant  volumes  of  ‘surplus 
water’; Venot et al., 2007). Farmers have been 
used to high – but highly unreliable – supplies 
and have been dramatically affected by years of 
low flows: overcommitment of water can ‘artifi-
cially’ create a situation of scarcity.
16   The  deficit  in  the  discharge  to  the  ocean  was 
sharpened by the increased storage capacity (3 
billion m3) of the Alamatti reservoir, whose level 
had been raised in the early 2000s.
17   Growth in well-endowed areas is supposed to 
trickle down to other regions and social groups.
18   This long-mooted project would consist of inter-
linking the Indian rivers through a ‘national water 
grid’, and in transferring water from ‘water-abun-
dant’ basins to water-scarce basins, such as the 
Krishna  and  the  Cauvery,  further  south.  After 
being given a strong impetus in the late 1990s, it 
is not clear if the project has achieved consensus 
among national politicians and decision makers 
(Venot et al., 2007): indeed, this ’all-India’ mega-
project seems to have been put off, and only a 
few links are being contemplated or constructed, 
but  without  further  references  to  an  all-India 
grid.
19   In Andhra Pradesh, the work of the Commission 
for Irrigation Utilization (Hashim Ali, 1982) was 
key in highlighting the need for such technical 
improvement programmes.
20   The  National  Watershed  Development  Project 
(early  1980s)  and  the  National  Watershed 
Development Project for Rain-fed Areas are two 
examples.
21   The World  Bank,  for  example,  has  withdrawn 
more than once from the controversial Alamatti 
project  (in  Karnataka)  and  returned  to  it  each 
time (D’Souza, 2006).
22   Intrastate political motives (to obtain the support 
of particular social groups or regions) have also 234  J.-P. Venot
largely  driven  the  construction  of  irrigation 
projects (see Box 10.3 and Venot et al., 2007).
23   Briscoe and Malik (2007) evaluate that 18% of 
Maharashtra’s fiscal deficit is due to the construc-
tion of dams whose primary purpose was to lay 
claims for water from the Krishna.
24   Notably, upstream states were worried that their 
allocation would be revised downward if they 
could not justify water use equal to, or higher 
than, their 1976 allocation.
25   In  1996,  the  federal  government  also  initiated 
the Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Scheme (a loan 
system)  for  the  states  to  complete  irrigation 
projects that were already at an advanced stage 
of construction.
26   Shah et al. (2003) highlight that capping ground-
water abstraction is one of the most challenging 
tasks in the Indian water economy.
27   For  example,  financial  decentralization  is  not 
part of the reforms.
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Introduction
This  chapter  describes  and  analyses  water 
resource development in the Bhavani basin, a 
sub-basin  of  the  Cauvery  basin,  in  southern 
India.  The  Bhavani  basin  is  almost  entirely 
located  within  the  semi-arid  state  of  Tamil 
Nadu.  This  is  an  area  where,  for  centuries, 
agriculture has had to cope with erratic rainfall. 
Up  to  the  middle  of  the  20th  century,  the 
vagaries of the monsoons resulted in feasts or 
famines. While irrigation development offered 
some stability in the second half of the 20th 
century, a rapidly growing population ampli-
fied the difficulty of matching food production 
with human needs. Water is now a key limiting 
factor to agricultural growth, and it is impera-
tive to have different strategies to increase the 
availability and productivity of water resources 
(Baliga, 1966; Mohanakrishnan, 2001).
The  Cauvery  basin  is  the  most  important 
surface water source in Tamil Nadu. In the 2nd 
century  a d  the  Grand  weir  was  constructed 
across the Cauvery River. It serves 350,000 ha 
in the delta and was the first major, and is still 
the largest, command area in the basin. During 
the  20th  century,  development  of  irrigation 
infrastructure  in  the  Cauvery  basin  increased 
the  (gross)  total  irrigated  area  from  about 
600,000 ha to 1.9 million ha and brought the 
entire basin to closure (GoI, 2005). The Bhavani 
basin was essentially brought to closure in the 
middle of the 1950s, and since then only a frac-
tion of the natural outflow reaches the Cauvery 
River (Lannerstad, 2008).
A primary response to the lack of additional 
surface water for irrigation has been a marked 
increase in groundwater use. In the 1980s, the 
Tamil Nadu farmers were given free electricity, 
irrespective  of  the  quantity  consumed,  and 
subsidies allowed groundwater use to flourish 
(Kannan,  2004;  Shah,  2007).  This  chapter 
demonstrates spatially and statistically how the 
initiative  during  the  last  decades  has  moved 
from the state, which earlier constructed the 
large-scale projects in the basin, towards indi-
vidual  farmers  pumping  water  from  many 
different sources, and thus depleting aquifers 
and perturbing allocation schemes for surface 
water.
The analysis is based upon statistics, water-
use data, interviews, reports and spatial ana  lyses 
from maps, GIS and remote sensing. The water 
dynamics in the Bhavani basin provide exam-
ples of a complex web of interconnections and 
redistribution – not only upstream–downstream, 
but  also  downstream–upstream.  This  chapter 
describes  how  intensification  of  agri  cultural 
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water use continues after basin closure. It has a 
special focus on the expanding use of pumps to 
extract water from aquifers, rivers and canals to 
enable  further  intensification  in  spite  of  an 
apparent constraint on overall water resource 
availability.
Agricultural Water Use in the  
Bhavani Basin
Agriculture has been the dominant water and 
land user in the Bhavani basin for hundreds of 
years. However, the way water is used for agri-
culture  has  changed  significantly  and  is 
expected to change further and rapidly.
The Bhavani basin
The Bhavani basin is the fourth largest (6500 
km2) sub-basin in the Cauvery basin (81,000 
km2) (Fig. 11.1). The western part (Western 
Ghats) is hilly terrain of 300–2400 masl. The 
northern (eastern Ghats) side of the basin is 
dominated by rugged, discontinuous hills, with 
an elevation of 300–1000 masl. The Bhavani 
valley,  the  south-eastern  part,  is  flat  terrain 
(NWDA, 1993). In the upper Bhavani basin 
(4100 km2), the average annual precipitation is 
1600 mm and the potential yearly evapotrans-
piration is about 800 mm. In the lower Bhavani 
basin (2400 km2), the conditions are the oppo-
site, with an annual rainfall of around 700 mm 
and  a  potential  evapotranspiration  of  1600 
mm (von Lengerke, 1977).
Forest  reserves  and  plantations  dominate 
the upper and the northern part of the lower 
Bhavani  basin.  Tea  and  coffee  plantations, 
vegetables  (carrots,  potatoes  and  cabbages) 
and spices (cardamom and ginger) characterize 
the cultivated areas in the Nilgiris district areas. 
In the parts of the basin falling within the Erode 
and  Coimbatore  districts,  there  are  irrigated 
lands with canals and groundwater, and rainfed 
croplands,  often  with  supplemental  ground-
water  irrigation.  Cultivated  crops  are  paddy, 
groundnuts,  sorghum  (for  fodder),  pulses, 
sugarcane,  coconuts,  sesame,  turmeric  and 
bananas (SCR, 2005). 
The  population  in  the  Bhavani  basin  has 
increased  by  about  200%  during  the  last 
50  years,  reaching  around  2.5  million  (GoI, 
2005). More than 50% of the workforce in the 
Nilgiris district is involved in livestock, forestry, 
fishing, hunting, plantations or orchards, and 
14% are employed in the agriculture sector as 
cultivators  or  agricultural  labourers.  In  the 
Erode district, almost 55% work in agriculture. 
Industrial development is now increasing in the 
basin and is fuelled by the rapid development 
of  Coimbatore,  the  industrial  and  second 
biggest city in Tamil Nadu, and Tiruppur, the 
textile centre of southern India, which are both 
located  in  the  neighbouring  Noyyal  basin 
(Census of India, 1991a, b).
Historical development of gravity irrigation
The major part of the cultivated areas in the 
Bhavani basin are located in the Coimbatore 
and Erode districts, which are described as an 
area ‘of exceptional dryness’ with ‘not less than 
two-thirds  of  the  seasons’  as  ‘unfavourable’. 
The  years  1804–05,  1806,  1808,  1812, 
1813, 1823, 1831, 1832, 1834, 1836, 1861, 
1866,  1876–1878,  1891–92,  1892–93, 
1894–95,  1904–05  and  1905–06  all  had 
  serious water scarcity, often leading to ‘scarcity, 
desolation and disease’ or ‘famine, sickness and 
death.’  In  1808,  failure  of  both  monsoons 
caused a famine ‘that carried off half the popu-
lation’, while ‘The Great Famine’ in 1876–1878 
was described as ‘more disastrous in effect than 
any  of  its  predecessors’  (Madras  Presidency, 
1902; Baliga, 1966).
The great annual and seasonal rainfall vari-
ability and the hot climate pose an agricultural 
challenge in Tamil Nadu. Most parts of the state 
rely upon the unpredictable and erratic north-
eastern monsoon (October–December), which 
is  characterized  by  cyclones  and  short  and 
heavy  downpours  (Mohanakrishnan,  2001). 
The people in the Erode district are fortunate 
as the upper part of the Bhavani basin receives 
ample rainfall during the south-west monsoon 
(June–September),  which  contributes  to  a 
perennial flow in the Bhavani River. To utilize 
this flow, two important weirs were constructed 
by local rulers during historic times. In the 13th 
century, the Kalingarayan weir (serving 4800 
ha) was constructed across the Bhavani River 
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River. In the 17th century, the Kodiveri weir, 
which serves the Arakkankottai (serving 2000 
ha) and Thadapalli (serving 7200 ha) canals, 
was  constructed  50  km  further  upstream. 
Together with Kanniyampalayam weir (serving 
160  ha)  there  were  three  weirs  across  the 
Bhavani River in 1940. At that time water was 
already diverted from the Kallar, Coonoor and 
Gandaipallam tributaries into a number of small 
canals, such as the Nellitturai and Maruthavalli 
canals (Fig. 11.2). In total, about 1100 ha were 
irrigated from these minor canals (Baliga, 1966; 
MIDS, 1998).
Compared  with  many  other  districts  in 
Tamil Nadu, tanks play only a minor role in the 
Coimbatore and Erode districts. In 1903, long 
before  the  expansion  of  canals  and  ground-
water use, only about 5% of the irrigated area 
was  under  tank  irrigation  (SCR,  1903).  The 
total  tank-irrigated  area  in  Bhavani  basin  is 
Fig. 11.1.  Bhavani basin from an administrative, hydrological and irrigation perspective (Source irrigated 
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Fig. 11.2.  Surface water resource development in Bhavani basin by 1940, 1970 and 2000.242  M. Lannerstad and D. Molden
currently about 2000 ha (MIDS, 1998). Most 
of the tanks are fed by local runoff and a few 
by canals.  The  Appakudal  tank  cascade,  for 
ex  ample,  is  fed  by  various  ‘jungle  streams’ 
from the Bargur Hills (Baliga, 1966).
During  the  Second  World  War,  the  food 
problem became acute on a national scale in 
British India. To quickly increase food produc-
tion, the Grow More Food (GMF) campaign was 
launched. Within this programme, the ‘Minor 
Irrigation  Programme’,  focused  on  irrigation 
works that could be rapidly implemented and 
did not demand large funds. The programme 
aimed at both private works (such as wells, tanks 
and water-lifting devices) and public measures 
(such  as  channels,  embankments,  tube-wells, 
public tanks, etc.) (GoI, 1952). Within the GMF 
campaign, the Public Works Department (PWD) 
started  several  projects  in  the  Bhavani  basin. 
The  Arakkankottai  canal  was  extended  to 
include another 800 ha in 1950. From Mettur 
reservoir, one canal was constructed on each 
side  of  the  Cauvery  River.  The  Mettur  West 
Bank canal from 1955 (Baliga, 1966) irrigates 
an area of about 800 ha in the Bhavani basin 
(NWDA,  1993)    (Figs  11.1  and  11.2).  The 
Thengumarahada Co-operative Farming Society 
is a small-scale example of how the food short-
age  inspired  individuals,  sanctioned  by  local 
authorities, to develop a new area. Since 1948 
about 200 ha have been irrigated with water 
sourced  from  a  weir  across  the  Kukkulthorai 
River,  a  small  tributary  to  the  Moyar  River 
(Seetharaman,  Nilgiris  district,  Tamil  Nadu, 
India, 2007, personal communication).
The major canal-irrigated cropland expan-
sion in the Bhavani basin after 1940 was the 
development  of  the  Lower  Bhavani  Project 
(LBP),  which  is  based  upon  plans  mainly 
designed during the last decades of British rule, 
and was sanctioned by the newly independent 
government of India and the government of 
Madras  state  in  1947.  In  times  of  national 
food-shortage  emergency,  the  LBP  was  of 
national importance and was built as a ‘Post-
War Development Scheme’. The project was 
completed in 1955 and included a reservoir 
with a storage capacity of 930 Mm3 and an 
irrigated area that straddles the Bhavani basin 
boundary (with about 31,500 ha falling within 
and  52,500  ha  outside)  (see  Fig.  11.2  and 
Lannerstad, 2008). 
With the completion of the LBP, the possi-
bilities for larger canal projects were exhausted. 
Since  1970,  only  three  minor  irrigation 
  reservoirs,  in  the  north-eastern  part  of  the 
basin,  have  been  constructed  by  the  PWD. 
Their total storage capacity is 10 Mm3 and the 
total designed command area is about 2000 ha 
(TWAD, 2000). In the upper Bhavani, about 
200 ha are irrigated in Karnataka in the north-
west and about 700 ha in Kerala in the south-
western corner (NWDA, 1993).
Between 1940 and 2000, primarily in the 
period  1950–1955,  the  net  canal-irrigated 
area within the Bhavani basin (not considering 
cropping  intensity)  increased  fourfold,  from 
about  12,000  ha  to  about  48,000  ha.  The 
total net command area designed to rely upon 
surface  water  generated  within  the  Bhavani 
basin  increased  from  about  17,000  ha  to 
105,000  ha,  a  fivefold  enlargement.  The 
annual  demand  for  surface  water  generated 
within the Bhavani basin for gravity irrigation 
increased from about 600 Mm3 per year to 
more than 2000 Mm3 per year. 
Urban water demands and  
hydropower storage 
Several  non-agricultural,  large-scale,  surface 
water, resource development projects can also 
be found in the basin (Fig. 11.2). About 35% of 
the hydropower generation in Tamil Nadu, 640 
MW, is produced in the basin (NWDA, 1993). 
The  development  of  hydropower  reservoirs 
started in 1938 and multiplied during the 1960s, 
when the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (TNEB) 
increased the current storage capacity to 500 
Mm3,  with  26  dams  and  weirs  (TNEB, 
Coimbatore, 2005–2006, personal communi-
cation).  The  hydropower  storage  represents 
more than half the storage of the LBP reservoir, 
and the timing of the releases impacts the water 
availability  for  downstream  irrigation  farmers. 
Evaporation  from  the  reservoirs  reduces  the 
flow from the upper Bhavani basin.
The first out-of-basin transfer to Coimbatore 
city  was  completed  in  1931,  with  4  Mm3 
diverted  annually  from  the  Siruvani  River 
(Saravanan and Appasamy, 1999); this transfer 
was increased to 37 Mm3 in 1984. In 1995, a 
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behind  the  Pillur  dam,  was  completed  and 
transfers about 48 Mm3 every year. To meet 
the needs of Tiruppur city, an additional volume 
of 19 Mm3 is withdrawn each year from the 
Bhavani River through three schemes. Every 
year, as a result, 104 Mm3 are transferred to 
meet urban and rural needs in the Noyyal basin. 
Annual  municipal  withdrawals  within  the 
Bhavani basin total about 23 Mm3 above the 
LBP reservoir and 34 Mm3 below, all mainly 
developed  after  1970.  Total  industrial  with-
drawals amount only to about 20 Mm3 per year 
(TWAD, 2000; TWAD, Coimbatore and Nilgiris 
Circle, 2005–2006, personal communication). 
Municipal and industrial abstractions together 
amount to almost 10% of the annual demand 
of the major canals in the basin.
Groundwater irrigation
Historically, wells were the major source for 
irrigation in the Coimbatore and Erode districts 
and were described as ‘the heart and life of the 
district’ at the end of the 19th century. At the 
beginning  of  the  20th  century,  these  open 
wells were mostly situated in ‘little valleys and 
hollows’,  and  most  of  them  were  found  on 
tank-fed  lands  (Baliga,  1966).  According  to 
statistics,  the  groundwater-irrigated  area 
amounted to about 20% of the cultivated area 
at  the  beginning  of  the  20th  century  and 
around  25%  in  2000  (Krishnaswami  Ayyar, 
1933; SCR, 2005). 
Hard rock underlies the lower parts of the 
basin. Groundwater is found in the porous and 
granular weathered mantle and in the joints, 
fissures  and  fractures  in  the  shallow  depths 
underlying the weathered zone. There is also 
groundwater in the narrow, deep-seated frac-
ture zones in the fresh crystalline rock. The 
aquifers can thus be differentiated into shallow 
aquifers  at  a  depth  of  10–30  m  and  deep 
  aquifers  down  to  a  depth  of  about  200  m 
(TWAD, 2000). 
The traditional well in the Bhavani basin is 
an open, rectangular well of about 7 × 7 m 
with a depth of 15–40 m. The statistics show 
that open wells dominate and only a fraction 
are bore wells (7%) (SCR, 2005). Today, a bore 
well is, however, often the preferred option for 
a new well. In the 1970s, bore wells used to   
be  about  80  m  deep.  After  the  year  2000, 
bore  wells  down  to  250  m  depth  became 
common (TWAD, 2000) (for more details see 
‘Intensification of Agricultural Water Use’).
Changes in Intensification of Land Use 
and Water Use
A description of canal-irrigated areas by scale 
and location gives a static perspective. The real 
agricultural  land  and  water  uses  are  more 
dynamic.  Different  kinds  of  data,  including 
remote sensing, can be used in different ways 
to understand what has happened over time.
Erode district cropland statistics
One way to understand the development in the 
Bhavani  basin  is  to  analyse  the  agricultural 
statistics for the Erode district (Krishnaswami 
Ayyar,  1933;  SCR,  2005).  The  entire 
com  mand area of all three major canals taking 
off  from  the  Bhavani  River  falls  within  the 
district, i.e. the LBP, Kodiveri and Kalingarayan 
canals. 
A comparison of data for 1926 with figures 
for the period 1980–2005 shows the same net 
sown area, about 300,000 ha. The canal- and 
tank-irrigated area increased from 18,000 ha 
to 90,000–100,000 ha, following canal expan-
sion. The groundwater-irrigated area increased 
from  about  60,000  ha  to  slightly  less  than 
80,000 ha, a 30% increase. 
Areas irrigated with water pumped directly 
from rivers and canals should come under the 
category of ‘other sources’, but this category 
totalled 1700 ha and 1300 ha in 1926 and 
2005, respectively, which clearly shows that 
the statistics fail to capture this water-use devel-
opment. The statistics also fall short of differen-
tiating conjunctive water use, e.g. considerable 
areas  within  the  84,000  ha  LBP  command 
area. Out of the entire gross irrigated area of 
178,000 ha in the Erode district only 800 ha 
are registered as an area where wells are used 
for supplementary irrigation.
In 1925/26, the ‘area cropped more than 
once’ was about 10%. According to statistics 
for  Erode,  the  overall  cropping  intensity  in 
2004/05  was  still  about  110%,  with  about 244  M. Lannerstad and D. Molden
121% for canal-irrigated areas and 118% for 
well-irrigated  areas.  This  does  not  reflect 
today’s reality. Technical advances during the 
last  decades,  with  electricity,  pumps,  bore 
wells,  long-distance  pipes  and  different  irri-
gation combinations point to a quite different 
situation.
Remote-sensing analysis of cropland areas
Remote sensing offers an alternative option to 
reveal  the  extent  and,  above  all,  the  spatial 
location of cultivated areas in the basin. Three 
Landsat satellite images (27 February 1973, 9 
November  1999,  3  March  2001)  enabled  a 
comparison of land-use change over time and 
between  seasons.  During  the  north-east 
monsoonal period, the maximum crop extent 
in the basin, both rainfed and irrigated, can be 
captured.  During  the  dry  ‘summer’  months, 
crop  areas  indicate  irrigation,  as  rainfall  is 
normally too meagre to sustain rainfed crops.
During the dry season in 1973, the total 
crop area was 55,000 ha, and for the same 
season in 2001 the area was 95,000 ha, an 
increase of about 70% (Table 11.1). In non-
command  areas  in  the  lower  Bhavani  basin 
(OL or ‘Other Areas Lower’; see Fig. 11.3 and 
Table  11.1),  the  crop  area  increased  from 
22,000 ha to 44,000 ha between 1973 and 
2001. This points to at least a 100% increase 
in  water-lifting  irrigated  areas,  surface  water 
and  groundwater,  in  this  area.  In  the  LBP 
command, the crop area increased by almost 
75%,  indicating  increased  water  lifting  from 
aquifers, canals or the Bhavani River in this 
area.
The  cropping  seasons  in  the  part  of  the 
Nilgiris district included in the Bhavani basin 
(N) are different. Analysis of image data shows 
that one or two crops are grown on around 
6500 ha, while 2500 ha are classified as fallow 
(indicating crop cultivation during other parts 
of the year). Altogether, a total cultivated area 
of 9000 ha can be found in this part of the 
basin.  There  has  been  a  very  strong  trend 
towards increasing vegetable cultivation in this 
area, through both the number of crops per 
year and the expansion of cultivation, replac-
ing  traditional  rainfed  crops  (SCR,  different 
years). 
Table 11.1.  Crop areas in the Bhavani basin in summer 1973 and 2001, and north-east monsoon 1999, 

















Total area (ha) Upper Bhavani basin Code  414,900 414,900 414,900
Fallow area Nilgiris district N     4,300     4,300     4,400
Crop area Nilgiris district N        300     4,900     4,700
Crop area Other areas upper OU   15,600   17,600   21,600
Crop area Total upper   15,900   22,400   26,300
Total area (ha) Lower Bhavani basin 243,400 243,400 243,400
Crop area Arakkankottai command A        900     1,600    2,800
Crop area Thadapalli command T     2,300     3,600     7,100
Crop area LBP command LBP   13,500   23,500   31,400
Crop area Other areas lower OL   21,800   44,100   67,600
Crop area Total lower   38,700   72,800 108,900
Total area (ha) Entire Bhavani basin 658,300 658,300 658,300
Crop area Entire Bhavani basin   54,600   95,200 135,200
Crop area Basin without Nilgiris   54,300   90,400 130,500  The Bhavani Basin, Southern India  245
Fig. 11.3.  Land cover in the Bhavani basin during the dry season in 1973 and 2001, and during the  
north-east monsoon in 1999, based on satellite images.246  M. Lannerstad and D. Molden
When  excluding  the  high-altitude  Nilgiris 
district and analysing the remaining part of the 
basin,  there  was  a  net  crop  area  of  almost 
159,000 ha around the year 2000. With about 
59,000 ha with double cropping, the cropping 
intensity is 137%.
Intensification of agricultural water use
After the completion of the LBP reservoir in 
1955, the basin essentially closed, in that all 
average available surface water resources were 
put to use by agriculture, with little remaining 
for the environment and the Cauvery River. In 
spite of this, and increasing in- and out-of-basin 
drinking-water diversions, agricultural systems 
continue  to  intensify,  with  groundwater  and 
surface water pumping playing a key role. 
Pump-based Irrigation
In 1930, each well on the plains of the Bhavani 
basin was used to irrigate about 1.5 ha, on 
average  (Krishnaswami  Ayyar,  1933).  The 
number  of  wells  has  increased  substantially 
during the 20th century. Figure 11.4 shows 
how  the  total  number  of  wells  in  the  Erode 
district has increased threefold. The mode of 
lifting  is  now  fully  mechanical  and  bullocks 
have  been  replaced  by  electricity  and  diesel 
engines. Palanisami (1984) showed that, at the 
end of the 1970s, the average extraction from 
a well with diesel or electrical pumps was four 
times greater than from bullock bailing, indi-
cating up to a 12-fold increase in groundwater 
abstraction  capacity  over  the  last  century. 
Today, most farmers use 3–10 hp pump sets 
(Kannan, 2004).
In Tamil Nadu, a fierce farmers’ movement 
protested against the cost of electricity during 
the  1970s  and  1980s.  A  state-wide  general 
strike  in  1972  was  met  by  a  strong  police 
response,  with  15  farmers  killed  in  the 
con  frontation.  The  development  spurred  the 
formation of The Tamil Nadu Agriculturalist’s 
Association, which reached across the entire 
state. Farmers refused to pay their electricity 
bills  and  the  Electricity  Board  responded  by 
trying  to  disconnect  the  power  lines.  More 
violence followed, and 13 people were killed in 
1978–1979.  In  1980–1982,  ‘Operation 
Disconnection’ was intensified and electricity 
prices  were  raised.  In  1982,  the  farmers 
launched a political party, ‘The Indian Farmers’ 
and  Toilers’  Party’,  with  the  aim  of  seeking 
legitimacy and ensuring protection from state 
government repression. Although the farmers’ 
party earned very few votes in the elections 
that followed, the protests eventually resulted 
in a political decision in which the ruling party, 
as an act of appeasement and a final move to 
undermine the farmers’ movement, decided to 
accept the farmers’ demands (Lindberg, 1999). 
From  September  1984  onwards,  electrical 
power  was  supplied  free  to  ‘small  farmers’, 
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irrespective  of  the  quantity  of  electricity 
consumed, a policy extended to all farmers in 
1992 (Kannan, 2004; TNEB, different years).
The free electricity policy has, predictably, 
driven  a  demand  for  electricity  connections. 
Since the end of the 1980s, the TNEB has 
limited  the  increase  to  about  40,000  new 
connections per year in the whole state (Fig. 
11.5).  During  the  end  of  the  1990s,  the 
increase in the Erode district was 1500–2400 
connections per year (PWD, 2002). From 1 
million pump sets in Tamil Nadu by 1984, the 
total is approaching 2 million in 2008. From 
the  1970s  up  to  1984,  the  total  electricity 
consumption followed the same trend as the 
number of connections and stayed at around 
2300 kWh per electric pump set and year. In 
2005,  the  consumption  per  pump  set  had 
increased  to  more  than  5000  kWh.  This  is 
more  than  a  100%  increase  in  energy 
consumed per electricity connection over less 
than 20 years. It is important to observe that 
there is no difference in the statistics between 
pumping from difference sources. Pumping of 
surface water from rivers, streams and canals is 
included  in  the  statistics  for  all  electricity 
connections and the total electricity consump-
tion by agriculture, often assumed to refer only 
to groundwater. 
Remote-sensing  statistics  showing  a  crop 
area increase from 22,000 to 44,000 ha from 
1973 to 2001 during the dry season for the 
non-command areas (Table 11.1) confirm the 
increased amount of water lifting. A survey in 
2000 of irrigation wells in the lower Bhavani 
south of the LBP command area showed that 
there  were  large  areas  with  crops  such  as 
sugarcane,  turmeric  (Curcuma  longa),  coco-
nuts and bananas (TWAD, 2000) irrigated with 
groundwater.  Groundwater  levels  in  the 
surveyed area have fallen during the last 20 
years. Initially many farmers resorted to drilling 
vertical as well as horizontal bores inside the 
open  wells  to  augment  the  yield.  This  only 
lasted for a few years. Instead, the farmers now 
have bore wells of 100 m to as much as 250 m 
depth, with submersible pumps or air compres-
sors (TWAD, 2000).
Canal releases and lifting from aquifers,  
rivers and canals
Canal irrigation within the Bhavani basin has 
increased in area. By the end of the 1950s and 
the  beginning  of  the  1960s,  it  had  also 
increased  in  both  intensity  and  number  of 
seasons.
The LBP command area was designed for 
one season with irrigated dry crops, such as 
cotton and groundnuts, and paddy cultivation 
was limited to zones affected by seepage from 
the unlined LBP canal. Having learned from 
the historic command areas, the LBP farmers 
wanted to cultivate paddy, and violated crop-
ping regulations. The PWD engineers tried to 
stop this trend, but the farmers complained to 
Fig. 11.5.  Electrified agricultural pump sets and electricity consumption by agriculture in Tamil Nadu, 1950 
to 2005 (TNEB, different years; TNEB, 2008).248  M. Lannerstad and D. Molden
the state government. The government, facing 
urgent food-shortage problems, made it clear 
‘that they were very anxious that the farmers 
should have no cause of complaint’. The engin-
eers had to accept keeping the water flowing in 
the canal, and the area under paddy increased 
from the intended 4000 ha to 27,000 ha. The 
canal, designed for irrigated ‘dry crops’, can 
only convey water for a paddy crop on about 
half the command area and the tail-end farm-
ers suffered. 
After public meetings between the farmers 
and the government authorities, a system with 
two seasons with paddy crops was tried. Such 
a  system  demands  about  twice  the  average 
annual water available for the LBP and had to 
be abandoned. In 1964, the LBP system was 
eventually  changed  to  a  yearly  alternating 
system,  where  in  the  first  year  half  of  the 
command area is supplied during two seasons: 
one (monsoonal) season with wet crops (680 
Mm3), mainly paddy, and one season with irri-
gated ‘dry crops’ (340 Mm3), such as ground-
nuts. The other half of the command area gets 
no supply at all during this year and roles are 
reversed during the second year. This system 
increased the water demand by 60%, from the 
originally estimated average water availability 
of 650 Mm3/year for the LBP to 1020 Mm3/
year. Higher supply from the dam means that 
there are almost no carry-over stocks and, with 
a larger designed demand relative to average 
availability, the frequency of seasons without 
planned canal supply will inevitably be higher.
The  farmers  have  adapted  by  developing 
groundwater resources. During supply seasons 
conjunctive use is common, and during non-
supply seasons groundwater is the main irri-
gation  water  resource.  Several  farmers  have 
also turned to external surface water resources, 
and lift water into the command area from the 
Bhavani River or the Thadapalli or Kalingarayan 
canals. Some farmers pump water from the 
Kalingarayan canal more than 7 km into the 
LBP area (PWD, Erode, Erode district, Tamil 
Nadu, India, 2004–2007, personal communi-
cation). 
Out of the 31,500 ha LBP command area 
located inside the Bhavani basin only half, or 
about 16,000 ha, receives canal supply during 
each  of  the  two  seasons.  Remote-sensing 
statistics show an area of 31,400 ha with crops 
during  the  north-east  monsoon  in  1999. 
Dry-season figures from 1973 and 2001 show 
that the cultivated area has increased by 75% 
to as much as 23,500 ha. This development 
points to the importance of increased lifting of 
groundwater  and  surface  water  in  the  LBP 
command area.
At  the  end  of  the  1950s,  the  command 
area served by the Kodiveri weir was, as part of 
the GMF campaign, shifted from a single paddy 
crop area to a double-crop area with 10 months 
of  continuous  canal  supply  (GoM,  1958, 
1963). While the canal is closed (15 February– 
15  April),  only  minor  water  quantities  are 
released  for  ‘standing  crops’  (PWD,  1984; 
PWD records). The satellite image from 2001 
showed perennial crops on 50% of the Kodiveri 
command area during canal closure. This is a 
60–80% increase compared with the figures 
from 1973. Farmers in the area confirmed this 
by describing the development of 20-m-deep 
open wells since the mid-1990s. Farmers with 
access to groundwater are able to bridge the 
2-month  gap  in  canal  supply  and  cultivate 
perennial crops such as sugarcane, which were 
not present at all in the basin in 1926 (Fig. 
11.6).
This 10-month supply has inspired farmers 
outside the area to lift water from canals to 
expand cultivation out of the command area. 
North of the Arakkankottai canal, most farm-
ers within about 150 m of the canal have a 
pipe  connection  between  the  canal  and  an 
open well. Water is pumped up to 5 km away. 
A  farmer  cultivating  sugarcane  and  bananas 
exemplifies this development: originally coarse 
grains  were  irrigated  through  bullock  bailing 
from  an  open  well  from  the  1920s.  In  the 
middle of the 1970s, the well was connected to 
the  Arakkankottai  canal  by  an  underground 
pipe, and the farmer was one of the first in the 
village to install a diesel pump. After 2 years, 
electricity replaced diesel, and today two 10 hp 
pumps are used. 
The  Kalingarayan  canal  has  continuous 
supply during 10.5 months of the year, with 
two paddy crops a year since as early as the 
end of the 19th century (Madras Presidency, 
1902), and up to three crops nowadays. The 
ample canal supply also spurred water lifting to 
irrigate lands on the elevated west side at the 
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originally limited by the chief engineer to about 
200  ha,  with  ‘dry  crops’  irrigated  through 
bullock bailing. In a stepwise process starting in 
the  1940s  and  1950s,  diesel  and  electricity 
pumps for wet-crop cultivation have taken over 
(Saravanan,  2001;  PWD,  n.d.).  Local  and 
national food shortages from 1940 until the 
end of the 1960s, with policies like the GMF 
campaign, were the main reason behind letting 
water lifting increase against regulations. The 
number of unauthorized pumps (some with a 
capacity of 20 hp) has gradually mushroomed 
to 1000–2000, and the total lift-irrigated area 
is  estimated  at  more  than  7000  ha  (PWD, 
Erode,  Erode  district,  Tamil  Nadu,  India, 
2004–2007, personal communication).
During the drought years, 2002–2004, the 
diversions into the Kodiveri and Kalingarayan 
canals  were  cancelled  or  much  less  than 
normal.  Immediate  water  scarcity  along  the 
canals intensified well development; interviews 
show that Kodiveri farmers have drilled bore 
wells of about 100–200 m depth, and that the 
Kalingarayan  farmers  have  mainly  increased 
the number of open wells. This will make it 
possible for the farmers to cope with drought 
years,  diversify  their  cropping  patterns  and 
also intensify water use further during normal 
years.
Lifting from rivers and streams
The best source of surface water for lift irri-
gation in the basin is the Bhavani River itself. 
Just as for canals, the free electricity, and diesel 
pumps and pipe technology make it possible to 
pump water several kilometres away.
Each  of  two  interviewed  farmers  (among 
several  others)  pumping  water  from  the 
Bhavani River cultivates an area of about 8 ha. 
One  farmer  cultivates  banana  and  coconut 
trees and has one piece of land next to the 
river and another piece of land 2.5 km away. 
He  has  an  electricity  connection  that  was 
formally granted for an open well. The well 
does not yield any water and was set up only to 
get  the  electricity  connection  endorsed,  to 
make it possible for the farmer to use the free 
power  for  river  pumping.  Recently  he  has 
drilled a new ‘fake’ bore well to get a second 
connection. The other farmer cultivates sugar-
cane and bananas on his land about 300 m 
from the river. Some 10 years ago he started 
to irrigate additional areas 1 km away. Both 
examples  show  how  entrepreneurial  farmers 
with access to river water (thanks to pump and 
pipe technology) can expand their cultivation 
to additional land acquired further away.
With the construction of the LBP reservoir, 
the historic Kanniyampalayam command area 
was submerged. As can be seen on the 2001 
satellite image (compare Fig. 11.2, 2000, and 
Fig. 11.3, 2001), farmers cultivate parts of the 
reservoir bed during the dry season, when the 
reservoir  is  almost  empty.  Water  is  pumped 
from the Bhavani and Moyar rivers. This prac-
tice is another example of how farmers effec-
tively utilize available land and water resources. 
Fig. 11.6.  Crop statistics for Sathymangalam and Gobichettipalayam taluks for 1925/26 and 2001/02. 
(Source: Krishnaswami Ayyar, 1933; Agricultural Department, Agriculture Directorate, Chepauk, Chennai, 
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Another  illustration  is  the  Thengumarahada 
Farming  Society,  located  next  to  the  Moyar 
River (see Figs 11.2 and 11.3), where, since 
the 1980s, electric pumps have allowed farm-
ers to permanently lift water directly from the 
perennial Moyar River to their canal system.
The PWD engineers, researchers and many 
farmers describe how farmers purchase ‘1 cent 
of land’ (1/100 acre or 40 m2) close to the 
river or a canal. On the land they dig an open 
well and through an unauthorized underground 
pipe obtain access to the canal or the river. 
With electricity or diesel pumps, water is then 
often pumped far away. Many persons refer to 
distances of more than 5 km. Farmers often 
install a more powerful pump than stipulated 
when  they  get  a  new  electricity  connection 
approved and can thus pump more water and 
expand  the  irrigated  area.  The  three-phase 
electricity for water pumps is limited to 12 h/
day. Some farmers overcome this constraint 
by  installing  a  ‘condenser’  and  use  the  two-
phase  electricity  to  pump  water  24  h/day 
anyway. The same also takes place in other 
places, such as Gujarat (Shah, 2007).
According to information from the PWD, in 
the middle of the 1990s, the number of author-
ized pumps along the Bhavani River was about 
900 upstream of the LBP reservoir (sometimes 
financed by a group of farmers) and around 
600 between the reservoir and the confluence 
with the Cauvery River. The total irrigated area 
was  then  estimated  to  be  almost  1100  ha 
(MIDS, 1998), increasing to 7000 ha by 2000 
(TWAD,  2000),  and  it  must  have  increased 
further  since  then.  The  PWD  tries  to  bring 
several cases to court, and the exact data on 
the number and capacity of unauthorized river 
pump sets is sensitive information and is not 
made public.
In the Nilgiris district, the increased crop-
ping intensity is based upon hose and sprinkle 
irrigation  from  streams  or  shallow  dug  wells 
initiated in the 1970s. With pipes, areas uphill 
and at longer distances can be irrigated from 
the streams (Lannerstad, 2008). Statistics show 
that  the  cultivated  lands  for  vegetable  crops 
have more or less stayed around 10,000 ha 
during the last century (SCR, different years), 
but  the  crop  intensity  and  water  use  have 
increased, with a shift from one or two to two 
or three crops per year.
Altered crop choices 
With  the  expansion  of  the  areas  irrigated 
through gravity and water lifting, and shifts in 
consumer preferences, cropping patterns have 
changed. Almost all cultivated areas (gross) of 
about 100,000 ha in the Sathymangalam and 
Gobichettipalayam  subdistricts  (taluks)  fall 
within the Bhavani basin and include rainfed 
lands, water-lifting  irrigated areas, Arakkan-
kottai  and  Thadapalli  command  areas,  and 
some of the LBP command areas. The statis-
tics for 1925/26 are most probably valid up 
until the end of the 1940s. A comparison thus 
shows dramatic changes during the 50 years 
till  2000  (Fig.  11.6).  Water-intensive  crops, 
such as paddy and sugarcane, have increased 
from 9 to 35%, with perennial sugarcane culti-
vation increasing from 127 to 16,000 ha and 
paddy from 8000 to 18,000 ha. 
The  subdistrict-level  statistics  available  for 
the  crop  year  2001–2002  unfortunately  do 
not specify the ‘other crops’ category. District-
level  data  indicate  that  this  group  includes 
crops  such  as  turmeric,  bananas,  tobacco, 
maize, flowers, spices, coconut trees, garden 
produce and sorghum (for fodder), found on 
20% of the cultivated area. This means that the 
area  cultivated  with  less  water-demanding 
coarse grains, such as sorghum, spiked millet 
and ragi (Eleusine coracana) has decreased by 
60%, while sorghum, which was earlier one of 
the staple food crops, is now instead used for 
fodder. This trend means higher water require-
ment  per  hectare.  The  water  demand  for 
increased cropping intensity and higher yields 
is, however, to some degree, compensated by 
new short-duration crop varieties.
The general trends in the Bhavani basin are 
valid for the whole of Tamil Nadu. Statistics 
comparing cropping data for 5 years around 
the years 1955 and 2000 show that areas with 
coarse cereals have gone down by 50–75%, 
while areas with sugarcane have increased by 
800%. Yields have increased dramatically: rice 
from 1.3 to 3.5 t/ha, spiked millet from 0.4 to 
1.4 t/ha, and groundnut from 1.0 to 1.8 t/ha. 
The figures for Tamil Nadu also show that the 
yield  for  irrigated  sorghum,  spiked  millet  or 
ragi  is  about  twice  the  rainfed  yield  (SCR, 
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Hydrological, Livelihood and 
Environmental Implications
Cropping  pattern  statistics,  remote-sensing 
figures, canal irrigation expansion and water 
lifting from aquifers, streams, rivers and canals 
all point to an intensified use of water. This 
trend has a number of implications, which are 
apparent in the Bhavani basin.
Falling and rising groundwater levels
Groundwater  observation  wells  within  the 
Bhavani basin have been continuously moni-
tored every month since 1971. The ground-
water levels range from less than 10 m during 
the post-monsoonal period to as deep as 50 m 
during the hot summer months. The deepest 
annual  water  level  is  observed  during  May, 
which marks the end of hot weather months 
and the beginning of the south-west monsoon 
(TWAD,  2000).  Groundwater  level  changes 
based on values in May over 30 years are visu-
alized in Fig. 11.7.
The light and dark grey dots indicate a drop 
in groundwater levels of 6 to 14 m and are all 
found  on  the  plains  outside  the  command 
areas. A black cross shows that many of these 
observation wells have been dry during a month 
or more. A study of irrigation wells in the lower 
Bhavani south of the LBP command area in 
2000 showed that groundwater levels in the 
surveyed  area  have  fallen  during  the  1980s 
and 1990s, and left most of the open irrigation 
wells  dry  during  the  summer  months  or  the 
entire  year  (TWAD,  2000).  Within  the  LBP 
command areas, the groundwater level is stable 
or slightly falling. Even if groundwater lifting 
and  conjunctive  use  are  common,  seepage 
from the fields and canals appears to almost 
recharge  the  aquifers.  Normally,  the  water 
table  is  shallow  in  canal-  and  tank-irrigated 
regions (PWD, 2002)
The grey squares indicating rising ground-
water levels of 6–10 m are located just north of 
the  Arakkankottai  command  area  or  the 
Bhavani River. Most of the white squares (rising 
groundwater levels of 2  –6 m) are also found on 
non-command areas next to the Bhavani River 
or next to the LBP canal. One plausible expla-
nation for this pattern must be the increased 
pumping  from  the  Bhavani  River  and  the 
canals. Over the years, the return flows have 
locally raised the groundwater level by several 
metres. Free electricity thus not only resulted in 
aquifer overexploitation but also in locally rising 
groundwater levels.
Government  groundwater  authorities  esti-
mate that the total groundwater draft within 
Fig. 11.7.  Observation well water level changes 1971–2004 (Data source: PWD records).252  M. Lannerstad and D. Molden
the Bhavani basin has reached about 350 Mm3 
per year, with an annual overexploitation of 
about 30 Mm3 (PWD 2002, 2003).
Changed surface water dynamics
The  inflow  into  the  LBP  reservoir  reflects 
changes in the upper part of the Bhavani basin. 
Despite a high variability in flow at the reservoir 
site (Fig. 11.8), it is possible to discern a trend 
of falling inflow of about 500 Mm3 during the 
past few decades, a reduction of about 25% of 
the inflow. This is due to several factors: the 
104 Mm3 of drinking water transferred out of 
the basin to Coimbatore and Tiruppur cities; 
the evaporation of about 10 Mm3 from domes-
tic  water  use  (assuming  a  50%  return  flow) 
within the upper part of the basin; the evapora-
tion of about 40 Mm3 from the hydropower 
reservoirs since the 1960s (NWDA, 1993); the 
general trend of conversion of grazing land and 
natural forest towards tea and tree plantations 
(SCR, different years), with higher transpiration 
(Wilk, 2000) and thus increased consumptive 
water use and reduced runoff from these rainfed 
areas; and water lifting from streams, rivers and 
aquifers. River pumping affects the inflow to 
the  LBP  reservoir,  especially  during  the  dry 
season  (PWD,  Ooty,  Nilgiris  district,  Tamil 
Nadu, India, 2004–2007, personal communi-
cation).
The LBP farmers have the lowest priority of 
water  supply  in  the  Bhavani  basin  (PWD, 
1984). The water quantity released to the LBP 
farmers is decided by the inflow to the LBP 
reservoir,  the  water  to  be  shared  and  the 
demands  of  the  downstream  Kodiveri  and 
Kalingarayan  canals.  The  records  from  the 
PWD show that as soon as the inflow to the 
LBP reservoir is less than 1500 Mm3 per year 
the LBP farmers lose one, two, or both seasons 
of canal releases. In addition, in some years, 
during episodes with high water demand in the 
delta, water is released to the Cauvery delta 
farmers,  thus  reducing  the  water  available 
within the Bhavani basin.
Return  flow  from  the  LBP  and  Kodiveri 
command  areas  increases  the  flow  in  the 
Bhavani River to be diverted into the Kodiveri 
and Kalingarayan canals. When the intensity of 
water  use  increases  in  the  command  areas 
(notably through pumping and recycling), less 
water is drained to the river. Pumping along 
the  Bhavani  River  also  reduces  the  water 
  quantity to be diverted into the historic canals. 
Fig. 11.8.  Inflow to the LBP reservoir and basin outflow to the Cauvery River. Actual inflows 1955 onwards, 
actual outflows 1975 onwards, and other values estimated from the Kodiveri weir flow measurements 
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Water lifting from the Kodiveri and Kalingarayan 
canals reduces the availability of water along 
the canals and more water has to be released 
from the reservoir to ensure water to all canal 
farmers. This, in turn, leaves less water in the 
LBP  reservoir  to  be  supplied  to  the  LBP 
command  area,  prompting  LBP  farmers  to 
further intensify their use of water and to tap 
groundwater.
Analysis of return flows and local runoff at 
the basin level at the end of the 1990s illu-
strates the importance of the return flows and 
shows that while annual overall releases from 
the LBP reservoir totalled about 1650 Mm3, 
diversions into the four main canals amounted 
to 2000 Mm3. Yearly data records show that 
during years with full supply to the LBP canal, 
the releases from the reservoir only amount to 
75%  of  the  water  actually  diverted  into  the 
Kodiveri canals. During years with limited or 
cancelled supply into the LBP canal, releases 
from  the  reservoir  have  to  compensate  for 
losses along the Bhavani River and correspond 
to about 115% of actual diversions. Releases 
from the LBP reservoir for the Kalingarayan 
canal normally equal 50% of actual diversions 
(PWD records).
All these fluctuating flow paths mean that 
water  is  constantly  spatially  reallocated  and 
that, consequently, conflicts arise. The conflicts 
over canal-lifting and water-scarcity problems 
started along the Kalingarayan canal at the end 
of  the  1940s  (Saravanan,  2001).  Over  the 
years,  the  authorities  have  made  several 
attempts to gain control over the number of 
pumps and the water quantity withdrawn, in 
order  to  reduce  tail-end  problems,  but  they 
have ended up diverting more water into the 
canals to compensate for these withdrawals. 
Diversions  into  the  Kalingarayan  canal  have 
increased from 310 to 380–400 Mm3 per year 
(PWD, n.d.). Likewise, PWD records show that 
the annual diversions into the Kodiveri canals 
have increased by about 30%, to 600 Mm3 per 
year.
Overall, the average impact of surface water 
pumping  on  water  demands  downstream  of 
the LBP reservoir amounts to almost 310 Mm3 
per year, with almost 250 Mm3 falling within 
the basin boundaries. This includes reservoir 
releases of 90 Mm3 to compensate for river 
pumping  and  increased  diversions  of  up  to 
150 Mm3 into the Kodiveri canals, and around 
70 Mm3 into the Kalingarayan canal.
Basin closure 
An analysis of the water situation at the basin 
level shows how, since the construction of the 
LBP reservoir, the Bhavani basin is a closing 
basin (Lannerstad, 2008). The discharge over 
the Kalingarayan weir to the Cauvery River can 
be of two types: releases from the LBP reser-
voir, destined to the Cauvery delta farmers, and 
basin surplus outflows.
The annual average unintended discharge 
over  the  Kalingarayan  weir  during  the  last 
25 years has been about 240 Mm3, or 10–15% 
of the outflow present before the completion 
of the LBP (Fig. 11.8). There is no storage 
below the LBP reservoir to capture the inten-
sive downpours during the north-east monsoon 
and the return flows from the LBP and Kodiveri 
command  areas  during  the  annual  6-week 
closure of the Kalingarayan canal. The outflow 
to the Cauvery River can thus only fall close 
to  zero  when  local  runoff  and  return  flows 
are so small that all can be diverted into the 
Kalingarayan canal. The small outflows during 
the past few decades indicate that the consump-
tive water use within Bhavani basin has reached 
a maximum level and cannot increase further.
Livelihood repercussions
Farmers lifting water from the Bhavani River 
or pumping from wells generally point to elec-
tricity subsidies as a ‘good subsidy’. It is aimed 
directly at the individual farmers and there is 
no  middleman  who  can  take  a  share.  The 
resulting  falling  groundwater,  however,  dis  -
tresses many marginal and small farmers, who 
find it difficult to invest in drilling bore wells 
deeper (TWAD, 2000). Small farmers turn to 
buying  water  from  large  farmers  who  can 
afford to deepen their wells, and local water 
markets emerge (GoTN, 2002). The original 
objective behind the free electricity policy to 
support small farmers has thus partly failed.
Falling groundwater levels negatively affect 
domestic  water  supply  on  the  plains  of  the 
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wells equipped with hand pumps dry up, espe-
cially during dry summer months. To secure 
water supply, the Tamil Nadu Water Supply 
and Drainage Board (TWAD) has drilled a large 
number  of  deep  bore  wells  of  150–275  m 
depth (TWAD, 2000). The falling water tables 
and failing wells force many women to spend 
3–4 h/day fetching water from far-off places, 
including  wells  in  the  fields.  Many  local 
com  munities (the village panchayats) have to 
pump for 10–12 h to fill up the rural water 
supply overhead cisterns and find it difficult to 
bear the electricity costs, often amounting to 
US$350–600 (Rs 15,000–25,000) per month. 
The  water  situation  drives  many  people  to 
migrate and settle in nearby towns, thus speed-
ing up urbanization (TWAD, 2000).
To increase the water availability in these 
areas,  a  groundwater  recharge  project  was 
planned in 2000. The project, not yet imple-
mented, aims to withdraw a quantity of about 
40 Mm3 during the monsoonal months from 
the Bhavani River above the LBP reservoir to 
fill  up  48  tanks  and  213  ponds  (inside  and 
outside  the  Bhavani  basin)  for  groundwater 
recharge  to  increase  water  supply  for  rural 
habitations  (TWAD,  2000).  Such  diversions 
will further decrease the water availability for 
downstream users.
Environmental consequences
The water resources development initiated in 
the 13th century has turned the Bhavani basin 
into a complex human-regulated system, where 
all  normal  flows  are  controlled.  The  natural 
seasonality,  important  for  many  organisms, 
with annual runoff peaks during June–August 
and  October–December  along  the  Bhavani 
River, has been replaced by an almost steady 
flow  during  the  entire  year.  The  weirs  and 
reservoirs  across  the  Bhavani  River  and  the 
tributaries effectively stop the natural migration 
upstream of the river system by, for example, 
some fish species, and retain the silt from the 
upper Bhavani, whose earlier fertilizing effect 
was  highly  appreciated  by  the  delta  farmers 
(GoM, 1965).
A number of small-scale textile, bleaching 
and  paper  industries  upstream  of  the  LBP 
reservoir and the four major municipalities in 
the basin discharge their effluents and sewage 
water  without  any  treatment.  The  strong 
annual river flow, however, dilutes the pollu-
tion,  and  the  surface  water  of  the  Bhavani 
River generally meets water-quality standards. 
There is, in contrast, a major pollution prob-
lem along the Kalingarayan canal, where 26 
tannery  and  32  textile-processing  units 
discharge  untreated  effluents  into  the  canal. 
This especially affects the tail-end farmers. The 
annual canal closure period leads to accumula-
tion of effluents, and farmers have to wait until 
pollution is flushed out to the Cauvery River 
before  using  the  water  (Appasamy  et  al., 
2005).
There  are  generally  no  problems  with 
groundwater quality in the basin, apart from 
increased nitrate levels in areas with intensive 
agriculture. In areas where industries discharge 
the effluents on land, and in some places where 
the polluted water is even used for irrigation, 
the  groundwater  is  locally  contaminated  and 
drinking water schemes have to be provided by 
the industries or the municipality (PWD, 1999; 
Appasamy et al., 2005). 
Future Challenges
The  competition  for  water  resources  in  the 
Cauvery basin and its sub-basins is increasing 
and  the  dynamics  of  water  use  are  rapidly 
changing. The two following sections consider 
the future viewed from different perspectives 
and scales.
The interstate Cauvery basin perspective
There have been discussions over how to share 
the Cauvery River flow for centuries between 
the two major states in the basin, Karnataka 
(earlier  Mysore)  and  Tamil  Nadu  (earlier 
Madras). In the beginning of the 20th century, 
the  British  Madras  Presidency  decided  to 
construct the Mettur reservoir (Fig. 11.1) across 
the Cauvery River. The reservoir should protect 
the delta farmers by moderating the floods and 
droughts,  following  the  monsoonal  climatic 
variability, and increase the irrigated area by 
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also started another ‘Madras–Mysore Dispute’ 
over  water.  The  project  was  postponed  and 
not started until after the interstate agreement 
in 1924. In 1934, Tamil Nadu’s largest reser-
voir,  with  a  capacity  of  2650  Mm3,  was 
completed (Barber, 1940; GoM, 1965).
The  irrigated  areas  in  the  Cauvery  basin 
have  increased  considerably  since  the  1924 
agreement. Tamil Nadu has increased the irri-
gated  areas  (including  a  second  crop)  from 
about  620,000  ha  to  850,000  ha,  about  a 
60% increase. Karnataka has about doubled 
the area, from 430,000 to 850,000 ha (GoI, 
2007).  The  water  demand  has  increased 
proportionately.
In January 2007, the Indian National Court 
of  Arbitration  delivered  ‘The  Report  of  the 
Cauvery  Water  Disputes  Tribunal  with  the 
Decision’ to resolve the last Cauvery dispute, 
which had been going on between Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu states since the 1970s. The 
decision settles the amount of water that each 
of  the  Cauvery  basin  states  –  Tami  Nadu, 
Karnataka,  Kerala  and  Pondicherry  –  can 
utilize.  Three  parts  of  the  agreement  might 
affect the Bhavani basin (GoI, 2007).
First, Kerala state has not developed much 
of the runoff generated within its Cauvery basin 
areas. The state, according to the decision, has 
the right to withdraw an additional 170 Mm3 
per year from the upper Bhavani basin.
Second, among the post-1924-agreement 
water developments, only those approved by 
earlier interstate agreements were considered 
when  establishing  the  new  shares  for  the 
dif  ferent  states.  The  second  crop,  along  the 
Kodiveri canals for example, is not recognized 
by the court. About half the diversions for these 
canals  are  thus,  according  to  the  water-use 
account, supposed to be used for irrigation and 
cities in other parts of Tamil Nadu’s portion of 
the Cauvery basin.
Third, the Cauvery tribunal decision states 
that there should be an environmental flow of 
25.5 m3/s from February until June below the 
Mettur  reservoir,  about  280  Mm3/year,  to 
maintain the freshwater–seawater interface in 
the Cauvery estuary to protect the mangrove 
forest. It is Tamil Nadu that controls the releases 
from  the  Mettur  reservoir  and  thus  has  to 
ensure  the  environmental  flow.  In  case  of 
shortage, water might have to be released from 
the LBP reservoir, the only other major storage 
in Tamil Nadu after the Mettur reservoir.
The Tamil Nadu and Bhavani basin 
perspective
The  recent  Cauvery  tribunal  decision  places 
the water use in the Bhavani basin within a 
larger  Cauvery  basin  and  in  an  interstate 
context.  There  are,  however,  already  within 
Tamil Nadu increasing demands for the runoff 
generated in the Bhavani basin.
The  rapidly  growing  Coimbatore  and 
Tiruppur  cities  along  the  ephemeral  Noyyal 
River  depend  upon  drinking  water  from  the 
Bhavani  River  above  the  LBP  reservoir. 
Coimbatore city already faces scarcity during 
normal conditions and rationing during drought 
periods. A second pipeline is planned from the 
last  hydropower  reservoir  and  will  increase 
abstractions  by  46  Mm3  to  150  Mm3/year 
(TWAD,  Coimbatore  and  Nilgiris  Circle, 
2005–2006, personal communication).
The Lower Bhavani Project was designed 
as a ‘surplus project’, intended only to impound 
and use water quantities in excess of the water 
rights  of  the  Cauvery  delta  farmers  and  the 
farmers  under  the  historic  Kodiveri  and 
Kalingarayan canals. Up to now, there have 
only  been  (limited)  releases  for  the  Cauvery 
delta farmers a few times during the last 20 
years (Fig. 11.8). With increased competition 
for water in the closed Cauvery basin, there is 
a risk that more water will be requested from 
the LBP reservoir.
Within the Bhavani basin, farmers compete 
for the same water resources. The LBP   farmers 
often express a desire to renegotiate the water 
rights in the basin. They want the releases from 
the LBP reservoir to be more evenly distrib-
uted, with less for the Kodiveri and Kalingarayan 
farmers and more for the LBP command area. 
A change in allocations is a political decision. 
The pumping from aquifers, canals, rivers and 
streams occurs at an individual level and will 
probably  continue  to  increase  unless,  some-
how, it can be regulated. One option for the 
government is to take control over the electri-
city,  with  metering  and  electricity  charges. 
Another option is to control the use of dif  ferent 
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sources,  and  make  sure  that  unauthorized 
actions are limited or closed down.
It is highly likely that less water will be avail-
able within the Bhavani basin in the future, as 
more water will need to be released for down-
stream  uses  and  environmental  flows. 
Upstream, the state of Kerala is likely to exer-
cise its right to abstract more water. Less water 
for  agriculture  in  the  Bhavani  basin  would 
probably stimulate further pumping, but could 
also substantially change the way agriculture is 
practised  within  the  basin.  Competition  will 
increase  both  within  the  Bhavani  basin  and 
from outside actors.
Discussion
The Bhavani basin is located in a historically 
famine-prone area, with meagre and unreliable 
rainfall.  Already  during  British  rule  different 
‘improvements  and  extensions  of  irrigation’ 
were considered, and some carried out (Madras 
Presidency, 1902). The LBP had been under 
consideration  for  decades  but  was  not  sanc-
tioned, since the investment would not meet the 
British requirements for economic return. This 
criterion was disregarded by the Indian National 
Government  after  independence.  ‘Minor’, 
‘medium’ and ‘major’ irrigation projects were 
launched on a broad scale. The projects imple-
mented at the end of the 1940s and during the 
1950s in the Bhavani basin are all examples of 
these ambitions (Mohanakrishnan, 2001).
Food shortages on a national level in the 
1950s  were  met  through  large  food-aid 
imports,  mainly  from  the  USA,  under  the 
Public Law 480 (PL 480). Still as late as 1965–
1967, India has witnessed serious drought and 
near-famine conditions. In 1976, food produc-
tion self-sufficiency targets were met for the 
first time (del Ninno et al., 2005). The food 
context, together with a constant population 
increase, is one explanation behind the goal, 
renewed in each Tamil Nadu state 5-year plan, 
of bringing more and more areas under irriga-
tion  (Mohanakrishnan,  2001);  for  example, 
the three small irrigation reservoirs constructed 
in the Bhavani basin from 1978 to 1990. 
Today, India is a food-exporting nation and 
agriculture only accounted for 11% of the Tamil 
Nadu  2004/05  net  state  domestic  product. 
With the rapid societal change taking place in 
India, agriculture is today regarded by some as 
‘the parking place of the poor’. Yet, 47% of the 
28 million workforce in Tamil Nadu are classi-
fied as either ‘cultivators’ or ‘agricultural labour-
ers’ (GoTN, 2005). Water plays an imperative 
role  in  the  daily  survival  of  many  small  and 
marginal  farmers,  and  the  large  numbers  of 
farmers  still  constitute  an  important  political 
power in the Tamil Nadu democracy; but water 
management  itself  is  fraught  with  several 
  difficulties.
Water-use complexity
Changing  societal  demands  and  drivers  add 
complexity to the status of water use, making it 
even  more  difficult  to  manage  it  sustainably 
and equitably. A farmer with pumps can utilize 
up to five different water sources: rain, canal, 
drain,  river  or  groundwater.  While  it  is  con  -
venient  to  categorize  water  use  by  water 
source,  in  fact  the  situation  is  much  more 
complex, because farmers typically use more 
than one source of water on the same field. 
This has made the statistics fuzzier. It is clear 
that in Tamil Nadu the traditional division of 
cultivated land into the three categories – ‘dry’, 
‘garden’  and  ‘wet’,  assuming  rainfed,  well- 
irrigated and canal-irrigated lands – is not valid 
anymore.
With an increased ability to withdraw water 
from different sources, individual farmers are 
ready  to  tap  water  whenever  and  wherever 
water happens to be available, as recharged 
groundwater, rainfall-generated runoff or canal 
and river flows, following allocation decisions 
by the irrigation authorities.
Groundwater complexity
Protective well-irrigation has been practised in 
India  for  at  least  a  thousand  years.  When 
seasonal supplemental irrigation of 1.5 ha with 
coarse grains is altered to 1.5 ha with sugar-
cane, there is a risk that a ‘race to the bottom’ 
has started. Aquifer depletion is prevalent on 
the plains outside the command areas, where 
only  bore  wells  of  more  than  200  m  depth 
offer a reliable water source. One problem of 
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the information provided by the authorities is 
inadequate to address the situation. First, the 
exploitation situation is analysed and presented 
according to the administrative boundaries and 
not according to hydrological realities as shown 
in  Fig.  11.7.  Second,  the  40–50-m-deep 
ground  water observation wells from the 1970s 
cannot monitor water use from deep aquifers 
extending as far as 200 m.
Clearly, there are water-use conflicts between 
users of the same aquifer – farmers with shal-
low wells versus farmers with deep wells, and 
farmers versus drinking water needs. The link 
between groundwater and surface water in the 
Bhavani basin is not clear, and it is difficult to 
say whether groundwater lifting competes with 
farmers depending on surface water. 
A dilemma of groundwater use is that, on 
the one hand, it has provided food security and 
economic  growth  and  has  been  extremely 
important  in  allowing  farmers  to  cope  with 
water stress, but, on the other hand, it is not 
sustainable in the long run, with some farmers 
dependent on groundwater going out of busi-
ness. In spite of this, existing policies, such as 
free electricity for agriculture, will encourage 
farmers to use more groundwater in the future. 
The reality of groundwater needs to be brought 
to the forefront of water policy and not to be 
hidden,  as  it  appears  to  be  today.  Forward-
looking  policies  need  to  anticipate  that  this 
resource will not be able to sustain indefinitely 
the farming sector as we know it today.
Allocations and local perceptions
As  agricultural  water-use  intensification 
progresses, the different users become aware 
of the water-use linkages in the Bhavani basin. 
During  interviews,  command  area  farmers 
criti  cize the pumping from the Bhavani River. 
Kalingarayan  farmers  claim  that  lifting  has 
reduced the inflow to the LBP reservoir. Some 
Kodiveri  farmers  believe  the  unauthorized 
pumping from the Bhavani River downstream 
of the LBP reservoir amounts to 340 Mm3/
year. They think that the return flow from the 
Kodiveri scheme is enough for Kalingarayan 
and that all releases from the LBP reservoir for 
the Kalingarayan canal are, in reality, aimed at 
meeting the river pumping demand. The LBP 
farmers also talk about river pumping decreas-
ing the inflow to the LBP reservoir and always 
point out that they get much less water per 
hectare compared with historic canals, demand-
ing that water allocation in the Bhavani basin 
be reassessed.
The Kalingarayan command area farmers 
have little reason to feel concerned about river 
pumping,  since  water  rights  secure  a 
10.5-month supply. The Kodiveri farmers have 
some reason to fear an increased competition. 
During  scarcity  conditions,  the  second  crop 
can,  according  to  regulations,  be  cancelled 
(GoM,  1963).  This  happened  during  some 
years in the 1980s. But it is the LBP farmers 
who should be most worried about the increas-
ing use of the Bhavani water: with the weakest 
water rights, they are last in line for water and 
bear  the  brunt  of  the  hydrological  variability 
(Lannerstad, 2008).
This seasonal and yearly variability in water 
availability  in  the  Bhavani  basin  masks  the 
trend over time. The outflow from the Bhavani 
basin also shows that there is no surplus and 
no ‘wasted water’ leaving the basin. Famers 
and water users are becoming more aware of 
this increased interconnectedness, and people 
are more likely to question new water develop-
ment within the closed basin.
Canal and river pumping
The  decision  to  permanently  increase  water 
allocation for the LBP command area by 60% 
in 1964 was the last major intensification of 
surface water use in the Bhavani basin. Since 
then, individual investments have increased the 
area irrigated with surface water pumped from 
the rivers (7000 ha), the Kodiveri canals (6000 
ha),  the  Kalingarayan  canal  (7000  ha),  and 
streams (6500 ha in the Nilgiris district).
Abstraction of surface water has resulted in 
less water reaching the LBP reservoir; more 
water has thus to be released into the Bhavani 
River to compensate for losses along the river 
and for water pumped from the historic canals. 
From time to time, canal pumping results in 
water scarcity and elicits complaints from tail-
end farmers (TWAD, 2000; Saravanan, 2001). 
The farmers along Kalingarayan describe how 
they  secured  a  court  decision  during  the 
drought  year  2002/03  to  disconnect  the 
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areas, to make sure water reached the tail-end 
farmers.  The  lifting  of  surface  water  thus 
increases the competition for decreasing water 
resources  in  the  basin  and  in  many  ways 
disturbs  the  functioning  of  the  entire  water 
  allocation system in the Bhavani basin.
The individual lifting initiatives can also be 
regarded as an efficient way to use available 
water resources. A comparison of water supply 
in gravity-irrigated command areas shows that 
the LBP farmers get 2100 mm, the Kodiveri 
farmers  6000  mm  and  the  Kalingarayan 
  farmers 8300 mm per year. However, when 
the  diversions  into  the  historic  canals  are 
divided  over  both  gravity  and  estimated  lift-
irrigated  areas,  the  yearly  average  supply  is 
reduced to about 3300 mm/year (two seasons), 
which appears more reasonable. The majority 
of  the  farmers  pumping  water  from  the 
Kalingarayan and Thadapalli canals belong to 
the  LBP  command  area,  and  these  farmers 
thus  contribute  to  rebalancing  the  unequal 
water supply given to the historic canals and 
also increase the efficiency of water use in the 
basin.
The fact that individual actions collectively 
add up to a detrimental situation for the basin 
as a whole poses a further dilemma for the irri-
gation authorities and policy makers. During 
pre-closure,  these  individual  actions  to  with-
draw more water may be justifiable, but after 
closure these diversions incur costs on other 
water  uses.  Overcoming  this  dilemma  will 
require tighter control on individual actions and 
shared management of the basin.
Basin closure implications across  
multiple scales
Water  resource  development  in  the  Bhavani 
basin  and  a  context  of  basin  closure  clearly 
impact actors and water-use sectors at different 
scales.  Within  the  lower  Bhavani  basin,  the 
allocations  for  the  command  areas  are 
perturbed by individual farmers acting at field 
level. Inside the Bhavani basin, there is a rivalry 
over  water  resources  between  the  historic 
command areas and the LBP command area, 
the lower and upper parts of the basin, and the 
Bhavani  and  the  Noyyal  basins,  both  closed 
sub-basins  in  the  Cauvery  basin.  Finally, 
competition  is  likely  to  get  more  serious 
between the Bhavani basin and the Cauvery 
delta.
The  delta  command  area  is  many  times 
larger than the LBP command area, and the 
political power of the many delta farmers is 
likely  to  be  decisive  in  the  future.  As  the 
extreme drought of 2003/04 showed, water 
can be released for the Cauvery delta, while no 
water is given to the command areas in the 
Bhavani basin.
Both the economic and political powers of 
the urban sector drive the drinking water diver-
sions to Coimbatore and Tiruppur. According 
to existing plans, the drinking water siphoned 
off to the Noyyal basin will increase by almost 
50%. Total drinking water abstractions in the 
Bhavani basin will, as a result, increase to more 
than  10%  of  the  annual  designed  diversions 
into the four major Bhavani basin canals. It is 
often claimed that drinking water diversions are 
very small compared with irrigation demands 
and  are  therefore  negligible.  In  a  basin  with 
different water rights, such as the Bhavani, the 
reduction in water availability for agriculture is 
not evenly spread. It is the dry-season releases 
for the LBP farmers that are reduced first. The 
total future drinking water abstractions of 210 
Mm3 equal more than 60% of the dry-season 
supply  (340  Mm3)  and  are  therefore  not  as 
insignificant as many may think.
Basin  closure  at  different  scales  leads  to 
competition for the same water. When sub-basin 
closures  multiply  over  a  larger  basin,  water 
managers  face  a  dilemma  whereby  water 
resources  that  were  earlier  thought  to  be 
suf  ficient for a given sub-basin may be requested 
or  claimed  from  outside.  So  even  if  closure 
within a sub-basin is successfully handled it can 
be disrupted by demands from other parts of the 
larger basins that are in even worse conditions.
Electricity subsidies and energy consumption
Free electricity is an important factor fuelling 
the increasing number of wells and the water 
quantities being pumped from aquifers, canals, 
streams  and  rivers  in  the  Bhavani  basin. 
In  2005,  the  total  electricity  consumption 
assigned  to  agriculture  in  Tamil  Nadu  was 
almost 10 GWh, equivalent to 24% of the total 
electricity  consumption  in  the  state  (GoTN,   The Bhavani Basin, Southern India  259
2005).  Subsidized  agricultural  electricity  use 
has created a number of negative externalities. 
The  farmers  do  not  understand  the  cost  of 
their  water  pumping,  and  at  the  same  time 
groundwater  levels  fall.  The  government  is 
supposed  to  transfer  funds  from  the  state 
budget  to  cover  the  costs  for  the  subsidized 
agricultural use. The TNEB nevertheless, in an 
attempt to reduce losses, has chosen to raise 
the tariff rates for non-subsidized sectors and 
has thus increased the cost of production in the 
industrial sector. The TNEB must also invest in 
additional capacity to keep up with a growing 
demand (GoTN, 2002).
The electricity consumption by agriculture 
is generally unmetered, and it is consequently 
difficult to know where in the system the energy 
use takes place. Free power for agriculture and 
the higher price charged for other sectors have 
led to unauthorized consumption of electricity 
by  both  farmers  and  other  sectors  (GoTN, 
2002). Many times, the Indian State Electrical 
Boards have used the agricultural consumption 
as a scapegoat to cover up both transmission 
and  delivery  losses  (Shah,  2007).  The  more 
than  doubled  consumption  per  agricultural 
connection  in  Tamil  Nadu  during  the  last 
decades thus has three explanations: increased 
water  pumping  following  free  electricity, 
increased  power  consumption  to  lift  from 
deeper  and  deeper  levels  because  of  aquifer 
depletion, and losses and illegal consumption 
in other segments that are wrongly assigned to 
agriculture. Researchers in Tamil Nadu have, 
without considering the losses, estimated that 
about  30%  of  the  increased  power  was 
explained by additional pumping and around 
70%  by  falling  groundwater  levels  (Shah, 
2007).
No author discussing the electricity sub  sidies 
for  agriculture  relates  this  to  pumping  of 
surface water from rivers or canals. As shown 
in  this  study,  the  subsidies  have  encouraged 
farmers in the Bhavani basin to considerably 
increase water lifting from rivers and canals. 
Increased pumping thus not only results in fall-
ing groundwater levels but also directly affects 
surface water flows in rivers and canals and 
impinges on the entire water use in the basin. 
Individual or collective pumping from surface 
water sources is attractive because the source 
of  water  is  often  perennial  and  energy 
consumption  is  lower  than  for  groundwater. 
The electricity subsidies must thus not only be 
discussed in relation to groundwater, especially 
in areas with available surface water sources. 
The  electricity  subsidy  has  stimulated  a 
dif  ficult dilemma. On the one hand, it has been 
very  effective  in  increasing  groundwater  irri-
gation, and some river/canal pumping, and in 
alleviating rural poverty, but, on the other hand, 
with falling groundwater levels, higher energy 
consumed and impact on allocation schemes, 
sustainability is at risk. The dilemma is that any 
benefit given by the society to the individual citi-
zen is very   difficult to withdraw, even if totally 
unsustain  able.  However,  ultimately  there  will 
probably be no choice other than changing the 
existing electricity subsidies.
Conclusions
Through  a  ‘triangulation  approach’  –  using 
different kinds of data and information – this 
chapter  has  shown  an  increased  water-use 
complexity and interconnectedness throughout 
the Bhavani basin. Water lifting from aquifers, 
streams,  rivers  and  canals  has  affected  the 
water situation and has played an important 
role  in  a  continuing  intensification  of  agri-
cultural water use in the closed Bhavani basin. 
While large-scale, state-driven irrigation devel-
opment peaked in the middle of the 1950s, 
development was furthered by individual and 
private  investments  in  pumps,  pushing  the 
system further and further into a more ‘water-
tight’ situation.
A number of factors have led to water-use 
intensification after basin closure:
•	 More	and	more	farmers	withdraw	surface	
water from rivers, streams and canals. As a 
result less water is reaching the LBP reser-
voir  and  more  water  has  to  be  released 
down the Bhavani River to compensate for 
abstraction along canals and the river.
•	 Cropping	 patterns	 in	 the	 Bhavani	 basin	
clearly show a trend towards more water-
intensive crops such as sugarcane. In both 
command and non-command areas, these 
crops depend on the pumping of surface 
water and groundwater.
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agriculture  in  Tamil  Nadu  in  1984,  the 
number  of  connections  has  increased  by 
50%  and  the  annual  electricity  consump-
tion per pump set has doubled. This devel-
opment should be discussed in relation to 
groundwater use, but must also be analysed 
in a context of pumping of surface water 
from rivers and canals.
Increased cropping intensity, mostly fuelled 
by water pumping, which in turn was propelled 
by free electricity, has had initial positive but 
later serious negative impacts:
•	 Tail-end	 farmers	 along	 the	 canals	 experi-
ence water scarcity.
•	 Small	farmers	cannot	keep	up	investing	in	
deeper  wells  and  become  dependent  on 
buying water from larger farmers.
•	 With	 the	 lowest	 water	 right,	 the	 LBP	
command area risks suffering more seasons 
without water supply.
•	 Individuals	 and	 municipalities	 relying	 on	
groundwater as their drinking water source 
face  many  problems  with  falling  water 
levels.
While  there  is  a  reasonably  good  data-
collection system, official statistics do not reflect 
reality. For example, remote sensing reveals a 
total cropping intensity in the basin of about 
140%, with a 100% increase in cultivation in 
non-command  areas  during  the  dry  season 
from 1970 to 2000. This is evidence of the 
importance  of  water  lifting  and  differs  from 
government statistical data.
In the future, more water will be requested 
for use outside of the Bhavani basin. Drinking 
water diversions for the cities in the neighbour-
ing  Noyyal  basin  will  increase.  Kerala  might 
utilize its right to withdraw consider  able quanti-
ties of water from the upper Bhavani. There is 
also a risk of an increased frequency of water to 
be  released  from  the  LBP  reservoir  for  the 
Cauvery delta farmers, or for the environment, 
as the closing of the Cauvery basin progresses.
There is increased interconnectivity within 
the Bhavani basin, and in fact within the entire 
Cauvery basin. The concerted impact from the 
many individual actions has resulted in a redis-
tribution of the water use and a pressure on 
prevailing allocation rules. The development of 
the  Bhavani  basin  illustrates  that  individual 
actions taking place after basin closure cannot 
be  ignored  by  policy  makers  but  should  be 
thought of and recognized before undesirable 
water-use patterns have established.
The study holds important implications for 
policy. The main implication is that, after basin 
closure, means must be found to align indi  vidual 
actions with the objectives of society. This will 
require a better understanding of what drives 
individual water use and of the hydrology of the 
basin, but many problems have built up over 
time and are difficult to resolve. These include 
the built-up dependency on electricity for pump-
ing and the increasing pressure on agriculture 
from other sectors. Eventually, it may be that 
policies  may  have  to  gradually  shift  people 
away from agriculture to ease water scarcity.
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Introduction
The Murray–Darling basin (MDB) in Australia 
has recently received considerable international 
exposure  and  is  frequently  commended  as  a 
working example of interstate cooperation and 
management of shared basin water resources 
(World  Bank,  2005).  This  position  is  usually 
accompanied by the caveat that the economy 
and agriculture of Australia have very different 
structures,  strengths  and  vulnerabilities  from 
those in developing countries. The basin has 
been extensively developed for agriculture, and 
water resources are widely thought to be over-
developed, at the cost of aquatic ecosystems 
(Cullen et al., 2000). The demand for water for 
industry and urban settlements has been very 
limited in comparison with the volumes used in 
agriculture,  stock-rearing  and  irrigation.  The 
major  debate  on  the  allocation  of  water 
resources in the basin now centres on realloca-
tion  to  mitigate  the  negative  environmental 
impacts  of  agricultural  uses  (NWI,  2005b). 
Recently,  the  decision  to  transfer  75  Mm3 
annually from the inland irrigation districts to 
the rapidly expanding coastal city of Melbourne 
has added a new dimension to this equation, 
although other urban transfers are not expected 
from the basin and the major factor governing 
the implementation of the transfer is its cost 
($A1 billion). This is again in strong contrast to 
basins  in  many  developing  countries,  where 
transfer  of  water  from  agriculture  to  higher-
value uses is dominated by rapidly rising urban 
and  industrial  demand,  with  little  conscious 
consideration  of  environmental  water  allo-
cation.  Nevertheless,  most  of  the  irrigation 
infrastructure in the basin is quite similar to that 
found in other semi-arid and arid regions, and 
owes much to the work of engineers who had 
earlier developed irrigation systems in northern 
India and in the western USA in the late 1800s 
(Hallows and Thompson, 1995).
Within  Australia  itself,  the  perceptions  of 
the success of the institutional arrangements for 
water  management  in  the  Murray–Darling 
Basin  are  changing  (Connell,  2007).  The 
emerging view at the federal government level 
has been that the institutional arrangements for 
interstate  cooperation  were  flawed,  having 
been  based  on  a  voluntary  and  unanimous 
agreement.  On  25  January  2007,  the  then 
Prime Minister John Howard announced that 
the Commonwealth Government would invest 
$A10  billion  to  reform  rural  water  manage-
ment  and  take  over  control  of  the  Murray–
Darling basin from the states. Later in the year, 
the  Commonwealth  Parliament  passed  the 
Water Act, 2007. This is the third attempt since 
federation in 1901 to design a comprehensive 
management framework. The pre  vious efforts 
were in the early decades of the 20th century 
and  in  the  1980s.  During  both  these  earlier 
periods,  a  strong  coordinating  structure  was 
© CAB International 2009. River Basin Trajectories: Societies, Environments and Development 
(eds F. Molle and P. Wester)  263264  H. Turral et al.
initially proposed. Ultimately, in both cases, the 
efforts of the reformers were frustrated by the 
strength  of  established  interests  and  concern 
for  state  ‘rights’.  As  a  result,  environmental 
conditions  and  the  security  of  water  as  an 
economic resource in the MDB have continued 
to decline.
In November 2007, a Labour government 
was elected and subsequently, to the surprise of 
many onlookers, it, in fact, increased the finan-
cial allocation to the new arrangements for the 
MDB to $A12.9 billion and has succeeded in 
bringing the recalcitrant state of Victoria into 
agreement,  with  an  updated  version  of  the 
‘Howard Plan’ that is more respectful of state 
positions  and  contributions,  and  pays  more 
attention to water allocation for the environ-
ment (Water for the Future). The strength of 
past  arrangements  has  been  that  innovative 
solutions have been required in order to gain 
unanimous acceptance from the states. This, in 
turn, has meant that the pro  cess has been noisy 
and slow (especially to those closely involved), 
whereas from the outside, it has a logic and 
strength that has put Australia in the forefront 
of water management. There are many reasons 
to doubt the efficacy of a centralized approach, 
especially given experience overseas, and the 
lack of federal experience and connection with 
details on the ground. A new chapter will have 
to be written some years down the track, which 
will distil the lessons of this latest change in 
institutional direction in water management in 
Australia.
The primary focus of this chapter concerns 
the  institutional  arrangements  developed  for 
integration of management across the states 
lying within the MDB, set against the evolution 
of  water  use  and  its  environmental  conse-
quences. It leads up to the recent major change 
in  water  resources  management  in  Australia 
through the ceding of state responsibility to the 
federal government. The implications of this 
most recent move are especially pertinent to 
developing-country  water-policy  analysts  and 
policy  makers.  The  writing  provides  some 
biophysical,  economic  and  technical  back-
ground  on  the  pillars  of  Australian  water 
management, including a well-evolved and, by 
world standards, sophisticated water-allocation 
and accounting system. This chapter tries to 
cover  the  range  of  perspectives  on  water 
management in the MDB, and to link these to 
broader  issues  of  natural  resources  manage-
ment in Australia.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the  current  challenges  being  faced,  most 
  notably in environmental water allocation and 
in adjusting to the significant projected impacts 
of climatic change. The emerging lessons from 
Australia are broadly instructive, since its arid 
climate is already very variable and is expected 
to experience considerable change, with signifi-
cant reductions in annual runoff expected in 
the existing irrigated areas.
Australia – a federation of states  
and territories
Although the smallest continent on the globe, 
Australia  is  a  vast  and  sparsely  populated 
  country,  with  a  population  of  just  over  20 
million, mostly living on the coastal margins of 
the  7.79  million  km2  land  mass.  Climates 
range  from  temperate  in  Tasmania,  through 
Mediterranean  on  the  south-east  and  south-
west  coasts,  semi-arid  in  the  near-coastal 
  interior and hyper-arid in the centre, to lush 
tropical in the north.
The Commonwealth of Australia unites six 
states and two territories under a three-tiered 
government  system,  of  national,  state  (and 
territory) and local jurisdictions. From federa-
tion  through  to  2007,  water  has  been  the 
responsibility  of  state  and  territory  govern-
ments, and each has evolved its own water law 
and  regulation.  Australia  was  federated  in 
1901, with section 100 of the federal constitu-
tion providing that the power over water was 
to remain with the states. The former colonies 
viewed water as a key stumbling block to feder-
ation and hence extracted a prohibition clause 
in  the  new  constitution.  Section  100  of  the 
treaty, added at the states’ insistence, stated: 
‘The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or 
regulation of trade or commerce, abridge the 
rights of the State or of the residents therein to 
the  reasonable  use  of  waters  of  rivers  from 
conservation or irrigation.’
The contest was really between common-
wealth power over water for navigation and 
the states’ desire to use the water for irrigation. 
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have,  for  much  of  the  last  century,  created 
their  own  laws,  policies  and  organizations, 
sometimes  without  reference  to  their  neigh-
bours. However, the commonwealth has inter-
vened  in  state  water  management  through 
section 96 of the constitution, which gives it 
power  to  grant  financial  assistance  to  the 
states, contingent on specified conditions being 
met, and it has been used to tackle basin-wide 
flood and salinity problems in the MDB.
The national government has progressively 
asserted its perspectives through financial lever-
age in a number of ways, and has thus carved a 
role in shaping national water policy (Bjornland 
and McKay, 2002). Matters of national signifi-
cance that concern the states and the federal 
government  are  overseen  by  the  Council  of 
Australian Governments (COAG), which deals 
with specific issues through specialized ministe-
rial councils. A Natural Resources Management 
Ministerial Council was created in 2001 (replac-
ing  the  earlier  committees,  ARMCANZ  and 
ANZECC), and has subsequently had a major 
impact on water reform.
Agriculture and irrigation in Australia
Historically, agriculture has been a major indus-
try in Australia, with an estimated total farm 
area of 463 Mha, or roughly 60% of the total 
land surface area (ABS, 1998). Much of this 
area is used for pastoralism, with only 4.6% of 
the total sown to crops and 4.9% to intensive 
pastures.  Up  to  the  late  1950s,  agriculture 
employed a population of up to 450,000 and 
accounted for 80% of the nation’s export earn-
ings.  By  2006/7,  farm  populations  had 
declined to 308,000 and the agriculture share 
of national GDP had fallen to less than 3%. 
Nevertheless,  the  sector  still  accounts  for  a 
significant  portion  of  total  exports,  around 
12%,  including  goods  and  services,  and 
17–18% of all merchandise (ABARE, 2007).
Since European settlement, there has been 
a strong interest in irrigation, with the Chaffey 
Brothers establishing the first irrigation system 
in northern Victoria before the end of the 19th 
century. This, as with their earlier ventures in 
California, was not completely successful, and 
was eventually taken over by the state, although 
it  helped  seed  a  broader  momentum  in  irri-
gation development (Turral, 1998). The state 
governments,  partly  influenced  by  irrigation 
development in northern India, began large-
scale  developments  around  the  turn  of  the 
century, peaking in the 1970s in New South 
Wales  (NSW).  Soldier  settlement,  a  form  of 
compensation for returning servicemen, was a 
major plank of agricultural policy between the 
two world wars and after 1945. The expansion 
of irrigation relied heavily on the creation of 
interannual dam storage, with the completion 
of the Hume dam on the Murray in 1929, and 
the  creation  of  the  Snowy  Mountains 
Hydroelectricity Scheme from 1949 to 1974, 
which  includes  interbasin  transfers  to  the 
Murray–Darling system from a network of 16 
dams and seven power stations, linked by 275 
km of underground tunnels.
In 1998, the total irrigated area of Australia 
was about 2.4 Mha, of which about 80% lies in 
the Murray–Darling basin. Approximately 70% 
of all water abstracted in Australia is used for 
irrigation  in  the  MDB,  predominantly  from 
surface  sources  (Table  12.1).  Groundwater 
accounts for about 22% of national water use, 
on average, but is limited by salinity in shallow 
groundwater  and  the  depth  of  pumping  for 
fresh, non-saline water. 
In recent years, there has been a growing 
recognition  of  the  hydrological  linkages 
between land use and salinity in the landscape. 
Much  of  Australia  is  underlain  by  ancient 
marine  deposits  with  high  levels  of  natural 
salinity. The imbalance between precipitation 
and  evaporation  has  also  fostered  a  gradual 
concentration of salt in soils from rainwater, 
and additional saline areas have been formed 
by wind-blown deposits of such soils. Although 
irrigation generates salinity due to rising water 
tables, there are large areas of Australia at risk 
from  dryland  salinity,  where  replacement  of 
deep-rooted  vegetation  by  annual  crops  has 
resulted in a gradual but inexorable increase in 
net recharge to groundwater, contributing to 
rising water tables and potential hazard to 20 
Mha (CSIRO, 2001).
The Murray–Darling basin (MDB)
The Darling (2740 km), Murray (2530 km) and 
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longest  rivers.  The  Murray–Darling  basin 
region (Fig. 12.1) covers more than 1,000,000 
km2 (14%) of Australia, unevenly spread over 
the  five  jurisdictions  of  Queensland  (QLD), 
New  South  Wales  (NSW),  Australian  Capital 
Territory  (ACT),  Victoria  (VIC)  and  South 
Australia (SA). The estimated population living 
in the basin was 1,956,765 in the last census, 
which corresponds to around 10% of the total 
Australian population. 
The Murray and the Darling are essentially 
two  river  systems,  with  only  16%  of  the 
Murray’s mean annual flow contributed by the 
Darling. Population in the basin is increasingly 
sparse to the north and west, on the edge of 
the ‘outback’. Bourke, an important town in 
the history and mythology of Australia, has a 
population of 3000, and Wilcannia, the third 
largest inland port in Australia in the 1890s, 
now  has  a  population  of  just  five.  Larger 
  country towns such as Broken Hill have popu-
lations in excess of 20,000, and those closer to 
the Murray are substantially larger, with Albury-
Wodonga heading towards 100,000.
Three of the five polities in the MDB (NSW, 
Victoria and South Australia) have developed 
the greater part of available water resources. 
The allocation and abstraction of surface water 
and  groundwater  in  the  MDB  states  for  the 
period 1995–1996 are sum  marized in Table 
12.1;  it  can  be  seen  that  groundwater  use 
accounted  for  less  than  4%  of  abstractions 
overall.  Although  groundwater  use  increased   
in terms of volume and proportion through the 
drought period after 1999, it is still only a small 
component of allocation. Total abstraction in 
ACT and Queensland is very limited.
In general, rainfall on the coast is high and 
falls  rapidly  towards  the  interior,  following  a 
decreasing trend from east to west (600–200 
mm per annum) in NSW and Victoria, with an 
increase again to the west in the lower basin. 
Precipitation in the upper catchments of the 
headwaters of the Murray may reach 900 mm, 
accounting  for  the  disproportionate  contri-
bution to runoff above Albury (33% of mean 
annual flow in the basin). NSW has the largest 
surface  water  runoff  and  also  abstracts  the 
highest  volumes  of  water  (Tables  12.1  and 
12.2).  Victoria’s  water  is  supplied  from  the 
main river and from the state’s own internal 
storage dams.




















NSW 10,252   6,139 197   6,336 4,113 40.1
VIC   5,589   3,662   95   3,757 1,927 34.5
QLD      702      574 –      574    128 18.2
SA      296      246   70      316      50 16.9
ACT        63        63 –        63        0   0.0
Total 16,902 10,684 361 11,045 6,218 21.9
Source: MDBC web site.




Mean annual flow (Bm3) 13.2
Mean annual diversion (Bm3) 10.8
Minimum flow to South Australia (Bm3)   1.8
Share to New South Wales (%) 57.4
Share to Victoria (%) 34.3
Share to South Australia (%)   5.4
Share to Queensland (%)   2.3
Share to Australian Capital Territory (%)   0.6  The Drama of Restraining Water Use  267
Fig. 12.1. The Murray–Darling basin, south-east Australia (Source: MDBC).268  H. Turral et al.
Australian  hydrology  is  among  the  most 
variable  in  the  world  (McMahon  and  Mein, 
1986) and droughts occur irregularly but may 
last for several years. Since 2000, there have 
been 5 years of continuous and unprecedented 
droughts  across  different  parts  of  the  basin. 
This high climatic variability has prompted a 
high level of river regulation of the Murray–
Darling basin, which has a dam storage capac-
ity of approximately 18 billion m3 along the 
main stem of the river network, with two dams 
having capacities greater than 3 billion m3 (the 
Hume and Dart  mouth). Total inflows to major 
streams and storages in the basin are estimated 
at  around  24–25  billion  m3  on  average, 
although much of this does not reach the main 
river;  for  example,  the  Lachlan  River  loses 
most of its tail flows in the Great Cumbung 
swamp. Large areas of the interior wetland can 
be seen on the map in Fig. 12.1, especially 
along  the  middle  and  lower  reaches  of  the 
Darling,  where  evaporation  accounts  for  a 
significant proportion of   ‘internal runoff’.
The average naturalized annual flow out of 
the Murray mouth is 13 billion m3, but actual 
outflows  to  the  sea  have  been  minimal  for 
years  (less  than  200  Mm3/month  slightly 
upstream at Euston on long-term averages for 
8 months, peaking at around 600 Mm3/month 
in  September).  Irrigation  use  (around  11.5 
billion m3/year) accounts for 95% of diversions 
in  the  basin,  from  both  the  main  river  and 
other  sources  (MDBMC,  1995).  The  water 
shares, mean annual flow and minimum flows 
to South Australia, the most downstream ripar-
ian state, are shown in Table 12.2.
The shares are based on flow analyses under-
taken  for  the  Murray  and  the  Darling  at  the 
beginning of the century, whereas the abstrac-
tions shown in Table 12.1 account for flows that 
are  sourced  from  all  rivers  and  groundwater 
lying in the MDB. The average runoff coefficient 
for the basin is a low 0.16, with a higher value 
of 0.2 for the lower-rainfall northern sub-basins 
and 0.10 for the southern sub-basins.
The average irrigated area in the basin is 
estimated to be just over 1.47 Mha, but can 
vary substantially through dry and wet periods. 
There  are  over  14,500  irrigated  properties 
producing crops or pasture. The mean size of 
irrigated properties is larger in the basin than 
elsewhere,  with  70%  of  the  irrigated  area 
farmed  by  47%  of  the  total  number  of  irri-
gators.  Cape  (1997)  estimates  that  irrigation 
accounts for 25–30% of the gross value of farm 
output, or about $A7.2 billion (Table 12.3). 
The  nature  of  irrigated  agriculture  in  the 
basin  reflects  the  security  of  water  supplies. 
Large  surface-irrigation  systems  were  devel-
oped in all states, with two covering more than 
500,000 ha each (the Goulburn–Murray and 
Murrumbidgee  irrigation  areas).  In  Victoria, 
there is a high degree of internal storage from 
catchments  that  feed  into  the  River  Murray, 
and strong links between different parts of the 
system (DSE, 2004). This results in a relatively 
Table 12.3. The value of irrigation enterprises in MDB (nominal year 2005).
Sector Area (ha) Number of farms
Percentage of 
national area
Value of production 
(million $A)
Pasture and grains     862,155 8,584 79.8 2,450
Fruit       38,856 2,732 64.5 1,027
Vines       30,492 2,819 69.0    813
Vegetables       23,511 1,106 25.4 1,119
Rice     150,000 – –    310
Cotton     490,000 – – 1,128
Total 1,595,014 – – –
Horticulture as % of 
basin irrigated area
                 5.8 – – –
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secure  water  supply  throughout  the  year, 
enabling widespread development of intensive 
pasture for dairy production as well as horti-
culture.
By contrast, in NSW, the rivers are long, 
with little storage downstream of dams located 
in the upper catchments. Water supplies are 
more variable, and farming enterprises tend to 
be larger and more mixed than in neighbour-
ing Victoria, with farmers adapting the balance 
of irrigated and rainfed production each year. 
The northern valleys of the Namoi and Gwyder 
rivers in NSW have a vibrant cotton industry, in 
part based on the overuse of groundwater and 
the contentious   storage of flood water, and a 
tough  process  of  renegotiating  water  use 
continues to generate controversy (Turral and 
Fullagar, 2006). 
Despite relatively high natural flow varia  bility 
and salinity in the river water, horticulture and 
dairy  production  are  the  main  enterprises  in 
South Australia. Recent trends in water pricing 
and  water  trading  have  tended  to  see  water 
move from more extensive irrigated pasture to 
dairy and horticulture, with a rapid expansion of 
viticulture in the last 10 years (ABARE, 2007).
Regulation  of  river  flows  has  also  had  a 
major impact on the magnitude of high and 
low flows in the system, with a ‘reversal’ of 
flow patterns from winter to summer in the 
upper reaches of many tributaries, as well as in 
parts of the main stem of the river. This reversal 
(more water flowing in summer than in winter) 
is due to the stocking of dams in winter and the 
subsequent release of irrigation supplies in the 
summer (Maheshwari and McMahon, 1995). 
Flow reversal and reduction in the upper tribu-
taries of the Darling and in the lower Murray 
have caused great concern to ecologists and 
other scientists. It has had a profound impact 
on the in- and near-stream flora and fauna of 
the river. There are 30,000 wetlands in the 
basin, including large tracts of riparian forest, 
and 15 are listed under the Ramsar Convention. 
Many wetlands, especially in the west of the 
basin, are naturally saline. A recent audit found 
that about 10% of bird species and 20% of 
mammal  species  are  endangered,  while  20 
mammal species have become extinct.
Concern  about  the  impacts  of  reduced 
water quantity, quality and timing of flows has 
propelled many of the recent changes in water 
resources  management  in  the  basin,  with 
particular  emphasis  on  developing  means  of 
reallocating water to the environment.
An Institutional and Political History  
of the MDB
The story of the efforts to integrate basin water 
management across multiple state jurisdictions 
unfolds  in  three  distinct  eras.  The  first  saw 
attempts to coordinate the development and 
use of water resources, followed in phase two 
by a gradual appreciation of the need for inte-
grated and sustainable management. The third 
phase arises out of the perceived failure of a 
consensual  model  between  the  states  them-
selves, with the emergence of a more directive 
and  controlling  federal  involvement.  Each 
phase is addressed in turn.
Attempt 1 – integrating development 
The 1915 River Murray Waters Agreement
After  many  years  of  negotiation,  a  formal 
organizational structure designed to coordinate 
management of a limited number of issues by 
the  three  state  governments  in  the  Murray 
catchment in the southern section of the MDB 
was established in 1915 by the River Murray 
Waters  Agreement  (RMWA).  Neither  the 
commonwealth  nor  the  three  state  govern-
ments  (NSW,  Victoria  and  South  Australia) 
wanted the newly born federal government to 
take a leading role. This agreement was incor-
porated into identical parallel legislation, which 
was passed by each of the three state parlia-
ments  (Commonwealth  Parliament,  1917). 
The new arrangement had three main compo-
nents. First, there was a programme of engi-
neering works planned as an integrated whole, 
with building and operations to be the respon-
sibility  of  the  state  within  which  they  were 
constructed.  Construction  costs  were  to  be 
shared near equally (later made equal) by the 
four governments, and operation and mainte-
nance costs were to be the responsibility of the 
three states within their jurisdictions. Second 
were  the  water-  sharing  rules,  which  under-
pinned Australia’s future water allocation proc-
ess (see Box 12.1). After providing a defined 270  H. Turral et al.
minimum  monthly  flow  to  South  Australia 
(which  would  vary  from  month  to  month, 
depending  on  the  time  of  year),  NSW  and 
Victoria were to share the flow at Albury equally 
and have exclusive right to the water in their 
own tributaries. As recommended by the 1902 
Interstate  Royal  Commission,  a  proportional 
share  arrangement  between  the  three  states 
was  agreed  for  times  of  drought.  Third,  a 
commission of four members, one from each 
government and chaired by the commonwealth 
representative, and supported by a small full-
time  secretariat,  was  established  to  oversee 
implementation of the works programme and 
the water-sharing arrangements. In compari-
son  with  cross-border  river  management 
schemes elsewhere in the world, the division of 
water by a proportional share approach (Table 
12.3)  and  the  creation  of  a  small  full-time 
secretariat,  which  could  later  be  expanded 
incrementally, were notable innovations.
Sandford Clark, water law expert and long-
term commentator on matters related to the 
MDB, has argued there is evidence that the 
RMWA  and  the  River  Murray  Commission 
(RMC) that it created were originally intended 
to be part of a more comprehensive institu-
tional structure than was ultimately the case. 
Clark (1983) argues there is strong evidence 
that the RMWA and the RMC were designed to 
operate  in  combination  with  the  Interstate 
Commission, a body intended by the designers 
of the consti  tution to be a key part of a federal 
decision-making system. The legislation estab-
lishing  the  Interstate  Commission  had  wide-
ranging  clauses  describing  the  scope  of  its 
powers to deal with river issues. These plans 
were  frustrated,  however,  by  a  High  Court 
decision  in  1915,  which  effectively  stripped 
the  Interstate  Commission  of  most  of  its 
powers.
Box 12.1.  Water entitlements in the Murray–Darling basin.
From the early 20th century, robust institutions have evolved in the MDB to underpin the development of 
irrigation. For example, in 1909, during the first phase of publicly sponsored development, water entitle-
ments were introduced by the state of Victoria, through the administrative issue of water licences on 
application by potential water users. Water meters were introduced in 1910 to ensure improved water 
sharing, accounting and charging, and, for more than eight decades, Victoria applied the same concept of 
a water entitlement, allocated to a specific area of land and with no right to transfer.
   Water entitlements in the MDB have two distinct characteristics compared with many international 
  allocation systems (particularly those in the south-western USA). First, most water ‘entitlements’ in the 
MDB are defined as a nominal (maximum) volume of water that can be abstracted under a licence. The 
actual amount allocated in any year (or ‘allocation’) is determined from the water available (the propor-
tional appropriation doctrine) after the reservation of high-value uses (urban water supply, stock and 
domestic supply, environmental reserve and permanent plantings). Allocation announcements are given 
as percentages of entitlement and updated regularly through the water year for each subsystem or valley, 
and therefore risks are shared equally. This differs from the prior appropriation doctrine, where the entitle-
ment is specified in absolute terms and risks are allocated according to seniority (see Chapter 6, this 
volume). Second, there are no beneficial use obligations for entitlement-holders in the MDB. The Water 
Act, 1912 (NSW) contains powers dating back to revisions to the Act in the 1930s that enable the 
  cancellation of inactive water licences, but this provision was not applied successfully. Throughout the 
reform process, the policy of upholding unused entitlements has been hotly debated, but has been upheld, 
primarily since entitlement-holders have continuously paid charges to water management authorities to 
retain their entitlement.
   Water  entitlements  are  specified,  measured  and  charged  volumetrically.  Although  the  principal 
  technology to measure surface flows, the Dethridge Wheel, was developed in the early 1900s, it only saw 
widespread  application  from  the  1960s  onwards  in Victoria  and  NSW,  with  volumetric  conversion 
(re-specification of area-based water allocation in volumetric terms) in the major irrigation areas taking 
place in the 1970s and 1980s in NSW. Surprisingly, the process of volumetric conversion in South 
Australia only started in 2005, although, as with bulk allocation processes in the other states, the process 
also includes environmental allocation (SA Government 2005; NWI–South Australian Implementation 
Plan (NWI, 2005a)).   The Drama of Restraining Water Use  271
An age of water resource development
It  was  perhaps  partly  in  response  to  these 
setbacks that the premiers of the state govern-
ments agreed to a number of important changes 
to the RMWA when they met in May and July 
1920. Instead of being the coordinator of three 
independent state construction bodies, it was 
agreed  that  the  commission  would  create  a 
single construction authority to build the dams, 
locks and other structures that were part of the 
programme of joint works. Even more intrigu-
ing, they agreed to change the voting system 
for the com  mission so that a three out of four 
majority  would  be  sufficient,  rather  than  the 
unanimous approval previously required for all 
major  decisions.  It  was  this  last  proposition, 
however, that resulted in the required legislation 
being rejected by the NSW parliament, thereby 
aborting all the amendments approved by the 
premiers (Eaton, 1946).
Continuing to work with the decentralized 
organizational  model  originally  approved  in 
1915, the RMC implemented a major works 
programme through the 1920s and 1930s. Its 
main components were:
•	 A	storage on the River Murray upstream of 
Albury, at Lake Hume (3.6 billion m3).
•	 An	enlarged	Lake	Victoria,	a	natural	lake	
just  off  the  main  channel  of  the  River 
Murray in NSW near the South Australian 
border, to supply South Australia. 
•	 A	 diversion	 channel	 near	 Yarrawonga	 to	
take water into the flat lands of south-west-
ern NSW.
•	 A	 series	 of	 weirs	 along	 the	 Murray,	
Murrumbidgee and Darling rivers to support 
navigation.
•	 Barrages	to	separate	the	lower	lakes	from	
the Coorong and the mouth of the River 
Murray (Eaton, 1946).
The  focus  during  this  time  was  on  the 
management of water quantity rather than on 
protecting water quality. The aim was to build 
new communities in the dry inland regions of 
Australia and to promote economic develop-
ment. This approach was at its strongest in the 
decades  immediately  after  the  Second  World 
War, pushed by no-nonsense aggressive state 
boosters  such  as  Henry  Bolte,  premier  of 
Victoria, and Thomas Playford, the long-  serving 
premier of South Australia (Blazey, 1972). For 
the  South  Australian  government,  the  main 
obstacle  to  development  was  its  shortage  of 
water. Concerns about water scarcity had domi-
nated  the  state’s  history  ever  since  Charles 
Sturt’s  expedition  down  the  River  Murray  in 
1830 and his subsequent report recommend-
ing the foundation of the colony. Since then, 
water shortage had severely constrained agri-
cultural  settlement  and  the  expansion  of 
Adelaide, the state capital. Access to water for 
irrigation along the river corridor and the piping 
of water to Adelaide and other towns from the 
Murray, undertaken in the 1950s, were seen as 
solutions to these constraints.
In  the  late  1940s  and  1950s,  a  growing 
network of pipelines began to distribute water 
around  the  state.  Adelaide  came  online  in 
1954.  Eventually,  the  city  would  draw  an 
  average of 40% of its water from the Murray, a 
dependence that has increased up to 90% in 
times  of  drought  (Hammerton,  1986).  This 
connection between the River Murray and the 
state  capital,  where  most  of  the  population 
lived, greatly increased the significance of the 
River  Murray  for  South  Australia.  With  the 
benefits came greater dependence and risks. 
Drought  was  an  obvious  danger,  but  more 
in  sidious was the lack of political, institutional 
and legal protection against the likelihood that 
the upstream states would continue increasing 
their  extractions.  For  the  upper-catchment 
states, the main factors limiting the growth of 
their diversions were the volume of flow that 
came into the system and the need to provide 
South  Australia’s  annual  entitlement  under   
the  RMWA,  then  1.5  billion  m3  and  later   
1.85 billion m3 (Table 12.2). Extra water only 
flowed over the border from either the Murray 
or the Darling because the upper states had 
not increased their consumption to the level 
that they were entitled to under the RMWA. In 
the coming decades, insecurity created by this 
situation caused South Australia to wage a long 
campaign  to  restrain  the  water-development 
ambitions of its upstream neighbours.
Attempt 2 – managing overallocation and 
rediscovering the environment
Salinity problems and institutional responses
Much of the rethinking of the aims and   methods 
of water management in the MDB during the 272  H. Turral et al.
1970s and 1980s was the product of growing 
awareness  of  salinity  problems.  Management 
options available to the RMC to control salinity 
were  very  limited.  Speaking  to  a  workshop 
conducted  at  Khancoban  late  in  1984,  Don 
Blackmore, then Deputy Chief Executive of the 
River Murray Commission, identified 14 factors 
influencing the level of salinity in the Murray. 
Of these, the commission controlled only one, 
dilution flows (Blackmore, Canberra, personal 
communication). The need for closer interstate 
cooperation  was  made  clearer  by  the  early 
results of a series of major projects undertaken 
in the following years, which revealed that the 
rivers draining the MDB overlay a number of 
naturally saline regional groundwater systems. 
The  research  also  showed  that  these  basins 
were filling up rapidly and changing the balance 
of the hydrogeological system of the basin; in 
essence,  the  groundwater  systems  under  the 
southern MDB are easy to fill but difficult to 
empty  (Williams  and  Goss,  2002).  The  high 
saline water table is the main cause of second-
ary      salinization of soils.
The growth in understanding of the basin’s 
salinity problems in the 1970s and 1980s was 
based  on  increasing  research  and  hard-won 
experience  (Fig.12.2).  This  new  knowledge 
paved the way for what came to be called inte-
grated  catchment  management  (ICM1),  a 
combination  of  holistic  thinking  about  the 
biophysical environment and recognition of the 
need for community involvement and empow-
erment.  A  recent  survey  of  ICM  throughout 
Fig. 12.2.  Salinity trends in the land and rivers of the MDB, 1975–1995 (MDBMC, 1987, 1988, 1995).  The Drama of Restraining Water Use  273
Australia put forward a useful generic descrip-
tion of the elements that would characterize a 
mature ICM system (Bellamy et al., 2002). The 
authors  suggest  that  it  would  be  flexible  and 
adapted to the variability and diversity of the 
area  being  managed.  Within  such  a  system, 
communities would be   thoroughly involved and 
aware  of  the  significance  of  their  place  in  a 
broader regional context. An ICM system would 
also be supported by legis  lation and regulation 
designed to empower and assist rather than to 
dominate  and  unnecessarily  restrict  Pro  -
grammes would be well resourced and power 
devolved down to the appropriate level. A wide 
range of options for community involvement 
would  be  available  and  participation  encour-
aged  by  providing  opportunities  to  exercise 
judgement and discretion. Above all, the people 
and groups involved would be encouraged to be 
cooperative and positive in their relationships 
with one another (Bellamy et al., 2002).
ICM philosophies had a strong influence on 
the thinking behind the revised organizational 
framework  for  the  MDB,  which  was  put  in 
place  in  stages  between  1985  and  1988. 
Known rather clumsily as the MDB Initiative, 
the new arrangements were incorporated in a 
revised MDB Agreement, which, for the first 
time,  included  Queensland  and  Australian 
Capital Territory, although not as fully com  -
mitted  signatories.  The  key  elements  of  the 
structure that resulted from the debates of the 
mid-1980s  were  the  Murray–Darling  Basin 
Ministerial Council (MDBMC), the Community 
Advisory Committee to the Ministerial Council, 
and  the  Murray–Darling  Basin  Commission 
(MDBC). The Ministerial Council has two or 
three  ministers  from  each  government.  The 
Community Advisory Committee is made up of 
selected representatives from the major regions 
and  organizations,  such  as  the  Australian 
Conservation Foundation, the Murray–Darling 
Association  and  the  National  Farmers’ 
Federation.  The  commission  has  two  repre-
sentatives from each jurisdiction, usually chief 
executives  from  the  environment  or  water 
agencies, who report to the ministers on the 
Ministerial  Council.  All  three  bodies  were 
assisted  by  the  MDBC  office,  which  had 
in  herited the RMC staff and then expanded it 
through the 1990s in response to the growing 
list  of  issues  that  came  within  the  widening 
ambit of basin-wide management.
In parallel with this higher-level institutional 
development and adoption of ICM principles, 
there have been innovative, local-scale initia-
tives aimed at solving local problems in an inte-
grated fashion. Land Care, a community-based 
land  management  programme,  has  mush-
roomed  in  Australia  to  number  more  than 
6000 Land Care groups, in rural, urban and 
coastal areas. The idea of Land Care emerged 
spontaneously  in  Western  Australia  (with 
community action on dryland salinity) and in 
northern Victoria (with Salinity Action Groups 
in irrigated areas) during the 1980s. A remark-
able  accommodation  between  the  National 
Farmers’  Federation  and  the  Australian 
Conservation Foundation oversaw the formali-
zation of Land Care as a regional and national 
strategy, with increasing levels of federal fund-
ing going into establishing and training Land 
Care  groups.  The  principles  and  practice  of 
community funding and community direction 
of public funding (co-financing) have underwrit-
ten  Land  Care.  Activities  have  included  the 
adoption of better practices; for example, salin-
ity  mitigation  measures,  tree  planting  and 
buffer-strip management. There are also inter-
esting school-based educational programmes, 
designed to target adults via their children, and 
community-based  awareness-raising,  such  as 
‘Water Table Watch’ in Victoria. Essentially, it 
has  been  a  parallel,  and  sometimes  discon-
nected,  activity  to  the  states’  and  common-
wealth’s pursuit of improved water management 
and environmental sustainability in the MDB. 
They certainly cross paths in many ways, but 
Land Care is much more truly integrated at 
farm and community level. The National Land 
and Water Audit (1998–2000) was conducted 
in part because of the realization that there was 
no  well-established  baseline  from  which  to 
measure  the  impact  of  15  or  so  years  and 
billions of dollars of private and public invest-
ment (National Land and Water Audit, 2001). 
A formal assessment of Land Care is not avail-
able, and deriving one presents a formidable 
challenge  in  integrating  agricultural,  environ-
mental and community benefits. Unsurprisingly, 
the evidence on the success and merits of Land 
Care  activities  varies  from  positive  endorse-
ment, through doubt on its economic merits, 
to disillusion with progress on the ground.
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(Fig. 12.2). Degradation in rivers and changes 
in habitat arose from salinity, low flows and 
changed flow patterns. Rising water tables, due 
to groundwater recharge from irrigation and 
land clearance for dryland farming, resulted in 
high salinity, which restricted yields and crop 
choice.  Disposal  of  salt  emerged  as  the  key 
challenge, with added political weight arising 
from its deleterious effects on the water supply 
infrastructure for the city of Adelaide, at the tail 
of the river. A key strategy has therefore been 
to prevent salt movement into the river, through 
interception, diversion and on-farm recycling.
Algal blooms have been a historic feature of 
Australian  rivers  since  European  settlement, 
but their severity and occurrence are exacer-
bated by changed (low) flow regimes and the 
additional influence of phosphorus and nitro-
gen fertilizers in agricultural runoff.
From water development to water 
management
In part, the water reforms beginning in the late 
1980s were also the product of changing ideas 
about how public institutions should be organ-
ized  and  operated.  There  was  a  widespread 
feeling that decision making could no longer be 
left to small groups of engineers who had spent 
their careers dealing mainly with water resources 
infrastructure.  Under  the  new  arrangements 
the basin’s river system was to be managed to 
conserve biodiversity and improve sustainability 
as well as production. The state and common-
wealth  governments  seconded  to  the  MDBC 
teams of ministers and senior public servants 
drawn from the agencies who dealt with these 
often-conflicting responsibilities for production 
and the environment. This brought the environ-
ment and agriculture into the institutional fold 
along with water management (although other 
potential  contenders,  such  as  tourism,  recre-
ation, aboriginal affairs and local government 
remained outside). In the lead-up to meetings of 
the Ministerial Council and Commission, each 
jurisdiction was expected to develop a consoli-
dated  position  on  the  various  issues  to  be 
discussed.  These  changes  were  incorporated 
into new legislation and passed as identical acts 
in  each  of  the  parliaments  of  the  MDB  in 
1992–1993  (Commonwealth  Parliament, 
1993).
However, most of the activities incor  porated 
into the new agreement were advisory or discre-
tionary in nature, and needed the enthusiastic 
cooperation  of  all  the  governments  and 
  agencies involved before they could be imple-
mented  in  any  significant  way.  This  applied 
particularly to activities outside the River Murray 
corridor.  In  addition,  the  long-established 
unanimity principle still applied to all decision-
making processes, giving the power of veto to 
any jurisdiction that wanted an item excluded 
from the agenda or which was dissatisfied with 
any decision made. Despite these limitations, 
however, the early years of the MDB Initiative 
were a time of considerable achievement.
Re-evaluating natural resources and  
their management
Soon after the MDBMC was formed in 1985, 
it commissioned a series of studies to provide 
the   knowledge and outline a new approach to 
implementation that would support a substan-
tial  expansion  of  interjurisdictional  activities. 
Brought together as the Murray–Darling Basin 
Environmental  Resources  Study,  the  project 
summarized  existing  information,  identified 
knowledge gaps, documented the locations of 
environmental resources that required special 
protection,  recommended  actions  needed  to 
protect these resources, and nominated further 
investigations. It also specified the requirements 
needed for a basin-wide monitoring programme, 
given that lack of quantitative data was a ‘major 
constraint’  on  effective  policy  and  manage-
ment. After noting that ‘integrated catchment 
management with strong community involve-
ment will need to be a fundamental strategy’, 
the  study  proposed  comprehensive  action  to 
deal  with  issues  related  to  agricultural  land 
resources, climatic change, vegetation, ground-
water,  flora  and  fauna,  aquatic  and  riverine 
environments, water quality, water allocation, 
water-use  efficiency,  riverine  regions,  cultural 
heritage,  tourism  and  recreation  (MDBMC, 
1987).
The resources study was the precursor of 
the Natural Resources Management Strategy 
(NRMS) adopted by the Ministerial Council in 
August  1990  (MDBMC,  1989).  The  NRMS 









•	 Ensure	 community	 and	 government	 co	 -	
operation.
•	 Ensure	 self-maintaining	 populations	 of	
native species.
•	 Preserve	cultural	heritage.
•	 Conserve	 recreational	 values	 (MDBMC,	
1990).
But  the  implementation  programmes  that 
would  have  been  required  to  achieve  these 
goals were never prepared. The water-quality 
policy was typical of a number of policies devel-
oped within the NRMS framework. The NRMS 
outlined a comprehensive view of the problems 
of the MDB and provided an overarching justi-
fication  for  many  projects,  both  specific  and 
general. What did not happen, despite strong 
statements  in  the  preparatory  work  for  the 
required  strategy,  was  the  development  of  a 
programme of activities that could be seen as a 
comprehensive  response  on  a  scale  that 
matched  the  extent  and  dimensions  of  the 
problems that had been identified. In the follow-
ing years, there were Herculean efforts to over-
come  this  gap,  but  attempts  to  devise 
middle-level  plans  for  the  range  of  issues  of 
concern  were  continually  frustrated.  Instead, 
the result was an ad hoc list of projects justified 
in a general way as contributing to a vaguely 
defined ‘improved sustainability’. 
The  one  issue  that  did  result  in  focused 
action under the new arrangements was salin-
ity management, particularly with regard to the 
manifestations of the problem that were directly 
relevant to irrigation. The first schedule added 
to the new Murray–Darling Basin Agreement 
in 1988 was the Salinity and Drainage Strategy 
(S&D Strategy), which brought together plans 
that  had  been  developing  independently  in 
Victoria, South Australia and NSW for more 
than  a  decade  (Commonwealth  Parliament, 
1993) and had little relevance to the emerging 
Land  Care  movement.  Once  negotiations 
between the states finally got underway, agree-
ment on the broad outline of the strategy was 
reached fairly quickly. As well as a number of 
management  changes  to  reduce  evaporation 
from storages, the new strategy allowed some 
additional saline drainage from new irrigation 
projects to flow to the river in the upper catch-
ment  states  –  Victoria  and  NSW.  In  return, 
these states and the commonwealth invested in 
groundwater interception works in the middle 
and lower reaches of the Murray River, where 
the greatest salinity reduction benefits would be 
obtained.2 Over time, the aim was to produce 
a significant drop in net average salinity levels 
in the Murray, as measured at Morgan in South 
Australia (Fig. 12.3), and manage flows so as 
to avoid the short but severe spikes in salinity 
levels  that  periodically  caused  considerable 
damage  in  the  lower  reaches  of  the  Murray 
(MDBC, 1999).
Central to the S&D Strategy was a register 
maintained by the MDBC to record the negative 
salinity impacts of new irrigation developments 
and the positive impacts of the compensating 
remedial projects. The currency developed to 
measure  positive  and  negative  impacts  was 
known as electrical conductivity units (ECs), a 
measure of electrical conductivity in water that 
indicates its salt content. For the S&D register, 
the key measurement was the EC reduction or 
increase  at  Morgan  caused  by  the  activity  in 
question. The 10-year aim of the S&D Strategy 
was to achieve a net average reduction in salin-
ity of 80 EC at Morgan and an average salinity 
of less than 800 EC at least 95% of the time.
The strategy was a major success, but its 
planners  were  well  aware  that,  rather  than 
solving  the  problem,  they  were  only  buying 
time against a rising long-term trend, driven by 
the  expansion  of  areas  affected  by  dryland 
salinity in the wider catchment (Turral, 1998). 
Reversing  that  trend  will  require  large-scale 
changes to the way in which the wider catch-
ment  is  managed,  and  despite  much  debate 
and  planning  that  remains  an  elusive  goal 
(Williams et al., 2002).
Although the MDB Initiative was not able to 
mount a comprehensive response to the many 
issues that now need to be managed in the 
MDB,  its  programme  was  still  wide-ranging. 
For example, working on the assumption that 
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has been funding programmes such as Special 
Forever in hundreds of primary schools across 
the region. This programme uses artistic and 
literary  activities  to  encourage  children  to 
investigate the relationship of themselves and 
their communities to local streams and catch-
ments. The intention is to foster cultural values 
that will support more sustainable practices.
Another  significant  influence  on  public 
policy in the MDB in the 1990s and 2000s 
was the controversy over the future of Lake 
Victoria, a major water storage body on the 
River  Murray  in  south-west  NSW  near  the 
South Australian border (Connell, 2002). The 
lowering of the lake in 1994 to allow repairs 
revealed a large number of Aboriginal grave 
sites,  reflecting  many  thousands  of  years  of 
occupation. After years of protracted negotia-
tions with the Aboriginal community connected 
with the lake, and more than $A4 million for 
conservation work to protect the grave sites 
and cultural material, a new operational plan 
was agreed in 2002. The previous plan had 
focused on supplying water to South Australia 
and mitigating some of the salinity impacts of 
the river-management regime then in place. In 
contrast, the new plan takes account of a much 
wider range of issues, particularly indigenous 
and  environmental  matters  (MDBC,  2002). 
The  Lake  Victoria  project  also  made  the 
Ministerial  Council  and  Commission  aware 
that many other parts of the riverine system in 
the  basin  required  similar  consideration  of 
indigenous  interests,  in  that  rivers  and  their 
banks had been prime sites for human habita-
tion and burials for many thousands of years.
Supply, demand and the environment 
The current total basin diversion and storage 
capacity (Fig. 12.4) considerably exceeds actual 
use (Fig. 12.5). It also illustrates the predomi-
nance of run-of-river diversions at early stages 
of  development  (during  the  inter-war  years), 
followed  by  rapid  development  of  storage 
capacity, which continued through to the late 
1980s. One of the last diversions built (Barren 
Box,  completed  in  1988)  was  developed  to 
Fig. 12.3.  Salinity trends along the River Murray in different flow conditions: upstream is on the left of the 
chart (adapted from MDBC, 1987).  The Drama of Restraining Water Use  277
Fig. 12.4.  Evolution of storage and diversion capacity in the MDB (adapted and modified from  
Haismann, 2004).
Fig. 12.5.  Historical water diversions and projections without the cap (dotted lines) in the Murray–Darling 
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manage  environmental  flows  to  natural  but 
endangered swamps. Although there are differ-
ent ways of accounting for total storage, the 
approximate ratio of major storage capacity to 
mean annual flow of the river system is about 
2.3:1, although there are figures as high as 
2.8:1  quoted  in  the  literature.  The  MDB  is 
highly  regulated,  and  storage  is  primarily 
intended  to  improve  inter-annual  supply 
  security. The pursuit of this goal has come at 
an increasingly evident and acknowledged cost 
to river and wetland health.
The institutional changes of the 1980s were 
largely driven by concerns about the increasing 
salinization of the streams in the MDB, but that 
was not the only water-quality issue that had to 
be managed. By the early 1990s, it had become 
clear that riverine conditions in the MDB were 
still deteriorating. A spectacular algal bloom in 
the summer of 1991/92, which extended along 
more than 1000 km of the Darling River, gave 
the issue international prominence. Water use 
had been growing in the basin throughout the 
1970s  and  1980s,  with  continued  develop-
ment, mostly in NSW (Fig. 12.5). Fearing that 
this  would  lead  to  overabstraction,  no  new 
licences  were  issued  after  1986,  but  existing 
unused licences were not rescinded. In NSW, it 
is common for licence-holders, particularly stock 
farms, to keep water rights in reserve for drought 
periods (known as ‘dozers’) or not use them at 
all (‘sleepers’). As time went on, more of the 
sleeper and dozer volume was activated, through 
property transfers and enterprise diversification, 
and, more recently, through water trading.
As the proportion of flow allocated to irri-
gation expanded, it had negative impacts on 
environmental  conditions  and  reduced  the 
capacity to meet demands in dry years. To halt 
the ongoing expansion, the Ministerial Council 
commissioned  an  audit  of  water  use  in  the 
MDB,  which  was  delivered  in  June  1995 
(MDBMC, 1995). Up to that point, the detailed 
accounting for water use had been undertaken 
by each state and then reported to the MDBC. 
Since  the  MDBC  was  constituted  with  the 
representation of all states, and limited by the 
requirement of unanimous decisions, it had no 
executive  authority  over  entitlements,  even 
though  actual  volumetric  allocations  were 
effectively well monitored. The situation was 
perceived  to  be  further  complicated  by  the 
differences in the specification of entitlements 
between states and between regions within the 
states. Although these differences often have 
reasonable local justification, they confuse the 
bigger  picture.  Two  major  concerns  under-
wrote the Ministerial Council audit: (i) that total 
diversions,  if  unchecked,  would  consume  all 
available  streamflow,  despite  the  cap  on 
licences; and (ii) that the large volume of unused 
licences in NSW (‘sleeper’ and ‘dozer’ licences) 
could be activated to propel further increases 
in total diversions.
The Water Audit found that, under 1994 
levels  of  development,  median  annual  flows 
from the basin at the River Murray mouth were 
only 28% of what they would have been under 
natural conditions, and that the percentage of 
years in which the lower reaches of the River 
Murray  experienced  drought  had  increased 
from  5%  to  over  60%  (MDBMC,  1996). 
Furthermore, diversions had grown 8% since 
1988, when the S&D Strategy was introduced, 
and were estimated to have the potential to 
increase by an additional 15% in the future. 
This would have severe environmental impacts 
and  so  reduce  the  security  and  reliability  of 
supplies to existing entitlement holders.
According  to  the  Water  Audit,  the  real 
constraints on water use were the inadequacies 
in the infrastructure used to physically distri  bute 
water and economic decisions about the profit-
ability  of  potential  activities,  rather  than  the 
MDB’s  water  management  systems.  In  most 
years,  the  total  licensed  volume  was  greater 
than  the  water  available  (MDBC,  1995), 
although actual allocations had to match availa-
ble supply (see Box 12.1). Water apportionment 
in  the  MDB  had  evolved  in  response  to  the 
imperative to encourage water use to justify the 
investment in dams and infrastructure by govern-
ments. Except in times of drought, controlling 
diversions had not been a special priority, since 
there was already a clear allocation procedure 
that reflected water availability and inter-annual 
variability. As a result, diversions had tripled in 
the previous 50 years and most small-to-medium 
floods  were  now  captured  by  the  storages, 
thereby  severely  weakening  the  linkages 
between flood plains and stream channels.
The seasonal pattern of flow had also been 
substantially  modified  in  many  parts  of  the 
MDB, with much of the late winter/spring flow 
captured for release in the summer and early 
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been at its lowest. Both changes were having 
substantial  impacts  on  water  quality  and 
bio  diversity  in  the  riverine  corridor.  In  the 
  northern valleys of the Darling River tributaries, 
the continued development of irrigation through 
flood water and runoff harvesting had a severe 
effect on the flood plains (Kingsford, 2000)
Controlling water abstraction: the cap
In response to the Water Audit, the Ministerial 
Council  introduced  an  immediate  temporary 
cap on further expansion at 1993/94 levels of 
development, the irrigation season upon which 
the Water Audit was based (MDBMC, 2000).
In July 1997, the cap was made permanent 
(MDBMC, 1999). When it was introduced, the 
cap was described as the first step in a process 
that  needed  extensive  development  before  it 
could achieve acceptable levels of environmen-
tal  sustainability  and  resource  security.  At  a 
time when the pressure for continued uncon-
trolled growth was strong, the introduction of 
the cap was a determined attempt to call a halt, 
as a precursor to a reassessment and potential 
winding  back  of  development  pressure.  The 
original intent was that the cap would be refined 
over  time,  but  that  has  not  happened.  In 
ad  dition,  despite  many  official  statements  of 
intent, the cap was never extended to ground-
water or to much of the northern section of the 
MDB, as it is a voluntary mechanism, to which 
Queensland, as a minor and later-developing 
user, did not subscribe. The cap and the policy 
statements  that  accompanied  its  introduction 
showed that the Ministerial Council was aware 
of the large-scale changes that were needed. Its 
failure to complete implementation of the cap 
by extending it to include groundwater and the 
northern part of the MDB, however, revealed 
its limited capacity to protect the medium-term 
future of the region. A number of other initia-
tives  and  developments  have  contributed  to 
trying to rein in overallocation (Box 12.2).
Although  the  MDB  Ministerial  Council 
became  increasingly  reluctant  after  the  early 
years to respond energetically to the issues that 
needed  to  be  managed,  it  did  continue  to 
commission major knowledge projects, which 
revealed the need for new policy and institu-
tional  reform.  One  such  project  was  a  study 
undertaken  in  2006  by  the  Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization 
(CSIRO)  to  assess  future  risks  to  inflows  into 
streams and storages from climatic change, and 
the  reductions  that  are  being  caused  by  the 
growth in farm dams, new plantation forestry 
projects, increased groundwater pumping and 
improved channel and irrigation management. 
In  light  of  these  factors,  CSIRO  predicted  a 
decrease in streamflow of between 2.5 and 5 
billion m3 over the coming 20 years, equivalent 
to  between  18  and  36%  of  long-term  mean 
annual flow to date. The situation is not expected 
to  stabilize,  and  predictions  for  the  mid-21st 
century  are  for  a  reduction  in  inflows  of  the 
order of 4.5–9 billion m3 (van Dijk et al., 2006). 
For purposes of comparison, current diversions 
for irrigation, which are officially considered to 
be too high, are of the order of 11–12 billion 
m3.
Most of the management options needed to 
respond to these threats were not available in 
practice to the MDB Ministerial Council under 
the regime put in place in the mid-1980s. Most 
of  the  states  individually  had  appropriate 
management  options  but  chose  not  to  use 
them (Arthington and Pusey, 2003).
At  the  national  level,  there  has  been  an 
important set of reforms, which has committed 
Australia to steer towards a path of sustainable 
development, beginning with COAG National 
Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Develop-
ment (COAG, 1992). Its provisions drew heav-
ily  from  the  Bruntland  (1987)  report  and 
adopted the precautionary principle as a guid-
ing   philosophy.
Reform  in  the  water  sector  was  tied  to 
micro  economic  reforms  under  the  National 
Competition  Policy  (1994),  which  aimed  to 
remove subsidies and ensure competition and 
economic efficiency. This eventually saw the 
restructuring  of  the  irrigation  sector,  with 
Victoria already well on the way to mandating 
full  recovery  of  operation  and  maintenance 
costs  through  corporatization3  of  the  Rural 
Water Commission in 1994. In 1996, the state 
government backed away from plans to fully 
privatize the Rural Water Corporation; instead 
it broke it into a number of independent water 
supply corporations, with state and user over-
sight. Since 2001, the Victorian Department 
of Sustainability and Environment has gained 
an increasingly directive role in the activities 
and strategies of the corporatized rural water 
suppliers,  partly  through  leverage  associated 
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water conservation efforts directed at reducing 
total  allocations  to  irrigation  and  increasing 
those for the environment. In NSW, an initially 
reluctant irrigation com  munity eventually opted 
for privatization of the three major systems (the 
Murrumbidgee, Colleambally and Murray irri-
gation systems). The main intention of privati-
zation  was  to  eliminate  subsidies  in  service 
provision,  and  to  a  large  degree  this  has 
happened,  although  continuing  investment   
in  water  conservation  (for  environmental 
pur  poses) and drought relief could be regarded 
as subsidies in a different form. Interestingly, 
some irrigation systems, such as the Murray 
irrigation systems in NSW, managed to negoti-
ate modest but favourable capital endowments 
to privatize. 
In Victoria, the corporatized systems started 
well on full-cost recovery and did a lot of work 
on asset replacement and financing, and nego-
tiated this with their users, resulting in signifi-
cant  increases  in  water  fees.  However,  low 
allocations  through  the  recent  drought  have 
severely  impacted  their  investment  schemes, 
since  the  money  banked  for  future  asset 
replacement comes from ‘sales water’ (i.e. the 
volume of water supplied above basic entitle-
ment), which has, historically, been an addi-
tional  70%  of  volume,  on  average,  in  the 
Victorian  system  of  allocation.  There  is 
evidence that the privatized systems in NSW 
are currently opting for aggressive moderniza-
tion and improvement now, but pay less atten-
tion  to  long-term  cost  recovery  and  asset 
replacement. 
The  lessons  of  privatization  do  not  yet 
emerge clearly because of the timing of the 
current  drought.  Interestingly,  the  states 
Box 12.2.  Responding to overallocation.
There have been five main thrusts to reining in overallocation in the basin:
•   Imposition of the cap. In NSW, this has involved the development of detailed water-sharing plans in all 
water management districts, especially those with actual or potential overallocation, including ground-
water (DLWC, 1998).
•   Enablement of water trading to reallocate water to higher-value uses. Owing to the drought, record 
prices in permanent trades have been achieved year on year since 2004, and water entitlement has 
become a means of collateral for farmers wishing to take investment loans (Rabo Bank, Sydney, 2004, 
personal communication).
•   Promotion  of  water-conserving  technologies,  including  better  measurement,  reduced  conveyance 
losses and more efficient on-farm practices that minimize recharge to shallow (and often saline) ground-
water. In Victoria, the ‘Foodbowl’ project proposes better flow measurement to reduce overdelivery, 
conservation technology and practice, and system remodelling in exchange for entitlement transferred 
to Melbourne (interbasin transfer, 75 Mm3), environmental flows in winter (75 Mm3), and for realloca-
tion in agriculture (75 Mm3).
•   Administrative tinkering with the allocation process through the specification of revised river-flow rules, 
dam-operation rules, and inter-annual carry-over reserves for environmental allocation. In NSW, this 
has included restricting access to ‘off allocation’: pump diverters along the river have traditionally had 
opportunistic access to water in the river that is rejected by its intended users, usually because of 
changing weather or summer flood flows (Wijedasa et al., 2001). Off-allocation amounts were not 
defined, but the authorization to harvest rejection flows was announced on an event basis.
•   Structural adjustment: since the early 1990s, marginal producers, often those with irrigated pasture for 
meat and wool production, and typically on saline soils (such as Pyramid Hill in north-west Victoria), 
have quit farming. Water trading has offered some improved compensation for some of these farmers, 
and may contribute to reducing negative environmental externalities. There was a proposal to fund 
some farmers to leave the land late in 2007, but the amount offered was considered too low and it has 
so far not been implemented.
   A main thrust of the recent $A12.9 billion Labour government plan (in 2008) is to reduce the allocated 
volume in return for system and on-farm investments in water conservation. This has also added impetus 
to the need to account for surface water and groundwater flows effectively, and to monitor and control the 
capture of runoff on farms. In all states, the ability to capture runoff in farm dams has been restricted 
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continue to be responsible for bulk water allo-
cation, regulation and oversight, although the 
operation of the major storages (Lakes Hume 
and Dartmouth) is delegated to the Department 
of  Water  and  Energy  (NSW)  and  Goulburn–
Murray Water (Victoria).
COAG (1994) also instructed the separation 
of  water  titles  from  land,  to  stimulate  and 
encourage water trading, which was seen as an 
important  means  of  reallocating  water  to 
higher-value  uses  within  the  irrigation  sector. 
This alone was expected to accelerate the trans-
fer of water from marginal agricultural enter-
prises to higher-value ones. Within the MDB, 
there is little competition for water from higher-
value urban and industrial uses, as most of the 
demand  is  located  on  the  coast,  outside  the 
basin. Thus, the target of these reforms was 
more  economically  efficient  agriculture,  with 
the expectation that some of the larger environ-
mental externalities related to salinity would be 
mitigated through the exit of the more marginal 
producers.  The  economic  reforms  in  water 
management set out by COAG were ‘enforced’ 
by an interesting combination of incentives and 
penalties. The most telling of these was to link 
progress  in  economic  and  service  provision 
reforms with tranche payments of federal tax 
revenue given back to the states, with hundreds 
of millions of dollars at stake. There was an 
implicit  assumption  that  these  economic 
reforms would have a positive impact on envi-
ronmental externalities.
Water  trading  has  become  increasingly 
active  through  the  1990s,  due  both  to  the 
separation  of  land  and  water  rights  under 
COAG and to very low water availability from 
2000  to  2007.  Water  in  Australia  can  be 
traded  on  the  temporary  market,  where  a 
farmer sells a portion of annual allocation to 
another  user  in  one  season  or  year.  Water 
en  titlements can also be traded permanently. 
Trades are registered and brokered by irri  gation 
suppliers, estate agents and associations (such 
as the Murrumbidgee Horticultural Association). 
Although it has been argued that trade effec-
tively reallocates water at the margin (Turral et 
al., 2005), with permanent trades accounting 
for less than 1% of total volume in any year, 
the cumulative effects of permanent trade are 
starting to be seen. 
Temporary  trading  has  been  extremely 
active  in  different  places  at  different  times 
through  the  dry  period  from  2000  onward, 
with more than 30% of allocated volume traded 
in  the  temporary  market  in  some  valleys  in 
NSW (Turral and Fullagar, 2006). If water allo-
cations return to higher levels, the volume of 
temporary  trading  is  expected  to  diminish. 
There are continued impediments to trade, due 
to  infrastructural  limitations  and  restrictions 
against trading water downstream if transmis-
sion losses are very high (for example, along 
the Lachlan River). Interstate trading is limited, 
due to continuing debate about exchange rates 
for volumes moving from one state or agro-
climatic  region  to  another  (Etchells  et  al., 
2004),  and  limited  allocations  over  recent 
years. In the medium term, it is expected that 
trading  will  provide  a  useful  mechanism  for 
reallocating water flexibly in dry periods, and 
strategically within agriculture as the effects to 
climatic change are felt (NWI, 2005b).
In November 2000, the COAG agreed to a 
regional model for the delivery of the National 
Action Plan on Salinity and Drainage (NAP). 
Following  this,  the  Natural  Resources 
Management  Ministerial  Council  (NRMMC) 
adopted a regional delivery model for the fund-
ing  of  environmental  activities  at  a  regional 
level, leading to the integrated implementation 
of both the NAP and environmental funding 
based on regional needs. In effect, this led to 
the institutionalization of catchment manage-
ment authorities (CMAs) as the primary organ-
izations  responsible  for  natural  resources 
management. The CMAs integrate public and 
private  interests  and,  in  Victoria  and  NSW, 
cover both irrigation and dryland areas, but it is 
fair  to  say  that  the  focus  of  many  CMAs  is 
predominantly on land rather than on water 
management.  Some  parts  of  the  basin  (in 
Queensland) are not covered by CMAs. Formal 
catchment management has arisen out of the 
need to integrate the burgeoning number of 
Land Care groups with varied mandates and 
foci,  and  there  remains  a  considerable  chal-
lenge in coordinating the activities of different 
CMAs within one river basin, let alone through-
out  the  MDB  (M.  Wood,  DSE  Melbourne, 
2008, personal communication).
The  principal  driver  underpinning  the 
regional  delivery  model  for  NRM  (natural 
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capacity of those closest to the problem on the 
ground,  building  on  local  knowledge,  experi-
ence and expertise and enabling flexible and 
responsive solutions to local NRM challenges’ 
(Senate of Australia, 2000). The key features of 
the regional delivery model include: 
•	 The	development	of	a	framework	that	sets	
out the respective NRM roles for common-
wealth,  state/territory  and  local  govern-
ments and the community.
•	 A	 shift	 from	 the	 funding	 of	 individual	
pro  jects  to  funding  outcomes  determined 
through regional NRM strategic planning.
•	 Devolution	of	decision	making	to	a	regional	
level, i.e. a dispersed rather than a centralist 
approach, which allows for flexible decision 
making  tailored  to  local  conditions  and 
needs.
•	 Introduction	 of	 national	 standards	 and	
targets to guide and provide direction for 
investment in NRM.
•	 A	comprehensive	accreditation,	monitoring	
and  evaluation  framework  to  achieve 
consistent  and  acceptable  standards  of 
programme delivery.
•	 Encouragement	 of	 community	 capacity	
building  through  involvement  in  local 
NRM.
Altogether  56  NRM  regions  have  been 
established  across  Australia.  The  boundaries 
for each region were agreed by the federal, 
state and territory governments. In the MDB 
region, they reflect state regional boundaries 
created under the legislation. In South Australia, 
the region has a board established by the state-
enacted Natural Resources Management Act, 
SA 2004, which reports to the SA Minister for 
Water, whereas in other states the NRM boards 
report to the Minister for Environment.
The COAG-instigated reforms continued in 
2004 with the National Water Initiative (NWI, 
2005a) in light of continuing resource manage-
ment, accounting and pricing issues. The NWI 
also  recognized  the  importance  of  including 
interactions of groundwater and surface water 
into a more comprehensive accounting frame-
work.  This  realization  was  prompted  by 
increases  in  groundwater  use,  particularly  in 
NSW, both in response to drought and, some 
feared, as a response to limitations on surface 
allocations imposed by the cap (MDBC, 1999; 
Sinclair  Knight  Merz,  2003).  Interestingly, 
despite these concerns, recent estimates of cap 
compliance (MDBC, 2007) show that ground-
water  usage  in  NSW  (the  dominant  ground-
water user) peaked in 2001–2002 and declined 
by  more  than  35%  in  2005–2006,  with  a     
similar scale of reduction in total use.
The Murray–Darling Basin Water Agreement 
(MDBWA) was signed at the COAG meeting 
held on 25 June 2004. The MDBWA set out 
the  arrangements  (The  Living  Murray)  for 
investing  $A500  million  over  5  years, 
commencing 2004–2005, to reduce the level 
of water overallocation and to achieve specific 
environmental outcomes in the Murray–Darling 
basin. The states were unable to agree on a 
funding formula with the commonwealth, and 
doubts  emerged  over  the  ability  to  buy-back 
this  volume  on  the  water  markets  with  the 
funds available. This impasse may have been a 
key factor in the subsequent promulgation of 
the 2007 Water Act.
Attempt 3 – breaking with the past
Even before the release of the 2006 CSIRO 
study (‘Sharing water resources of the Murray–
Darling  basin’)  dissatisfaction  with  the  slow 
speed of reform had prompted the common-
wealth  and  state  governments  to  adopt  the 
NWI at COAG’s June 2004 meeting (COAG, 
2004). A comparison of water management 
being conducted in the Murray–Darling basin 
and  as  projected  by  NWI  reveals  two  very 
different philosophies. One is goal orientated 
in its approach to change (a so-called ‘stretch 
strategy’),  while  the  other  is  incremental. 
Stretch  strategies  accept  that  the  needed 
capacity may not be available but use target 
setting to stimulate its development. The oft-
quoted example is President Kennedy’s deci-
sion  to  put  a  man  on  the  moon.  The 
incremental approach only sets goals that are 
already known to be achievable. Approval of 
the  NWI  means  that  a  stretch  strategy  for 
Australian water management was endorsed at 
the highest political level. Whether that commit-
ment can be made real has been a continuing 
question since 2004.
Concern  about  the  state  of  the  Murray–
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the introduction of the NWI. In its philosophy 
and approach, the NWI is fundamentally differ-
ent  from  the  policy  frameworks  that  have 
controlled  water  management  in  Australia 
since irrigation was first established in southern 
Australia  in  the  late  19th  and  early  20th 
cen  turies.  For  nearly  a  century,  Australian 
water  management  had  been  controlled  by 
public officials and government ministers, who 
applied  an  administrative  approach  to  the 
distribution of heavily subsidized water. During 
most of this period, it was governments and 
their officials who led the way in promoting 
increased  water  use.  As  part  of  the  nation-
building project that extends back to the mid-
19th  century,  the  aim  was  to  use  water  to 
create  new  rural  communities.  Governments 
actively sought out people who would use the 
water  made  available  by  the  publicly  funded 
storage and distribution systems. Data about 
the volumes of water available, where it came 
from and where it was going were important 
for managers, but except in times of drought 
there was little concern about overextraction 
or the need to balance competing priorities.
In NSW, which continued to build irrigation 
works  20  years  after  ’full  development’  had 
been  reached  in  Victoria,  such  schemes  had 
considerable  autonomy  in  the  way  they 
expanded the use of irrigation water. The result 
was the ad hoc development of many poorly 
documented  entitlement  and  distribution 
systems, which reflected biophysical variations 
between regions and the idiosyncrasies of local 
communities and their water managers, who 
often  stayed  long  term  in  the  same  place. 
Variation  in  entitlement  systems  continues 
today, although there has been a progressive 
standardization within each state. The reasons 
for  different  styles  of  water  entitlement  are 
embedded in the hydrology and storage avail-
able. The water allocation system in Victoria 
was more secure and better accounted for than 
in NSW: (i) due to a greater degree of regulation 
(both internally and on the main stem of the 
Murray);  (ii)  because  most  schemes  were 
managed by one overarching body – the Rural 
Water Commission; and (iii) because a bulk allo-
cation system had been put in place over the 
top of individual rights, beginning in the 1980s. 
For a number of decades, this was less of a 
problem  than  it  might  seem.  The  expansion 
was occurring during a time (1945–1985) that 
was significantly wetter than the first half of the 
20th  century;  extractions  were  still  at  fairly 
moderate levels for the early decades in this 
period; and there was minimal water trading, 
which  meant  that  inconsistencies  between 
regions were not a significant issue. Neverthe-
less, as the audit shows, total diversions contin-
ued to increase slightly in Victoria in the 1990s, 
prior  to  significant  reductions  in  the  ensuing 
drought.
The context for managing water has altered 
dramatically.  More  than  a  decade  ago, 
Australian  governments,  both  Liberal  and 
Labour, at federal and state levels, had under-
gone  a  philosophical  transition  from  one  of 
‘nation  and  community  building’  to  a  much 
tighter focus on the promotion of economic 
growth. At the same time, there has been an 
emerging  consensus  that  many  hydrological 
systems  are  now  in  serious  uncontrolled 
en  vironmental decline. This development has 
coincided with an expansion in the number of 
stakeholders  determined  to  influence  water 
policy, which has forced governments to step 
back  from  their  previously  close  relationship 
with  irrigation  communities  and  increasingly 
adopt the role of arbiter between competing 
interests.
According to the NWI, the tensions between 
the many different demands that are placed on 
hydrological  systems  are  to  be  managed 
through  the  development  of  comprehensive 
water plans. These water plans are to include 
secure  water  access  entitlements,  statutory-
based  planning,  statutory  provision  for  envi-
ronmental and public-benefit outcomes, plans 
for the restoration of overallocated and stressed 
systems to ‘environmentally sustainable levels 
of extraction’, the removal of barriers to trade, 
clear assignment of risk for future changes in 
available  water,  comprehensive  and  public 
water accounting, policies focused on achiev-
ing water efficiency and innovation, capacity to 
address  emerging  issues,  and  many  more 
elements  (NWI,  2005b).  The  plans  are  to 
provide  for  the  ‘adaptive  management  of 
surface  and  groundwater  systems’  (NWI, 
2005b),  with  their  connectivity  recognized 
where it is significant (NWI, 2005b). The states 
and regions within states have taken up this 
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response  to  varying  combi  nations  of  influ-
ences. Water-planning pro  cesses and the local 
committees are constructed in different ways, 
and  different  areas  have  in  dividual  funding 
arrangements. In South Australia, for ex  ample, 
all growers and urban users pay a water levy 
and, although this is small, it does engage the 
community.
Within  each  state,  apart  from  South 
Australia, there are multiple jurisdictions deal-
ing with water, with nine in NSW, incorporating 
74 bodies, and seven in Queensland, incorpor-
ating 115 bodies. It is partly this sort of institu-
tional mass that NWI architects hold responsible 
for what they see as the prevailing inertia in 
water management. However, there are many 
who have strong reservations about the wisdom 
and likely effectiveness of a federal administra-
tion, not least because of concerns about the 
skill  base  and  the  lack  of  understanding  of 
fundamental issues and detail at federal level.
Many  documents  attending  the  NWI  and 
the National Water Commission have a ‘back 
to basics’ enthusiasm that almost implies there 
has  never  been  water  planning  in  Australia, 
which  is  evidently  far  from  the  truth.  Thus, 
water  plans  must  take  a  comprehensive 
approach to managing hydrological systems in 
a  sustainable  way.  The  NWI  explicitly  states 
that  the  volume  of  flow  needed  to  maintain 
environmental sustainability, whatever the level 
of  modification  negotiated  in  developing  the 
plan, must be met before allocations for extrac-
tion are determined (NWI, 2005b). A key task 
is to define the requirements of environmental 
sustainability,  and  of  the  institutions  able  to 
ensure  that  sustainability  is  achieved  and   
maintained.  This  gives  the  debate  about  the 
meaning of the concept of ‘environmental sus  -
tain  ability’ a new urgency. Extrapolating from 
the Brundtland definition of sustainability and 
the relevant NWI sections, there seem to be 
two minimal criteria that need to be met for a 
hydrological system to be defined as environ-
mentally sustainable: the level of modification 
must  be  politically  acceptable  to  society  in 
general, and its en  vironmental condition needs 
to be stable from a system-wide perspective.
The aim is to introduce a system of water 
management that will be durable for the long 
term, but its implementation has been difficult. 
According to the original policy in mid-2004, 
all  hydrological  systems  subject  to  overallo-
cation (a term whose meaning continues to be 
debated) were required to have water plans in 
place that would remedy that situation by the 
end of 2007. The first biennial assessment of 
the implementation of the NWI was released 
by  the  National  Water  Commission  late  in 
2007.  While  concluding  that  progress  had 
been achieved, the Commission made it clear 
that implementation was well behind schedule, 
with  many  difficult  issues  still  outstanding 
(National Water Commission, 2007).
In addition, water plans must take account 
of indigenous issues by making arrangements 
for indigenous representation in water planning 
‘wherever possible’, and provision for indige-
nous social, spiritual and customary objectives 
‘wherever they can be developed’. The plans 
should also include allowance for ‘the possible 
existence of native title rights to water in the 
catchment  or  aquifer  area’  (NWI,  2005b). 
Water  plans  are  also  to  provide  a  common 
currency  that  will  allow  entitlements  to  be 
traded from one region to another.
In January 2007, in response to failure to 
implement remedial programmes in the MDB, 
the  then  Prime  Minister  (John  Howard) 
announced a $A10 billion national water reform 
package. It called for the states in the MDB to 
transfer their constitutional powers over water 
management  to  the  commonwealth  govern-
ment  so  that  a  comprehensive  basin-wide 
approach  could  be  introduced.  After  some 
negotiation,  NSW,  Queensland  and  South 
Australia agreed, but Victoria refused. Eventually, 
the  commonwealth  government  passed  the 
Water  Act  2007,  which  introduced  the  most 
substantial  organizational  changes  since  the 
reforms of the 1980s, and possibly since the 
first framework was put in place in 1914–1915. 
The  medium-  and  long-term  future  of  these 
proposals is by no means clear, as some of the 
political momentum behind them was part of a 
broader challenge to state authority across many 
other axes, including Aboriginal affairs, educa-
tion, health and, especially, industrial relations. 
With a change in government, it is not clear 
how the agenda for a stronger federal bloc will 
transform, but it is unlikely to remain as now, 
especially as many of the ‘promises’ were not 
put into law. The succeeding Labour administra-
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$A12.9 billion in April 2008 and, with some 
further assurances of a greater role and auton-
omy  for  the  states,  succeeded  in  getting  the 
state of Victoria to agree to defer powers to a 
federal authority.
The new legislation is less comprehensive 
than originally intended but not dependent on 
referred powers. It will impose a sustainability-
based cap on both surface water and ground-
water,  designed  to  be  responsive  to  the 
expected impacts of climatic change, a basin 
environmental watering plan and a number of 
other reforms. For reasons of political expedi-
ency, existing water-sharing plans have been 
allowed to continue until their dates of expiry 
(in the case of Victoria this is as late as 2019), 
even if they are clearly not compliant with the 
NWI sustainability principles. The Water Act 
2007 is the legislative cornerstone of the third 
attempt to introduce a comprehensive manage-
ment framework for the region. It will be some 
years, however, before it can be assessed in 
terms of its success in introducing sustainable 
water  management  in  the  Murray–Darling 
basin.  It  is  more  likely  that  success  will  be 
achieved through a deft incorporation of state 
sensibilities,  knowledge  and  capacity  than 
through grand new initiatives. It remains to be 
seen if a less democratic process results in less 
innovation (as might be expected) and faster 
and more responsive progress towards sustain-
able water management.
The Water Act displaces the MDBC as the 
apex body with an independent Murray–Darling 
Basin Authority (MDBA), composed of a chair 
and  four  independent  part-time  members. 
There  will  still  be  a  Ministerial  Council  to 
provide comment on proposals, but final deci-
sions  will  be  made  by  the  Commonwealth 
Minister acting on the advice of the MDBA. 




minister, including setting sustainable limits 
on water that can be taken from surface 
water and groundwater systems across the 
basin.
•	 Advising	the	minister	on	the	accreditation	
of state water resource plans.
•	 Developing	 a	 water	 rights	 information	




•	 Gathering	 information	 and	 undertaking	
research.
•	 Engaging	 the	 community	 in	 the	 manage-
ment of the basin’s resources.
A key difference between the MDBA and 
the  MDBC  is  that  the  former  will  be  skills- 
based and not made up of jurisdictional repre-
sentatives, and that unanimous agreement by 
all state representatives is no longer required 
before  decisions  can  be  made.  The  former 
Commission  Office  will  continue  to  perform 
similar work as the technical and institutional 
coordinating and managing body for the basin, 
under the direction of the MDBA.
The basin plan will be developed in consul-
tation with the communities, and will accredit 
state-based plans, but must have the following 
mandatory content:
•	 Limits	on	the	amount	of	water	that	can	be	
taken  from  basin  water  resources  on  a 
sustainable  basis,  known  as  long-term 
  average sustainable diversion limits. These 
limits will be set for basin water resources 
as a whole and for individual sources, and 
are considerably lower than the limits set by 
the 1994 cap.
•	 Identification	 of	 risks	 to	 basin	 water	
resources,  such  as  climatic  change,  and 
strategies to manage those risks.
•	 Requirements	 that	 a	 water	 resource	 plan	
will  need  to  comply  with  if  it  is  to  be 
ac  credited under this Act.
•	 An	 environmental	 watering	 plan	 to	 opti-
mize environmental outcomes for the basin 
by  specifying  environmental  objectives, 
watering  priorities  and  targets  for  basin 
water resources.
•	 A	 water	 quality	 and	 salinity	 management	
plan, which may include targets.
•	 Rules	 about	 trading	 of	 water	 rights	 in	
re  lation to basin water resources.
The  Act  establishes  a  Commonwealth 
Environmental  Water  Holder  to  protect  and 
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Darling basin, and also outside the basin where 
the commonwealth owns water.
Challenges for the Future
The main challenges for the future concern the 
best  way  to  reduce  overall  allocation  in  the 
basin and, more importantly, how to get all the 
states to comply with a significant reduction in 
water availability compared with recent history. 
It is no longer merely a question of complying 
with the 1994 cap, but of adjusting to signifi-
cantly  reduced  allocations  for  the  irrigation 
sector. The pressure to do this is mostly driven 
by current environmental allocation concerns, 
plus  the  expectation  of  reductions  in  mean 
annual flow of the order of 20–30% by 2100 
under  a  range  of  climatic  change  scenarios 
(CSIRO, 2007), illustrated for Victorian rivers 
in Fig. 12.6. Much of the political rhetoric justi-
fying  the  recent  federal  takeover  of  water 
management has been fuelled by a long and 
historically unprecedented drought, which has 
allowed the attribution of many woes to bad 
management rather than to a change of circum-
stances.  However,  the  possibility  that  those 
changed circumstances represent the future is 
one that will make very significant changes to 
water use and management.
The  institutional  challenge  is  whether  a 
more active and dominant role by the central 
government  will  deliver  the  expected  results. 
Multilateral,  negotiated  and  voluntary  water 
sharing  and  custodianship  of  the  basin  have 
been noisy and slow to react, but innovative in 
many of their solutions. It can be argued that, in 
order to be acceptable to all parties, only inno-
vative solutions, such as the Salt Credit Scheme 
and the cap (in its first incarnation), will emerge. 
Against that, it is clear that more painful adjust-
ments, such as a revised cap, will prove difficult 
to negotiate and see through, especially in the 
time-frame  now  expected.  The  belief  of  the 
federal government is that it has the intellectual 
horsepower,  political  muscle  and  financial 
resources to succeed where it and others believe 
the MDBC/MDBMC has failed. This is proba-
bly a belief that is common to many central 
government elites, and their immediate tech-
nocracies, and often leads to impatience with 
detail  and  the  preservation  of  considerable 
secrecy and minimal transparency.
At this stage, the process is too new and too 
Fig. 12.6.  Expected range of reductions in mean annual streamflows in 2030 in Victorian rivers, using an 
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young for any comparisons to be made, but 
there are fears of declining skill and knowledge 
at large in the water sector and there is a need 
to hire many experienced and technically profi-
cient staff at the central level. Logically, there 
are  useful  templates  from  recent  history, 
through  the  commonwealth’s  brokerage  of 
innovations  such  as  the  Salt  Credit  Scheme 
and its insistence on implementing the National 
Competition Policy, through a mix of ‘carrot 
and  stick’  approaches  associated  with  the 
tranche payments of federal tax revenue back 
to  the  states  under  COAG.  It  seems  likely, 
given the past pragmatic history of Australian 
water  management,  that  the  states  will  ulti-
mately retain more autonomy and responsibil-
ity in management of the MDB, with perhaps 
more forceful (and better informed) guidance 
and incentives from the centre.
Within agriculture itself, it is likely that exist-
ing  adaptations  to  climatic  variability  will  be 
needed more frequently and will also have to 
be developed further to adapt to the expected 
reductions in water availability. The prospect 
of higher evaporative demand and lower water 
availability  is  expected  to  lead  to  declining 
productivity (DSE 2006a; CSIRO, 2007).
Recent  upturns  in  the  real  prices  of 
commodities are already sending strong signals 
to  the  agriculture  sector  in  Australia,  which 
returns smaller farms to profitability. However, 
it remains to be seen whether this will stop the 
trend to larger and more intensive holdings, 
and  to  a  more  diversified  and  market-niche-
oriented irrigation sector. 
Australia,  more  than  most  countries,  will 
face a daunting challenge to increase productiv-
ity in agriculture with smaller and more variable 
water supplies in the wake of climatic change. 
An ABARE study (Beare and Heaney, 2002) 
predicted significant reductions in the volume 
and  value  of  irrigation-sector  outputs  in  the 
MDB, which would not be mitigated effectively 
by increased water-use efficiency or by water 
trading, although water trading was modelled to 
be the better adaptation of the two. 
A more fundamental structural challenge to 
the water sector is likely to emerge in the need 
to reformulate water entitlements as the impacts 
of climatic change unfold. Reduced water avail-
ability implies reduced allocations and further 
changes to inter-annual storage management 
in dams if the reliability of supplies to farmers is 
not to be seriously compromised. The current 
system is based on a sensible proportional allo-
cation,  which  responds  well  to  variations  in 
water supply that follow inter-annual climatic 
variability.  However,  the  hydrologic  basis  for 
the  current  entitlements  is  changing,  and  if 
emerging theories on a step change in climate 
over south-east Australia are correct (Kirby et 
al. (CSIRO) 2006; CSIRO, 2007) the need will 
be  strengthened.  The  proposals  for  a  lower 
cap, implemented by the MDBA, will reduce 
total available allocation, which may be further 
reduced  once  climatic-change-induced  reduc-
tions in water availability become clearer. At 
the moment, the proposals to conserve water 
and reduce allocations in Victoria do not fully 
account  for  expected  climatic-change  reduc-
tions in water availability, and are likely to be 
further  revised  in  the  future,  in  the  light  of 
experience  with  conserving  water  through 
projects  such  as  ’Foodbowl’.  One  of  the 
requirements of the new Water Act is that the 
entitlement formulations in different states and 
regions should be unified. This proposal has 
obvious merit, but it is also clear that different 
formulations of entitlement have emerged to 
meet  local  conditions  and  needs,  and  that 
uni  fication beyond a certain point is likely to be 
counter-productive.
While scientists, policy makers and farmers 
are struggling to understand and agree upon 
current  environmental  water  allocations, 
climatic change will further reduce water    avail-
ability for natural systems. Even harder deci-
sions will have to be made to assess and reserve 
allocations for environmental flows if climatic 
change turns out as predicted.
The only emerging urban water transfer in 
the basin is for Melbourne, and planning seems 
to  be  well  in  hand  to  ensure  reliable  water 
supplies  through  a  transfer  from  within  the 
basin,  over  the  ‘Great  Dividing  Range’  to 
Melbourne  (DSE,  2006b).  In  economic  and 
volumetric  terms  (75  Mm3),  this  is  almost  a 
‘no-contest’  from  a  within-basin  perspective, 
and the capital costs of transfer ($A700 million 
for  the  pipeline  and  pumping  stations)  and 
compensation for entitlement ($A300, to be 
used for water conservation) are to be paid by 
Melbourne Water to Goulburn Murray Water 
as the bulk entitlement holder.288  H. Turral et al.
Conclusion
From the perspective of improving the arrange-
ments  for  water  resources  management  in 
developing  countries,  there  are  many  useful 
lessons available from the past experiences in 
the  MDB,  despite,  and  because  of,  conflicts 
being experienced in response to overuse, inad-
equate environmental allocation and the emerg-
ing  stress  of  climatic  change.  It  is  clear  that 
there  are  strong  benefits  to  having  a  well-
accounted water allocation system that internal-
izes natural hydrological variability. But it is also 
clear that this sound basis has not prevented 
the MDB from getting into trouble, nor does it 
necessarily help in implementing solutions. It is 
certainly imperative to know enough about the 
dynamics  of  water  availability  and  use  for 
managers  and  policy  makers  to  know  the 
extent,  likely  impact  and  possible  adaptive 
  strategies to climatic change, and to balance 
productive  use  with  sustainable  eco  systems. 
Achieving agreement and consensus on how to 
do this is a different question altogether.
Innovative solutions to a succession of water 
resources management problems have emerged 
in  Australia,  sometimes  with  a  lot  of  noise, 
debate and antagonism, but also with an under-
lying sense of pragmatism and recognition of 
wider issues. Public information has been at the 
heart of the debate, and science and research 
have  helped  guide  and  constrain  political 
options within the realms of the practical and 
the achievable.
It makes great sense not to overallocate a 
water  resource  system.  The  emerging  chal-
lenges for Australia, and the MDB in particular, 
with comparatively good information and rela-
tively  small  numbers  of  well-endowed  stake-
holders,  point  to  severe  problems  for 
over  -allocated basins elsewhere. The task and 
cost  of  reducing  allocations  and  usage  are 
politically  daunting,  even  more  so  where 
millions of poor are dependent on an increas-
ingly scarce resource and where basins reach 
across national boundaries.
Australian  water  management  is  evolved 
and complex in comparison to those in most 
other countries, although that is often not real-
ized  or  celebrated  within  the  country.  It  is 
constantly evolving and adapting to changing 
needs, biophysical influence and public expec-
tation.  Recently,  there  has  been  heightened 
concern  about  the  use  of  groundwater,  and 
inadequate  accounting  of  surface  water  and 
groundwater  interactions,  which  have  impli-
cations for major groundwater users, such as 
India  and  China,  whose  agriculture  is  much 
more dependent on groundwater than that of 
‘down under’.
Australia is entering a new phase of poten-
tially  top-down  water  administration,  after 
nearly 50 years of increasingly bottom-up initi-
atives.  The  commonwealth  has  moved  from 
strategic funding – through sponsoring water 
reforms over the top of those undertaken within 
individual  states,  and  supporting  bottom-up 
natural resource management initiatives, such 
as  Land  Care,  CMAs  and  other  com  munity-
based efforts – to a position of ultimate control 
and responsibility. It is not without irony that 
this  should  happen  at  the  same  time  as  the 
better aspects of Australian water management 
(devolution,  voluntary  consensus,  technical 
soundness and open information) are promoted 
elsewhere. It remains to be seen what lessons 
this new policy direction will offer.
Notes
1    ICM (integrated catchment management) in this 
context is at a lower level of scale than river basin 
management and could be said to have a stronger 
focus on land than on water.
2    One of the perennial incentives for interstate coop-
eration has been federal funding for capital works. 
Interception of mostly natural saline in-     flows to the 
river was one of the capital-funding levers applied 
in return for agreement to limit the salt discharge 
from each state – known as a salinity credit. Each 
state manages the salinity loads within the frame-
work of its total credit. This measure was designed 
to leave the states free to prioritize salinity manage-
ment strategies within their jurisdiction. The efflu-
ent  from  salt  interception  is  pumped  to  large 
evaporation pans: there has been perennial interest 
and some commercial activity in salt pro-  duction 
and marine fisheries at some of these sites.
3    Corporatization  involves  the  development  of 
private-sector  business  practice  within  a  state-
owned  or  partially  state-owned  enterprise.  In 
Victoria, the irrigation systems are required to pay 
a dividend to the state government each year, as 
well  as  cover  all  operation,  maintenance  and 
future capital investment needs.  The Drama of Restraining Water Use  289
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land-use changes effect  111
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Salinity
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desalination  36, 42, 167
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landscape hydrological linkage  265
management  275, 285
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wetlands  269
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costs  269
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Smallholders  14, 58, 184
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moisture  219–221
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Species  125, 126, 134–135, 182, 188, 269
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Stakeholders  76, 179–180, 185–186
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State
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interventions  201–202
irrigation  30
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regulation  15
rights, concern for  264
role, water development  53–55, 221
Storage
accounting  277
aquifers, Tunisia  147
Colorado basin  124, 133
Corrales dam  83, 85, 86
hydropower  242–243
Kairouan plain  150, 167
Krishna River basin  216
Lerma–Chapala basin  76, 77–79, 88, 91
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Massingir dam  48
minor irrigation  217
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Murray–Darling basin  267, 276–278
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Solís dam  84, 87–88, 91, 95
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drought relief  280
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groundwater use effect  238
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Supply and demand  31, 111, 113, 174, 276–
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see also Water accounting
Surface water
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agreement  92–93
allocations  92–93, 257, 266
changed dynamics  252–253
depletion  75
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flows measurement  270
pumping impact  253
resource development  241
supply evolution  202
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Surface-irrigation  23
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Sustainability, management  179, 187, 191
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Tamil Nadu  238, 239, 250, 255–256
Tamil Nadu Agriculturalist’s Association  246
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (TNEB)  242, 259
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Technology
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see also Climate
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Time-share  30
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hydroelectricity  49, 222, 242–243, 265
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scarcity response  36
sector  90
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land and water control  28
political  27, 28–29
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security  268
stress  111
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Water accounting
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failure impacts  254
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water level changes  251
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trends  35
Yellow River basin  113
see also Abstractions
Witwatersrand  51, 53, 54
Women  29, 50, 56, 58, 61, 254
World Wildlife Fund  179–180, 185, 191
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